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FOREWORD 
BY EDSON R. SUNDERLAND 
Professor of Legallleseardh,, University of MiMigan Law School, 
It is probable that no procedural process offers greater 
opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the admin­
istration of justice than that of discovery before trial. 
Much of the delay in the preparation of a case, most of 
the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large part 
of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the want 
., of information on the part of litigants and their counsel 
as to the real nature of the respective claims and the 
facts upon which they rest. 
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under 
a 'system of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary 
stages of litigation followed by surprise and confusion 
at the trial. Under such a system the merits of con­
troversies are imperfectly understood by the parties, are 
inadequately presented to the courts, and too often fail 
to exert a controlling influence Uf>on the final judgment. 
All this is. well recognized' by the ·profession, and ·yet 
there is a wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery. 
Hostility to " fishing expeditions " before trial is a tradi­
tional and powerful taboo. To overcome its subtle in­
fluence requires more than logic and learning. .Experi­
ence alone can effectively meet it. 
The primary purpose of this study is to present the 
results of professional experience in administering dis­
covery as a normal function of pre-trial procedure. Mr. 




Graduate Fellow, and the second as Research Associate, 
in the Law School of the University of Michigan. His 
thesis for the graduate degree in law dealt with the 
history and theory of discovery, and his· researches in­
cluded practically everything to be found in print upon 
the subject. With this as a foundation he devoted a 
second year to a field study of the actual _use of dis­
covery in all the jurisdictions of the United States and 
Canada where it had been effectively developed. The 
book, therefore, represents an extensive survey of the 
current practice regarding this important procedural de­
vice, in the light of its history and its logical theory. It 
is being published under the auspices of the Law School 
of the University of Michigan for the information of the 
American bench and bar, in order to exhibit the great 
possibilities of discovery as a means of removing some 
of the needless hazards of litigation. 
Mr. Ragland has made a unique contribution to the 
literature of the administration of justice. The method 
employed, which involved interviews with hundreds of 
lawyers, judges and court officials in many jurisdictions, 
was difficult and laborious, and produced a vast amount 
of detailed data which he has analyzed and presented 
with great skill. He is an accurate observer and reporter, 
and his conclusions are well founded and conservative. 
The book is submitted to the judgment of a critical pro­
fession with full confidence that it will prove to be of 
unusual interest and value. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
October 1, 1932 
PREFACE 
The purpose of this volume is to present in a conven­
ient and usable form a comparative study of the expe­
dients which are being employed in various American 
and English jurisdictions for the purpose of facilitating 
pre-trial practice, to describe the practical operation of 
the different devices, and to show their effect upon the 
general administration of justice. An analysis of the 
statutory and case law has been combined with data 
which shows the practical operation of the procedure in 
the everyday work of the lawyer and judge. Field studies 
were made by the author in different cities of the follow­
ing fourteen jurisdictions for the purpose of ascertaining 
the experience of the profession with each type of 
device which is being us.ed: Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Ontario, Quebec, Texas, 
and Wisconsin. Interviews were sought with representa­
tive judges, lawyers, and where there were such, officials 
in charge of discovery examinations. Other means em­
ployed in obtaining information inclu'ded the study of 
trial court records of examinations for discovery, obser­
vation of actual examinations and· correspondence with 
lawyers in states other than those in which field investi­
gations were made. 
Chicago, illinois 
October 1, 1932 
v 
GEORGE RAGLAND, J:a. 
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DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 
CHAPTER I 
INADEQUACY OF PLEADING AS BASIS 0� 
PREPA.B.ATION FOR TRIAL 
CoMMON LAw PLEADING 
Written pleadings formed the traditional basis of 
preparation for trial in courts of common law. The chief 
objective of common law pleading was the production of 
a single issue which might be tried by the jury. The 
facts of the controversy were supposed to be narrowed 
down to a single issue from the respective allegations of 
the parties. The plaintiff was required to plead his case 
according to its legal effect and, therefore, eould not 
plead evidence but only the ultimate facts upon which 
his claim rested.1 When the facts had thus been stated 
by the pleader, the opposite party was required to deny 
specifically each allegation which he wished to contro,.. 
vert at the trial. All the well-pleaded facts not denied by 
the adverse party were deemed to be admitted. This 
device, applied to the alternate pleadings, was supposed 
in the end to produce a single controverted point or issue, 
but a great number of highly technical rules were re­
quired to make it effective. As has been said, "refine­
ments of pleading grew up on the court's passive will­
ingness to let issues emerge out of the allegations recited 
1 Stephen on Pleading, �41. 
1 
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to it by contending pleaders in antiphonal rivalry, and the 
stilted form which written pleading eventually assumed 
was born of the tradition of care with which every state­
ment in one 's opponent 's pleading had to be met to the 
court 's satisfaction without disclosing to that opponent 
� much of one 's own case. ' '  8 
It is doubtful whether common law pleading ever af­
forded an adequate basis of preparation for trial. In 
any event there were two factors at work which ultimately 
destroyed to a large extent whatever degree of efficiency 
the system formerly had. Clear statements of the facts 
of the case in the plaintiff's pleadings gave way to ficti­
tious and vague allegations which were couched in anti­
quated terminology. The plaintiff was more concerned 
with invoking the judicial process by incantation of the 
precise ritual than he was in reciting the facts of the case. 
The defendant, too, was allowed to conceal his true posi­
tion under the guise of an easy formula, the general issue. 
The general issue was used not only for the purpose of 
denying everything in the opposite pleading, whether 
really controverted or not, but also for the purpose of 
enabling the party pleading it to prove matters not sug­
gested on the face of the pleading/ 
Especially did use of the general issue work havoc with 
the
' 
system of special pleading. This was the oldest form 
of traverse, which Stephen describes as ' ' an appropriate 
plea fixed by ancient usage as the proper mode of travers­
ing the declaration, in cases where the defendant· means 
to deny the whole or the principal part of its allega­
tions. " 8 Its effect had always been to put a summary 
close to the pleadings, thus, as Stephen says, "narrowing 
very considerably the application of the greater and more' 
a Rosenbaum, Rule-making Authority in the English Supreme Court, 
109. 
8 Stephen on Pleading, 172. 
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subtle part of the science of special pleading," and mak-
, ing it impossible for the pleadings to perform their theo­
retical function of disclosing the real points in dispute be­
tween the parties. Both the courts and the legislature 
encouraged its use. An act passed in 1650 provided that 
the general issue might be pleaded in any case whatso­
ever 4 and though, as Holdsworth has pointed out, "this 
sweeping change did not outlive the period of �he com­
monwealth, a number of statutes were passed in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, expressly allow­
ing the general issue to be pleaded in certain actions in 
which it would not otherwise have been applicable." 1 
Blackstone has pointed out exactly why the general issue, 
after that date, was increasingly used: "formerly the 
general issue was seldom pleaded, except when the party 
meant wholly to deny the charge alleged against him. 
But when he meant to distinguish away or palliate the 
charge, it was always usual to set forth the particular 
facts in what is called a special plea ; which was originally 
intended to apprise the court and the adverse party of 
the nature and circumstances of the defense and to keep 
the law and fact distinct. And it is an invariable rule, 
that every defense, which cannot be thus specially 
pleaded, may be given in evidence, upon the general issue 
at the trial. But, the science of special pleading, having 
been frequently perverted to the purposes of chicane and 
delay, the courts have of late in some instances, and the 
legislature in many more, permitted the general issue to 
be. pleaded, which leaves everything open, the fact, the 
law, and the equity of the case, and have allowed special 
matter to be given in evidence at the trial." 6 
tActs and Ordinances of the Interregnum (Firth and Bait) ll, 443, 444; 
an Act of Bot. 23, 1650, cited by Holdsworth's History of English Law, 
IX, 321, note 3. 
lid. 
e Blackstone's Commentaries, UI, 305. 
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Upon the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1705,'7 it 
became the fashion for defendants to add the general is­
sue even when they :filed special pleas of confession and 
avoidance. This had the effect of preventing the opera­
tion of the rule of implied admission by failure to deny.8 
The practice was justified on the ground that it saved the 
defendant from the risk of a judgment non obstante 
where the pleadings raised a technically immaterial is­
sue.9 Such men as Runnington advocated an even greater 
use of the generaf issue. " Nothing, " he said, "would 
more prevent ' the many miscarriages of causes, ' or more 
promote the ends of justice, than to enact that the de­
fendant shall in all actions, on giving previous notice of 
his intended defense to the plaintiffs, be permitted to 
plead the general issue, and give the merits of his case. 
in evidence. ' '  10 This was the policy which was adopted, 
with the exception that the defendant was not required 
to give ' 'notice of his intended defense. ' '  Whereas for­
merly nothing could be shown under the general issue 
except that which went to dispute the truth of facts 
stated in the declaration; it became customary to allow 
also matters which merely avoided liability.11 To a 
declaration of indebitatus assumpsit, for instance, it be­
came possible, as Brougham pointed out in 1821, to set 
up no less than eight different defenses under a plea of 
the general issue of non assumpsit.111 These were a de­
nial of the contract, payment, usury, gaming, infancy, 
accord and satisfaction, release, and coverture. Use of 
the general issue prevented the disclosure of the real 
'1 Anne, ch. 16, sec. 4. This statute also diminished the possibility of 
/ reducing the· controversy to a single point since it allowed the d,efendant 
to plead as many several pleas as should be necessary to his defense. 
8 Millar, Ficta Confessio as a Principle of Allegation in Anglo-Ameri-
can Civil Procedure, 23 Illinois L .  Rev. 215, 222. 
9 Ex parte Pearce (1885) 80 Ala. 195. 
10 Holdsw.orth 's. History of English Lftw, IX, 322. 
11 Reppy, ''The Hilary Rules and Their Effect, ' '  6 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev. 
95, 111. 
111 Cited in Holdsworth, op. cit. IX, 323, note 4 • .  
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points at issue. Especially was this true of such actions 
as trespass on the case, trover, and ejectment, for in 
these actions the declaration itself was already marked 
by an all too great generality of statement.18 The situ­
ation became so intolerable in the early part of the Nine­
teenth Century that reforms in pleading were adopted in 
the form of the Rules of Hilary Term 1834. The prin­
cipal effect of these rules was to ' ' restrict drastically 
the scope of the general issue. ' '  14 The reform, however, 
did not prove satisfactory. The effect of the Hilary 
Rules has been accurately estimated thus, upon the basis 
of a survey of cases decided in the ensuing twelve years: 
"Under the common law system the. matter was bad 
enough. with a pleading question decided in every sixth 
case. But 'J!nder a Hilary rules it was worse. Every 
fourth case decided a question on the pleadings. Plead­
ings ran riot. ' '  16 
The confusion occasioned by the attempt to make :writ­
ten pleadings the chief, if not the only, basis of prepara­
tion for trial at common law was tersely stated by Bent­
ham when he said: ' 'General pleading conveys no in­
formation, but there is an end to it ; if any information is 
conveyed by pleading, it is by special pleading, but there 
is no end to it. ' '  ie The mistake of the common law sys­
tem of procedure in the final analysis was that written 
pleadings were supposed to do �hat they were inherently 
incapabie of doing. Instead of recognizing the limita­
tions of pleadings as a fixed basis for litigation and sup­
plementing them by other devices, pleadings were made 
increasingly complicated and technical in an attempt to 
force them to produce impossible results. 
18 Millar, Ficta Confessio as a Principle of Allegation in Anglo-Ameri­
can Civ.il Procedure, 23 Illinois L. Rev. 215, 222.· 
· 14 Holdsworth's History of English Law, IX, 324; Reppy, "The Hilary 
Rules and Their E1fect, " 6 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev, 95 �-
111Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 507. Id. 
16 Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Works Vll, 274 • .  
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EQUITY PLEADING 
Pleading in courts of chancery performed a quite dif­
ferent function from pleadings in courts of common law. 
There was ho formal trial with witnesses in equity until 
a comparatively recent date.17 Pleadings were supposed 
to present the facts of the case to the court in so com­
plete a fashion that the court would be able to render its 
decision thereon. The pleader set forth detailed state­
ments of the .evidence in support of his case. A bill in 
equity cpnsequently was a very lengt�y and elaborate 
affair./tndeed as Story has said: ' ' Equity pleading has 
now become a science of great complexity, and a refined 
species of logic, which requires great talents to master 
in all its various distinctions and subtle contrivances. ' '. JS 
A bill consisted of nine parts, the most important" of 
which, as far as disclosure of the facts of the case was 
concerned, were the stating part and the interrogating 
part. The stating part was supposed to contain a full 
narrative of the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's 
case.19 The interrogating part of the bill contained ques­
tions addr.essed to the defendant. The defendant 's an­
swer was supposed to bring forward such other facts 
and circumstances as might be considered essential to his 
defense, as well as to make full response to the inter­
rogatories contained in the bill.20 A defense by answer 
in equity always meant an affirmative defense. Defense 
by denial was . not necessary because, unlike the practice 
of common law, there was no constructive admission by. 
failure to deny.81 
The later reform of pleading by the codes, it has been . 
said, owed much to equity pleading.82 Even so, equity 
1'7 Langdell, ·Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 57. 
18 Story, Equity Pleading (7th Ed.) sec. 13. 
19 Id. sec. 27. Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 56. 
liO Story, Equity Pleading (7th ed.) sec. 849; Great Britain Chancery 
Commission Report (1852) 6. 
11 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 79. 
n Clark on Code Pleading, 13. 
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pleadings were not intended to prepare a case for a 
formal trial with witnesses. They were intended to dis­
close all of the evidence of the case rather than to reduce 
the controversy to such a form as would make a trial 
with witnesses practicable. 
ConE PLEADING 
Reforms in pleading under the codes of practice which 
have been adopted in many of the United States have not 
rendered pleadings a sufficient and satisfactory basis of 
preparation for trial. It is true that some changes have­
been made in the direction of a more complete disclosure 
of the facts in dispute. Draftsmen of the first codes 
recognized that common law pleading too often contained 
formal and general statements which did not distinctly 
set forth the pleader's case. Accordingly the codes re­
quired that parties plead the facts, not the evidential 
facts but the material operative facts.118 The codi:fiers 
considered the requirement that the actual facts be 
pleaded in simple and concise language to be ''the key 
of the reform" which they were proposing.114 While the 
defendant is not allowed to make a general denial of all 
of the allegations of the complaint in a few code jurisdic­
tions which require that every allegation of the complaint 
be specifically denied, the more usual rule under the 
codes is to allow general denials.116 
Some of the same factors which made cotpmon law 
pleading ineffective as a means of disclosing the facts in 
issue are to be seen at work under the code practice. 
Even though a pleader is faced with the requirement that 
he plead the facts on which he relies, he often copies his 
c�plaint direct from a previously approved form. Sim­
ple and concise statements of the actual facts gradually 
U!d. 150. 
HFirst Report, New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading 
(1848) 137. . . 
116 Olark on Code Pleading, 392. 
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have given way to statements couched in the language of 
form books. The complaint used in one negligence ac­
tion, for example, could, with slight changes of wording, 
be used with equal propriety in a dozen similar cases. A 
comparatively small portion of the facts involved are 
disclosed by the pleadings. The defendant, too, can con­
ceal his real. position by use of the general denial. By 
denying ''each and every allegation'' of the complaint, 
he gives no indication as to what statements he will actu­
ally contest at the trial. Even in the few code jurisdic­
tions in which it is required that denials be specific rather 
than general, lawyers often make a literal denial of every 
allegation, thus effecting what is in reality a general 
denial. The final result is that code pleadings do not 
afford a satisfactory solution of the problems of pre-trial 
practice. There is needed some additional device or 
devices for the clarification of issues and for the elimina­
tion of fake claims. 
REFORMED ENGLISH PLEADING 
Pleadings are no longer regarded as the primary basis 
of preparation for trial under the reformed English pro­
cedure. Rather pleadings are regarded as mere forecasts 
of the points in dispute and are supplemented by dis­
covery and various pre-trial administrative devices. Re­
forms under the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 were 
predicated upon the view that it is impossible to expect 
written pleadings alone to provide a sufficient means of 
pre-trial practice. Pleadings may be dispensed with 
entirely in many types of actions. Every action is com­
menced by a writ of summons.118 The plaintiff must en­
dorse on the writ the general nature of the claim upon 
which he sues. It is not necessary that he set forth the 
precise ground of complaint or the precise remedy or 
118 Annual Practice (1932) Order II. 
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relief to which he considers himself entitled.27 In actions 
to recover a .debt or liquidated claim and in actions to 
recover possession of land or possession of specific chat­
tel, the plaintiff may specially endorse the writ with a 
short and concise statement of his claim,28 and this is all 
the pleading there is in 'the action. Even in cases in 
which the plaintiff endorses the writ generally rather 
than specially it is not always necessary for the parties 
to file pleadings. Since 1897 the question as to whether 
pleadings are necessary in an action and the time within 
which such pleadings must be filed is a matter for the 
master to decide. In each individual case the matter is 
presented to the master on a preliminary reference 
known as the hearing on summons for directions. 
When pleadings are required they consist of a short 
and concise statement of the material facts upon which 
the party relies. The Judicature Acts required that: 
''Statements shall be as brief as the nature of the case 
will admit and every pleading shall contain as concise 
as may be, a statement of the material facts on which the 
party pleading relies, but not the evidence upon which 
they are to be proved. '' 29 The present rules provide 
that : ''Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, 
a statement in a summary form of the material facts on 
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, 
as the case may be, but not the evidence upon which they 
are to be proved.'' 80 General denials are not and never 
have been allowed under the reformed English practice.81 
The present rules provide that allegations of fact in a 
pleading if not denied specifically or by necessary impli­
cation are taken to be admitted.811 
117 Id. Order III. 18 Id. Order III, rule 6. 
29 Rosenbaum, Rule-making Authority in the English Supreme Court, 54. 
80 Annual Practice (1932) Order XIX, rule 4. 
81 Hepburn, Development of Code Pleading, sec. 297. 811 Annual Practice (1932) Order XIX, rule 13. 
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Pleadings have been simplified by these reforms in 
England and some of the faults which existed under the 
common law system and under the equity system, re­
spectively, have been corrected. But even so, pleadings 
are not suppos�d to perform the full function of disclos­
ing and sifting the facts of the case before trial. They 
have been supplemented by other procedural devices 
which make possible a more thorough preparation for 
trial. 
CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURE TO 
SUPPLEMENT PLEADING 
ANCILLARY PRE-TRIAL DEVICES IN CouRTS oF CoMMON LAw 
Two ancillary devices were employed to supplement. · 
pleadings and to furnish additional means of preparation 
for trial in courts of common law. These were the bill of 
particulars and the bill of discovery. The classic descrip-
. tion of the bill of particulars is thus given in Tidd 's 
Practice: "Where the declaration does not disclose the 
particulars of the plaintiff's demand • • • the defend­
ant's attorney or agent may take out a summons before 
a judge for the plaintiff's attorney or agent to show 
cause, why he should not deliver to the defendant's attor­
ney or agent, the particulars in writing of the plaintiff's 
demand, for which the action is brought, and why all pro­
ceedings should not in the meantime be stayed. This 
summons, which cannot, it seems, be had till after· the 
defendant has appeared, is usually taken out before a 
plea; and unless good cause be shown to the contrary, 
the judge will make an order, agreeably to the summons, 
which operates as a stay of proceedings till the particu­
lars are delivered.'' 1 The real purpose of ordering the 
bill of particulars was to limit the generality of pleading 
and to more fully disclose the facts of the case. Their 
object was to give the parties every reasonable facility 
for coming to the trial fully prepared for what might be 
produced by the other side.• At common law granting or 
1 Tidd's Practice (3rd ed.) vol 1, 534. 
I Liscomb v. Agate (1889) 4 N. · Y. 8. 167. 
11 
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refusing a demand for particulars was a matter within 
the sound discretion of the court under the facts of the 
particular case. On an entire failure to furnish a bill 
of particulars when ordered, the court could order a stay 
until it was furnished or it could strike out the pleadings 
respecting which the particulars were required and not 
given.8 
, 
A second additional means of preparation for trial was 
afforded by the equitable bill of discovery. Discovery 
of facts and discovery, and production of documents 
could be had in aid of actions at law by application to 
courts of chancery. Spence in his treatise on Equitable 
Jurisdiction shows how ancient this practice was : 
''Where discovery was wanted in order to sustain an 
action at law, without reference to any equitable ques­
tion, the Court of Chancery, certainly as early as the 
reign of Henry VI, entertained jurisdiction to compel 
it." 4 The statute of 36 Henry VI, p. 26, provided in part: 
"Where certainty wanteth the common law faileth, but 
yet help is to be found in Cliancery for it.'' 6 
One of the chief objectives of the common law pro­
cedure acts which w-ere passed in the early part of the 
Nineteenth Century was that courts of common law be 
empowered to grant complete relief without the necessity 
of resort to chancery. In line with this policy an attempt 
was made to empower the law courts to administer the 
remedy which equity formerly had given by bills of dis­
covery. The Commissioners on Courts of Common Law 
in 1830 circularized the bar of England with these ques­
tions: "Would it not be desirable, in order to obtain 
the benefit of a discovery without having recourse to a 
court of . equity, that the parties in a cause should be 
examined upon oath either personally, or by interrog-
8 31 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 571. 
4 Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, vol. 1, 677. 
l>ld. 
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atories? At what stage of the proceedings should this 
be done, and before whom, and what regulations would 
you suggest for the purpose of carrying this measure 
into effecU" 6 The answers which were sent in by the 
bar did not favor the innovation which was proppsed.7 
It was not until the passage of the second common law 
procedure act in 1854 that law courts were allowed to 
administer discovery. Section 51 of the act allowed par­
ties to deliver with their pleading interrogatories to their 
adversary, who was required to answer them under oath. 
For failure to answer without just cause the punishment 
was as for contempt. Section 52 of the same act pro­
vided the mode by which a party could obtain the appro­
priate court order allowing interrogatories, namely, upon 
an application under oath that the party believed the 
matter sought was material, that he had a good cause of 
action, and that discovery was not sought for purposes 
of delay.8 
DEVELOPMENT OF DiscoVERY PROCEDURE IN CouRTS OF 
CHANCERY 
The first chancellors were churchmen and accordingly 
procedure in courts of chancery was modelled in many 
respects after procedure in the ecclesiastical courts. The 
canon law practice is especially significant in respect to 
the development of discovery procedure in equity. Plead­
ings occupied a relatively unimportant place in pre-trial 
practice in the ecclesiastical courts. The object of the 
plaintiff's pleading was "not to state the facts which 
plaintiff would prove on the trial, but to identify the 
claim, to indicate its legal nature, and to specify the re­
lief which the plaintiff sought; and thue to enable the 
defendant to decide whether he would resist the claim or 
6 Report of Commissioners on Courts of Common Law, ·Rep. (1830) 
Appendix, p. 3. 
'7Id. 
8 See also Day's Common Law Practice Under the Procedure Acts 
{4th ed., 1872) p. 295. 
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submit to it, and to assist the judge in framing his sen­
tence.'' 9 As the pleadings were always in the affirmative 
there was no such thing as a denial corresponding to the 
common law traverse; all the defendant had to do was to 
indicate by oral statement in court whether or not he 
would contest the plaintiff's claim. If he indicated that 
he would so contest, all of the facts stated by the plaintiff 
were deemed to be denied.10 
Regarding pleadings as a mere preliminary forecast 
of the issues to be tried, the ecclesiastical courts provided 
an additional means of reducing the controversy to a. 
justicable form. The plaintiff was required, in a series of 
separate allegations which were not a part of the plead­
ing and which were called positions or charges of evi­
dence, to set forth in detail the evidence in support of 
the facts which he had alleged in his pleading and to 
demand of the defendant a categorical answer of "yes" 
or "no" to each proposition. This detailed statement or 
charge of the party's own evidence was divided into 
paragraphs which were numbered, and each paragraph 
was called a position; the whole instrument was called 
positions; and the procedure was called positional. The 
defendant had to proceed in the same way as to the evi­
dence supporting his affirmative defense, if he had 
pleaded such. The adverse party could object to any par­
ticular charge and ask that he be relieved from answer­
ing, on the ground that the matter was impertinent, or 
irrelevant, or that the statement was bad for uncertainty, 
or that it was set forth in negative form. But once the 
positions were held admissible it was incumbent upon the 
adverse party to categorically admit or deny them. If 
he did neither, it was held equivalent to an admission.11 
9 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 5. 
10 Id. sec. 6. 
11 This admission was not accomplished ipso juro but only upon the 
intervention on the part of the court to make the admission effective. 
Millar, ficta confessio as a principle of allegation in Anglo·American 
Civil Procedure, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 215, 216. 
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This was exactly the reverse of the rule applied to the 
pleadings themselves, for there a failure to do anything 
was equivalent to a denial. 
Englemann observes that this procedure in Romano:.. 
canonical law "possessed the great advantage of dis­
pensing with proof of all positions either expressly ad­
mitted or left undenied, and of lending an extraordinary 
degree of precision to the propositions remaining to be 
proved.'' 18 Among the writings of the canonists we find 
similar encomiums on- the effectiveness of the method, as 
for instance, the following: ''Positions have long been 
·used for the purpose of relieving the litigant 6f the 
onerous burden of proof, by means of admissions ob-
tained from his adversary.'' 18 
Pleadings and discovery proper were commingled in 
equity pleadings.14 The result was that pleading in 
equity assumed the form of a detailed statement of the 
party's evidence. The bill in equity not only showed a 
right to relief founded upon a statement of facts, but it 
also demanded the personal answer of the defendant to 
the plaintiff's evidence stated in the bill.15 The part of 
the defendant's answer which set up affirmative allega--, 
tions by way of defense and the part' of the answer 
responsive to the charges of evidence were even more 
closely blended than were the two corresponding ele­
ments of the bill. In fact the union was so close that for 
a long period it was not noticed that the answer con-
. tained these two distinct elements.16 About 1700 drafts­
men began to insert interrogatories in bills for the pur­
pose of obtaining a more complete answer from the de­
fendant. However, no interrogatory was permissible 
18 Englemann, History of Continental Civil Proeedure (Millar 's trans-
lation) 472. . 
18 Deeretals of Pope Clement V., Lib. 5, tit. 11, e. 2., eited in Lang-
dell, Equity Pleading, see. 22. 
14 Gilbert, Forum Romanum, 90. 16 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, see. 76. 
16 Hare on Diseovery, 223. 
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unless it was founded upon a charge or statement of evi­
dence in the bill. In theory there was no nece�sity for 
the use of interrogatories because the defendant was al­
ready required to categorically answer each and every 
charge of evidence. , Interrogatories in time assumed an 
independent status as an important part of eq\}ity plead­
ings. Gradually over a period of more than a century 
they ceased to be used as mere specifications of the state­
ments of evidence which should be answered. While 
theoretically they still required a supporting charge, in 
reality they became independent of the charging p�rtion 
of the bill. This development facilitated the separation 
of interrogatories from the bill proper. Interrogatories 
already had a separate status and use in the chancery bill 
of discovery which was employed as an ancillary remedy 
in law actions. Discovery without any other relief was 
the sole object of bills of discovery and consequently such 
bills were composed of interrogatories entirely. Appar­
ently David Dudley Field, of New York, first suggested 
the separation of interrogatories from the pleading in 
all chancery pleadings. His proposal was " that the 
practice of obtaining discovery by answer in equity, be 
discontinued, leaving the bill of complaint and answer to 
be regarded merely as pleadings, " for, said Field, " if 
the practice of obtaining discovery by answer in equity 
were discontinued the pleadings would naturally fall into 
a plain, short statement by each party of his own case. 
May not a discovery be obtained in some other way¥' '  11 
A similar recommendation of the English Chancery 
Commissioners was adopted, that : (1) Every bill should 
contain a concise narrative of the material facts, matters 
and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies ; (2) a bill 
should not contain interrogatories for the examination 
of the defendant ; (3)  the plaintiff should file separate 
17 From an essay of Field's published Jan. 1, 1847, found in Speeches 
and Papers of David Dudley Field, vol. 1, p. 230. . 
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interrogatories for the defendant to answer; and until 
the plaintiff files such interrogatories the defendant need 
not answer the bill.1s 
DisCOVERY. UNDER THE CoDES 
Draftsmen of the New York Code of Procedure of 1848 
recognized that discovery procedure should play an im­
portant part in the reforms which they proposed. The 
Commissioners in their note to the sections of the New 
York Code of Procedure dealing with the subject of dis­
covery, said: "The provisions contained in this chap­
ter, we have considered so important to the success of our 
system, that from the first we have contemplated their 
introduction. Meantime the legislature, at their late 
session, have passed an act upon the subject. That act, 
however, contemplates the examination at the trial only. ' 
We think it important to extend it so as to permit the 
examination to take place before the trial at the option 
of the party. 
"Before the act of the last session, whenever a party 
sought a discovery from his adversary, he was obliged to 
file a bill in equity, called a bill of discovery. The pro­
ceeding was dilatory and expensive. If the examination 
be had at all it may be had in the same action as well as · 
in another. That it should be had in some form our law 
has always admitted. The difficulty was, that the process 
to obtain it was oppressive and often ineffectual. 
"One of the great benefits to be expected from the 
examination of the parties is the relief it will afford to 
the rest of the community, to a considerable degree, from 
· attendance as witnesses, to prove facts, which the parties 
respectively know, and ought never to dispute, and would 
not dispute if they were put to their oaths. To effect this 
objeGt it should seem 1,1ecessary to permit their examina-
\, 
lli IS and 16 Viet. Chap. 86, sees. 10-12. See also Langdell, Discovery 
Under the Judicature Acts, 12 Harv. L. Rev, 16, 166. 
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tion beforehand, that the answer of the party may save 
the necessity of a witness.'' 19 
Many of the other American jurisdictions which 
adopted codes of practice modelled after the New York 
Code of Procedure of 1848, overlooked the importance of 
discovery as such and its relation to the general scheme 
of pleading and pre-trial practice under the code. A 
number of these jurisdictions, however, have remedied 
the defect by enacting liberal provisions for taking depo­
sitions generally. This has made possible a combination 
of the methods for discovering and preserving the testi­
mony of parties and witnesses alike. It has proved an 
entirely feasible way of allowing oral examinations for 
discovery before trial. 
DISCOVERY uNDER REFORMED ENGLISH PROCEDURE 
Draftsmen of the English judicature acts devised a 
combination of the devices for obtaining discovery before 
trial which had formerly been used in courts of common 
law and courts of chancery respectively. The purpose of 
the combination was "to obtain the benefit ·of the ex­
tended principles of the court of chancery and to com­
bine with them the simplicity of the common law meth­
od.'' 20 Briefly the system of discovery set up under the 
judicature act of 1875 provided that any party might, 
after the first pleadings had been exchanged, deliver to 
his opponent without leave, a set of written interrog­
atories requiring sworn answers. Rules of court pro­
vided full details as to the times and methods for re­
questing discovery and for enforcing the right, by penal­
ties, when refused. Discovery as well as other pre-trial 
administrative devices has played a prominent part in 
the reformed English practice. 
19 Report of Commissioners on Praetiee and Pleading (1848) p. 244 • .  
10 Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority, 58. 
CHAPTER III 
PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY BY MEANS OF 
DISCOVERY 
Preservation as well as discovery of testimony is one 
of the important functions of pre-trial procedure. It is 
important that the lawyer have at his. disposal adequate 
means of providing for the contingency of the death or 
removal of necessary witnesses, since cases are not 
reached for trial until months and sometimes years after 
the occurrence of the transactions in question. This is 
especially true in the large cities where there is a shifting 
population and where court calendars are so crowded 
that there are unusual delays in reaching trial. The law 
has always recognized the need but the machinery which 
it has provided to supply it too frequently has been cum­
bersome and inadequate. 
Courts of common law for a long period of time fur­
nished no machinery to perform this function. Conse­
quently courts of chancery were called upon to supply 
the defect. Just as courts of chancery entertained bills 
of discovery, which preserved as well as discovered the 
testimony of adverse. parties, so, likewise, did they enter­
tain bills to perpetuate testimony and to take testimony 
de bene esse in aid of actions at law.1 The purpose of 
both of the latter remedies was to provide a means of 
preser$g the testimony of witnesses generally. In the 
early part of the nineteenth century common law courts 
were empowered by special statutes to give the same 
remedy which chancery formerly had given by these 
1 Story's Equity Jurisdiction (2nd English ed.) sees. 1505, 1513; 
Wee'lm, Law of Depositions (1880) see. 10 fl. 
19 
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ancillary bills. The statutory remedy became known as 
deposition procedure. 
There has been an increasing tendency under modern 
practice to combine the methods of obtaining discovery 
and preservation of evidence, respectively. As a matter 
of fact there usually can be no discovery without inci­
dental preservation. · Conversely, preservation often 
affords an incidental discovery. Why not,. therefore, 
combine the two procedures into a single one T This is 
the trend of the modern practice. Two developments 
have removed differences in the two types of procedure 
which formerly made their assimilation less practicable. 
At one time parties to an action were neither competent 
nor compellable to testify as witnesses but later this dis­
ability was removed.8 When parties became witnesses 
in fact it was an easy step to provide that they be ex­
amined as witnesses. There has also been a tendency to 
make liberal allowance for the taking of depositions of 
all witnesses .on the theory that it is impossible to tell 
when a witness may die or become inaccessible and that 
therefore .a litigant should not be required to show the 
witness is unavailable before taking his deposition. It 
has been thought sufficient to make the unavailability of 
the witness a condition to the use of the deposition at the 
trial rather than to the taking thereof. 
If depositions may be taken from both witnesses and 
parties and if the right to take is unconditional, a very 
liberal method of discovering and preserving evidence 
is afforded. If the right to take is unconditional there is 
no reason for the court to inquire whether the preserva­
tion of testimony or the discovery of testimony is the 
primary objective of the applicant. The words of the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in this regard are classic : 
' ' Now the giving of testimony, whether on the trial or 
by deposition, is not a privilege of the witness, but a right 
a Wigmore on Evidence, IV, sec. 2217. 
PRESERVAT.iON OF TESTIMONY 21 
of the party. He need not solicit ; he can compel. It 
seems to us therefore that under our statutes a witness 
may be compelled to give his deposition, although he re­
side in the county where the action is pending. It is said 
that this power is liable to abuse, and that a witness may 
be compelled to give repeated depositions, and still be 
present at the trial. Courts will see that this power is 
not abused, or the time of· witnesses unnecessarily taken. 
It is also said that large amounts of costs will be ac­
cumulated. This will not injure the adverse party, for a 
party taking depositions which he does not use must him­
self pay their cost. It is also said that this permits one 
to go on a 'fishing expedition' to ascertain his ad­
versary's testimony. This is an equal right of both par­
ties, and justice will not be apt to suffer if each party 
knows fully beforehand his adversary's testimony." 8 
When first introduced there was considerable aversion 
on the part of the bar to the use of deposition procedure 
for purposes of discovery before trial. Such use of the 
procedure has been attacked as a "fishing expedition" 
and as being foreign to the traditional purpose of depo­
sition procedure. Some lawiers have felt that, to employ 
words used by the Kansas Supreme Court upon another 
occasion, ' 'the taking of the deposition of a party in a 
pending case merely to find out in advance what his testi­
mony will be, and to annoy and oppress him, and not for 
the purpose of using the same as evidence, is an abuse of 
judicial authority and process.'' 4 
8 In re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451, 452. See to the same e1fect Tyson 
v. Savings and Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo. 588, 57 S. W. 740 ; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Williams (1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S. 
W. -651; Owensboro City Ry. Co. v. Rowland (1913) 152 Ky. 175, 153 
S. W. 206; Willis v. Bank of Hardinsburg (1914) 160 Ky. 808, 170,8. W. 
188; Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r (1916) 169 Ky. 38, 183 
S. W. 237 ; In re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701; Dogge v. State 
(1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; Ulrich v. McConaughey (1901) 63 
Neb. 10, 88 N. W. "150 ; Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 71 Neb. 17, 98 N. W. 
415 ; In re Berger (1919) 13 0. App. 206 (affirmed 101 0. S. 512, 130 N. 
E. 935). 
4 In re Davis (1898) 38 Kan. 408, 16 Pac. 790. 
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This hostility on the part of the bar, however, is short­
lived once the use of deposition procedure both to dis­
_cover and preserve evidence is given a fair trial. Its 
very reproach becomes its glory-the courts say that the 
virtue of the device is that it is a means of discovering 
evidence. The following quotations from various opin­
ions will serve to illustrate the satisfaction which such a 
use of the procedure gives: ( 1) "The code confers the 
right on either party to take the deposition of the adverse 
party, not merely for use as evidence if the necessary con­
ditions arise, but for the purposes of exploration, or of 
ascertaining the facts on which the adverse party re­
lies. " 11 (2)  "This is a very wise provision of the code 
. of procedure, taking the place of the old bill of discovery 
and affording a much more speedy and efficient remedy 
than was given in that mode." 6 (3)  "Taking the deposi­
tion of a party is the only substitute we have for a bill 
of discovery under our practice." 7 ( 4) "It was the in­
tention of the legislature • • • to remove every barrier 
to the discovery of the truth.'' 8 ( 5) ''The common law 
originally was very strict in confining each party to his 
own means of proof, and, as it has been expressed, re­
garded a trial as a cock-fight, wherein he won whose 
advocate was the gamest bird with the longest spurs. 
But we have come to take a more liberal view and have 
done away with most of those features of trials which 
gave rise to that reproach.'' 9 
Effective machinery for discovery and preservation of 
evidence already exists in all of the states which allow 
II Clay, in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty 's Adm 'r (1916) 169 Ky. 
44, 183 s. w. 237. 
6 Valliant, J., in Tyson v. Savings & Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo • 
. 588, 57 S. W. 740. Compa:.;e the earlier case of Ex parte Krieger (1879) 
7 Mo. App. 367. 
7 Barnes, J., in Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 7i Neb. 17, 23, 98 N. W: 415. 
8 Reese, J., in Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 277, 31 N. W. 929. 
9 Pound, C., (Now Dean of the Harvard Law School) in IDrich v. 
McConaughey (1901) 63 Neb. 10, 20, 88 N. W. 150. 
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the taking of depositions to be an unconditional right of 
the party, and impose limitations, depending upon the 
availability of the witness, only upon the use of the depo­
sition at the trial. Already approximately half of the 
states of this country have this type of deposition statute 
and other states could obtain the same result by a simple 
statutory amendment to the effect that the conditions 
which are now imposed for the taking of depositions 
henceforth shall apply only to the use thereof at the trial 
and that depositions may always be taken as of right. 
It would facilitate the practical use of the device and 
reduce the possibility of illiberal decisions limiting such 
use if the deposition statutes were so labelled as to indi­
cate that use both for discovery and for preservation of 
testimony is intended. Indeed, the greatest danger inci­
dent to the use of ordinary deposition procedure for pur­
poses of discovery before trial is that since it is not 
labelled discovery procedure courts and lawyers hesitate 
to use it as such. The easiest way to remove this danger 
is . to specifically label the statutory provisions discovery 
and deposition procedure. 
It is to be regretted that the first tentative draft of the 
proposed uniform deposition act submitted to the Oom­
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1929 has not made 
provision for. such a practice. The proposed · act pro­
vides that, "depositions may be taken of any witnesses 
who are about to be beyond reach of a subpoena or for 
some cause are expected to be unable to attend court at 
the time of trial.'' 10 In a note to this provision it is 
said: ''Question is raised as to whether under this Act 
the deposition of a party could be taken and if so under 
what circumstances. And if his deposition could be 
taken, could he be compelled to produce books, docu­
ments, or things under his control? Some states have 
10 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and Proceedings (1929) 360. 
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special statutes or rules which permit examination of 
parties before trial. The entire question could be compre­
hended in this statute but, as now drafted, Section 1 
would have to be modified. If, however, it is desired to 
exclude examination of parties hereunder, it could be so 
stated, perhaps in Section 1. To include the whole sub­
ject here might introduce a controversy which would be 
undesirable. However, it should be broad enough · to 
cover parties beyond the reach of a subpoena or who 
cannot attend trial.'' 11 Perhaps one explanation of the 
fact that this type of deposition statute has been pro­
posed is the personnel of the committee which drafted 
it. Lawyers from the following states were on the com­
mittee : Washington, Delaware, Utah, Iowa, lllinois, 
Mississippi, and Oregon. None of these states exhibits 
an effective discovery practice based upon a statute 
which gives an unconditional right to take depositions. 
It seems rather unfortunate that the committee had no 
representative from such states as Ohio, New Hampshire, 
Missouri, Kentucky, Indiana, Nebraska and Texas, 
where liberal deposition statutes have been the means of 
developing an effective practice for discovery and pres­
ervation of testimony. 
ll ld. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS OF DISCOVERY IN DIFFERENT 
JURISDICTIONS · 
, . 
. There are two basic methods of discovery of testimony 
which are being employed in the different jurisdictions. 
In addition there are several methods for discovery and 
inspection of documentary evidence. The two methods 
of discovery of testimony are written interrogatories and 
oral examination before trial. Under the former the 
party serves a series of written questions upon his ad­
versary who is required to answer under oath. Under 
the latter the person from whom· discovery is sought is 
subjected to an examination upon oral questions pro­
pounded by the applicant for discovery. The questions 
and answers are recorded in the form of a deposition. 
The written interrogatory practice is modelled after 
the chancery procedure for discovery. Considerations 
of procedural policy, however, favor an oral examination. 
Ever since the time of Jeremy Bentham who pointed out 
the superiority of what he termed "confrontatory" to 
"epistolary" examinations 1 lawy�rs have increasingly 
recognized that an oral examination is the only efficient 
means of taking testimony. David Dudley Field, one of 
the draftsmen of the New York Code of Procedure, con­
sistently urged t�e general adoption of this mode of tak­
ing testimony by all of the cour�s.11 Accordingly the com­
missioners in their note to the sections of the New York 
Code of Procedure which provided for an oral examina:­
tion before trial, said : "Two modes of examination have 
,1 Bentham 's Rationale of Judicial
. 
Evidence, �ol. 2, pp. 140, 158, 197-
199; viot 4, p. 613; vot 5; pp. s7U, 401. . , . · .  . . 
a Speeehes and Papers of David Dudley Field, vol 1, pp. 230, 269. . 
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been proposed, one oral, the other upon written interrog­
atories. The latter is the method of the civil law. We 
think the question is decided by the act of December, and 
if it were not we should still prefer the oral examination. 
A written deposition taken in private is not the best 
means of eliciting the truth ; nor do we see why the law 
should be so tender of the consciences of parties when it 
is so hard with the consciences of witnesses. These are 
brought into court, are made to waste their time about a 
matter not their own, and when called to the stand, are 
subjected to the most searching and often offensive ex­
amination. Why should he who has brought them here 
be exempted from the same scrutiny? '' 8 The various 
jurisdictions have adopted one or the other of these two 
methods of discovery, either the oral examination or 
written interrogato:Hes. In many states discovery and 
preservation of testimony have been combined so that an 
oral examination may be had under the ordinary deposi­
tion procedure. 
The statutory provisions on discovery are set forth 
in the appendix at the back of this volume. The provi­
sions in the United States federal courts are given :first 
and thereafter the other jurisdictions are listed alpha­
betically. The statutes and rules of court in each state 
dealing with oral examinations for discovery and pres­
ervation of evidence before trial, written interrogatories 
and inspection of documents are set forth. The number 
and the elaborateness of the statutory provi�ions 
·
is no 
index to the effectiveness of the practice. New York has 
lengthy and detailed statutes and rules of court dealing 
with discovery, yet the actual practice is notoriously in­
effective. Ohio, New Hampshire, Kentucky and other 
jurisdictions, oli the other hand, have developed an ex­
tensive and effective discovery practice upon the basis of 
a short and simple statutory authorization. 




TYPES OF ACTIONS IN WHICH DISCOVERY IS 
AVAILABLE 
DiscoVERY AvAILABLE IN ALL TYPEs OF AcTIONS IN MANY 
JURISDICTIONS 
There are no prohibitions or restrictions upon the use 
of discovery, as far as the type of action is concerned, in 
most of the jurisdictions which have procedures for dis­
covery before trial. On the contrary the usual provision 
is that discovery may be had in all civil actions. In some 
states, such as Missouri for instance, it is also possible 
to have discovery under the guise of depositions in crimi­
nal actions. The latter aspect, however, is without the 
scope of this treatise. In all of the jurisdictions in which 
field investigations were conducted, except New York, 
it was found that discovery is actually used much more 
extensively in automobile accident litigation than in all 
other types of action combined. Some lawyers who take 
discovery examinations as of course in personal injury 
cases seldom resort to the device in other cases. · 
The following statistics from Wisconsin and Ontario, 
respectively, show that while personal injury cases ex­
hibit the most extensive use of discovery, it is actually 
employed in all kinds of litigation in those jurisdictions . 
These statistics were obtained . by examination of fifty 
consecutive records of cases in which discovery had been 
used in each of the following cities : Milwaukee, Wiscon­
sin ; Madison, Wisconsin ; and Toronto, Ontario. 
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Ohart Showing Types of Actions in Which Discovery Is Used 
in Wisconsin 
Type of Action MilwaUkee Madison Composite . 
Automobile Accident 24 21 45 
Contract 6 7 13 
Negligence Other than 
Automobile 5 3 8 
Fraud 2 5 7 
Divorce 4 3 7 
Account 2 4 6 
Promissory Note 1 5 6 
Malpractice 1 1 2 
Mortgage Foreclosure 1 1 2 
Assault and Battery 1 1 
Cancellation of Deed 1 1 
Slander 1 1 
Conversion 1 1 
ToTAL 13 Different Types 50 50 100 
TYPES oF AcTIONs IN W RICH DiscoVERY Is PROHIBITED IN 
SOME JURISDICTIONS 
Discovery is not allowed in actions to enforce for­
feitures or penalties in England and Ontario.1 Some of 
the federal courts have held that, under federal equity 
rule 58, discovery cannot be  had in patent litigation, it 
being the theory that discovery is inappropriate because 
such proceedings often are in the nature of actions to 
enforce penalties.8 There is, however, substantial au­
thority to the effect that discovery is available in such 
cases, because of the fact that rule 58 itself mentions no 
such �xception.8 Discovery in patent actions, while not 
1 Annual Practice (1930) p. 500 and cases cited thereat;  Bray 's Law 
of Discovery, 345; Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) 796. 
B F. Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co. (1906) 232 Fed. 617 ;  Blackmore v. 
Collins (1923) 286 Fed. 629; Heatometer Co. v. Jacobs Bros. Co. (1926) 
12 F. (2d) 103 (citing many other cases) . 
8 Taylor v. Ford Motor Co. (1923) 2 F. (2d) 473; Standard Oil Co. 
v. Rozana Pet. Corp. (1925) 9 F. (2d) 453; Koehring Co. v. Foote Co. 
(1927) 21 F. (2d) 569, 
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Ohart Showing Types of Actiona in Which Discovery Is Used 
in Ontario 
Type of Action 
Automobile Accident 







Cancellation of Instrument 
Alimony 
Possession of Realty 
Malpractice 
Will Contest 






Dissolution of Partnership 
ToTAL 20 Different Types 
Number in Whick 






















favored, is not prohibited by the English courts.4 Dis­
covery in divorce proceedings is forbidden by the courts 
of Indiana.5 Discovery in action� for criminal cop.versa­
tion is forbidden in Ontario.8 The New York courts have 
held that there can be no examination for discovery in 
summary actions, since discovery is deemed to be incon­
sistent with the theory �nd spirit of such actions." 
4 Annual Practice (1930) p. 494; Bray's Law of Discovery, 550 :tr. 
5 Barr v. Barr (1889) 31 Ind. 240 (this ease applies only to discovery 
by written interrogatories and not to discovery by oral examination) .  
8 Ontario Judicature Aet (Holmested, 1915) p .  796. 
'7 Inter·City Apartment Hous(l Co. v. Kern (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 284; 
Dubosky v. Goldsmith (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 67. · 
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TYPES OF AcTIONS IN WHICH DiscoVERY Is RESTRICTED BUT 
NOT PROHIBITED IN SoME JURISDICTIONS 
Peculiar rules which obtain in New York in regard to 
the scope of discovery examination generally have made 
it possible for courts to restrict discovery to ,such an 
extent that it becomes almost useless in some types of tort 
actions and particularly in automobile accident litiga­
tion. There is a distinct division of opinion among the 
several departments of the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court in regard to the allowable 
scope of examination before trial in negligence cases. 
The question at issue is whether the examination in these 
cases shall be limited to such items as ownership and 
control of the vehicle or shall extend also to the facts of 
liability and damage. Generally speaking, the First De­
partment has adhered to the rule that the examination 
may extend only to such items as ownership and control 
of the vehicle, whereas the Second Department of the 
Appellate Division has allowed the examination to ex­
tend to the facts of liability and damage as well. Re­
strictions upon the scope of the examination similar to 
those enforced in automobile negligence cases are also 
applied in such tort actions as deceit, libel and malprac­
tice. The English courts likewise have taken the posi­
tion that in most accident cases both parties are able to 
call witnesses and therefore do not need to interrogate 
upon small questions of fact relating to the details of the 
accident.8 
The experience of lawyers in California, Missouri and 
Wisconsin, particularly, suggests that discovery is more 
apt to be abused in certain types of litigation than in 
others, but that the remedy is to prevent publication of 
the results of the examination rather than to restrict the 
scope of the interrogation. An excerpt from the letter 
8 Griebart v. Morris (1920) K. B. 659, 666. 
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of a Los Angeles attorney . illustrates the problem which 
is involved : " In certain types of cases, such as seduc­
tion under promise of marriage, and malicious prosecu­
tion, depositions are frequently threatened and taken for 
blackmailing purposes. I recall particularly a case in 
which the newspapers were full of salacious details dis­
closed by a deposition. That was a year or so ago and 
I have never heard anything further of the case, so I 
presume it was finally disposed of out of court. No 
doubt everyone reading those articles thought that the 
witness interrogated had been guilty of the indiscretions 
charged and yet there may not have been a word of truth 
in the charges. However, this blackmailing use of a 
deposition is very infrequent. But it would be an easy 
matter to entirely guard against it by providing that on 
the application of either party the deposition would be 
taken behind closed doors, sealed by the notary and filed 
as sealed by him, and not opened until offered in evi­
dence by one party or the other. I think any state grant­
ing rights similar to those given by our discovery stat- -
ute should include some such provision. ' '  Missouri law­
yers complain that in election contests, divorce proceed­
ings and alienation of affection actions, particularly, an 
opportunity is afforded for what is called a " newspaper 
trial of the case. " The Milwaukee courts have met this 
situation in the way suggested by the Los Angeles attor­
ney. They have enacted a rule of court which forbids 
the opening of the record of a discovery examination ex-
cept under order of court. 
· 
CHAPTER VI 
RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT TO DISCOVERY 
Discovery in equity was of more importance to the 
plaintiff than to the defendant. It was primarily the duty 
· of the defendant to answer the interrogatories which the 
plaintiff had included in his bill. Less frequently did 
the defendant seek discovery from the plaintiff. The 
tendency under modern discovery practice is to make 
discovery equally available to both plaintiff and defend­
ant. Where the written interrogatory procedure obtains 
either party may file interrogatories for his opponent to 
answer. Similarly either party may have an oral ex­
amination of his adversary where this form of discovery 
is employed. 
There are, however, certain rules in a few jurisdictions 
which prevent discovery from being an entirely equal 
right of both parties. Especially under the New York 
practice is there an inequality of discovery. The New 
York rule is that a party can have discovery only as to 
the issues of which he has the affirmative under the plead­
ings. Obviously this allows a plaintiff far greater rights 
to discovery than is allowed the defendant, for the reason 
that the former .usually has the affirmative of most of the 
issues. Similarly, a defendant is not allowed discovery 
under a mere denial. 
Absence of a provision for examination of representa­
tives of corporate parties may prevent discovery from 
being equal. While lawyers for a corporate party can 
examine the adverse party the latter obviously cannot 
examine the artificial body. This is the situation in New 
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Jersey. Even under the ordinary deposition procedure 
the rights to discovery are not absolutely equal in the 
event one party is a corporation, for the corporation can 
examine its adversary as a party while the latter can 
examine the corporate representatives, only as wit­
nesses. The difference is that in one case the answers 
constitute admissions, while in the other case they may 
not. 
Even in those states in which as ,a matter of law the 
rights to l:liscovery are equal the actual use of the pro­
cedure is not always so. In most of these states defend­
ants use the procedure much more frequently than do 
plaintiffs. This, however, is not true in all jurisdictions. 
In Wisconsin, for example, both plaintiffs and defend­
ants use the procedure widely. In fifty consecutive cases 
in which discovery had been used in Milwaukee the rec­
ords showed that both parties were examined in eight 
cases, the plaintiff alone in thirty, and the defendant 
alone in twelve. Similarly in Madison both parties were 
. examined in twenty-two out of fifty cases, the plaintiff 
alone in twelve, and the defendant alone in sixteen. One 
hundred consecutive cases studied in the Superior Court 
of Suffolk County, Boston, indicated that under the 
Massachusetts written interrogatory procedure defend­
ants had filed interrogatories approximately five times to 
every three times plaintiffs had done so. The special 
procedure for an oral examination for discovery in New 
Jersey, however, has been used almost exclusively by 
defendants. Indeed one lawyer said that he had seen 
hundreds of examinations and applications for exam­
inations by defendants ' lawyers, especially those repre­
senting insurance and corporate interests, but that he 
could remember only two cases wherein lawyers for 
plaintiffs 
·
had sought an examination of the adverse 
party. In all of the states in which the deposition is 
used for discovery purposes defendants employ the proc­
ess much more frequently than do plaintiffs. · 
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The following reasons have been assigned why defend­
ants use discovery more than plaintiffs : (1) The plain­
tiff generally is less able to afford the expense. (2)  
There is  a tendency upon the part of many plaintiffs ' 
lawyers to want to get to the jury and to disparage any 
dissipation of their strength in the form of pre-trial 
moves. Corporate interests, on the other hand, often are 
glad to use any expedient to avoid a trial. (3)  Whereas 
much of the business of defendants is concentrated in 
the larger law firms, with skilled lawyers, the plaintiff's ' 
business usually is scattered. Often actions are initiated 
by men with inferior training, and a more thoroughly 
trained lawyer is not called into the case on the plain­
tiff 's behalf until immediately before trial. Accordingly, 
the case, up until the trial stage at least, is handled by 
men who are either ignorant or careless in their prepara­
tion for trial. This explanation is borne out by the fact 
that some plaintiffs ' lawyers who are careful about their 
preparation for trial use the process just as frequently as 
do defendants ' lawyers. But plaintiffs ' lawyers as a 
whole do not. 
It is a mistake to suppose that simply because defend­
ants use the process more widely the procedure favors 
the defendant and prejudices the plaintiff. Even in 
states in which plaintiffs ' lawyers make little use of the 
device, they say that they have no hostility toward the 
process. Outside of New Jersey, practically no oppo­
sition to discovery was found among the several hun­
dred lawyers who were interviewed. A typical response 
upon · the part of the lawyers who specialize in repre­
senting plaintiffs in automobile accident litigation was 
that they welcomed the examination of their client if he 
had a good case because it enhanced the possibility of an 
advantageous settlement. In some states 
'
which have no 
provision for the oral examination of parties before 
trial lawyers for the plaintiff sometimes will grant an 
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examination of their client as & basis for settlement 
negotiations. This is testimony to its effectiveness in 
this regard. Again, many plaintiffs ' lawyers said that 
the process had afforded them a valuable remedy in cer­
tain cases. Some stressed the fact that it afforded the 
outsider a means of preparation for trial which placed 
him more nearly on an · equality with the larger firms 
which have at their disposal independent means of in­
vestigation. Still others said that in cases in which em­
ployees of the defendant were witnesses to the accident 
they had found it desirable to examine such employees 
just as soon as possible after filing suit, and that often­
times these employees at such an early stage of the liti­
gation were more sympathetic to the victim of the acci­
dent than they would be after adroit and suggestive 
questioning by claim agents, fear of loss of their jobs, 
or merely the lapse of time had dampened their sym­
pathies. 
In fairness it should be said that the little prejudice 
toward dis_!:lovery which
-
was found in the fourteen ju­
risdictions
· 
which were visited, was confined to lawyers 
who specialize in representing plaintiffs. In New Jersey 
these lawyers were uniformly opposed to the procedure, 
whereas defendants ' lawyers favored it. But in other 
states no such wide-spread prejudice was found. Upon 
occasion defendants ' lawyers said that they supposed 
some prejudice toward the procedure would be found 
among plaintiffs ' attorneys. They were asked to name 
particular men whom they supposed entertained such 
prejudice. Interviews with the latter did not bear out 
the suppositions. Even those plaintiffs ' lawyers who 
were said to dislike the procedure because of its deal­
ing with so-called fake claims concealed their animosity, 
if they had such. While many lawyers of all types said 
that they had in mind specific instances in which the 
process had been abused, very few were willing to say 
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that the process as a whole was not a good thing. On 
the contrary, the great majority were outspoken in their 
praise of the device. 
The ideal, of course, is that all procedural devices be 
available to both sides equally. The often quoted words 
of the Kansas Supreme Court are in point : "It is said 
that this permits one to go on a ' fishing expedition' to 
ascertain his adversary's testimony. This is an equal 
right of both parties, and justice will not be apt to suffer 
if each party knows fully beforehand his adversary 's 
testimony. ' '  1 Not only is it important that the · oppor­
tunity for discovery be mutually available, but it is like­
wise important that a mutual use of the device be en­
couraged. Missouri has a provision which is unique in 
this regard. If one party takes depositions, the other 
party can begin taking depositions just as soon as his 
adversary has finished without giving formal notice. It 
is only required that he make known his desire some­
time during the taking of depositions by the first party.2 
This encourages a party to take advantage of the process 
whenever his adversary does so, and to this extent it 
fosters an equal and a mutual use of discovery. 
1 In re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451. 
II Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5465. 
CHAPTER VII 
PERSONS FROM WHOM DISCOVERY MAY BE HAD 
DISCOVERY FROM pARTIES 
The statutes very generally provide either that " ad­
verse " or that " opposite " parties may be examined 
or interrogat�d for discovery.1 The only exception is to 
be found in New York where, under the amendment of 
1926, the words " any other party " have been substituted 
for the words " an adverse party. " 1 Various inter­
pretations have been given to the words " adverse " and 
" opposite. " The latter word has been construed by the 
English courts to mean parties on the other side of the 
record, parties between whom some right is to be ad­
justed in the action, and parties intervening to oppose 
the claim of the party seeking discovery.8 The Wiscon­
sin court .has held that a co-defendant may be examined 
if his interests in reality are adverse.4 In states in which 
depositions of parties and witnesses alike are taken for 
discovery the statutes usually make no mention of parties 
as such. There the right to examine a party is obtained 
by virtue of the fact that he is a witness, and separate 
statutes which make parties witnesses are relied upon 
for the connecting link. 
On principle it would seem that the ordinary rules as 
to parties un4er the law of pleading would suffice to · 
determine whether a particular person is examinable for 
1 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the back of this volume. 
a New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288; Kirman v. Fries (1927) 
220 N. Y. S. 430. 
8 Bray, Digest of the Law of Discovery, 12, 48 • .  
H > 'Day V'. Meiers (1911) 147 Wis. 549, 183 N. W. 605. 
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discovery as a party. In this way a number of extra­
neous rules regarding the real party in interest, proper 
and necessary parties, and the like, can be used to define 
the bare word "party. " Accordingly the Wisconsin 
court has held that the real party in interest rather than 
a mere nominal party is the person intended,6 and that 
proper as well as necessary parties are examinable.6 In 
New Jersey and Louisiana, on the contrary, only the 
parties to the record are examinable.' The Georgia stat­
ute expressly provides that either nominal or real parties 
may be examined. Special provision is made for dis­
covery from a person in whose behalf an action is prose­
cuted or defended in Ontario, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and South Dakota. The converse situation, 
namely, the right to discovery from assignors, who under 
the real party in interest statutes are not parties to the 
record, is specifically provided for in Ontario, New York, 
Michigan and California. The New York provision and 
the similar Michigan provision are the more elaborate 
in this regard : " the original owner of a claim which con­
stitutes, or from which arose, a cause of action acquired 
by grant, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or endorse­
ment and which is set forth in his pleading as a cause 
of action or counterclaim. ' '  8 But there is some doubt 
under the New York provision as to whether the phrase 
" original owner " includes an intermediate assignor.9 
This defect is cured in the Michigan rules which add the 
words " or prior owner. " 
II Rohleder v. Wright (1916) 162 Wis. 580, 156 N. W. 955. · 
6 Wells v. Green Bay & M. C. Co. (1895) 90 Wis. 442, 64 N. W. 69. 
'1 Apperson v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. (1876) 38 N. J. L. 272; Rev. Code 
of Prac. (Marr., 1927) sec. 347. 
8 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288; Mich. Court Rules (1931) 
rule 41, sec. 1 (a slight difference of wording). 
9 Question raised but not decided in Green. v. Saisselin (19�7) 214 N. 
Y. S. 776. But cf. for ·indication that· intermediate assignors are not ex· 
aminable, Wappler v. Woodbury Co. (1923) 201 N. Y. S. 503. See a�so 
27 Col. L. Rev. 422. 
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Special questions have arisen as to what persons are 
properly examinable where an executor or administrator 
is a party to the action. In New York it has been held 
that, under appropriate circumstances, legatees, devisees 
or the representative may be examined.10 In New Jersey 
it has been held that the representative can be examined 
but that he cannot be compelled to ·testify to any trans­
action with or statement by the deceased person.11 Spe­
cial provision has been made in Ontario for the situation 
where an infant is a party. Either the guardian or next . 
friend is examinable, as is the infant also, unless he is 
incompetent to give evidence. The court rather than the 
special examiner is the judge of the capacity of the in­
fant if his examination is contested. 
PERSONS ExAMINABLE ON BEHALF OF CoRPORATION 
If discovery was sought from a corporation defendant 
under the chancery procedure, it was the practice to add 
one of its officers as codefendant.u Under the statu­
tory practice the New Jersey court has held that in the 
absence of specific statutory authority it was not pos­
sible to examine representatives of a corporate party.18 
The South Carolina court, on the contrary, has held that 
the word "party " is broad enough to include officers of 
a corporation which is a party.14 In states in which 
deposition procedure is used for purposes of discovery 
before trial representatives of corporations may be ex­
amined as witnesses generally. The question of their . 
right to represent the corporation is reserved for the 
trial. The discovery statutes in a number of jurisdictions 
specify what particular representatives of a corporation 
1o m  re Kimmerle 's Will (1927) 225 N. Y. S. 779 ; In re Dooper's Will 
(1925) 208 N. Y. S. 820; In re Britsch 's Estate (1926) 219 N. Y. S. 124. 
11 Deak, Adm 'r v. Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. (1923) 1 N. J. Mise. 457. 
1J Wilson v. Church (1878) 9 Ch. D. 552. 
11 Apperson v. Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. (1876) 38 N. J. L. 272. 
16 U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C. 56, 150 
8. E. 347. 
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may be examined on its behalf. Often the statutes pro­
vide both a general and a specific designation of the 
representatives who are examinable. T.he statement that 
' ' officers ' '  may be examined is followed by the enumera­
tion of specific officers. Jurisdictions in which the stat­
utes employ the word " officer " are : Alabama, California, 
Connecticut, England, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin. The 
following officers and agents are specifically designated 
in the various statutes : 
President, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Da­
kota, Ohio and Quebec. 
Vice-president, in Virginia. 
Secretary, in North Dakota, Ohio, Quebec and Vir­
gmra. 
Treasurer, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Quebec and 
Virginia. 
Superintendent, in Massachusetts and South Dakota. 
Manager, business manager, or managing agent, in 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, South Dakota and 
Virginia. 
Dir"ector, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan and 
New York. 
Member, in California and England. 
Agent, in Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, 
Quebec, Virginia and Wisconsin. 
Clerk, in Connecticut and Massachusetts. 
Cashier, in Virginia. 
Statutes in the following states provide for the ex­
amination of corporate employees or servants : Michigan, 
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New Jersey, New York, Ontario, Washington and Wis­
consin. Since the theory is that the person examined 
represents the corporation and to that extent binds the 
corporation, it is natural that corporations should dis­
pute the right of mere employees to be examined on their 
behalf. The decisions in Ontario as t.o what persons may 
be examined have been varied and numerous, the most 
nearly general test being the ability of the particular 
person to give the necessary information rather than 
his exact relation to the company.15 In New York it has 
been held that the word " managing" in the phrase " man­
aging agents and employees ' '  is applicable to both 
"agents " and "employees. " 16 The chief reason which 
prompted the present wording of the statute was that 
employees were to be examined as corporate representa­
tives rather than as witnesses merely.17 Therefore the 
test generally followed is this : Can the particular em­
ployee whose examination is sought speak in any wise 
representatively for the corporation in regard to the par­
ticular matter in question7 The important point is not 
the g�neral relation of the employee to the corporation,l8 
but rather his relation to the particular transaction in 
dispute.19 Thus, under differing circumstances, iden­
tically the same employee of identically the same corpo­
ration may or may not be held a managing employee 
15 Ross on Discovery (Can. Ed.) 30; MacGregor, What Persons in the 
Service of a Litigating Corporation Are Examinable for Discovery in Its 
Behalf, 2 Can. L. Rev. 254; Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed. 
1927) vol. 3, page 781 ff. 
18 Swift v. General Baking Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 554. 1'7 Cf. Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 
23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 742. 
18 The earliest cases indicated that this was the test. Friedman v. New 
York Central R. Co. (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 337; Bloede & Co. v. Devine Co. 
(1924) 206 N. Y. S. 739. But there has been a constant and conscious 
backing away from the theory of the Friedman ease. See Rothschild, 
The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 
742 ; 26 Col. L. Rev. 30, 56; 27 Col. L. Rev. 413, 422. 
19 See Fulton v. Nat. Aniline & Chemical Co. (1925) 211 N. Y. S. 769; 
and eases in the next several footnotes. · 
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within the meaning of the statute.2° Certainly few em­
ployees would have less right to represent a corporation 
generally than elevator operators, and yet in one case 
where the issue concerned the condition and state of 
repair of an elevator at the time of an accident, such an 
employee was deemed to be a fit representative of the 
corporation.21 
In such states as New Hampshire, Missouri, Kentucky, 
Indiana, Ohio. and Nebraska, where it is possible to take 
the deposition of parties and witnesses alike for discov­
ery purposes, there is no such trouble about the right to 
examine employees of corporations. Any and all em­
ployees may be examined just as if they were ordinary 
witnesses. The question as to whether, and to what ex­
tent, the statements of any particular employee can be 
used against the corporation, under such a procedure, 
is not raised until the trial. 
Particular problems have arisen concerning the ex­
amination of former officers and employees of litigating 
corporations due to the prejudice which common ex­
perience has shown former employees may bear toward 
the very corporation on whose behalf they are examined. 
Such problems have been handled in the following ways : 
New York. .Although neither the Civil Practice Act 
nor the Rules cover the exact situation, it has been held 
that a trial court, under its general discretionary powers, 
may allow the examination before trial of a former em­
ployee of a corporation which is a party to the action." . 
A rather practical expedient in the examination of such 
former employee for discovery is to allow the employee 
10 Cameron v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1925) 210 N. Y. S. 241; Warner 
v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 579. In one case the claim 
agent was held a managing employee and in the other case not. 
21 Bregman v. Edbro Realty Co. (1929) 135 Misc. 87, 236 N. y; S. 409, 
where an examination of an elevator operator under such circumstances 
was allowed. See also Swift v. General Baking Company (1927) 129 
Misc. 135, 220 N. Y. S. 554. 
U Mayer v. New York Canners (1926) 217 App. Div. 202, 216 N. Y. S. 
568. 
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to be examined as a witness only and not as a corporate 
representative. This precludes an unfair use of the 
examination at the trial.118 This is the method used for 
the examination of all corporate officers and agents, both 
present and past, in states which allow the taking of 
depositions generally for discovery. 
Wisconsin. There has been some complaint against 
the practice of allowing the examination of former em­
ployees as adverse witnesses on the ground that they 
are not in reality hostile. It is always possible, how­
ever, for the corporation, under the ordinary rules of 
evidence, to object at the trial that such examinations 
should not be used as admissions against it, regardless 
of the specific ·allowance of the examination by the dis­
covery statutes. 
England. The problem of former employees is han­
dled by allowing interrogation of bona fide present rep­
resentatives of the corporation only, but requiring such 
representatives to make due inquiry for information 
from past agents. It is, however, a reasonable excuse 
that it is impracticable or impossible to obtain the de­
sired information from the former agents.84 
Massat•httsetts. Only persons in the present employ of 
corporations are examinable in its behalf and there is no 
duty of making inquiry from former employees and serv-
ants." 
· 
Ontario. It was at one time allowable to examine 
former officers for discovery, but later such a policy was 
abandoned.86 
83 Schmitt v. Neapolitan Ice Cream Co. (1925) 213 App. Div. 884, 209 
N. Y. S. 916. See also' Cokely v. Bronx Nat. Bank (1926) 127 Misc. 175, 
215 N. Y. S. 311. 
84 Bray's Law of Discovery, 142. 
85 Gunn v. Railroad Co. (1898) 171 Mass. 417, 50 N. E. 1031. 
86 See Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed. 1927) vol 3, page 
789 as to the exact time as of which the officer shall be deemed a present 
or past officer of a corporation in cases where the connection is severed 
after the cause of action accrues or after the action is brought. 
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Several of the states make special provision for exam­
ination of officers of municipal corporations. In Massa­
chusetts the mayor or chairman of the board is the 
proper representative to be interrogated. While an offi­
cer or employee of a municipal corporation may be exam­
ined for discovery in New York in a proper case, it has 
been held that the proceeding for such an examination 
must be initiated by court order rather than by notice 
as in the case of representatives of private corpora­
tions.117 Under the statutory provision for written in­
terrogatories to corporate parties it has been held that 
a county can be compelled to answer through its offi­
cers.28 The federal equity rules treat private and public 
corporations alike in this respect, but in both instances, 
· it is necessary to procure a court order for the examina­
tion, rather than to proceed by notice as in the case of 
an ordinary litigant.29 
If the theory is that the person examined is the alter 
ego of the corporation and that his answers are regarded 
as the answers of the corporation,80 it is of some moment 
whether the corporation or the applicant for discovery 
selects the representative who does the answering. This 
matter has been handled in the following way in different 
jurisdictions. 
England. The applicant for discovery can serve the 
interrogatories upon the corporation and let it select a 
representative to answer for it, or he can show why some 
particular officer or member is better qualified than 
others to give an answer.81 But in the latter event the 
117 City of New York v. Velmachos (1927) 129 Misc. 177, 221 N. Y. S. 
40; Hannon v. City of New York (1929) 226 App. Div. 757, 234 N. Y. S. 1. 
liS Ex parte Elmore County (1921) 207 Ala. 68, 91 So. 876. 
ll9 Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co. (1916) 234 Fed. 194. ·Cf. 
Grasselli Chem. Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co. (1920) 282 Fed. 
379. 
SO Berkeley v. Standard Co. (1879) 13 C. D. 98. Some of the statutes 
provide that the corporate representative shall be examined " as if he 
were a party. ' '  
3 1  Authorities are collected in Annual Practice (1930) page 514; 
Bray's Law of Discovery, 79. 
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corporation can contest the right of the person named 
to represent the body. 
Massachusetts. Sometimes the proponent of the in­
terrogatories specifies the officer from whom an answer is 
desired, but more often the questions are addressed to 
the corporation and it selects the officer to do the answer­
ing. Even in the former event the corporation can select 
some officer other than the one named. 
Georgia. It is necessary to address the interroga­
tories to some particular officer of the corporation and 
to give notice of filing of the interrogatories to its attor­
ney of record, or officers. 
Ontario. The party seeking the examination rather 
than the corporation is the one to say what corporate 
officer shall be questioned. 88 
Other states. The usual practice is for the applicant 
for discovery to name the corporate officer whose exam­
ination is desired. Especially is this true in states which 
employ an oral examination for discovery, and this for 
the practical reason that the applicant not only must 
serve n<ltice of the examination but he mu�t also sub­
poena the particular person who is to be examined. 
Shall only one representative be examined on behalf 
of a corporation, or may more than one · be examined ¥ 
The following variations of practice are to be found. 
Wisconsin. It is possible to examine as many cor­
porate representatives as are thought to have knowledge 
of any of the facts in dispute. Some complaint as to 
this practice was heard among Wisconsin lawyers, who 
reported several instances in which whole train crews 
had been examined at one time, causing some hardship. 
88 Barry v. Toronto and Niagara Power Company (1906) 70 W. R. 700, 
770. 
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Federal equity. In the absence of a special showing 
of necessity only one corporate officer can be examined.88 
New York. The policy has been to discourage the 
scheduling of simultaneous examinations of different 
corporate representatives, but to allow successive exam­
inations until the necessary . information is finally ob­
tained. at 
Ontario. Only one corporate representative may be 
· examined as of right, although discovery may be obtained 
from others upon court order for cause shown.85 Such 
leave seems to be seldom granted, unless the first exam­
ination has failed to give an adequate disclosure. Al­
though there are cases of record in which a number of 
officers or agents have been examined,86 the tendency at 
present is to restrict the questioning to a single person 
who is entitled to speak for the corporation. 
Other states. States in which it is permissible to take 
the depositions of both parties and witnesses for dis­
covery obviously have a practice which allows the exam­
ination before trial of as many corporate officers and 
servants as the applicant desires, since they are exam­
ined upon the theory that they are witnesses rather than 
upon the theory that they are corporate representatives. 
DISCOVERY FROM WITNESSES 
Discovery could be had only from parties under the 
clrancery practice. The rule was that only persons who 
had such an interest in the action that they would be 
directly affected by the decree could be parties for pur­
poses of discovery.87 This was tantamount to saying 
88 Texas Co. v. Gulf Refining Co. (1926) 12 F. (2d) 317. 84 N. Y. City Car Ad. Co. v. Regensburg and Sons (1923) 205 App. Div. 
705, 200 N. Y. S. 152. 
85 Dawson v. London St. Ry. (1898) 18 P, R, 223. 86 Clarkson v. Bank of Hamilton (1904) 90 L. R. 317. See al110 Ca­
nadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed. 1927) vol, 3, p. 791, 
8'7 Bray 's Law of Discovery, 40. 
PERSONS SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY 47 
that discovery could not be had from witnesses or from 
any other third persons not parties. This doctrine has . 
been carried over into some of the �pecial statutory sub­
stitutes for the chancery practice. A Massachusetts opin­
ion is representative when it states that : "It is clear 
that courts do not compel discovery from persons who 
sustain no other relation to the contemplated litigation, 
or to the subject of the suit, than that of witnesses. ' '  88 
In such a situation it is of importance to note the inroads 
which modern practice is making upon this principle. 
Ontario. There is a rule of court which allows the 
court to order the examination of any person as upon 
deposition when it appears necessary for the purposes of 
justice.89 Up until 1894 some use was made of this pro­
vision to obtain discovery from persons not parties and 
from ordinary witnesses, and the practice was sanc­
tioned.40 In that year, however, the court overruled the 
line of cases allowing this expedient and held that this 
provision could not be used to enlarge the power of dis­
covery under the regular rules covering that subject.41 
Toronto judges and practitioners are opposed to the al­
lowance of widespread discovery from ordinary wit­
nesses. Sometimes, however, there can be discovery of 
documentary evidence from persons not parties- to the 
action.48 The test as to whether production for inspec­
tion will be ordered is whether production of the par­
ticular document at the trial could be compelled. 
New York. The deposition of any other person, which 
is material and necessary may be taken if any of the 
following conditions are met : . 
(1 )  Where the person is  about to  depart from the 
state ; 
88 Post v. Railway Co. (1887) 144 Mass. 341, 11 N. E. 540. 
89 Rule 271. 
40 See list of cases in Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) 
page 738. 
41 Beaton v. Globe Printing Co. (1894) 16 P. R. 281. 
41 Rule 350. · 
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(2) Where the person is out of the state ; 
(3 )  Where the person resides at a greater distance 
·from the place of trial than one hundred miles ; 
( 4) Where the person is so sick or infirm as to afford 
reasonable grounds of belief that he will not be able to 
attend the trial ; or 
· 
( 5) Where ' ' other special circumstances ' '  render it 
proper that his deposition ·should be taken.48 It is obvi­
ous that these provisions offer possibilities for discovery 
before trial from ordinary witnesses. The courts have 
been v�ry liberal in their construction of (2) and (3) ,44 
and one of the " special circumstances " under ( 5 )  is that 
the adverse party has wrongfully refused to furnish in­
formation in his possession which he has been ordered 
to disclose.45 
A memorandum decision has been rendered recently 
in the First Department which indicates an allowance of 
. discovery of documents in the possession of persons not 
parties to the action.46 The brief for the successful party 
in the case stated : ' ' The court has inherent power to re­
quire the production of any books and papers within its 
jurisdiction and to direct that those books and papers 
may be used to refresh the memory of any person without 
putting the subpoenaed person upon the stand to identify 
the books and papers or testify with regard to them. As 
a practical matter, the party producing the books and 
records would neither be sworn nor examined. He would 
merely be directed to turn over to the defendant, who was 
being examined, the books and records produced. The 
defendant would then examine these books which either 
48 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288. 
44 Muschler v. General Metalsmiths (1925) 125 Misc. 643, 211 N. Y. S. 
693. 
411 Loomis v. Marsch (1925) 215 App. Div. 691, 212 N. Y. S. 859. See 
also as to special circumstances, 0 'Neill v. James (1925) 214 App. Div. 
522, 212 N. Y. S. 386 ; Roberts v. Hayden (1925) 213 App. Div. 1, 209 
N. Y. S. 598. The first cited case indicates limitations upon discovery 
from witnesses generally. 
46 Bernheim v. Samuels (1928) 224 App. Div, 722. 
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would or would not refresh his recollection. There the 
matter would end. ' '  47 An act was passed, in 1929 pro­
viding for the production under compulsory process of 
hospital records but apparently only production at the 
trial is contemplated.48 
Wisconsin. There is a liberal provision for exam­
ination of parties and representatives of corporate par­
ties in Wisconsin, but there is no provision for exam­
ination of witnesses before trial. Discovery procedure 
is quite widely used by Wisconsin lawyers and has given 
entire satisfaction. For this reason it was thought wise 
to ascertain the viewpoint of the bar of the state as to 
the wisdom of allowing discovery from witnesses gen­
erally. A variety of opinion is entertained. Slightly 
less than fifty per cent of those who were questioned 
about the matter (not counting the commissioners,. whose 
opinion might be said to be of less weight because of per­
sonal interest ) were in favor of allowing discovery from 
witnesses. · Some of those favoring it added certain limi­
tations, as for instance, that the party taking the exam­
ination of an ordinary witness be forced to pay for it 
and not be allowed to tax therefor. . Several kinds of 
objections were offered by those who opposed the innova­
tion : ( 1 )  It would make it even harder to get voluntary 
witnesses at the trial than it is now ; ( 2 )  It would be too 
costly ; (3 )  It might work injustice in particular actions 
such as actions for divorce ; ( 4) It would prevent the 
lawyers from keeping back certain parts of their evi­
dence which for tactical reasons is a valuable practice. 
The arguments advanced by those who favored the pro­
posal were : (1 )  That the best way to get at the truth 
is to turn all of the light possible on the case ; (2 )  That 
settlements would be facilitated ; (3)  That it would give 
47 See also the following cases for possibilities of discovery of docu­
ments from witnesses: Continental ,Ins. Co. v. Equitable Trust Co. (1930) 
244 N. Y. S. 377; Meretsky v. Wolff (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 776. 
48 Laws of New York. (1929) Ch. 339. 
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a weapon with which to deal with witnesses who refuse 
to give voluntary statements ; ( 4) That the experience 
with discovery so far has been so wholesome that the 
extension would be worth a trial. Only one Wisconsin 
lawyer gave as a reason for opposing discovery from 
witnesses the one formerly employed against discovery 
as a whole, namely, that if the party knew his opponent 's 
evidence in advance of trial he would manufacture evi­
dence to meet it or would tamper with witnesses. 
Ohio, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Indiana and Texas. The ordinary deposition procedure 
did not follow the rule of chancery that only parties 
should be examined, for its primary purpose was to 
provide a way to take and preserve the testimony of 
ordinary witnesses. Accordingly, in states in which the 
deposition procedure has been used as a device for ob­
taining discovery, discovery from witnesses as well as 
from parties is allowed. Such a practice exists and is 
used in the following states : Ohio, Kentucky, New 
Hampshire, Missouri, Nebraska, Indiana and Texas. It 
likewise exists in a few other states but has not been 
used to any considerable extent. 
The policy behind a liberal allowance of discovery 
from witnesses has been well stated by the late William 
Howard Taft while he was Judge of the Superior Court 
of Cincinnati, Ohio : 
" There is likely to be no motive for fishing unless 
the person whose deposition is sought has been unwilling 
to state his knowledge upon inquiry. If a witness is so 
reluctant as not to state his knowledge to a party asking 
it, the witness cannot complain if the party presumes 
that the knowledge thus withheld may be useful evidence 
to him on the trial of the case, and that his refusal to 
give information indicates a desire to avoid the trial. 
Witnesses do not belong . to one party more than to 
another. What they know relevant to the issue should 
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be equally available to both sides, and if they claim im­
munity from examination by deposition on the theory 
that their testimony is one side 's rether than the other 's, 
their claim is utterly indefensible. , What a witness is 
presumed to know is the truth and that cannot vary be­
tween the time of taking the deposition and the trial. 
If there is likely to be a variance in the testimony, the 
earlier a witness is committed to a statement the better 
for the sake of the truth. There is no objection that I 
know, why each party should not know the other 's \ 
case. " 49 
Even though it is possible to take depositions af any 
and all witnesses there is no inclination upon the part 
of lawyers to take them promiscuously for purely dis­
covery purposes. In the first place there is no general 
necessity for doing so, because it is usually possible to 
get voluntary statements from witnesses. Only when a 
witness refuses to give a statement, or when the lawyer 
distrusts a witness, is there any need to employ the com­
pulsory process. Occasionally, for tactical reasons, the 
depositiiJln of an important witness is taken without first 
seeking his voluntary statement. Apparently the taking 
of depositions of witnesses for purposes of discovery 
is more widespread in New Hampshire and in Missouri 
than elsewhere. In the principal cities of both states 
quite a number of lawyers make it a regular practice to 
take the deposition of every witness who refuses to give 
a voluntary statement. In Ohio, Texas, Nebraska, Ken­
tucky and Indiana there is a similar though less com­
mon practice. Several other reasons are assigned by 
practicing lawyers to explain why they do not take 
depositions of witnesses more frequently. One reason 
is that either party may use the deposition of a witness 
at the trial, if the witness is unavailable for oral testi­
mony, regardless of which party has taken the deposition. 
49 Shaw v. Ohio Edis.on Co. (1887) 9 0. Dee. Rep. 809, 812. 
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In Texas it can be used even if the witness is present. 
Since depositions would be taken for discovery purposes 
from hostile witnesses more often, there is some danger 
that by taking the depositions of such witnesses a lawyer 
might be supplying ammunition for his adversary. If 
the witness should die or become unavailable his testi­
mony really would have been preserved by the adverse 
party. Even though the witness were
' 
available, there 
is a chance that the party favored by the testimony might 
induce the witness to be unavailable at the trial so as to 
be able to use the testimony without the witness being 
subjected to rigid cross examination, if the deposition 
has proved particularly unfavorable to the party who 
took it for discovery. Such is the fear expressed by some 
lawyers, especially in states where practically no use is 
made of the deposition procedure for discovery from 
either parties or witnesses. Of course the danger is 
less in the case .of parties, for a party usually would lose 
more than he would gain by staying away from the 
trial. 
Coupled with the fear of supplying testimony for the 
adverse party is the fear of " being bound" by the wit­
ness ' testimony. The only relevant rule of law upon 
which such fear could be based is the rule that a party 
by using the deposition of a witness thereby makes the 
witness his own so as to preclude him from impeaching 
the credit of the witness. Clearly upon principle, and.as 
a rule of law in most states, a party does not lose the 
right to impeach the credit of a witness by taking his 
deposition but only by using it. Dean Wigmore has set 
forth the rule thus : 
"But the difficulty is, where A the taker, has made no 
use of the depositions, that he can hardly be said to have 
made the witness his own ; indeed, his failure to use them 
is generally due to the discovery that the witness ' testi­
mony is unfavorable, and is practically a repudiation of · 
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it ; his taking the deposition was thus a mere unsuccessful 
voyage of discovery, and the first and only person to 
utilize the deposition as testimony ie B ; the witness there­
fore is B 's ; accordingly, B may not impeach him. ' '  60 
The final reason assigned why the practice of taking 
depositions of ordinary witnesses for discovery is not 
more widespread is the expense involved. Generally the 
party who takes depositions must pay for them in the 
first instance and he may tax them as costs only in case 
he uses them at the trial. That this rule has some bear­
ing upon the practice under discussion is indicated by 
the experience in Missouri, where the cost of all depo­
sitions may be taxed regardless of whether they are used 
or not. The taking of depositions of witnesses is quite 
widespread in Missouri and the rule as to costs is as­
signed as one of the reasons why it is widespread. 
60 Wigmore on Evidence, III, 912. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TIME OF DISCOVERY 
DISCOVERY UsuAL Y AvAILABLE ONLY AFTER PLEADING 
As a general rule discovery is available to a party only 
after he has filed his pleading. Nor is discovery before 
pleading often necessary. A party usually knows enough 
about his supposed cause of action to file a pleading. 
The statements contained in the pleading are regarded as 
an indication of the party's bona fides in seeking dis­
covery.1 Then, too, the proper scope of the examination 
is more easily ascertained after the pleadings have been 
filed. While discovery is not necessary until after plead­
ing in most cases, there are occasional cases in which 
justice requires that a party have discovery before 
pleading. Several states have provided for this situation 
by specific statutes. 
RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO DISCOVERY BEFORE PLEADING 
Most of the states which have a written interrogatory 
procedure have adopted the rule of chancery that dis­
covery can be had by a party only after pleading. In­
terrogatories must be attached to the pleading under the 
practice in some states.8 In others the party is not re­
quired to annex his interrogatories but may serve them 
separately. Even so, it is usually provided that the 
plaintiff may do so only after filing his petition.8 In Eng-
1 Campbell v. Scott (1890) 14 P. R. 203. 
a This is true in Indiana, Iowa, Ohio and Louisiana. The statutes are 
set forth in the appendix at the back of this volume. 
8 This is true in Connecticut, Washington, Florida and the United 
States Equity Courts. The New Jersey provision is even stricter, allow­
ing discovery only after issue joined. 
54 
TIME OF DISCOVERY 55 
land a plaintiff is rarely if ever allowed discovery before 
statement of his claim, or defendant before statement of 
his defense.' Bray aptly summarizes the English atti­
tude when he says : ' ' From the earliest times the courts 
have set their faces against allowing discovery for the 
purpose of fishing out a case. ' '  5 Within the last year 
the question whether the plaintiff can ever have discovery 
before he has delivered his statement of claim has been 
presented to the King 's Bench Division of the High 
Court of Justice in England. The court held that such 
discovery would not be allowed except " in the most ex­
ceptional circumstances. ' '  Scrutton, L. J., said : ' ' This 
is a daring experiment but I am afraid I am too old to 
yield to Mr. van den Berg 's entreaties. The appeal is 
against an order made by the Master and Judge order­
ing the production of documents before the statement of 
claim in the action has been delivered. Neither Lawrence, 
L. J., nor I has ever known of such an order being made. 
I do not question for a moment that under the wide 
words of Order XXXI., rr. 12 and 14, there is power to 
make such an order, but equally I think that it should 
not be made unless in the most exceptional .circumstances. 
A plaintiff who issues a writ must be taken to know what 
his case is. If he merely issues a writ on the chance of 
making a case he is issuing what used to be called a ' fish­
ing bill ' to try to find out whether he has a case or not. 
That kind of proceeding is not to be encouraged. For a 
plaintiff after issuing his writ but before delivering his 
statement of claim to say, 'Show me the documents which 
may be relevant, so that I may see whether I have a case 
or not ', is a most undesirable proceeding. " 6 
Several jurisdictions allow discovery by oral exam­
ination before pleading. The procedure, however, is dif-
. i British Thompson-Houston Co. v. Duram (1915) 1 Ch. 823; Dis­
ney v. Longbourne (18·75) 2 C. D. 704. 
II Annual Practice (1929) 494. 
6 Gale v. Denman Picture Houses, Ltd. (1930) 1 K. B. 588, 590. 
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ferent from that which obtains if the discovery is sought 
after pleading. 
Wisconsin. If discovery is desired for the purpose of 
enabling the party to plead, the notice must be accom­
panied by an affidavit of the party, or his attorney or 
agent, stating the general nature and object of the ac­
tion ; that discovery is sought to enable him to plead ; 
and the subjects upon which information is desired. The 
examination is allowed as a matter of course unless be­
forehand the judge further limits the subjects to which it 
may extend. This places the burden on the adverse 
party to raise the issue of the right to take the examina­
tion. It is not necessary that the affidavit set out facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action ; nor even is it 
necessary that the affiant know that a cause of action 
exists. It is sufficient if the plaintiff shows that he may 
be entitled to recover against the defendant and that dis­
covery is necessary to enable him to plead.7 The courts 
have even gone so far as to hold that bad faith in seeking 
an examination should not defeat the right thereto as 
long as the affidavit sets out the grounds mentioned in the 
statute, the view being that the statute itself affords 
ample protection against unnecessary or improper exam­
ination.' Nor does it necessarily defeat the plaintiff's 
right that he already has facts sufficient to frame a com­
plaint general in its terms.8 After service of the com­
plaint the defendant 's right to an examination of his 
opponent is the same as if the allegations of the com­
plaint had already been put in issue. T...he notice should 
be served at least five days beforehand. If the exam­
ination is to be taken without the state three days' notice 
7 American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co. (i912) 151 Wis. 
385, 138 N. W. 1123 ; Keckendorn v. Romadka (1909) 138 Wis. 416, 120 
N. W. 257 ; Gratz v. Parker (19()7) 137 Wis: 104, 118 N. W. 637. 
8 Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1909) 138 Wis. 390, 120 
N. W. 235. 
9 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co. (1896) 92 Wis. 529, 66 N. W. 695. 
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plus an additional day's notice for each three hundred 
miles or fraction thereof after the first ten miles from 
the place where the notice is served, must be allowed.10 
The notice must comply with the• requirements of the stat­
utes as to notices generally ; it must be in writing and be 
served on all adverse parties or their attorneys.11 As a 
practical matter, it is usually not necessary for the court 
· to limit the examination. Nor is it often requested. The 
records further indicate that in a large percentage of 
cases no action is ever brought after the discovery is com� 
pleted. Some of the court clerks have a file for miscella­
neous papers in which they place depositions which have 
not been followed up by any subsequent papers. The 
number of such depositions which accumulate in a year 
is rather remarkable. 
New York. The earliest New York cases under the 
Code of Civil Procedure in 1848 held that discovery could 
be had only after issue joined but this construction was 
later refuted.111 The Civil Practice Act specifically pro­
vides that the examination may be had before pleading.18 
The purpose of the provision is to allow an examination 
for the purpose of framing a pleading and the showing 
upon which the order allowing the examination is granted 
must be in accordance with this purpose.14 The pro­
cedure is equally available to a defendant to aid him in 
drawing his answer, although the Rules of Practice do 
not specifically cover the case.15 Of the two possible 
methods of initiating examinations for discovery in New 
10 Wis. Stat. ( 1927) ch. 326, sec. 9. 
11 Wis. Stat. (1927) ch. 269, sec. 32 ff; First National Bank of Elk­
horn v. Wood (1870) 26 Wis. 500. 
lll Phoenix v. Dupuy (1878) 2 Abb. N. C. 146. See generally New 
York Civiii Practice Notes (Cahill, 1927) p. 366. 
18 N. Y. Civil Practice Act, sec. 295, Rules of Civil Practice, rule 122. 
14 Newman v.' Potter (1922) 201 App. Div. 335, 194 N. Y. S. 207 ; 
Welsh v. Cowles Shipyard (Jo. (1922) 200 App. Div. 724, 193 N. Y. S. 
355. 
15 Ainsworth v. Cooper Underwear Co. (1929) 227 App. Div. 837, 237 
N. Y. S. 301. 
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York only ·one, an application for a court order in the 
first instance, can be used if discovery is sought before 
issue joined.18 The showing required on the application 
for such order is that the discovery is material and 
necessary for the purpose of framing a pleading.17 Un­
der this general provision the test as outlined by the 
decisions is that the party must show reasonable grounds 
for belief that he has a meritorious cause of action ; 18 
and must name the definite adverse parties.19 A distinc­
tion is drawn between facts constituting a good cause of 
action and facts constituting a good complaint, a dis­
tinction in line with which it has been held that an exam­
ination of the defendant to frame a complaint can be 
permitted only when the plaintiff states a good cause of 
action in his affidavit, but is unable to state material and 
necessary facts with sufficient definiteness or particu..: 
larity to make a good pleading.80 Similarly a justifiable 
purpose in seeking discovery may be to :find out the exact 
legal character of the claim so that the proper form of 
action may be ascertained.11 Again, a somewhat similar 
theory, under the disguise of different terminology, is 
that discovery before issue joined will be allowed when 
the party applicant can give an approximate forecast of 
what the issues may be.u 
Since it is conceived to be the very essence of the pro­
vision allowing an examination to enable a party to plead 
that it can be allowed only when otherwise injustice 
would result, an application for such an examination can 
16 In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. ( 1923) 198 N. Y. B. 503. 
17 Rule 122. 
· 
18 Ashton v. Baker Mfg. Corp. (1923) 206 App. Div. 343, 201 N. Y. B. 
259. 
19 In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. (1923) 198 N. Y. B. 503. Cf. Lauffer 
v. Eastern Star Temple (1924) 210 App. Div. 619, 207. N. Y. B. 292, 
where an examination for the purpose of identifying the defendant was 
allowed. 
liO Garbrinsky v. Meagher (1923) 198 N. Y. B. 833. 
ll1 Teall v. Roeser (1923) 206 App. Div. 371, 201 N. Y. S. 280. 
u Noble v. Copake Lake Pure Ice & Water Co. (1927) 129 Miac, 4451 
222 N. Y. B. 367. 
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be defeated by a showing that the party already has the 
· requisite knowledge, or could reasonably get it by fol­
lowing up the knowledge which he"'has.88 Discovery may 
be postponed until after the determination of some pre­
liminary issue, if the court thinks it expedient.84' This 
is especially the desirable practice in actions for account­
ing, namely, to postpone the discovery until after the 
right to an accounting has been decided.26 
Carolinas and Dakotas. The statutes in North Caro­
lina, South Carolina, North Dakota and South Dakota 
provide that the examination may be had ' ' at any time 
before trial. " Only in North Carolina has this provision 
been definitely construed to allow discovery to enable a 
party to plead. The applicant must show the necessity 
and materiality of the discovery by appropriate affi­
davits.86 The South Dakota Supreme Court has avoided 
the question of the right to examine before pleading say­
ing, " whether under this statute an adverse party may 
be called for oral examination prior to issue joined is a ·  
question with which we are not concerned at this time. ' '  87 
' 
California, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio and Texas. The.c2 
are two different expedients under deposition procedure · 
in some states by which it is possible for the plaintiff to 
obtain discovery before pleading. First, the statutes re­
garding depositions to perpetuate testimony, in contrast 
with the statutes regarding depositions generally, allow 
taking before commencement of the action.28 Such depo-
28 Tanebaum v. Lindheim (1900) 66 N. Y. S. 375 ; Thompson v. Haigh 
(1909) 119 N. Y. S. 331. Likewise discovery is not proper where the 
only information lacking is the exact amount of recovery to be de­
manded. Flackee v. Peck (1925) 212 App. Div. 883, 208 N. Y. S. 860; 
• In re Groothaert (1922) 201 App. Div. 510, 194 N. Y. S. 577. 
M Struckler v. Teitz (1923) 206 App. Div. 436, 201 N. Y. S. 394. 26 De Rapalie v. Gavin (1924) 209 App. Div. 883, 205 N. Y. S. 578. ll6 Bailey :v; Matthews (1911) .156 N. C. 78, 72 S. E. 92 ; Smith v. 
Wooding (1919) 177 N. C. 546, 94 S. E. 404; Fields v. Coleman and 
Young (1912) 160 N. C. 11, 75 S. E. 1005; Chesson v. Washington County 
Bank (1925) 190 N. C. 187, 129 S. E. 403. · 
ll'7 Niblo v. Ede (1917) 39 S. D. 338, 341, 164 N. W. 109, 111. 
ll8 See Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 565; Mo. �ev. Stat. (1919) 
sec. 5476. See 4 Sou. Cal. L. Rev. 190 as to the California situation. 
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sitions can be taken only upon court order for cause 
shown.19 Very little actual use of this procedure for dis­
covery before pleading has been found, but it offers possi­
bilities which a few lawyers have used. The second 
device for obtaining what is in reality discovery before 
pleading is to file a skeleton pleading, take depositions 
and then amend. This expedient is used quite widely, 
especially in Missouri, Ohio, California and Texas. The 
Missouri courts have considered this practice at differ­
ent times and have upheld it, saying that : ' ' The failure 
_of the petition to state a cause of action will not deprive 
a party to a suit of the right to obtain the deposition of 
a witness. ' '  80 ' ' The institution of the suit ' '  is regarded 
as the 
·
' 'guaranty of the plaintiff 's earnestness. ' '  31 
Similarly the California court has allowed the plaintiff 
to take the defendant 's deposition for discovery after a 
general demurrer has been sustained to the pleading and 
before any amendment has been filed.32 While authority 
: ; ' for obtaining discovery before pleading has not been 
set forth by the courts 'in other states the practice actu­
, ' , ally exists. It is a ·quite frequent thing for plaintiffs to '
., ' ,' serve notice to take depositions at the same time they 
' serve the summons in the action, take depositions, and 
then file an amended complaint. 
RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO DISCOVERY BEFORE PLEADING 
Some courts have taken the position that there should 
be more liberal allowance of discovery before pleading 
to defendants than to plaintiffs since the former may 
more reasonably be resisting claims as to which they 
19 This is not true in Texas ; while no court order is necessary the 
procedure is more formal and complex than the ordinary deposition 
procedure. Tex. Stat. (1928) art. 3842. 
80 State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren. (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 1097. 
See also C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Olin & Sons (1924) 218 Mo. App. 578, 
266 s. w. 130. 
31 Ex parte Munford (1874) 57 Mo. 603, 604. 811 Ross back v. Superior Court (1919) 43 Cal. App. 729, 185 Pac. 879. 
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have no knowledge.88 Moreover, defendants are involun­
tary participants to the controversy and less assurance 
is needed of their bona fides. Accordingly, in some ju­
risdictions either party may have discovery as soon as 
the plaintiff has filed his pleading.84 There is also the 
possibility of discovery before pleading for the defend­
ant under deposition procedure. In Ohio, New Hamp­
shire, Nebraska, Indiana, Texas and Missouri either 
party can take depositions for discovery as soon as the 
action is commenced.85 But in Kentucky the defendant 
may not take depositions until after he has filed his 
answer.88 
88 Hovey v. Gilbert (1887) 12 P. R. 114. 
84 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) Ch. 231, sec. 61; Mich. Court Rules (1931) 
rule 41, sec. 1. Griggs' Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, sees. 286, 
286(a). 
85 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the back of this 
volume. 
86 Ky. Civ. Code (Carroll, 1927) sec. �557. 
CHAPTER IX 
INITIATING STEP IN OBTAINING ORAL EXAM­
INATION FOR DISCOVERY 
WHERE ExAMINATION Is MATTER OF RIGHT 
The examination is initiated by notice and subpoena in 
all jurisdictions in which the examination is a matter of 
right. This is the practice in Wisconsin, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ontario, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hamp­
shire, Ohio, Nebraska, Missouri, California and Texas. 
Except in Ontario the notice is entirely an. extra-judicial 
affair. In Ontario it takes the form of an appointment 
from the special examiner before whom the applicant 
desires that the examination be conducted. A somewhat 
similar practice exists in Wisconsin and elsewhere but 
with the difference that there is no necessity for the ex­
amining officer to issue the notice ; he merely does so for 
convenience. In Wisconsin the commissioners send 
around to the various lawyers forms for the notice and 
subpoena, already signed by themselves. This is a con­
venience for the lawyers as well as a means of soliciting 
business for the commissioners. Printed forms for the 
notice are available in other states and, sometimes, the 
examining officer will effect service thereof for the party 
without extra charge. 
Usually, the notice, in contrast with the subpoena, 
may be served either upon the adverse party or his attor­
ney. The notice must be served upon each adverse party 
if there are several parties.1 Some of the statutes pro­
vide for substituted service of the notice in the event · 
1 Cf. First National Bank of Elkhorn v. Wood (1890) 26 Wis. 500. 
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neither the adverse party nor his attorney of record can 
be served. 
The manner of service of. the notice varies in different­
states. Sometimes it is required that it be served by an 
officer of court/ but more usually it may be made in any 
way in which notices generally may be served under the 
practice of the particular state. 
A common provision is that the notice must be served 
a specified number of days before the examination. The 
exact time differs from ten days in Texas to one day in 
Quebec. The most popular provision is that five days ' 
notice be given, a provision which obtains in Indiana, 
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and North Dakota. Six days ' 
notice is required in South Dakota. No specific period is 
provided in Kentucky but it is required that a reasonable 
time be allowed. In a few jurisdictions the time for 
service of the notice is arranged upon a graduated scale : 
a minimum of one clear day must be allowed for prepara­
tion and sufficient time for travel. This plan is employed 
in N ebraska and Missouri. 
The usual requirement is that the notice must contain : 
The title of the action ; the court in which the action is 
pending ; the time and place of the examination ; the name 
of the officer before whom it will be held ; and the name of 
the person to be examined. Ohio has a peculiar pro­
vision as to the specification of the time when the ex­
amination will be held. It is possible, instead of specify­
ing the exact hour, to schedule the examination between 
two different specified hours. This provision has been 
the subject of some little abuse in Ohio, in that the oppos­
ing lawyer cannot tell exactly when the examination will 
begin. In Nebraska and Missouri the notice merely 
specifies that the examination will be held before " com­
petent authority, " without naming the particular officer. 
Of course the subsequent subpoena discloses the officer 's 
2 Kyle v .  Kyle (1876) 55 Ind. 387 .. 
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identity. While it is usual to require- that the names of 
the particular persons to be examined be specified in the 
notice,• Ohio and Kentucky omit this requirement. Since 
the ordinary deposition procedure is used, the only speci­
fication of the notice is that depositions of ' ' sundry wit­
nesses ' '  will be taken. This form gives neither the party 
nor his attorney any indication as to whether an examina­
tion of the adverse party or an examination of witnesses 
is contemplated. Nor does it disclose the identity of the 
witnesses who will be examined. Sometimes, if an ex­
amination of the adverse party is contemplated, a phrase 
is added to the effect that the deposition will be taken 
' ' as if upon cross-examination. ' '  The practical result 
of the failure . to specify the persons to be examined is 
that it · is more difficult to coach such persons how to an­
swer anticipated questions. The importance of this as­
pect of the notice is minimized somewhat by the fact 
that the subsequent subpoena divulges the identity of 
the person or persons whose depositions are desired. 
Some Ohio lawyers delay service of the subpoena as late 
as possible, so as to prevent disclosure of the identity of 
the persons to be examined. 
States which employ the notice procedure require that 
the person to be examined be served with a subpoena for 
his attendance. Usually the officer before whom the 
examination will be held issues the subpoena, but in 
California the clerk of the court in which the action is 
pending issues it.t It seems rather clear that American 
courts would not uphold penalties for contempt not predi­
cated upon a subpoena and a refusal to comply there­
with. A subpoena is necessary in Ontario only in the 
event that the person to be examined is not a party to 
the action. It is not necessary to subpoena the party · 
8 In addition to the statutes, see Miller v. Frey (1896) 49 Neb .• 472, 
68 N. W. 630; Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745. 
t Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. (1923) see. 2031;  Cal. Stat. (1929) eh. llO, 
p. 197. 
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nor yet to serve notice on the party. It is sufficient to 
serve notice upon the party 's solicitor. If the party 
fails to appear for the examination his appropriate 
pleading is stricken from the files. This procedure has 
proved very popular with Toronto lawyers because it is 
a step toward simplicity, and reduction of expense.6 
In New Jersey where the proceeding must be initiated 
by court order in the first instance, the service of the 
order is deemed � sufficient summons and notice to the 
party to be examined. 6 
The actual practice in the states in which an examina­
tion before trial is a matter of right indicates its effec­
tiveness in fostering that which is better than a forced 
discovery, namely, a voluntary disclosure. Investigations 
were made in nine states which exhibit such a practice. 
There is a widespread tendency in six of the nine to 
dispense with all formal steps in securing discovery. 
The longer the practice has obtained in the state, it would 
seem, the greater is the tendency to waive technicalities. 
A convenient and inexpensive informality has been sub­
stituted' for a theoretically technical practice by common 
agreement amongst the bar, or at least amongst the 
better element of the bar. The explanation given by 
the lawyers is uniformly that lawyers will accord to their 
opponents voluntarily anything which they know they 
can be compelled to give. Take, for example, the New 
Hampshire experience. All formalities and technical­
ities of every sort regarding the initiating step and other 
formal details are waived in ninety-five per cent. of the 
cases. The lawyer who desires an examination merely 
calls the opposing attorney on the telephone and asks 
· to be allowed to examine the opposing party. Often he 
offers to produce his own client for examination if it is 
desired. All details as to time and plac� and as to the 
li Cf. Campbell v. Lennox (1919) 17 0. W. N. 179 as to possible con­
stitutional difficulties with such a practice in the United States. 
6 N. J. Laws of 1924, ch. 93, p. 183. 
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officer to take down the examination are then agreed 
upon. Only when the applicant distrusts the opposing 
attorney, or when the examination of an ordinary wit­
ness rather than a party is desired, and the applicant 
thinks the witness will hesitate to come voluntarily, does 
he employ the formal process. The first part of a deposi­
tion in New Hampshire usually reads : ' ' All technical­
ities and formalities are waived, so that this deposition 
can be useq for all purposes as if they had been com­
plied with. " The same tendency is found in the fol­
lowing states in which the ordinary deposition procedure 
is used for discovery purposes : Kentucky, Indiana and 
Texas. In Louisville, Kentucky, and Indianapolis, Indi­
ana, there is a widespread practice for the firms of re­
porters who report examinations to arrange all of the 
details. Individual lawyers in these states testify to 
another feature which is yet a ·  step farther in the direc­
tion of an absolutely voluntary discovery. They say they 
offer to allow their opponents to inspect all of the state­
ments which they have obtained from witnesses in the 
case, regardiess of whether the statements favor them­
selves or their opponents. If the opponent can get the 
same information under a compulsory process why not 
accord him the same voluntarily and thus save expense 
and give evidence of an interest in finding the truth, 
regardless of the result 1 Lawyers who have tried it 
· testify to its efficacy in gaining the respect of opposing 
counsel and in getting at the truth of the case. More­
over, such tactics are often reciprocated. Wisconsin 
lawyers often dispense with all technical formalities. 
Thirty-one of fifty examinations in Madison, and twelve 
out of fifty in Milwaukee were taken by stipulation. In . 
Ohio, Nebr�ska, and Missouri the tendency to waive the 
formal steps is less noticeable. Some lawyers do so 
among their intimate associates but the bar generally 
still proceeds formally-at least up until the time the 
attendance of the witness has been secured. 
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WHERE ExAMINATION Is NoT MATTER oF RIGHT 
Two different methods of initiating a discovery ex.­
amination are employed in jurisdictions in which the 
examination is not a matter of right. The party who 
seeks discovery may either apply for a court order or he 
may proceed by notice. If he proceeds by notice, the 
opposite party may move to vacate the notice and thus 
raise the question of propriety of the examination. Some 
jurisdictions provide for both methods, while in others 
the examination can be had only by application for a 
court order in the first instance. 
New York. Both methods are employed under the 
New York practice. Under the Code of Civil Procedure 
an examination for discovery could only be had upon 
court order in the first instance. But in the delibera­
tions preceding the revision which culminated in the 
Civil Practice Act of 1921 there was ' ' an active discus­
sion as to the simplification of the practice relating to 
examinations before trial. ' '  7 ' ' There was a large and 
active representation of the bar of New York City, who 
argued for an examination upon notice similar to the 
federal equity practice, but the board of statutory con­
solidation concluded that an examination should not be 
had, unless the testimony sought was material and neces­
sary. The joint legislative committee, · in passing upon 
the consolidation of the provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure on this subject prepared by the board, said : 
' That the provisions on this subject should be restored 
for the present in practically the same language in which 
'they now exist. ' And in the final draft they were sub-
'I This and the following quotations are taken from the opinion of 
Rodenbeck, J., in Swift v. General Baking Co. (1920) 220 N. Y. S. 554. 
Inasmuch as Judge Rodenbeck was the chairman of the Board of Stat­
utory Consolidation which prepared the Report on the Simplification of 
Civil Practice in New York (usually called the " Rodenbeck Report ") 
these statements are very significant. Compare also pages 200-205, 328-
3,55 of that report. 
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stantially restored, but with a concession of a section to 
those who pleaded for more liberal provisions, which 
authorized the taking of depositions upon notice. As if 
afraid of this, however, the joint committee followed this 
section with one authorizing a motion to vacate or modify 
the notice. The result is that the profession is back 
about where it was under the Code of Civil Procedure, 
with a motion to vacate or modify in nearly every im­
portant case, where a notice is given, and with the prac­
tice gTowing of applying to the court, in the :first instance, 
as was done in the present case. ' '  8 
There are, then, two different initiating steps which 
may lead . to approximately the same result. Discovery 
may be had either upon court order in the :first instance, 
or upon notice, subject to the atlversary turning the pro­
ceeding into one upon court order by his motion to vacate 
the notice. The two procedures, however, require sepa­
rate descriptions. 
The Civil Practice Act, as amended in 1923, provides : 
' ' A  party entitled to take testimony by deposition may 
obtain an order of the court therefor in the :first instance, 
instead of proceeding by notice. The motion shall be 
upon notice to the other parties who have appeared or 
answered. ' '  9 There are three situations in which there 
is no alternative, and in which the only possible 
mode is to obtain a court order in the :first instance. 
These are : :first, where discovery is desired before issue 
joined ; Ul second, where the person whose deposition is 
desired is an . office� or employee of a municipal corpora­
tion ; and third, where it is desired to force the party 
to be examined to bring with him books and papers for 
inspection.11 Where the deposition of a party is to be 
8 See also Bieber-Isaacs Co. v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 
(1925) 125 Misc. 494, 211 N. Y. S. 435. 
9 Sec. 292. See also 23 Col. L. Rev. 734. 
10 See 24 Col. L. Rev. 876. 
11 Ritzwoller v. Lurie (1923) 198 N. Y, S. 754; New York City Car 
Advertising Co. v. E. Regensburg & Sons, Inc. (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 152 ; 
Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745. See also for fine dis-
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taken before issue joined it is not only necessary that 
the proceeding be upon court order, but a notice of the 
motion for the order and supporting affidavit must be 
served upon all adverse parties.18 But the deposition of 
a witness can be taken upon notice, if the statutory 
grounds for taking exist.18 The latter rule, however, 
does not sanction an evasion of the former rule so as to 
allow an examination of the party on the ground that 
he is a witness and resides more than one hundred miles 
away from the place of triaJ.l1 While an officer or em­
ployee of a municipal corporation may be examined in a 
proper case, it has been held that the proceeding for 
such examination must be initiated by court order rather 
than by notice as in the case of representatives of private 
corporations.15 
The party desiring an examination for discovery, in­
stead of applying for a court order in the first instance, 
may serve a notice five days beforehand upon his ad­
versary.18 The notice must set forth : 
(1 )  'fhe person before whom the testimony is to be 
taken. 
(2 )  The time and place at which i t  i s  to  be taken ; 
(3)  The name or names of the persons to be ex- . 
amined ; 
( 4) The matters upon which such person or persons 
are to be examined ; 
( 5) The title of the action ; and 
( 6 )  The ·name and address of the party giving the 
notice. 
cussion of these cases, Rothschild, The Simplication of the Civil Prac­
tice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732 ; 24 Col. L. Rev. 881. 
18 Rules of Civil Practice, 122; In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. (1923) 
198 N. Y. S. 503 ; Davis v. Erdmann (1924) 209 App. Div. 172, 204 
N. Y. S. 333. 
18 St. John v. Putnam (1927) 128 Misc. 707, 220 N. Y. S. 146. lt Curtis v. Searles (1923) 206 App. Div .. 287, 200 N. Y. S. 602. 
15 City of New York v. Velmachos (1927) 129 Misc. 177, 221 N. Y. s. 
40; Hannon v. City of New York (1929) 226 ,Ap;p. Div. 757, 234 N. 
Y. S. 1. 
18 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 290 ; Rules of Civil Practice, 
rule 121. 
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The requirement that the names of the persons to 
be examined be specified applies equally to corporate 
employees ; each employee whose deposition is desired 
must be named and a blanket notice will not suffice.17 
The notice should state that the applicant desires the 
examination of the corporation through the specified 
officers or employees.18 
The requirement that the subject matter of the ex­
amination be stated has caused more difficulty than any 
other. At first there was a variance of opinion among 
the several departments as to whether the rule under 
the Code that the issues must be definitely stated 
without reference to outside papers, should apply. The 
First Department held in favor of the older rule ; the 
Third Department held the opposite, namely, that it was 
sufficient to state that the examination would be upon 
the issues formed by the pleadings.19 In 1923 the Act 
was so amended as to substitute the word ' 'matters ' '  
for the word " issues. " 20 The purpose of this change 
seems to have been to establish the older rule that the 
subject matter of the examination must be specifically 
stated in the notice. It has been held improper merely 
to state that the examination will be "upon the issues 
in this action. "  21 But "the fact that the items are in 
part stated as in the complaint is not a defect, especially 
in view of the fact that the allegations .of the complaint 
are unusually full and detailed. ' '  112 The Surrogate 's 
Court of Bronx County, has allowed the statement to be 
made by reference to an attached exhibit.28 It is safer 
1'7 Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745. 
18 Nedlin Realty Co. v. Bachner (1928) 232 N. Y. S. 126. 
19 The cases are listed in Rothschild, The Simplication of Civil Practice 
in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 736. 
20 N, Y. Laws of 1923, ch. 205 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Morse Dry Dock 
& Repair Co. (1927) 221 N. Y. S. 289. See also letter of Senator J. G. 
Saxe in New York Law Journal, April 24, 1923, for explanation of reasons 
for the change. 
Ill Rubin v. Sheldon (1927) 224 N. Y. S. 340. 
112 Heslin v. Whalen (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 830, 831. 28 In re Kimmerle 's Will (1927) 225 N. Y. S. 779. 
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to state the matters of the proposed inquiry rather fully, 
for it is impossible to add additional matters by a sub-. . 
sequent notice as long as the first one is outstanding.84 
While the usual mode is to state the matters in question 
form, the expression "whether or not " should be 
avoided.116 
· 
Service of the notice upon the attorney of the defend­
ant will not suffice so as to render it possible to punish 
the defendant if he fails to appear at the examination,86 
but service upon the attorney of the plaintiff makes it 
possible for the court to stay the proceedings until the 
plaintiff submits to the examination.117 It does not suffice 
to serve the notice on the person to be examined. He 
must also be served with a subpoena before he can be 
punished for contempt.8B 
· 
It is not permissible for a party to serve successive 
notices or applications for orders for e'xaminations, be­
fore trial, while others are outstanding. The reason for 
such rule has been well stated by Rodenbeck, J. : ' ' The 
plaintiff is not entitled to pursue the remedy by notice 
for an ex'amination under the Civil Practice Act, having 
already obtained an order therefor under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, any more than he may dupLicate orders 
or notices for the examination under the present prac­
tice. He must stand on the proceedings taken. This 
.course is required by an orderly administration of the 
law. The principle that prohibits a party from institut­
ing a second suit for the same cause of action between 
the same parties underlies the prohibition against dupli-
114 Pritchard v. Security Trust Company (1924) 123 Misc. 492, 205 
N. Y. S. 724. 
86 Gaydiea v. Szemko (1927) 219 App. Div. 935, 220 N. Y. S. 650. 86 Levine v. Moskowitz (1923) 206 App. Div. 194, 200 N. Y. S. 597. 
87 Bloch v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1922) 119 Mise. 832, 198 N. Y. S. 305. 
as New York Civil Practice Act, see. 299; Goldberg v. Candy Prod-
ucts Co. (1926) 127 Mise. 455, 215 N. Y. S. 772; Syracuse Mortgage 
Corp. v. Kepler (1923) 122 Mise. 95, 202 N. Y. S. 193 ; Roseberg Holding 
Co., Inc. v. Berman (1925) 211 N. Y. S. 900. See also Rothschild, The . 
Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 737. 
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eating motions. The object is to prevent a multiplicity 
of actions and motions and to obviate a waste of judicial 
time. ' '  19 
Lawyers in New York City and Rochester say that 
four out of five times examinations before trial are 
initiated by notice rather than by court order, except in 
situations where there is no alternative. Only when the 
applicant for discovery expects that his opponent will 
contest the right is it desirable to proceed by order. In 
this event there are the following tactical advantages by 
proceeding by court order in the first instance : it effects 
a saving of time ; it allows the applicant for discovery 
to put his opponent on the defensive ; and it simplifies 
the procedure for getting a contempt ruling if the op­
ponent proves contumacious. 
There is a much less noticeable tendency to waive 
formalities where the examination is not a matter of 
right than where it is a matter of right. The New York 
situation is illustrative of lack of waiver of formalities 
under the former type of procedure. The fact that the 
adv.erse party is allowed to make a motion to vacate the 
notice serves as a sort of inducement to him to contest 
the proceedings and to seek a restriction upon the scope 
of the examination from the court, or, at least, to obtain 
the delay incident to a motion to vacate. The New York 
rule that the court has a discretionary control over the 
extent of the discovery to be allowed in each case serves 
as an invitation to adverse parties to appeal to the 
court 's discretion. In such a situation it is no wonder 
that the extent of stipulations and waivers is not as large 
as elsewhere. A voluntary and mutual discovery does 
not obtain in New York. Rather discovery is looked 
19 Pritchard v. Security Trust Company (1924) 123 Mise. 492, 205 N. 
Y. S. 724. On the same subject see Schriro v. Kennell (1928) 223 App. 
Div. 786, 227 N. Y. S. 613 ; Norman Oil Corporation v. Bensabat (1922) 
118 Mise. 392, 194 N. Y. S. 359. 
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upon as a device with which to extract information from 
opponents. " 
M ickigan. The new Michigan Court Rules contain 
a provision which is modeled in part after the New York 
practice to the effect that the adverse party can move 
to vacate or modify the notice and · that such a motion 
shall operate as a stay of the proceedings until its de­
termination.80 This prevents the examination from being 
entirely a matter of right. These Rules have also copied 
another feature of the New York practice which is in the 
direction of limiting the scope of the examination, since 
the notice is required to state the " matters as to which I 
such persons are to be examined. ' ' 11 In New York this 
requirement is incidental to the more basic rule that the 
examination should be limited in scope to the issues of 
which the examining party has the affirmative under the 
pleadings. Since the hope has been expressed by one of 
the draftsmen of the Michigan Rules that the examina­
tion may not be thus limited in Michigan the requirement 
seems an.'omalous. Ill The experienee in New York has 
been that the setting forth of the. subject matter of the 
proposed inquiry serves as an invitation to the attorney 
for the party to be examined to coach the party on the 
matters set forth. The contrary experience in states in 
which there is no such requirement is that there is less 
coaching in preparation for an examination before trial 
than for an examination at the trial and that the testi­
mony accordingly is more spontaneous and truthful. 
Indiana, North Carolina and South Dakota. The stat­
utes in Indiana, North Carolina and South Dakota pro­
vide that the examination may be had on previous notice 
of a specified number of days " unless for good cause 
80 Mich. Court Rules (1931) rule 41, see. 4. 
11 Id. see. 3. 
Ill Sunderland, The New Michigan Court Rules, 10 Mich. State Bar 
Journal, 586, 592. 
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shown the court orders otherwise. ' '  Arguably this could 
be held to offer a possibility of restricting the examina­
tion. But the North Carolina caurt has held that the 
restrictive clause applies only to the time provision and 
that the examination is absolutely a matter of right.88 
The effect of this construction is to allow the court to 
order the examination earlier than the time provided by 
the statute, but not to allow the court to restrict the 
right to the examination after that period.84 
New Jersey. Originally an examin�:�.tion could be had 
only upon court order.86 In 1914, however, an amend­
ment to the statute was passed, making discovery a mat­
ter of course upon the service of a subpoena, and with­
out · a  court order.86 A case arose under this provision 
wherein a party summoned for an examination for dis­
covery appeared before the officer but refused to answer 
the questions propounded. Thereupon his adversary 
moved the trial court for a committal for contempt. The 
recalcitrant party, on appeal, contended that the amend­
ment allowing an examination without a court order was 
unconstitutional. The court, while upholding the con­
stitutionality of the amendment, held that there was a 
lapsus in the method of procedure outlined by the statute 
and that before a party could be punished for contempt 
it was requisite that he shouid have violated some order 
of the court. The implication was that the party seek­
ing discovery should first obtain an order requiring an 
answer to the questions, if his opponent refused to an­
swer voluntarily, and then use such order as a basis 
for contempt proceedings.87 Again, in 1924, the statute 
88 Vann v. Lawrence (1892) 111 N. C. 32, 15 S. E. 1031; Abbitt v. 
Gregory (1928) 196 N. C. 9, 144 S. E. 297 ; Cartwright v. Norfolk 
Southern R. Co. (1918) 176 N. C. 36, 96 S . .  E. 647. 
84 See also Hardman v. Lasell (S. D., 1929) 225 N. W. 301. 
86 N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 4098, sec. 144. 
86 N. J. Laws of 1914, c. 95, p. 151. 
8'7 Epstein v. American Hammered Piston Ring Co. (1920) 95 N. J. L. 
391, 113 Atl. 319. 
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was amended so as to require a court order in the first 
instance.88 Moreover the granting of the order now is 
discretionary with the court. While it might be sus­
pected that the purpose of the amendment was to cure 
the lapsus in the former procedure, the real purpose was 
to discard the former practice of allowing unrestricted 
examinations for discovery. The trial courts, under the 
power conferred by the 1924 amendment have enforced 
several rules, all of which indicate the illiberality which 
obtains : The application for the order must be upon ' 
notice to the adverse party rather than merely ex parte; 
the application must state the special circumstances which 
are relied upon to show the propriety of an examination ; 
an order will not be granted, if other remedies, such as 
interrogatories or bills of particulars, will suffice ; and 
the scope of the examination may be restricted to par­
ticular subjects. 
South Carolina. Since 1923 it has been required that 
an order of the court be obtained for an examination be­
fore trial.89 Prior to that time it had been held that the 
examination could be initiated by mere notice to the 
adverse party and that it was a matter of right.40 The 
amendment has made it necessary for the applicant to 
give four days ' notice and to show ' 'good and sufficient 
cause " for the examination.11 
88 N. J. Laws of 1924, ch. 93, p. 183. 89 Session Laws (1923) page 170. 
40 Fox v. Clifton Mfg. Co. (1922) 122 S. C. 86, 114 S. E. 700. 
41 White v. Banker 's National Life Ins. Co. (1926) 134 S. C. 183, 132 
S. E. 171 ; U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C. 
56, 150 S. E. 347. 
CHAPTER X 
PLACE OF EXAMINATION 
PLACE OF EXAMINATION OF RESIDENT 
The statutes generally provide that the examination 
of a party or witness who is a resident of the state may 
be held in the county in which the party or witness re­
sides or in the county in which he is served with sum­
mons.1 The place of the examination should conform to 
the place stated in the notice. The proposed Uniform 
Deposition Act provides that the examination may be 
had ' ' at any place within twenty miles of the abode of 
such witness. ' '  8 
PLAcE OF ExAMINATION OF NoNRESIDENT 
There is .a statute in Wisconsin which provides that if 
the person to be examined ' ' is a nonresident individual 
who is a party to the action or proceeding or is a non­
resident president, secretary, treasurer or managing 
agent of a foreign corporation that is a party to the 
action, the court may �!_)on just terms, fix the time and 
place of such examination--either within or without the 
state and such nonresident shall attend at such time and 
place and submit to the examination, and, if required, 
attend the reading and signing of such deposition, with­
out service of subpoenas. Such examination shall not 
be compelled in any county other than that in which the 
person examined resides, except when a different county 
1 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the baek of this 
volume. 
ll Handbook of the National Conferenee of Commissioners on Uni­
form State Laws and Proeeedings (1929)1 p. 361. 
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shall be designated for the examination of a nonresident, 
and except that any nonresident subject to examination 
may be examined in any county of this state and states 
in which he is personally served with notice and sub­
poena. ' '  8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that 
prior to the passage of this statute a trial court was 
without power to order an examination of a non­
resident party to take place within the state when he 
could not be personally served with notice and subpoena. 
The court indicated further that there might be serious 
doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute quoted 
above. The court said : ' ' There may be important and 
serious questions raised and argued when an order is 
made under this statute compelling a party in a distant 
state to appear in Wisconsin for examination under sec­
tion 4096. We shall not anticipate those questions 
now. " '  The United States Supreme Court subsequently 
held that since the law of Wisconsin under the George 
case was that a nonresident individual could not be com­
pelled to submit to examination within the state unless 
personally served with notice and subpoena, it was dis­
criminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws to compel an examination of officers of a foreign 
corporation within the state when they could not be 
served with notice and subpoena within the state.5 The 
Court did not hold that it was a denial of due process to 
' require nonresident parties to submit to an examination 
before trial within the state. It merely held that to 
distinguish between individual nonresidents and foreign 
corporations constituted unjust �iscrimination. The dis­
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in which 
Mr. Justice Holmes concurred, contains interesting lan­
guage concerning the question as to the right of a state 
8 Wis. Stat. (1929) ch. 326, sec. 12. 
' George v. Brode (1920) 170 Wis. 411, 414, 175 N. W. 939. 
li Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp. (1923) 
262 u. s. 544. 
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to compel attendance of nonresidents generally for ex­
amination before trial within the state : ' ' That there 
may be cases in which oral examination of a plaintiff in 
the presence of defendant and by counsel familiar with 
the matter in issue is essential to an adequate presenta­
tion of the facts cannot be doubted. If so, it is within 
the power of a state to require that a plaintiff shall 
submit to such preliminary examination somewhere. 
Whether this was a case requiring such examination 
could be determined properly only upon hearing the par­
ties ; and for such hearing opportunity was given by the 
'judge of the trial court. If this was a case in whiGh 
oral examination and inspection of the documents was 
essential to an adequate presentation of the matter in 
controversy, it was necessary, in order to secure it, that 
either the plaintiff's secretary should go to Milwaukee 
for examination, or that defendant and counsel should 
go to Louisville. Whether, under such circumstances, 
the plaintiff should in fairness be required to come to 
the place where it instituted suit or the defendants be 
obliged to go with counsel to the plaintiff's place of resi­
dence, was, likewise, a matter which could properly be 
determined only upon hearing the parties ; and this op­
portunity was given by the judge of the trial court. It 
cannot be that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment deprives a state of the power to authorize 
its courts to so mould their process as to secure, in this 
way, the adequate presentation of a case. " 6 
The New York Civil Practice Act provides that where 
a person to be examined is not a resident, he shall not 
be required to attend in any other county than that where 
he is served with a subpoena ; except that where the ex­
amination is held pursuant to order, he may be com­
pelled to att�nd in any county specified in the order .. 7 
6 Id. 552. 
7 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 300. 
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Examination of nonresident parties or witnesses under 
the general deposition procedure is usually conducted 
upon commission or letters rogatory. A witness must 
be within the jurisdiction before a court has power to 
compel him to give testimony.8 Therefore, if a witness 
is without the jurisdiction in which the action is to be 
tried the right to take his testimony rests on the comity 
between courts of different jurisdictions. It has been 
held that a court has no inherent power to compel the 
attendance of witnesses before an officer or commissioner 
appointed by the courts of another state, although it may 
qo so when authorized by a statute.9 The court to which 
letters rogatory are addressed is vested with a discretion 
to compel or refuse to compel a witness to attend and 
testify.10 
OFFICE IN WHICH ExAMINATION Is HELD 
States in which deposition procedure is used for dis­
covery purposes exhibit the practice of the examination 
being held in the office of the examining lawyer, unless 
necessity or convenience dictates a different place. This 
is simply a matter of common practice and is not covered 
by the statutes. The choice of the examining lawyer 's 
office as the place for holding the examination appears 
to be a matter of practical convenience · rather than of 
tactical advantage. This is also the New York practice. 
Even where the motion for an order is returnable at the 
Special Term, the actual examination usually is ad­
journed to the lawyer 's office, after the court has decided 
the proper subject matters of the inquiry. Neither the 
examination nor the swearing of the party takes place 
in the court house. 
8 State v. Kennan (1903) 33 Wash. 247, 74 Pac. 381 ; In re Hughbanks 
(1890) 44 Kans. 105, 24 Pac. 75. 
9 Marshall v. Irwin (1917) 280 Ill. 90, 117 N. E. 483 ; In re Searls 
(1898) 155 N. Y. 333, 49 N. E. 938. 
10 Doubt v. Pittsburgh R. Co. (1833) 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 238; 19 Pa. C. C. 
Rep. 178; In re Martinelli (1914) 219 M::>.ss. 58, 106 N. E. 557. 
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Under the Wisconsin and Ontario procedure the officer 
in charge of the examination has quarters wherein the 
examination is held. In some of the smaller Wisconsin 
towns the officer uses a room in the court house in pref­
erence to his office. The officer 's quarters in the larger 
cities, notably Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Toronto, On­
tario, are arranged to accommodate the holding of sev­
eral examinations at one time. All examinations in 
Montreal, Quebec, are conducted in the clerk 's office in 
the court house. This office is arranged somewhat on 
the order of a modern banking institution, with barred 
windows, a lobby and surrounding booths. It is in these 
latter that all discovery examinations are conducted. 
., 
CHAPTER XI 
GENERAL CONDUCT OF ORAL EXAMINATION 
SwEARING OF WITNESS 
The statutes uniformly require that the party to be 
examined be sworn by the officer in charge. 
ExAMINATION BY ATTORNEY FOR PARTY SEEKING DiscovERY 
The attorney who desires discovery propounds oral 
questions to the witness. The Wisconsin statutes spe­
cifically provide that the examination may assume the 
form of a cross-examination. Some of the states which 
allow use of deposition procedure for discovery have 
extraneous statutes which provide that a party may be 
examined as if under cross-examination by the adverse 
party, either orally or by deposition as any other wit­
ness. Such a statute, taken together with the deposition 
statute, ' allows the discovery questioning to be in the 
form of a cross-examination. Wjthout such a statute 
. the theoretical rule is that questions shall not be leading, 
because the party makes the witness his own by taking 
his deposition. ·But as a practical matter lawyers in 
conducting discovery hearings usually probe a party, or 
even a witness, about as thoroughly as if a cross-ex­
amination were allowed. The chief reason for this is • 
that the attorney for the party who is being examined 
seldom makes objection to the form of the questions. Of 
course there is the danger that the adverse party may 
take advantage of his right to file written objections to 
the form of the questions before trial and thus deprive 
the examining lawyer of that part of the testimony which 
was obtained upon leading questions. This is very in­
frequently done in actual practice. 
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ExAMINATION BY ATTORNEY FOR PARTY AGAINST WHOM 
DiscovERY Is SouGHT 
After the attorney seeking discovery has finished ques­
tioning the witness, his own attorney is allowed to pro­
pound questions. Only in Wisconsin was it found that 
attempts have been made to limit the extent of question­
ing by the latter on the ground that it is a misconception 
of the purposes of discovery and works a hardship in 
that it forces the applicant to pay in the first instance 
for folios increased by his adversary. Ordinarily there 
is no desire upon the part of the party 's lawyer to ask 
questions, unless they are for the purpose of explaining 
some incidental statement or straightening out the wit­
ness where it is thought he has misunderstood the ques­
tion. Occasionally such questions are interposed during 
the course of the principal examination. Lawyers who 
have had experience in the matter say they refrain from 
questioning their client at a discovery hearing initiated 
by the adverse party, not because it is considered im­
proper but simply because they have no desire to add to 
the adversary's knowledge. In only three cases out of 
fifty examined in Toronto, for instance, did the party's 
solicitor ask a single question. When a lawyer becomes 
accustomed to the use of discovery procedure he adjusts 
his tactics and does not ordinarily ask questions of his 
own client. The fact that either party can use the depo­
sition if the deponent is unavailable at the trial does not 
counteract the tactical .advanj;ages of non-questioning in 
the usual discovery situation. 
ART OF EXAMINING FOR DISCOVERY 
Lawyers who have had considerable experience in con­
ducting discovery examinations say that they have devel­
oped a peculiar technique as to the mode of questioning. 
Seldom is a hostile cross-examination :i,ndulged. The 
reasons are that a hostile cross-examination would rev�al 
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the examining party's own line of attack, and would ren­
der less effective the cross-examinalion at the trial. The 
tactics which are employed are : The lawyer assumes a 
friendly role ; sometimes he assumes a false front of more · 
or less aimless, haphazard searching after information ; 
his principal object is to get the witness to talk and to 
disclose the whole story in his own way. His object is to 
get as much information as he. can from the witness and 
to disclose as little of his own objective as possible. 
Ontario practitioners have developed this art to a finer 
point than found elsewhere but various lawyers through­
out the states which were visited said they employed the 
same technique. 
Usually a discovery hearing is very informal, amount­
ing in some instances to a virtual conference between 
adversaries. This is especially true in states which allow 
use of the ordinary deposition procedure for discovery. 
Perhaps too great an informality prevails. Examina­
tions have been witnessed in which attorneys and parties 
alike smoked cigarettes as they pleased. This feature 
seemed especially soothing to one particular party who 
was being probed in an action wherein he sought to ob­
tain payment of an insured loss which the insurance 
company claimed was the result of a fire started by him­
self. The informality of discovery hearings reaches its 
height in Montreal, Quebec. In true French style banter 
and repartee are indulged in by the lawyers throughout 
the proceedings. 
RECORD OF ExAMINATION 
In Wisconsin and Ontario either the officer. in charge of 
the examination takes. it down and transcribes it or a 
reporter does so under his direction. The latter practice 
. is the more general in the larger cities. The usual prac­
tice elsewhere., especially under the ordinary deposition · 
procedure, is for the officer to do the reporting himself. 
84 DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 
There are statutory requirements in some states that the 
deposition be written up by the officer in the presence of 
the deponent. The courts have not applied such require­
ments strictly but have allowed the reporting to be done 
in the fashion now generally employed by firms of re­
porters.1 The usual practice is for the reporter to take 
down all questions, answers and objections. If the offi­
cer is allowed to make rulings upon the objections, as in 
Wisconsin, such rulings also are noted. The more care­
ful reporters make it a practice to number the questions 
so as to expedite any subsequent use of, or objection to, 
the record of the examination. In New York the statute 
provides that no objections, except those to the form of 
the questions, are to be noted.11 
Except in Wisconsin, the applicant for discovery has 
an option as to whether or . not the examination shall 
be transcribed. In Wisconsin it is always written up. 
The practical importance of the matter is that if there 
is no necessity of writing up, the examining lawyer can 
save that expense if he cares to. Perchance the ques­
tioning has proved entirely futile, or perchance the law­
yer 's own stenographer, by agreement, has done the re­
porting, in which event he can simply have the shorthand 
notes preserved. It is a quite usual practice in some 
offices, especially in the smaller towns, for the examining 
lawyer to take enough notes to refresh his memory as to 
the testimony of the witness, and, if it becomes necessary 
to use the examination at the trial, to call the stenog­
rapher and have her read her notes. If an outside re­
porter is used it usually is possible to adjust the fees if 
transcription of the notes is not desired. In the larger 
offices, especially in the cities, the expense is 'considered 
secondary to the more thorough preparation and depo­
sitions always are written up. This is especially true 
1 The discussion of the Ohio situation in 14 Ohio Jurisprudence, 
pages 41, 42, is representative. 
II Rules of Civil Practice 129. 
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where the· examination for discovery and the 'trial work 
are handled by different members of the law office. 
RIGHT TO CoPIES OF RECORD 
The rules discussed in the preceding section are sub­
ject to the limitation that the adverse party can compel 
that the deposition be written up so that he can obtain a 
copy, if he will agree to pay the cost thereof. This is the 
uniform practice with the possible exception of Indiana. 
While the statutes are silent on the matter, a majority of 
the Indiana lawyers who were interviewed were of the 
opinion that the only way a copy of the examination could 
be had, over the objection of the taker, was for the party 
examined to bring his own stenographer. The theory 
seems to be that the examination is the taker's own pri­
vate affair until it is filed. In New Hampshire and in 
Texas sbme of the lawyers go to the other extreme of 
giving their opponents copies free of charge. But the 
usual rule is that the adverse party can have a copy if, 
and only if, he will pay for it. 
READING OVER AND SIGNING RECORD 
There is a uniform requirement, except in Ontario, 
Quebec and West Virginia, that the party examined read 
over and sign the record of the examination.; But in 
almost every jurisdiction there is a widespread waiver 
of the requirement. In Wisconsin, for instance, there 
had been a waiver of signature in ninety-one of the hun­
dred cases which were inspected in Milwaukee and Madi­
son. Commissioners said that this was about the usual 
ratio. Even so, a majority of the lawyers in the states 
which have the requirement do not favor its aboliti�m. 
They prefer to be able to require a signature if they 
choose to, so as to render use of the deposition more 
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effective at the trial. Ontario and Quebec have abolished 
the requirement. In Toronto, the Examiner (officer in 
charge) signs the deposition and either he, if he reports 
it himself, or the reporter certifies that it is correct.8 
Toronto practitioners regard this as a distinct improve­
ment over the older practice of having the party read 
over and sign the deposition. One of the advantages 
pointed out is that a saving of time and trouble is 
effected, since it is no longer necessary for the parties 
to reappear for the signing formalities. West Virginia 
has tried the same expedient in regard to depositions, but 
no use is made of the deposition for discovery purposes 
in the state.• A number of West Virginia lawyers to 
whom letters of inquiry were addressed replied that there 
is general satisfaction with the provision as far as ordi­
nary depositions are concerned. 
CoRRECTING REcoRD 
Uniformly the deponent js allowed to make corrections 
of clerical errors on the part of the reporter. His right 
to make substantial corrections to the testimony which 
he has previously given presents a more difficult problem. 
A case taken from the records in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
indicates the character of the problem. In a case involv­
ing fraud the parties came back three weeks after the 
deposition was taken, for the signing thereof. At this 
time the following occurred : 
Mr. A :  "I  ask for another adjournment so I can have 
the witness correct some errors in the testimony. ' '  
Mr. B :  "I  object to this. " 
Commissioner : ' 'Do you mean errors on part of wit­
ness or in the transcribing� ' '  
Mr. A :  ·" On part of witness. " 
8 Rule 340. 
4 W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1923) eh. 130, see. 33. 
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.. 
Commissioner : ' ' This is cross-examination, no direct 
examination is permitted except on the trial, because this 
is supposed to be discovery of one side only. ' '  
Mr. A :  "Do I understand the rule t o  be that a party 
may not read over his deposition and any corrections he 
desires to make, the witness may make them ? ' '  
Commissioner :  ' ' I  understand h e  may correct any 
errors of the reporter in writing the testimony. ' ' 
Mr. A :  " He may correct any errors he. has made in 
the testimony. I understand that to be the rule. ' '  
Commissioner : "I  understand the rule that any cor­
rection, not taking into consideration mistakes of the 
reporter, cannot be made before the commissioner over 
objection, because this is strictly a cross-examination. 
Now I have never been reversed on that, but I don't think 
it has ever been tried out. It might be certified up and 
get a ruling from the Circuit Court. That has been my 
ruling far upward of ten years. I may be wrong but if 
I am I would like to be corrected. I do not want to 
rule one way in one case and another way in another 
case. ' '  
Mr. A :  "I  know of rulings of that kind where the 
deposition is closed and adjournment taken simply for 
the purpose of permitting the witness to read it over and 
sign it. I appreciate your position that the opposite side 
may not directly examine their own witness, but I think 
this is true, that if a witness testified in the forenoon and 
came back in the afternoon and said to the commissioner 
' I  said so and so in the forenoon but I was mistaken', 
that the witness might have an opportunity to correct his 
testimony. ' '  
Commissioner : ' ' Suppose on the trial he made a mis­
take in testifying, and I want to correct the testimony­
the court may say ' You may when your counsel examines 
you, correct your testimony. ' But the only opportunity 
he has to make it is at the close of the trial, or when a 
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deposition is taken at the close of the reading of the 
deposition. ' '  
Mr. A. :  "It seems to me you do not catch my distinc­
tion. I appreciate a witness may not be asked to explain 
his testimony. But if the witness says, ' I  made a mistake 
in my testimony', I think the court will and should per­
mit correction at any time. ' '  
Commissioner : "I  think it is in the discretion of the 
trial court, ' You may correct it now or you may correct 
it when you have your direct examination. ' ' '  
Mr. A. :  " Well, I will ask some questions in order to 
get the matter before the court. ' '  
He then asked 23 questions by telling the witness what 
he had stated and asking if he desired now to correct it. 
These questions covered almost the whole case. Then 
Mr. A. said : ' ' There are other questions of the same 
character but these are enough to get a ruling. ' '  
The case was certified to the trial 'judge and he ruled 
that the correction should be allowed. The exact words 
of the ruling were : ' ' Said party is hereby given leave to 
correct the answers to questions asked on said examina­
tion and his counsel may examine him as to all mat­
ters tending to explain or qualify any testimony given 
by her on said examination. ' '  5 A. number of the Wiscqn­
sin commissioners refuse to follow such practice but 
require the witness to sign without corrections. 
Corrections, even substantial corrections, are allowed 
under the New York practice. In one case it was dis­
closed on appeal that there had been thirty-five different 
corrections, varying from slight changes in figures to 
very substantial changes. It was urged that the de­
ponent should have signed the transcript as prepared by 
the reporter but the court held otherwise. The reasoning 
of the court was that there would be no sense in having 
li Milwaukee Circuit Court Records, No. 79847. 
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the transcribed testimony read before it is signed, if no 
corrections are to be allowed.6 
The view of the Ohio court is indicated by the follow­
ing quotation from Minshall, J. : ' ' The witness must be 
the judge as to whether his testimony had been accurately 
t3;ken down by whomever it is done. What he signs is 
his sworn statement, and he should not be required to sign 
what he under oath says is not accurate. In case of a 
controversy about the matter, witnesses might be called 
at the trial to state what the defendant stated in the first 
instance, for the purpose of reflecting on his credibility, 
but he cannot be compelled to sign a deposition which he 
says on oath is not correct. ' '  7 
Officers in charge of discovery proceedings have de­
vised pra<?tical ways of solving disputes as to the right to 
correct the record. Sometimes they instruct the deponent 
to sign and to write out any corrections he desires to make 
underneath as a qualification of the signature. This 
allows the correction, and yet does not deprive the exam­
ining party of the full effect of the previous discovery. 
Any scheme which will separate the corrections from the 
previous testimony and label the latter as such has a 
similar effect. In fact, if the correction is obviously a 
change of testimony upon advice of other persons, it does 
little harm to the examining party so long as the contra­
dictory statements are preserved. Indeed some lawyers 
say they are glad to get such corrections because they 
tend to discredit the whole story of the witness. Other 
officers allow corrections subject to the proviso that the 
party allow himself to be re-examined by his adversary 
as to the new part. 
FILING THE RECORD 
The statutes uniformly require that the officer fi.l� the 
record of the examination, with the proper certification, 
6 Van Son v. Herbst (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 272. 
7 Ex parte Hafer (1901) 65 0. S. 170, 172, 61 N. E. 702. 
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with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending. 
The clerk then places the record with the papers of the 
case. In Wisconsin always, and in Missouri and Nebras­
ka usually, the officers obey this rule. In Missouri 
this is due in part to the fact that aU depositions which 
are filed may be taxed as costs. In Ontario the record 
need be filed only in the event that the taker requests the 
transcription of the reporter 's notes, but it must be filed 
then. There is a widespread disregard of the statutory 
requirement in all other jurisdictions. The reasoning in 
justification of the failure to follow the statutes is that 
they prescribe the requirement only as a condition pre­
cedent to the use of the deposition as such at the trial ; 
that ordinarily a deposition taken for discovery purposes 
will be used . only for purposes of impeachment at the 
trial, rather than as original evidence, and that it can be 
used for this purpose as a signed statement, or as a con­
tradictoey previous statement, without any official sanc­
tions. Another reason why some lawyers do not file the 
record is that such tactics deprive the adverse party, or 
his attorney, of access to the record for purposes of 
preparation for trial, unless he is willing to pay for a 
copy. Accordingly, it is a widespread practice for the 
officer to return the record to the examining attorney, 
unless directed otherwise by him, and for the latter to 
keep the same in his files. Court rules in Concord, New 
Hampshire and in Louisville, Kentucky, specifically di­
rected at this- practice, have been disregarded by the bar. 
Of course, if a lawyer thinks there may be occasion for 
the use of the deposition as original evidence at the trial 
he should have the record filed. If he is the attorney for 
the party examined in a state where either party is 
entitled to use the deposition at the trial if the deponent 
is unavailable, he may obtain a court order requiring that 
the particular deposition be filed for his use. 
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A difference of practice exists as to whether depo­
sitions which are :filed must remain sealed until opened 
by court order or until published by the taker. Usually 
it is required that it be sent sealed to the clerk by the 
officer taking. In Ontario there is no such requirement. 
But even in some states where the deposition is sent 
sealed, the clerk opens it as soon as he receives it. This 
is the general practice in Wisconsin, but within the last 
year or so the Milwaukee judges have required that all 
depositions be kept sealed until the court orders them 
opened. The purpose is to check the activities of cer­
tain newspaper reporters. An Indiana appellate court 
has held that once a deposition is filed the taker loses con­
trol over it so that he cannot remove it from the files.• 
8 Grant v. Davis (1892) 5 Ind. App. 116. 
CHAPTER XII 
EXAMINATION BY WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES 
FILING INTERROGATORIES 
All of the jurisdictions which allow discovery by writ­
ten interrogatories, except England, allow the filing of 
the interrogatories as a matter of right, with any objec­
tions being decided subsequently. In a few jurisdictions 
the questions are annexed to the appropriate pleading, 
but the more usual practice is to file the questions sepa­
rately. The following American jurisdictions require 
some additional step in the nature of a showing of the 
propriety of the interrogation either by petition or affi­
davit : Alabama, Connecticut, Tennessee, Louisiana, and 
New Mexico. Indiana requires that the proponent also 
obtain a rule to answer, which is given as of course. 
Virginia requires that the proponent, after filing inter­
rogatories, require the clerk to issue a summons to be 
served by the proper officer. Georgia requires that he 
take out a commission, as in deposition procedure. Stat­
utes in the following states specify that the adverse party 
· be served with a copy of the questions : Massachusetts, 
United States Equity, New Mexico, Washington, Ala­
bama and Florida. 
The English practice is slightly different from that 
which obtains in the United States. Up until 1893 in­
terrogatories were delivered directly to' the party to be 
interrogated and then he entered his objections, as is 
generally the practice in American jurisdictions at pres­
ent. But since 1893 it has been necessary to first obtain 
leave of court before filing interrogatories.1 The par-
1 Annual Practice, order 31, rule 1. 
92 
W BITTEN lNTERROGATORmS 93 
ticular interrogatories proposed to be delivered are first 
submitted for approval to a master in chambers on sum­
mons for directions.2 A copy of the proposed questions 
is usually served with the notice· of the application, which 
is filed two days before the heariJ,lg. At the hearing the 
master may either grant or deny the application, in whole 
or in part, or he may alter the number, extent or for� of 
the questions.3 The English system contemplates the 
obtaining of judicial approval to the particular questions 
before they are put to the adverse party. 
NUMBER OF QuESTIONS ALLOWED 
One of the most troublesome problems in some Ameri­
can jurisdictions, notably in Massachusetts, has been 
whether a party may file as many questions as he chooses 
to. The Massachusetts experience in this regard throws 
an interesting sidelight upon the relative effectiveness 
of an oral interrogation and a written interrogation. 
Prior to 1929 there was no limit to the number of in­
terrogatories which might be filed. In one case 2,258 
interrogatories were filed.4 Gradually there came into 
use mimeographed and printed forms which contained 
two, thtee and four · hundred interrogatories. These 
qu�stions were not prepared with . reference to the par­
ticular case in which they were to be used, but were stock 
forms entirely. Their most widespread use was in auto­
mobile accident litigation. One of the purposes in using 
so many questions was to put each principal question in 
so many forms that evasion would be difficult. It was 
urged by way of justification of the practice that, ' ' Most 
automobile collision cases involve the 'Same questions, 
which can be covered by a prepared set of interrogatories, 
and, where plai!ltiffs ' lawyers flood the courts · with 
I Id. rule 2 ;  Stringer, A. B. 0. Guide to Practice (1928), 66. 
3 Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority, 128. 
4 First Report of Massachusetts Judicial Council (1925) 42. 
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thousands of cases where merit does not exist, or is very 
doubtful, there is no sense or reason for the defendant 
trying to get up a special set of interrogatories where 
the same principles are involved ; and in order to do it, 
a company, under the laws of compulsory insurance, 
would have to hire a separate building and a corps of 
lawyers and stenographers and the work would be much 
less accurate than under a system of mimeographing. ' '  6 
In time the practice became extremely burdensome 
upon the courts. Almost all of the various motion hours 
were taken up in deciding objections to interrogatories. 
Oftentimes the questions asked, as applied to the par­
ticular case, were quite ludicrous. The burden on the 
clerk 's office was surprisingly heavy. Yet, in a test case 
which was carried to the Massachusetts Supreme C6urt, 
the practice was allowed.6 Just recently a statute has 
been enacted limiting the number of interrogatories 
which may be filed as of right to thirty.7 Nor can several 
questions be grouped in one interrogatory so as to escape 
the rule, for the thirty include "interrogatories subsidi­
ary or incidental to, or dependent upon, other interrog­
atories, however the same may be grouped, combined or 
arranged. ' '  There is little or no complaint with the 
operation of the new rule. Usually, it is said, thirty 
questions, if fully answered, are sufficient. Additional 
interrogatories can be propounded in a proper case by 
special leave of court. The burden upon the court has 
been greatly lessened, although it is still considerable. 
Other effects of the change are that considerably more 
care is spent in the framing of interrogatories and an­
swers ; and the use of motions for specifications and par­
ticulars has increased. Mimeographed and printed 
6 From the defendant 's brief in the case of Goldman v. Ashkins (1929) 
266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 513. 
6 Goldman v. Ashkins ( 1929) 266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 513. 
7 Aets 1929, ch. 303. Cf. suggestion that this be done, First Report 
of Massachusetts Judicial Council (1925) 42. 
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forms are still in use, but they comply with the rule. 
Usually about sixteen interrogatories are included in the 
printed form. The questions have to do chi-efly with mat­
ters bearing upon items of damage, extent of injuries, 
physicians and nurses employed, earnings at the time of 
the accident, and similar matters. "'Forms used by plain­
tiffs usually include questions as to ownership and 
agency. Clerks who handle such work in some of the 
larger law offices have a dozen or so of these mimeo­
graphed forms from which they can select the one most 
nearly appropriate to the particular case. 
Other American states have had less trouble in this 
regard principally because they confine the interrog­
atories to so narrow a scope that they are not used for 
the purpose of eliciting a full discovery upon all the 
issues of the case. In Washington one hundred and sixty 
interrogatories were filed in one case.8 While there is 
no arbitrary limit upon the number of questions under 
the 'federal equity practice, the courts look with dis­
favor upon an excessive number being filed.9 In the few 
states in which both an oral examination for discovery 
and one upon written interrogatories are allowed, there 
is no need nor desire to increase the number of the writ­
ten intertogatories. Rather they are used, if at all, for 
the purpose of obtaining a few formal admissions. 
ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES 
It is uniformly provided that the party served with · 
interrogatories file an explicit, responsive, and full an­
swer to each question separately. Of course, as a prac­
tical matter, one of the chief complaints with the writ­
ten interrogatory procedure is that answers usually are 
so evasive as to give little enlightenment. The time 
8 Pearce v. Greek Boys' Min, Co. (1907) 48 Wash. 38, 92 Pac. 773. 
9 A. B. Dick Co. v. Underwood Typewriter Co. (1916) 235 Fed. 300 
But for a late case in which 345 interrogatories were filed see O 'Brie� 
v. Makey (1929) 36 F. (2d) 89. 
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within which answers should be :filed varies in the differ­
ent jurisdictions. Three different schemes are employed 
in various jurisdictions : (1 )  Some statutes provide a 
specific time within which answers must be :filed unless 
the court orders otherwise. Provisions of this character 
are : England, ten days ; United States Equity, :fifteen 
days ; Massachusetts, ten days ; Alabama, sixty days ; 
Washington, twenty days. ( 2 )  Statutes in the following 
states provide that the interrogatories shall be answered 
in such time as the court may prescribe ; Indiana, Iowa, 
Connecticut and Virginia.10 (3 )  States which allow inter­
rogatories to be annexed to the pleading require that 
answers be filed within the time allowed for answering 
the pleading to which they are annexed. This is the pro­
vision in Ohio, and under the special interrogatory pro­
cedure in equitable' actions in Kentucky and Arkansas. 
The adverse party usually is allowed to include in his 
answers relevant matters in avoidance.11 
10 In Virginia sixty days is the maximum allowance that the court 
can grant. 
11 In addition to the statutes see Baxter v. Massasoit Ins. Co. (1866) 
95 Mass. 320 ; Railsback v. Koons ( 1862) 18 Ind. 274 ; Phelps v. Mul­
haupt (1920) 146 La. 1078, 84 So. 362. See also 1 A. L. R. 76, 91, for 
a note as to the theoretical basis for such a rule in connection with 
· self-serving declarations; and Grinnell, Discovery in Massachusetts, 
16 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 193, as to policy considerations. 
CHAPTER XIII 
DECIDING OBJECTIONS AND COMPELLING 
ANSWERS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION 
WHERE OFFICER DoEs NOT HAvE PowER TO . CoMPEL 
ANSWERS OR TO DECIDE OBJECTIONS 
I 
A number of states follow this plan in administering 
discovery examinations : the officer in charge is a re­
porter with power only to swear the . witness and pre­
serve the orderly conduct of the hearing ; he has no power 
to compel answers or to decide objections to questions ; 
if objections arise which cannot be decided among coun­
sel, the examination is adjourned until a ruling can be 
obtained, from the trial court. This is the plan which 
obtains in California, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey,t 
North Carolina,2 Ontario, Quebec and Texas. 
The officer under the plan in question is any officer 
qualified under the statutes to take depositions generally. 
Such an arrangement has the following advantages : (1 )  
It does not require an additional officer for discovery 
examinations but allows the use of officers already pro­
vided ; (2 )  It fosters an assimilation of discovery pro­
cedure and deposition procedure both of which are his-
1 This plan now obtains in New Jersey: Backel v. Linn (N. J., 1928) 
140 Atl. 285. But this decision was rendered after the. right to, and 
the scope of, the examination had been drastically restricted. A large 
part of the dissatisfaction which finally lead to the substitution of a 
restricted examination upon court order for a full examination upon 
notice is attributable to an earlier decision to the effect that a lawyer 
ran great danger, either of being committed for contempt or of being 
scolded by the judge, if he instructed his client not to answer a question, 
however incompetent it might be, at a discovery examination. Brown 
and Seccomb v. Shafman (1923) 2 N. J. Mise. 13. 
2 In addition to the statutes which are set forth in the appendix, see 
Cartwright v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. ( 1918) 176 N. C. 36, 96 S. E. 647 ; 
Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor (1893) 112 N. C. 141, 17 S. E. 69. 
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torically and functionally akin. A disadvantage some­
times supposed is that an effective discovery can , be 
obtained only when the officer in charge has certain judi­
cial and quasi-judicial powers. It is said that the officers 
who take depositions generally are not qualified to exer­
cise such powers. 
The statutory enumeration of the officers eligible to 
take depositions varies in the different states, but the 
following persons generally are included :  judges, justices 
of the peace, clerks of courts of record and notaries pub­
lic. As a practical matter reporters and stenographers 
who are notaries public are almost always used. Many 
of the statutes forbid a notary from serving if he is kin 
to the parties or interested in the cause. The general 
view of the lawyers who were interviewed is that this 
prevents a notary in the office of either lawyer in the 
cause from serving, unless allowed to do so by agree­
ment.8 It is a quite usual thing in many towns and cities 
of less than one hundred thousand population, for the 
stenographer in the office of the examining lawyer to take 
down the examination. In such cities as Fort Wayne, 
Indiana, Concord and Manchester, New Hampshire, and 
Lexington, Kentucky, for instance, the best law firms 
do this, and the sentiment of the bar supports it. The 
. principal reason, of course, is to save expense. Skilled 
reporters are scarce and the office stenographers are 
about as accurate as the reporters who are available. 
No complaint of unfairness due to the fact that the 
stenographer is an employee of one of the lawyers has 
been found. While the practice also obtains to an extent 
in the larger cities, there is a general feeling upon the 
, part of the bar that it is preferable to employ an outside 
reporter in order to remove even the semblance of over-
8 Of. Singer Mfg. Co. v. MeAllister Bros. (1887) 22 Neb. 359, 35 N. w. 
181, where the praetiee is allowed, without any agreement, but is dis· 
eouraged. 
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reaching and in order to get mote accurate reporting. 
In many such cities there are firms of reporters who are 
available and whose work is of the highest character. 
Large law firms find it convenient to give all of their 
work of this nature to some particular firm of reporters, 
and the latter in turn feel obligated to have a man avail­
able at all times. There are no official court reporters in 
Cleveland, Ohio, so some law firms use the same reporter 
for deposition work and trial work. Then if any dispute 
arises at the trial as to the correctness of a deposition the 
reporter who took it is there to verify it. It is said that 
the jury looks upon such a reporter as an officer of the 
court, and that it makes the use of the deposition more 
effective for purposes of contradiction if the lawyer can 
ask the witness whether he did not make the alleged 
statements before this supposed officer. 
The officer in charge .merely notes the objection made 
by the attorney for the party who is being examined. 
Sometimes the party gives an answer subject to objec­
tion. More often the opposing lawyer 's objections ale 
addressed to the examining counsel rather than to the 
officer. They serve as a word of warning that the inquiry 
has reached the limits of its proper scope. Both lawyers 
know that the officer has neither power to compel an 
answer nor to relieve a witness from answering. What 
actually happens is that when the lawyer for the party 
under examination objects to the question and instructs 
his client not to answer, he and the lawyer conducting 
the examination argue the ground of the objection in­
formally among themselves, first of all ; usually they 
reach an agreement : the proponent either agrees to with­
draw or to restate the question or the opponent agrees to 
allow an answer subject to objection. If, however, the 
lawyers are unable thus to adjust the matter and the 
proponent of the question meets with a refusal to an­
swer which he considers unjustified, he can take either 
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one of two. courses. (1 )  He may adopt the policy of get­
ting what he can and letting the rest go. In this event 
he will waive his right to an answer and proceed to pro­
pound other questions. This is usually the course adopt­
ed in practice unless the question is especially important 
or the witness becomes especially balky and refuses to 
answer any and all questions. (2 )  He can adjourn the 
examination and go before the court and move that an 
answer be compelled. The actual operation of discovery 
examinations in Toronto is slightly different from this. 
The examiners who have had legal training exercise 
limited powers. While they cannot compel an answer, 
they often order the witness to answer, or relieve him 
from answering if they think the question is improper. 
Of course the witness has the power to relieve himself 
from answer�ng by merely refusing, and thus forcing the 
proponent to go before a judge or master and move that 
an answer be compelled. The essential difference from 
, ·'the American practice is that the examiner enters into the 
· discussion with the lawyers as to the propriety of the 
question and aids a decision. 
Under the American practice the proponent of a qu�s­
tion to which an answer has been refused has the right to 
g9 before the trial judge and move that an answer be 
compelled by contempt proceedings. Usually the pro­
cedure is informal : after having met with a refusal to 
answer a particular question, the examining lawyer pro­
ceeds to propound a number of representative questions 
so as to cover all angles of the matter in dispute ; then 
he adjourns the examination and takes the matter to 
the judge in chambers. A few courts require that the 
matter be presented by formal petition or motion, but a 
majority allow an informal resort to the judge in cham­
bers. While the procedure is informal it is not always 
as expeditious as it might be. Access to the judge, espe­
cially in the larger cities, often is difficult. In New York 
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City it is often necessary to wait a considerable time 
before reaching the judge, even after an appointment has 
been secured from his secretary. In some of the smaller 
towns in Indiana, Kentucky and elsewhere local lawyers 
sometimes take advantage of lawyers from the city who 
have come to conduct an examination for discovery. 
Knowing that their opponents are anxious to :finish the 
examination and return to the city and are not apt to 
wait over until a rather tardy judge compels an answer, 
they instruct their clients to refuse to answer questions 
which clearly are proper. Ontario and Quebec have a 
somewhat differ.ent method of handling this problem. In 
Ontario the master (an intermediate officet not used in 
American practice) relieves the trial court of most of 
this type of work and settles the matter expeditiously. 
In Montreal, all such questions, instead of being pre­
sented to a judge or a master in chambers, are presented 
to the Practice Court, a court which sits each afternoon 
from two to four. This court is presided over by an ex­
pert in matters of practice who handles all the chamber 
work of the various judges. Inasmuch as discovery ex­
aminations usually are conducted during the hours at 
which the Practice Court sits it is possible to carry dis­
putes which arise directly to the court and obtain a deci­
sion quickly. 
The exact balancing of the scales between unjust con­
cealment, on the one hand, and unjust discovery, on the 
other, is largely dependent upon the question whether a 
ruling can be expeditiously secured from the trial court 
when an objection arises during the course of the exam­
ination. The indirect effect of this consideration is even 
more important than the direct effect. Usually lawyers 
know whether a question is proper or improper. Little 
danger exists of a party being forced to disclose im­
proper matters since he can refuse to answer until com­
pelled to do so by the judge. If the party under exam-
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ination can, without unnecessary delay, be compelled to 
answer a question, scant encouragement is afforded to a 
party to withhold information on the ground that he 
knows his adversary will prefer to let the matter drop 
rather than to pursue his rather clumsy remedy of en­
forcing an answer. Lawyers are willing to do volun­
tarily that which they know they can be forced to do. In 
a majority of the cities which were visited the means of 
compelling an answer is sufficiently expeditious to dis­
courage unjust concealment. The remedy in places 
where it is otherwise, lies with the trial judge. 
There are two factors which foster a voluntary an­
swering of proper questions even when the means of com­
pelling answers is clumsy. ( 1 )  It is possible to adjourn 
the whole examination to the trial judge for its comple­
tion. Some lawyers have found that the mere threat of 
using this expedient has proved effective in persuading 
the witness to answer voluntarily. ( 2 )  Some lawyers 
are glad to obtain a refusal on the part of the witness to 
answer a question. They would prefer to be able to dis­
play the refusal to the jury, rather than to have an an­
swer. Their adversaries sense this desire and do not 
care to gratify it ; consequently they refrain from in­
structing a refusal to answer. 
The New York rule that examinations before trial must 
be confined to issues of which the applicant has the bur­
den of proof has necessitated a somewhat different 
method of deciding objections. An attempt is made to 
settle the major objections before they arise, by allowing 
the trial judge to fix the proper matters of inquiry. To 
this end the party applicant is required to set forth the 
matters upon which he desires to question his adversary. 
Then the latter is allowed to contest the propriety of the 
matters set forth by a motion to vacate the notice. The 
motion to vacate or modify the notice is applicable when 
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it is desired to make an objection as to any of the follow­
ing matters : 
(1 )  The right of the party seeking t o  examine ; 
( 2) The time of the examination ; 
(3 )  The place of the examination ; 
(4) The person before whom the examination 1s 
scheduled ; and 
( 5) The matters upon which the examination is to 
be had.4 
The notice of motion to vacate or modify must specify 
the grounds relied on and may be supported by appro­
priate affidavits.5 The service of the motion, if made for 
the first term or sitting of court at which the motion can 
be heard, operates to stay the examination until the de­
termination of the motion. The order given by the court, 
whether requested by the applicant in the first instance 
or whether made necessary by a motion to vacate the 
notice is framed in accordance with approximately the 
same regulations.6 The terms of the order are largely 
in the discretion of the court under its power to deter­
mine whether the examination sought is material and 
necessary.7 
The new Michigan Court Rules provide for a motion to 
vacate the notice, similar in character to the New York 
practice.8 Since the principal objective of the device in 
New York is to limit the scope of the examination in a 
way which seems undesirable, there is danger that the 
very availability of the device in Michigan may serve as 
an invitation to limit the scope in a similar fashion. 
4 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 291. 
5 Rules of Civil Practice, 124. 
6 Bieber-Isaacs Co. v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1925) 125 
Misc. 494, 211 N. Y. S. 435. 
'7 New York Civil Practice Act, sees. 288, 294 ; Rules of Civil Prac· 
tice, 124. 8 Michigan Court Rules (1931) rule 41, sec. 4. 
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WHERE OFFICER HAs PowER TO CoMPEL ANSWERS AND To 
DECIDE OBJECTIONS 
Some jurisdictions, instead of providing a powerless 
officer to supervise the examination and allowing all dis­
putes to be presented to the trial court directly, provide 
an officer who is empowered to compel answers and to 
decide objections. This plan is followed in Wisconsin, 
Missouri, Ohio, New Hampshire and Nebraska. 
Wisconsin. The examination is supervised by a court 
commissioner who is an officer of the court appointed by 
the circuit judge and holding office during the term of 
office of the judge who appoints him.9 Only a limited 
number can be appointed in each county. In Milwaukee 
and elsewhere the commissioners are practically all law­
yers, but in some of the smaller towns it has been diffi­
cult to obtain the services of men with legal training and 
reporters have been appointed instead. 
A variety of opinion exists in Wisconsin as to the 
power of a commissioner. In Milwaukee the view is that 
a court commissioner is vested with the powers of a judge 
in chambers. He decides all objections which arise dur­
ing the course of the adverse examination and, when nec­
essary, exercises the power to punish for contempt. The 
theory advanced to support this view is that if the com­
missioner did not have such powers the examination 
might as well be taken before a notary as are ordinary 
depositions, yet this latter has been expressly disallowed 
by the Supreme Court.10 The general opinion in Madi­
son, Wisconsin, is that the commissioner has only the 
power to decide objections bearing on the question of 
relevancy. The theory in support of this view is that the 
statute says an adverse examination shall be conducted 
as the taking of ordinary depositions except where other-
9 See Wis. Stat. (1927) ch. 252, sec. 1415. 
10 Hincliff v. Hinman (1864) 18 Wis. 139. 
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wise provided and that the statute provides the party 
must not be compelled to disclose matters not relevant to 
the issues. This theory is carried to such an extent that 
when objections as to incompetency, privilege, hearsay, 
and the like, are presented, as the records show they 
occasionally are, the commissioners rule that they haV'� 
no power to decide whether the question is improper. 
They even go so far as to refuse to strike irrelevant mat­
ter once it is in. Asked what they do with the objection 
that an answer would incriminate the party,. they say that 
they do not decide the objection but that the counsel for 
the party instructs him not to answer and that the exam­
ining counsel does not ask for a contempt certification. 
A third view is taken in some of the other Wisconsin 
cities and towns, namely, that commissioners have no 
power to decide objections but must simply note them on 
the record. If objections become very frequent counsel 
often asks that it be noted of record that all the subse­
quent testimony is taken subject to objection. In some 
sections such a practice has led to the complaint that 
parties are being forced to disclose family affairs and 
other matters entirely irrelevant to the controversies. 
Possibly this is what has led the Advisory Committee on 
Rules to propose that the words ' ' but the deponent shall 
not be compelled to disclose 'anything not relevant to the 
controversy, " which were formerly in the statute and 
which have been omitted in recent revisions of the stat­
utes, be re-inserted.11 The saving feature in the practice 
in these outlying districts is that the commissioners also 
refuse to punish for contempt. A party can refuse to 
answer clearly objectionable questions and place the bur­
den on his opponent to ask for contempt proceedings be­
fore the trial judge. 
The explanation of such a diversity of opinion in Wis­
consin probably is this. The commissioner, under the stat-
11 Proposed Changes in Rules of Pleading Practice and Procedure, 
October, 1930, item 18. 
· 
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utes, does have the power which he is thought to have by 
the Milwaukee lawyers. But the question as to how much 
power he should exercise has been decided by the prac­
ticalities of the situation in each locality. The chief fac­
tor in determining the policy has been the training and 
ability of the various commissioners. The commissioners 
exercise only that portion of their powers which experi­
ence has demonstrated they can exercise to the satisfac­
tion of the judges and the lawyers. In those localities 
where the view is taken that the commissioner has no 
power except to note the objection, the commissioners are 
not lawyers but are former court reporters. Then there 
is another factor which helps explain the difference be­
tween the practice at Milwaukee and Madison. Mil­
waukee circuit judges are so overworked that they can 
find no time to decide objections arising out of examina­
tion before trial, whereas Madison judges can and do 
devote a greater amount of their time to this feature of 
the procedure. Consequently the attitude of the- judges 
in the former city is to discourage certification of ques­
tions, and to encourage the commissioners to rule on 
objections. The situation at Madison is just the oppo­
site. There the judges are readily available to decide 
certified questions. 
A further word should be said about the administra­
tion of the machinery in Milwaukee. There the commis­
sioner, who is a trained lawyer, employs reporters to 
take down the examination. The commissioner who has 
the largest amount of the work maintains a suite of 
offices which are so arranged that offices for the reporters 
surround a central office in which the commissioner sits. 
Under this plan he is able to conduct as many as four 
examinations simultaneously. Each examination is in 
charge of the reporter entirely until a dispute arises 
which the lawyers are unable to settle among themselves. 
At this juncture the commissioner is called in. Resort 
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is thus had to the commissioner in much the same manner 
as to the trial court in other places, except it is much 
more expeditious. 
If the commissioner punishes for contempt the order 
is reviewable by the trial court on habeas corpus pro­
ceedings. If the commissioner refuses to compel an an­
swer to a question and the proponent thinks the decision 
is erroneous he can ask for a certification to the trial 
judge. The officer upon granting the certification sends J 
up the relevant part of the record. In Milwaukee the 
whole record is sent up together with a formal statement 
pointing out the location of the objections. To the usual 
certification at the end of the deposition are added words 
such as these : ' ' And I hereby certify and return the 
foregoing deposition to the above named court in pursu­
ance of request of counsel for them to obtain a ruling on 
the matters shown at pages 45, 48 and 50, to the end that 
the above named court may direct whether the rulings 
are correct and whether they should be affirmed or re­
versed and for such other orders as the court may think 
proper. ' '  The commissioner then mails the deposition 
to the cletk as usual. In Madison and other places the 
certification is informal ; the appropriate questions, an­
swers and objections are written up and carried directly 
to the judge. Certification upon request is practically a 
matter of course in Madison but most commissioners in 
Milwaukee will only certify important matters. The 
position is taken that the judges are too busy to be wor­
ried with minor matters and that certification is often 
asked for the purpose of delay. Several commissioners 
make it a regular practice to refuse to <lertify · questions. 
The only remedy in such case is to go directly to the 
trial judge and move that he order the record sent up. 
Missouri. In Missouri cities of a greater population 
than fifty thousand inhabitants, it is the privilege of the 
party served witlr a notice that his deposition is to be 
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taken, to apply to the court for the appointment of a spe­
cial commissioner to supervise the examination.12 When 
the party applies for the appointment of a special com­
missioner, there is no necessity for service of a subpoena 
by the latter, the original service of the subpoena by the 
notary sufficing. The commissioner must be ' ' an attor­
ney of record in such court, learned in the law, disinter­
ested, and of no kin to either party to such cause. ' '  The 
policy behind the provision for trained officers to super­
vise examinations has been explained by the Court of 
Appeals : · " Manifestly, in providing-for the appoint­
ment by the court, on the motion of the adverse party, of 
a special commissioner, learned in the law, to preside as 
an officer of the court at the taking of depositions in large 
cities, the Legislature was guided by the belief that the 
abuses of the power to take depositions before a notary 
public of the selection of the party giving the notice were 
greater in large cities than in other communities, and 
that the adverse party should be accorded the protection 
of the right to have a special and disinterested commis­
sioner to preside at the taking of the testimony, to the 
end that the inquiry might be confined to the legitimate 
issues of the case and not range over other and imperti­
nent :fields. ' '  18 A special commissioner has all the power 
which any officer empowered to take depositions has, in­
cluding the power to compel answers by attachment for 
contempt, and, in addition, has ' ' power and authority 
to hear and determine all objections to testimony and 
evidence, and to admit and exclude the same, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as the circuit court might 
in a trial of said caus'e before said circuit court. ' '  14 In 
cases in which such an officer is used he actually exercises 
his powers. 
12 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5_446. 18 State ex rel. Wilson v. Burney (1916) 193 Mo. App. 326, 334, 186 
S. W. 23 . 
. 14 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5446. 
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As a matter of practice it is the exception rather than 
the rule that the opposite party requests· the appoint­
ment of a commissioner. It is almost never done in auto­
mobile accident litigation. Even so, Missouri lawyers 
generally regard the provision as a wise one. They · say 
that it affords a sort of residuary protection for those 
who feel that an examination before a notary is subject to 
abuse. While there is neither need for nor desire 
to have such protection in the usual case, there is satis­
faction in knowing that it is available. That the expedi­
ent is seldom used is further attested by the fact that 
there are no lawyers who make it a special business to 
serve as commissioners at such examinations. In the 
event the opposite party desires that the examination be 
supervised by a commissioner the lawyers usually agree 
among themselves as to who shall serve and do not apply 
to the court to appoint a commissioner. 
The following provision is made in Missouri for ap­
peals from the special commissioners ' rulings to the cir­
cuit court. If the officer rules that the question need not 
be answered, the proponent of the question can demand 
that he refer the matter to the circuit court for a decision. 
In this event the circuit court is required to give a ruling 
forthwith as to the correctness of the commissioner 's rul­
ing. If the circuit court rules that the question should 
be answered the commissioner holds a further examina­
tion of the witness for that purpose. It should be no­
ticed that the statute does not provide that the witness 
can appeal from a ruling of the commissioner which, iii­
stead of relieving him from answering a question, re­
quires that an answer be given. The only way the wit­
ness can present his objection to the trial court before 
trial is to refuse to answer the question, suffer commit­
ment for contempt and, by habeas corpus proceedings, 
get a review by the trial court. His rights in this regard 
are the same as if the examination were held before a 
notary rather than a commissioner. 
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New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Ohio. The practice in 
New Hampshire,l5 Nebraska, 16 and Ohio,17 is to allow 
the notary who takes depositions to compel answers by 
attachment for contempt. The notary who takes a depo­
sition in Missouri has power to enforce answers by at­
tachment for contempt 18 but, as already pointed out, in 
Missouri cities of a greater population than fifty thou­
sand inhabitants, it is possible to require the appoint­
ment of a special commissioner instead of a notary to 
supervise the examination.19 In all cases in which a 
special commissioner is not appointed the practice in 
New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Ohio approximates that 
in Missouri. 
The primary object in giving the notary in these states 
power to punish for contempt was to insure that wit­
nesses in giving their depositions would answer all ques­
tions except those involving personal privilege.80 It was 
not contemplated that notaries should decide objections 
involving relevancy and similar questions. Rather it was 
contemplated that the witness should answer the ques­
tions and then object at the trial if they were improper. 
Such system was intended primarily for the taking of 
ordinary depositions rather than for the taking of dis­
covery examinations. The question arises when the pro-
15 N, H. Public Laws (1926) ch. 336, sec. 1-7 ; ch. 17, .sees. 3, 12 ; 
Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200; Robertson v. Hale (1896) 68 
N. H. 538, 44 A. 695. 
16 Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; In re Hammond 
(1909) 83 Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203. 
17 Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1926) sec. 11510; DeCamp v. Archi­
bald (1893) 60 0. S. 618, 35 N. E. 1056. See also for ,a full treatment 
of the cases 9 Ohio Jurisprudence, pages 58, 111, 121 ; 14 Id. page 38. 
18 Recently the Missouri Supreme Court said: ' 'For almost three quar­
ters of a century this court * * * has uniformly held that a notary 
public in taking depositions is authorized to commit a witness for 
contempt for refusing to answer questions other than those which it is 
his personal privilege to refuse to answer." Ex parte Noell v. Bender 
(1927) 317 Mo. 392, 396, 295 S. W. 532. For a long list of :Missouri 
decisions upholding the right of the notary to punish for contempt, see 
Missouri Digest, " Depositions, " sec. 17. · 
19 The latter aspect of the Missouri practice has been treated in detail 
)n the paragraphs immediately preceding. 
10 Re Nushuler (1878) 4 0. Dec. Rep. 299. 
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cedure is used for discovery purposes whether the notary 
may relieve a party from answering questions. An Ohio 
opinion has suggested a way in which the notary can 
assert the right whether the statutes contemplate it or 
not. Said the court : " It is said that a notary public 
when taking a deposition has not power to decide- as . to 
the competency or relevancy of a question. For the pur­
poses of the deposition and of the case in which the depo­
sition is taken, he has not. But for the purpose of pun­
ishing a witness for contempt, he has. A notary public 
in committing a witness for contempt exercises judicial 
power. The exercise of that power req1,1ires that he 
should find a witness who refuses to answer a question 
guilty of contempt. To :find the witness guilty of con­
tempt the notary must determine whether !he question 
asked was one which the witness could lawfully be or­
dered to answer ; the determination of that fact neces­
sarily requires the notary to pass .upon the competency 
of the question. ' '  111 
It is a very rare thing that a notary punishes a party 
for conte:r:npt, even where the power to punish exists. 
Only when the examining lawyer persuades the notary to 
do so, does the latter assert his prerogative. Even then 
he seldom goes so far as to actually commit. If he does 
anything 'it is merely to order the witness to answer and 
to threaten to exercise his power. Reasons assigned why 
the notary will not exercise his power are that he is 
afraid he will be liable upon his bond for making a wrong­
ful committal,1111 and that, as a practical matter it is very 
Ill Ex parte Woodworth (1893) 6 Ohio Dec. 19, 21. 
1111 The Nebraska court has said the following about the liability of a 
notary.. In a case wherein a person who had been committed by the 
notary sued that officer for damages for false imprisonment the court 
sustained a demurrer to the petition, saying: ' ' In order to state a cause 
of action in such a case the petition must allege * * * that the evi­
dence sought to be elicited from the witness was of such a character 
as would justify him in :refusing to testify. It is a familiar rule that 
a judicial officer, whether of a court of limited or general jurisdiction, 
is not liable in a civil action for acts performed in his judicial capacity, 
if he has acquired and does not exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon 
him by law. He is not liable for a mere error of judgment while acting 
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hard for a lady reporter (as is often the case) to make 
the actual arrest and it is troublesome to call the sheriff. 
The notary does not know, and makes no pretense of 
knowing, whether or not the . question is proper. 
For these reasons the practice usually approximates 
that which obtains in states wherein the officer has no 
power. If the witness refuses to answer a particular 
question, upon advice of counsel, and the examining law­
yer thinks it important enough, he must move the trial 
court to compel an answer. There is one advantage, how­
ever, to the plan under dis-cussion. The fact that the 
notary has power to punish, and the fact that he can 
order the witness to answer upon threat of punishment 
has a tendency to foster voluntary answers to all ques­
tions. A disadvantage of the' plan is that it places within 
the hands of a nonjudicial officer a power which is ca­
pable of abuse and which has been abused upon more 
than one occasion. Occasional abuses of this sort have 
caused dissatisfaction with discovery procedure as a 
whole in a few localities. Last year companion bills were 
introduced in the Nebraska legislature, the one to take 
away the notary's power to punish for contempt, the 
other to curb the use of depositions for purposes of dis­
covery before trial. Investigation revealed that the bills 
were introduced by a layman, and that they were intro­
duced as a protest against the abuse which one of his · 
friends had suffered at the hands of a notary in a par­
ticular case. The Omaha Bar Association opp_osed the 
bills and they were defeated. The incident which 
prompted them indicates the danger of placing a judicial 
power in the hands of a non-judicial officer. 
The uniform mode of obtaining a review by the trial 
court is upon habeas · corpus proceedings 118 when the 
·' 
within his jurisdiction but he is not protected if he assumes to act 
. 
. beyond the scope of his authority. " Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 71 Neb. 
17, 21, 98 N. W. 415. 
ll8 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200 ; In re Hammond (1909) 83 
Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203 ; Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701, 
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notary punishes a party for refusing to answer a ques­
tion at a discovery hearing. The commitment will stand 
or be vacated by the court, depending upon whether the 
witness had a right to refuse to answer the particular 
question. While the witness can justify his refusal to 
answer upon the ground that the evidence elicited is im­
material or irrelevant, such practice is · not encouraged, 
for, as the Ohio Supreme Court has said : " If the wit­
ness assumes to decide these questions for himself at the 
time, unless the interrogatory involves a question of 
privilege, he must do so at his peril. If he should be 
right in his decision [to refuse to answer] he would lose 
nothing ; if wrong, he must suffer the consequences. ' '  14 
Presumably the court means the witness would lose noth­
ing because he could have the improper matter stricken 
at the triaJ.25 
ll4 Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701. 
116 De Camp v. Archibald (1893) 50 0. S. 619, 35 N. E. 1056. 
CHAPTER XIV 
DECIDING OBJECTIONS AND COMPELLING 
ANSWERS TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES 
There are several administrative problems involved 
in deciding objections and compelling answers to written 
interrogatories. The problem of first importance is, who 
shall decide objections which are raised to interrog­
atories. Shall the court or shall a special officer 1 The 
trial judge decides all objections to written interrog­
atories under the American practice. The English plan 
of administration calls for a special officer, a master. 
Objections to, and controversies about, written interrog­
atories are presented to the court in one of the following 
three ways under the American practice : (1 )  The party 
upon whom interrogatories are served must either answer 
or make objections to the questions by motion to strike 
within a limited time after they have been served upon 
him under the practice in some jurisdictions. (2 )  It is 
possible under the practice in some states for him to 
present his objections for the first time in response to 
the proponent 's motion that the penalty for failing to 
answer be enforced. (3) Even after answers have been 
filed the proponent of the questions may move that fur­
ther and more explicit answers be compelled and thus _ 
precipitate a controversy as to the propriety of particu­
lar questions. 
The English practice is quite different. Leave of court 
is necessary in the first instance before the questions are 
submitted to the adverse party.1 The practice is for the 
1 Annual Practice (1929) order 31. 
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p�ticular interrogatories which are proposed to be de­
livered to be submitted first for approval to a master in 
chambers by notice for directions.• A copy of the pro­
posed interrogatories usually is served with the appli­
cation at least two days before the hearing. The master 
takes into account any offer which may be made by the 
party sought to be interrogated, to deliver particulars, 
or make admissions, or produce documents, and allows 
only such particular interrogatories as he ' ' considers 
necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or mat­
ter, or for saving costs. ' '  8 He has the fullest discretion 
as to postponing, limiting, conditioning or refusing the 
application.4 The hearing upon notice for directions is 
an effective auxiliary to discovery procedure proper. By 
getting the parties together the master is able to foster 
mutual disclosure and admissions and in a measure to 
supply some of the benefits attendant upon an oral exam­
ination. 
In England up until 1893 interrogatories were de­
livered directly to the party to be interrogated and then 
he entered his objections, as is generally the practice in 
the United States today. But since 1893 in England this 
practice has been greatly improved by the provision for 
the interlocutory applications described above. The reg­
ulations of 1893 have been described as ' ' the most satis­
factory arrangement that could be arrived at, since they 
have remained unaltered since. The principal change 
they made is that the leave of a master must first be ob­
tained and he must approve the specific questions to be 
asked ; he may, if he considers proper, alter their num­
ber, extent or form. " 11 Of course objections may be 
taken by the adverse party after the interrogatories have 
ll Stringer, A. B. C. Guide to Practice (1928) 66. 
8 Id. 68. 
4 Order 31, rules 12, 18. 
li Rosenbaum, Rule-Making Authority, 128. 
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been approved and submitted,8 yet it is less frequently 
done than formerly.7 
'rhe two most glaring defects in the practice of some 
of the American states are, that the proponent often has 
to make a number of motions before he gets anything 
like a complete answer to his questions, and that the bur­
den on the court is considerable. Not all of the states 
have experienced the same trouble about the administra­
tion of written interrogatories that has been experienced 
in Massachusetts. One reason the trouble has been less 
pronounced elsewhere is that the attempt has not been 
made to use written interrogatories on a wholesale 
scale as a means of obtaining a full discovery. Such · 
attempt has been made in Massachusetts and the ex­
perience thereunder is worthy of a more detailed con­
sideration. While the trial judge is supposed to decide 
all objections that arise, a considerable portion of the 
administrative details is handled by a very efficient chief 
clerk in Boston. Prior to 1903 it was necessary for the 
proponent to move the court to compel an answer before 
the party served with interrogatories had any obligation 
to answer. In 1922 a statute was enacted for the purpose 
of shifting this burden. 8 According to its terms a party 
served with interrogatories was required to answer with­
in ten days, unless he obtained an order of court relieving 
him from so doing. But the statute failed of its intended , 
effect for the reason that it was generally thought unfair 
for the penalty to be self-operative, when there was 
no showing that the proponent had served copies of the 
interrogatories. It is necessary for the proponent, if 
answers are not duly filed, to move the court, upon notice 
to his adversary, that a default or nonsuit be granted. 
Upon the hearing, the opponent can present any objec­
tions to specific questions. · Usually, however, the c!erk 
8 Order · 31, rule 6. 
7 Stringer, Op. Cit. 68. 8 Acts of 1922, ch. 314. 
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simply enters a formal order : ' 'Allowed by the court. 
Defendant (or plaintiff) defaulted (or nonsuited) .  De­
fault ( or nonsuit) to be removed without further order 
if answers to interrogatories are filed within ten days. " 
This is in reality an order to answer. The consequence 
is that more often than otherwise the parties do not 
answer voluntarily, but simply wait until forced to do 
so by an order. Sometimes interrogatories remain on 
file for months before the proponent moves for an an­
swer. If the opponent files evasive or incomplete an­
swers, it is necessary for the proponent to make a motion 
that further and fuller answers be required. It is re.:. 
quired that such a motion contain : 
(1 )  A general statement of the nature of the action. 
{2) The interrogatories and such answers thereto as 
are deemed insufficient. 
(3)  The basis of the claim for fuller answers. Occa­
sionally it is necessary that this procedure be repeated 
several times.9 Each of these steps costs time and 
trouble. It seems that every consideration is accorded 
the party upon whom interrogatories have been served, 
so that the default or nonsuit, if such be entered, can be 
removed if he repents seasonably. Usually the pro­
ponent contents himself with whatever answer he has 
elicited by the original motion for a default or nonsuit. 
The Massachusetts practice is defective in this respect. 
This particular feature is generally recognized by the 
Massachusetts bench and bar as the weakest point in 
the present interrogatory machinery. The economic 
waste incident to it is considerable. The defect would be 
remedied somewhat under the revision of the Rules of 
the Superior Court which was recommended in 1931. 
In substance the proposal is that a conditional default 
be entered, without motion and hearing, upon the filing 
of an affidavit by the proponent to the effect that a copy 
9 Of. Warren v. Deeoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505. 
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of the interrogatories has been served and that the time 
for answering has elapsed. 
The Washington procedure is representative of that 
which obtains in a number of other states. Under it a 
part of the burden placed upon the proponent of inter­
rogatories has been eliminated. Once interrogatories 
have been duly filed and served the real burden is upon 
the party upon whom they are served to either answer 
them or present his objections within twenty days to 
the court by motion to strike. If he does nothing, the 
proponent need only move that the penalty be enforced. 
There is no way by which the party served with inter­
rogatories can simply allow the time to elapse and force 
the proponent to take additional steps such as by mo­
tion for an order to answer, as in Massachusetts.10 After 
the time has elapsed the proper procedure is for the 
proponent to move that the appropriate pleading be 
stricken and judgment rendered accordingly, rather than 
to move for judgment.11 There are two courses open 
to the proponent if the interrogated party files incom­
plete or insufficient answers. Generally he should pro­
ceed by motion to make the answers more speci:fic.111 But 
if the answers are palpably insufficient he may move 
to strike them from the files and then proceed as if no 
answer had been given.18 
The practice in most of the states falls somewhere 
between that of Massachusetts and that of Washington. 
The statutes provide that the party served must make 
his objections or answer. Yet before a penalty can be . 
enforced it is necessary for the proponent to move either 
10 LeMay v. Baxter (1895) 11 Wash. 649, 40 Pac. 122; Livesey v. 
0 'Brien (1893) 6 Wash. 553, 34 Pac. 134. 
11 Haas v. Washington Water Power Co. (1916) 93 Wash. 2911 160 
Pac. 954. 
111 Knapp v. Order of Pendo (1904) 36 Wash. 601, 79 Pac. 209. 
18 Lowry v. Moore (1897) 16 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (where answers 
were very evasive) ; Saar v. Weeks (1919) 105 Wash. 628, 178 Pac. 819 
(where only 2 of 44 interrogatories were answered). Cf. Lawson v. 
Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 26, 86 Pac. 1120. 
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1 
that the penalty be enforced or that answers be com­
pelled. It is not clear under some of the statutes and 
decisions whether the party served with · interrogatories 
is entitled to contest the propriety of the questions, after 
time for answering has elapsed.u 
Prior to the recent amendme�t Jo the Massachusetts 
statutes which limits the number of interrogatories to 
thirty, the burden upon both the judge and the clerk's 
office was very great. Although conditions have im­
proved since the number of interrogatories has been 
limited, there is still a considerable administrative bur­
den upon the cQurt in connection with interrogatories. 
The same has been true under the federal equity practice. 
Wallace R. Lane has said : "In some instances quite 
as much time of . the court has been taken in hearing 
arguments concerning interrogatories and deciding what 
should or should not be answered, as is occupied in the 
actual trial of the case. ' ' 11 
14 In addition to the statutes whieh are set for-th in the appendix see: 
Niven v. Union Trust Co.· (1927) 5 N. J. Mise. 291, 136 A. 334; Combs v. 
Union Co. (1896) 146 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16 ; Sparks v. Reeves & Co. 
(1910) 165 Ala. 352, 51 So. 574; Fahey v. Aneient Order of United 
Wor)onen (1919) 187 Iowa 825, 174 N. W. 650 ; Free v. Telegraph Co. 
( 1907) 135 Iowa 69, 110 N. W. 143 ; Modern .8. S. Co. v. Van Buren 
Co. (1905) 126 Iowa 606, 102 N. W. 536. 
16 Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 294. 
' 
CHAPTER XV 
MAY A PARTY BE REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE 
EVIDENCE OF HIS OWN CASE? 
DISCLOSURE OF WHAT PARTY WILL TEsTIFY To IN SuPPORT 
OF HIS CASE 
The lawyer who is examining a party for discovery 
before trial may interrogate upon all of the issues of 
the case in some thirteen jurisdictions. Disclosure of 
everything relevant to the controversy may be required. 
The examination may assume the same latitude as an 
examination of the party at the trial. In none of the 
jurisdictions in which deposition procedure is used for 
purposes of discovery before trial is the scope of the 
examination restricted to narrower limits than would 
obtain upon examination �t the trial.l As a matter of 
practice the scope is even broader than at the trial. At­
tempts have been made to restrict the examination, but 
they have been unsuccessful. The epithet "fishing ex­
cursion for the adverse party's evidence " has been em­
ployed against the taking of depositions for discovery 
in every state where it :Pas been attempted, first for the 
purpose of preventing the examination entirely, and fail­
ing of this, for the purpose of restricting its scope. Judi­
cial opinion, however, has been opposed to restriction. 
The late William Howard Taft expressed the Ohio view 
when he said : " There is no objection that I know why 
each party should not know the other 's case. ' '  8 Com-
1 Such states are Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Ramp· 
shire, Ohio and Texas. , 
8 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co. (1887) 9 0. Dec. Rep. 809, 812. See also 
Re Berger (1919) 13 0. App. 205, 101 0. S. 5121 130 N. W. 935, The 
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missioner Clay of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the 
classic case setting forth the Kentucky discovery prac­
tice, said : "It is earnestly insisted that the right given 
by subsection 8 of section 606 (allowing cross-examina­
tion of adverse party by deposition) ,  if interpreted 
according to the contention of appellant, is liable to 
great abuse ; that it will enable the party to find out his 
opponent 's evidence. in advance of trial. As, however, 
the right is given to each party, they will be upon terms 
of equality ; and, as it is to be presumed that neither 
will offer any evidence other than the exact facts and 
truth of the case, we do not see how either could be preju­
diced. ' '  8 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has said : 
" We think it cannot admit of a serious doubt that the 
deposition of either party may be taken as to all the 
matters in issue between them, except disclosing the .1 
names of witnesses and the manner of proving his case.' 
So far as the plaintiff is concerned it would hardly occur 
to any that the defendant could not take his deposition 
to all the material matters on which the suit is founded. 
To hold otherwise would render this provision nearly 
nugatory. • • • We see no reason to doubt that in 
taking the deposition of a party he may be required to 
answer all questions relating to the issue on either side, 
much as if he were on the stand. ' '  6 The actual practice 
in Missouri, Nebraska, Texas and Indiana, as described 
by lawyers in those states, permits the examination by 
deposition before trial to be at least as broad as an ex­
amination at the trial, and frequently, much broader. 
Ohio statutory provision that the examination may assume the form of 
a cross,examination has been instrumental in fostering this liberal Ohio 
rule as to the scope of the examination. 
8 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Williams (1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S. W. 
651, 653. 
. 
4 This limitation is imposed by the statutes. N. H. Public Laws 
(1926) eh. 336, see. 25. 
5 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200, 201. See also LaCoss v. 
Lebanon (1917) 78 N. H; 413, 101 A� 364; Penniman v. Jones (1879) 
59 N. H. 119. . 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken the position 
that examination for discovery may assume the form 
of, and be as broad as, cross-examination at the trial, and 
that everything relevant to the controversy should be 
disclosed.6 In the case in which this policy was first set 
forth the trial court had made an order stating ' ' that 
the . proposed examination be, and the same is hereby, 
limited to such subjects as may be material to the de­
fendant 's case, but the same shall not extend to any 
examination into the facts essential to support .the plain­
tiff's case. " 7 The Supreme Court set aside the order 
and held that it was improper thus to limit the examina­
tion.• The Ontario discovery procedure is similar to 
that of Wisconsin. There is a similar liberality as to 
the scope of the inquiry, permitting questions to be asked 
regarding any or all of the issues of the case. 9 
Limitations were imposed upon the scope of written 
interrogatories for discovery under the earlier Massa­
chusetts practice, but more recently such limitations have 
been discarded. Today interrogation may be upon all 
of the issues of the case. This change in rules is the 
result of statutes which were enacted for the specific 
purpose of liberalizing the practice. The early decisions 
held that discovery from a party was limited " to mat­
ters in aid of a case to be established against the party 
interrogated. ' ' 10 Iri applying the rule the court said : 
"It is difficult to imagine a question relative to material 
facts in support of a case against a party the answer to 
which would not necessarily involve a disclosure of the 
mode of the proof. ' ' It was held that a party need not 
6 Kelly v. Railroad Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521; Horlick's 
Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201, 144 N. W. 272. 
'7 Kelly v. Railroad Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521. The briefs in 
the ease show clearly that such was the main issue before the court. 
Wis. Cases and Briefs, vol. 18!!. 
S id. 
9 Graham v. Temperance Co. (1895) 16 P. B. 536. 
10 'W'illl'on v; Webb'er (18"54) 2 Gray 55'8. 
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answer ' 'concerning the proofs of his own case. ' '  11 A 
party was permitted to refuse to answer such a question 
as " What caused the collision T "  on the ground that it 
would disclose his own case.18 Th'e view was maintained 
that the word "case " meant " case set up in his own 
pleadings. ' ' In 1910, however, the Massachusetts Su­
preme Court indicated a more liberal view when it said : 
"But this does not mean that he could file interrogatories 
only as to matters upon which he had the burden of 
proof, or that a defendant whose answer was merely a 
general denial could not require the plaintiff to answer 
any interrogatories. ' '  18 Again in 1912 the court held 
that interrogatories could approxilnate in scope an ex­
amination at the trial.u But the court was not certain 
whether "interrogation as to specific facts in contradic­
tion of a definite claim set up by the adverse party" 
would be permitted.16 Shortly thereafter it was held 
that a plaintiff could not be questioned for a detailed 
account of an accident.16 The statute of 1913 provided 
the final and decided liberalization of discovery in Massa- , 
chusetts,. It provided that a party might interrogate an 
adverse party for the discovery of all facts and docu­
ments admissible at the trial, the only limitations being 
that he could not discover the names of witnesses or title 
papers not material to issues in the action.17 This stat­
ute has been given a liberal construction. Recently it 
has been construed to ' ' enable a party to interrogate 
his adversary to the same extent as would be permissible 
11 Id. 
18 Robbins v. Brocton St. Ry. Co. (1901) 180 Mass. 51, 61 N. E. 265. 
18 Grabenstein v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp. (1910) 205 Mass. 431, 
439, 91 N. E. 411. 
14 Looney v. Saltonstall (1912) 212 Mass. 69, 98 N. E. 698. 
15 Id. 
16 Wakeley v. Boston Elevated Railway (1914) 217 Mass. 488, 105 
N. E. 436. This ease did not involve the statutes of 1913. 
17 Mass. Laws of 1913, ch. 815, preserved in Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) 
ch. 231, sec. 63, and in amendment of 1922, Acts 1922, ch. 314. 
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if he were called as a witness at the trial. ' '  18 Quebec, 
Iowa, Louisiana and Alabama also allow written inter­
rogatories to cover all of the issues of the case.19 
Field investigations were made by the author in the 
following jurisdictions which do not restrict an examina­
tion before trial more narrowly than an examination at 
the· trial : Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Ohio, Ontario, 
Quebec, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas, Missouri, New Hamp­
shire and Nebraska. Practically every lawyer and judge 
who was interviewed in these states was asked whether 
a party who is allowed to find out in advance of trial 
what his adversary and his adversary's witnesses will 
testify to, is not encouraged to manufacture evidence to 
meet that disclosed. The uniform answer was that this 
had not been the experience but that on the contrary 
a chief use of the procedure was to curb perjured testi­
mony and to eliminate false claims. A few terse ex­
pressions of opinion representative of those given gen­
erally are as follows : (1 )  "It does not foster perjury 
for this reason. If each party can first of all pin his oppo­
nent down to a definite and detailed position in regard to 
the facts in controversy, there is little reason to fear 
that the party thus pinned down will concoct evidence 
in any fashion. He is already bound. The mutuality of 
discovery is a saving feature. "  (2)  " The procedure is 
very helpful in keeping in line that class of witnesses 
who have not much regard for the sanctity of an oath. ' '  
(3) "Instead of finding that a ruthless discovery will 
foster perjury, as some lawyers supposed at first, our 
experience has been that it is the greatest preventive of 
perjury. " (4) "We find that our opponents do not coach 
18 Cutler v. Cooper (1920) 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634; Warren v. 
Decoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505. See also Goldman v. 
Ashkins (1929) 266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 515. 
IS Grigg 's Quebec Code of Civil Procedure (1930) sec. 287 ; Code of 
Iowa (1927) sec. 11185; McGhee v. Brown (1848) 3 La. Ann. Rep. 272 ; 
Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167 Ala. 557, 
52 So. 751. 
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their witnesses in preparation for a discovery examina­
tion like they do for the trial. The.Y are so busy that they 
think little of preparation until the necel!lsities of trial 
arise. Consequently we get the witness before he has 
been coached to any extent. The very spontaneity of the 
testimony is an evident guaranty of its truthfulness. ' '  
( 5 )  " Inasmuch as it is often more than a year before 
trial is reached it means a good deal just to be able to 
obtain a witness 's story while his memory is fresh. " 
( 6 )  ' ' Our chief use of the procedure is to eliminate the 
most elaborate form of perjury-the fake claim. " 
(7)  " It has proved to be a weapon of the utmost value 
to our bar in ascertaining the truth where the claim of 
the person whose deposition is being taken is believed 
to be a fictitious one. Many lawyers refer to it as a fish­
ing expedition and there are a good many cases where 
it is abused as such, but where a party is likely to shift 
his story after learning the · theory of the case of his 
opponent, it is a most satisfactory means of confining 
him to one story. It has proved to be the terror of the 
lying litigant. ' '  These statements are representative 
of those given by some two hundred practicing lawyers 
in jurisdictions which employ the unrestricted examina­
tion for discovery before trial. There is said to be some 
coaching of witnesses upon the basis of what they and 
others have testified to upon their depositions, but this 
coaching is done in an effort to square up the testimony 
of witnesses within the bounds of limitations prescribed 
by a knowledge that the opposing attorney has copies 
of their previous testimony and will point out any 
flagrant change of position. 
A final word should be said about the Massachusetts 
experience. There, discovery is upon written interroga­
tories. Both the narrow rule and the liberal rule have 
been tried, the latter obtaining at present. Not a single 
Boston lawyer who was interviewed expressed the opin-
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ion that the scope of the inquiry was too broad at present. 
or that it was resulting in increased perjury. On the 
contrary, a number said that they favored augmenting 
the written interrogatory procedure with an oral ex­
amination so that the theoretical scope of the inquiry 
would be utilized under a more effective machinery. 
Discovery has been limited in several jurisdictions to 
facts relating to the issues upon which the party seeking 
discovery has the burden of proof under the pleadings. 
The most striking example of the disastrous effect of 
this rule upon discovery procedure is furnished by the 
New York practice. There was a conflict from the very 
adoption of discovery in New York as to whether and 
to what extent, a party could be required to disclose evi­
dence in support of his own case. A rule of court was 
adopted in 1870 which limited discovery to facts ' 'mate­
rial in proving the case or defense of the party " seeking 
the exarnination.80 The Throop code subsequently com­
bined the several methods of taking testimony before 
trial into a single deposition procedure, and since it had 
formerly been possible to take depositions to perpetuate 
testimony, when necessity required it, this element found 
its way into the consolidated procedure and the word 
"necessary" was added to the word "material. " The 
two requirements that a ·  party must show that the dis­
covery sought was material and nec.essary to his cause 
of action or defense produced a very strict rule, so that 
finally the general . statement of the rule in New York 
became : "The applicant can have an examination to 
prove his own case only. ' '  11 This was taken to mean 
that a party could not have an examination merely to 
establish the negative of a proposition which his ad­
versary was required to establish affirmatively,88 the 
eo Rule 21, quoted in Adams v. Cavanaugh (1885) 37 Hun 232, 233, 
see also cases cited in 1 Silvernail 7. 
Ill Oshinsky v. Gumberg (1919) 176 N. Y. S. 406. 
811 Kimball v. John Budd Co. (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 404. 
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word ' ' case ' '  being interpreted to include the issues as 
to which the party had the burden of proof under the 
pleadings. The following quotation is representative of 
the reasons which the courts set forth as justifying re­
strictions upon discovery : ' ' The provisions for such 
examinations are not intended to enable a party to dis­
cover what his opponent 's testimony will be, so that he 
may obtain witnesses to contradict it. Experience shows 
that if a party discovers what his opponent 's testimony 
will be, and has time enough, he is often successful in 
discovering also witnesses for contradiction. ' '  28 The 
four departments of the · Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court at present enforce a fairly uniform 
rule in regard to the scope of an examination before 
• trial, in other than tort cases. It is this : Ordinarily 
the examination will be confined to the issues concerning 
which the party applicant has the burden of proof under 
the pleadings.24 ' 
· 
Some of the New York courts use the rule that a party 
is entitled only to discovery of facts material and neces­
sary to his cause of action or defense as the basis for 
imposing special restrictions upon discovery in automo­
bile accident litigation. There is a conflict of ·opinion 
among the several departments of the Appellate Division 
concerning the exact scope of examinations for discovery 
in this type of litigation. The question at issue is 
whether the examination should be limited to such items 
28 Sheehan v. The A. & B. Turnpike Co. (1889) 8 N. Y. S. 14. See 
also Beach v. Mayor (1878) 4 Abb. N. C. 236; Chapin v. Thompson 
(1878) 16 Hun 53 ; Knight v. Morgenroth (1904) 87 N. Y. S. 693. 
24 First Department: Ganni v. Stallman (1922) 193 N. Y. S. 97 ; 
Standard Bank v. American Union Bank (1922) 197 N. Y. S. 148 ; New 
York City Car Advertising Co. v. E. Regensburg -& Sons (1923) 200. 
N. Y. S. 152; .Curtis v. Searles (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 602. Second depart· 
ment: Parkin v. Unity Protective Ins. Ass'n (1926) 219 N. Y. S. 27;  
Fromm v. Grisman (1922) 197 N. Y. 8. 156; Safrin v. Safrin (1923) 200 
N. Y. S. 51; Kimball v. John Budd Co. (1925) 212 N. Y. 8. 404; O 'Boyle 
v. Home .Ins. Co. (1929) 234 N. Y. B. 259. Fourth Department: Tich· 
nor Bros. Inc. v. Bickle (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 547; Schmitt v. Baptist 
Temple, Inc. (1929) 234 N. Y. S. 888. , · 
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as ownership and control of the vehicle or should extend 
also to the facts of liability and damage. Prior to the 
adoption of the Civil Practice Act there was substantial 
authority to the · effect that a general examination would 
not be allowed, the reason being that it "would amount 
to nothing more than a cross-examination of plaintiff 
and an inquiry into his case. " 25 Under the Civil Practice 
Act the First Department has committed itself to the 
same rule.88 Reasons assigned for adhering to the rule 
are that the Civil Practice Act changed only the pro­
cedure and not the right to examinations before trial, and 
that "considerations of sound public policy" do not 
· favor general examinations before trial in negligence 
cases. The Second Department has consistently ad­
hered to the contrary view ·and has sanctioned general 
examinations.27 This allows an inquiry into the facts of 
liability, whereas the rule enforced in the First Depart­
ment does not. The reasons given for allowing a general 
examination are thaf the Civil Practice Act was intended 
to liberalize the practice, that anything which will bring 
out facts before the trial should be encquraged, that the 
experience of the bar with the more liberal practice has 
been favorable, and that the fact that the action is in 
tort is no reason for limiting the examination. It results 
from this conflict that in New York City (First Depart­
ment) the strict rule is followed while nearby Brooklyn 
(Second Department) has the liberal rule. The Rochester 
practice seems to follow that in Brooklyn more nearly 
than that in New York City, although it is somewhat less 
liberal than the practice in Brooklyn.aa The possibility 
ll6 Kessler v. North River Realty Co. (1915) 155 N. Y. S. 799, 800. 
J6 Shaw v. Samley Realty Co. (1922) 194 N. Y. S. 531. 
8'7 Samols v. Mayer (1923) 199 N. Y. S. 754; Middleton v. Boardman 
(1924) 206 N. Y. S. 725 ; Storm v. Gair (1925) 207 N. Y. S. 925; Major 
v. Coles (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 877. 
88 Cf. Judge Rodenbeck's liberal opinion in Swift v. General Baking 
Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 554; Cameron v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1925) 210 
N. Y. S. 241 ; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman (1924) 204 N. Y. S. 673. 
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of a uniformity of practice throughout the state seems 
rather remote since the Court of Appeals has refused to 
lay down a u.niform rule, on the ground that the matter 
is discretionary with the Supreme Court.119 Eve:p. in 
courts where the stricter rule is .followed, a more liberal 
examination may be allowed if ' ' special circumstances ' '  
are shown to exist.80 The general test as to what con­
stitutes such special circumstances is whether the plain­
tiff would "be unable to prove a cause of action without 
an examination of the defendant. " 81 The " necessity"· 
factor may sometimes operate to enlarge the scope of the 
examination, and sometimes, though lesl? frequently, it 
may operate to restrict it.82 The fact that the party 
seeking discovery already has knowledge of the facts 
sought,88 or that he has witnesses who could testify to 
the facts,84 is not conclusive proof that the discovery 
is unnecessary, inasmuch as a legitimate purpose of dis-
covery is to obtain adinissions.85 
· 
Special restrictions upon the scope of the examination 
similar to those which are applied in negligence cases 
are also applied in other types of tort actions in New 
York. The scoP,e of the examination is restricted in such 
actions as deceit;86 libel,87 and malpractice.88 
. 89 Middleton v. Boardman (1924) 240 N. Y. 552, 148 N. E. 701. 
80 Illustrative examples of " special circumstances" may be found 
in the following eases: Palmer v. Hampton (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 768 ; 
Laurino v. Pratt (1927) 226 N. Y. S. 848 ; Sehonhous v. Weiner (1930) 
246 N. Y. S. 73 ; Oshinsky v. Gumber (1919) 176 N. Y. S. 406. 
81 Krumeieh v. Sundelson (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 488, 489. 
88 Citizen 's Trust Co. of Utica v. Prescott & Sons, Inc. (1927) 223 
N. Y. S. 184. 
88 Klapp v. Merwin (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 694; Drake v. Line-A-Time 
Mfg. Co. (1929) 233 N. Y. S. 481. 
84 Green v. Selzniek (1927) 221 N. Y. S. 63. 
811 Maria v. Bower (1929) 134 Misc. 800, 236 N. Y. S. 291. A similar 
rule was recognized under the code. Terry v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co. 
(1917) 167 N. Y. S. 747. . 
86 Sands v. Comerford (1925) 207 N. Y. S. 398. 
87 Hermann v. Osborne Co. (1927) 128 Misc. 859, 220 N. Y. S. 306; 
Bergstrom v. J;l.idgway
_ 
Co. (1910) 138 App. Div. 178, 123 N. Y. S. 29; 
Albanos v. News SyndiCate Co. (1927) 130 Mise. 566, 224 N. Y. S. 331 ; 
Lattimer v. Sun-Herald Corp. (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 734. 
88 Krumeieh v. Sundelson (1927) 131 Misc. 9, 225 N. Y. S. 667; Schon· 
hous v. Weiner (1930) 246 N. Y. S. 73. 
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The New York practice illustrates the ineffectiveness 
of restrictions upon the scope of the discovery as an aid 
in arriving at the truth. The following discussion is 
based upon interviews with representative lawyers in 
New York City and Rochester, and upon a comparison 
of their views with those found in the states in which an 
unrestricted examination is allowed. The experience of 
lawyers in states in which an unrestricted examination 
is allowed is that where each party pins his adversary 
down to a definite and detailed story in advance of trial, 
the truth is discovered and perjury · curtailed. The mu­
tuality of discovery is the saving factor. In New York, 
on the contrary, one party, the plaintiff, can find out his · 
opponent 's expected testimony as to one side of the 
controversy, and perhaps, by fishing, get glimpses of the 
other side also. Is there anything to prevent the plain­
tiff from manufacturing a story to meet this Y Elsewhere 
the saving feature is that he is prevented from such 
tactics by virtue of the fact that he has already bound 
himself as to his detailed position with regard to the 
facts. The defendant may have a similar right to dis­
covery as to his affirmative defenses, but this is by no 
means sufficient to bind his adversary definitely. Or per­
chance he has no affirmative defense. 
Again, it may be possible for either party to get un­
restricted discovery from adverse witnesses on the 
ground that they reside more than one hundred miles 
from the place of trial. The experience elsewhere has 
been that little harm comes from a party examining his 
opponent's witnesses if it is possible to bind such party 
to his own story before he starts on his quest for infor­
mation. Without this safe-guard there are considerable 
possibilities of unfair advantage. 
Another result of the lack of a full and mutual dis­
closure is that the plaintiff may be allowed to seek ma­
terial with which to build up a case to such an extent 
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that it amounts to a species of blackmail. There is no 
reciprocal right of the defendant to a weapon with which 
to meet a nonmeritorious case. The result is that instead 
of discovery being regarded as an instrument of truth, 
it is regarded as a tactical wea�n. Instead of the pro­
cedure encouraging settlements by disclosing the exact 
status of the controversy, it is employed quite differently 
as a mode of forcing settlements. If there is a suit 
against a prominent business man or a prominent so- \ 
ciety woman the first move is for an examination before 
trial, not so much for the purpose of discovering the truth 
as upon the theory that such a person will prefer to settle 
rather than to suffer the humiliation of the examination. 
To �nforce the New York rule as to the scope of the 
examination it has been necessary to require that the 
applicant set forth the subject-matter of his intended in­
quiry. This has the effect of notifying the opposing at­
torney as to the points on which he should instruct his 
client to disclose as little as possible. Indeed it serves 
as a sort of invitation for such coaching. The contrary 
experience in states where the applicant is only required 
to state that he desires an examination without disclos­
ing the points thereof, has been that lawyers do com­
paratively little coaching of the witness in preparation 
for facing the examination. They are not careful in this 
regard until the necessities of the trial appear. The 
New York rule serves to counteract this natural tendency 
and, accordingly, to give less assurance of spontaneous 
testimony. 
The New York rule as to the scope of the examination 
has been the means of effecting severe limitations upon 
the use of discovery in that type of litigation · in which 
it has found its greatest usefulness elsewhere, namely, 
personal injury actions. Similarly, it restricts employ­
ment of discovery examinations by the class of litigants 
who elsewhere hav-e fo'Und the de'Vice moat helpful; 
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namely, defendants. Thus, from two different angles, 
the practical utility of discovery procedure is curtailed. 
In some states discovery has had a salutary effect on 
pleading in that it has divided the labor of the reduction 
of the controversy to precise issues. In Ne�York the 
situation is exactly the reverse, in one particular, at 
least. Since the defendant can have no discovery ex­
cept on his affirmative defenses, he often puts in fictitious 
defenses for the sole purpose of securing an examination 
of his adversary. Indeed several New York lawyers 
pointed to this as one of the chief defects in the present 
system. 
Finally, the theory that the right to discovery is with­
in the discretion of the court and that each case has its 
peculiar status as regards discovery, serves as an in­
vitation for needless presentation of disputes to an al­
ready overburdened court. The experience elsewhere 
�as been that when lawyers know what their opponents 
can have, as a matter of right, they will accord them the 
same voluntarily. And when the basis of adjustment is 
the ordinary law of evidence there is sufficient definite­
ness of knowledge to allow the lawyers to settle a 
majority of the disputes among themselves without re­
sort to the court. 
It is a mistake to suppose, as some courts apparently 
have done, that the New York rule that a party can have 
discovery only of facts relating to the issues of which . 
he has the burden of proof under the pleadings is sub­
stantially the same as the chancery rule that a party 
could not be compelled to disclose his evidence or the 
manner of proving his own case. As a matter of fact, 
the chancery rp.le was not as illiberal as the New York 
rule. Wigram stated the chancery rule thus : ' ' The 
right of a plaintiff in equity to the benefit of the defend­
ant 's oath is limited to a discovery of such material facts 
as relate to the ' plaintiff's case '_..:arid does hot exterid 
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to a discovery of the manner in which, or of the evidence 
by means of which the defendant 's case is to be estab­
lished, or to any discovery of the defendant's evi­
dence. ' '  89 Similarly, Hare said that, ' ' The defendant 
is not compelled to discover his evidence if it cannot tend 
to establish affirmatively the cru;e of the plaintiff. ' '  iO 
The chancery rule did not restrict the examination to the 
issues of which the party had the burden of proof under 
the pleadings. The correct interpretation of the rule 
has been set forth by Bray, the leading English authority 
on discovery : ' ' It is, however, plain from the general 
scope of the book (Wigram, on Discovery) that the 
meaning which he attaches to the expression ' the party 's 
own evidence ' is not in principle different from that of -
the expression ' matter in question in the action' here 
adopted.. It must also be remembered that under the 
chancery practice a plaintiff ex necessitate rei had to 
deliver his interrogatories before the defense was put in, 
and therefore their relevancy could only be referred to 
the plaintiff's statement of his case in the bill. ' '  '1 
Several other jurisdictions besides New York restrict 
the scope of discovery examinations. The question has 
not yet been dec\ded under the new Michigan rules for 
discovery as to whether or to what extent the New York 
decisions limiting the scope of the examination will be 
followed. There is some danger of such an undesirable 
result because the rules are modeled after the provisions 
of the New York Civil Practice Act, and employ the 
words "material " and "_necessary, ' '  the very words 
which have been seized upon by the New York courts as 
the, basis for restricting the scope of the examination. I 
One of the draftsmen of the Michigan rules of court has 
. 89 Wigram on lAw of Discovery, 13 Law Library Series 41. 
40 Hare on Discovery, 198. For similar definitions see Bray 's Law of 
Dise:overy, 4�4; W.JK!!!J¥"e on E�ide�e�e, vol. 3, see. 1846, 1856; Story, Equ1ty Pleadmg \llrtli M.) see; ·572. · ·  
tl Bray's Law of Discovery, 12. 
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said concerning the rule on discovery : "Unfortunately 
it has been given a rather narrow interpretation by the 
New York courts, which have held that the examining 
party may interrogate regarding his own case only, but 
. not regarding the case of the other party. It is to be 
hoped that the courts of Michigan will give the rule a 
wider scope. " 41 
There is a distinct division of authority as to the 
allowable scope of interrogatories in the Federal equity 
courts under Equity Rule 58. The greater number of 
decisions, however, limit discovery to facts in support 
of the case of the applicant. As in New York, the 
"necessity " factor has played a part in limiting dis­
covery. The general theory of the federal courts which 
adhere to the strict rule as to the scope of the exainina­
tion is illustrated by the leading case of J. H. Day Com­
pany v. Mountain City Milling Company, in which San­
ford, .T., says : "After careful consideration I think it is 
clear that the 58th Equity Rule was intended merely to 
change the procedure in reference to obtaining discovery 
and to extend this right to a defendant as well as to a 
plaintiff, and was not intended to change the long estab­
lished rule in reference to the subject matter of such 
discovery or to extend such right in favor of either party 
beyond the matters relating to his own ground of action 
or defense, respectively, and enable him to obtain dis­
covery in reference to matters relating solely to the 
ground of action or defense of the other party. ' '  48 
41 Sunderland, The New Miehigan Court Rules, 10 Mieh. State Bar , 
Jour. 586, 592. 
48 225 Fed. 622, 624. Aeeord: F. Speidel Co. v. Barstow Co. (1925) 232 
Fed. 617 ; Wooleott v. Nat. Elee� Sign Co. (1916) 235 Fed. 224; Gas Prod. 
Co. v. Am. Ref. Co. (1926) 12 F. (2d) 98; Buron Weston Co. v. Brown 
Paper Co. (1926) 13 F. (2d) 412; P. H. MeGarry & Co. v. South. Pae. 
Co. (1925) 4 F. (2d) 421. The infiuenee of the similar English rule is 
apparent in some of these deeisions. See also the English influenee at 
the ineeption of the rule from the correspondenee between Mr. Jus· 
tie Lurton and Lord Chancellor Loreburn, found in liopkins' New Fed· 
eral Equity Rules (6th ed.) p. 32. 
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The liberal view which obtains in some federal courts 
is set forth by Trippet, J. : " Some of the courts seem 
inclined to throw difficulties in the way of discovering the 
truth as provided by the rule under discussion, and 
oppose the evident purpose of it. The old rules are abol­
ished. There is no reason why the procedure now should 
be hampered by restrictions imposed by any previous 
rules of procedure. The truth should always be sought 
after, and the courts should eageriy enforce any method 
of securing the truth. It makes no difference whether 
the facts are as much within the knowledge of the plain­
�iff as of the defendant. The. facts have to be proven, 
and if the plaintiff can get an admission from the de­
fendant, it saves the necessity of proving the facts, 
except by such admission of the defendant. The rule 
expressly provides that the plaintiff may propose inter­
rogatories to elicit facts material to the support or de­
fense of the case. To say that the plaintiff shall not 
inquire about the facts that may relate to the defense is 
to construe the rule in plain derogation of its language 
and purpose. • • • The plain object of this rule is 
to dispose of issues in advance of the trial by compelling 
the parties tq make admissions. This rule, properly 
enforced, will compel the parties to be honest concerning 
their pleadings, and parties to litigation ought to be com­
pelled to be honest by putting them on oath and requiring 
them to be specific about the facts at issue. There is no 
reason why the parties should wait until the day of tr�al, 
and then bring in witnesses to prove facts that the par­
ties may be compelled to admit under oath· prior to the 
trial. The truth is always the truth and telling the truth 
will not hurt anyone, except in so far as he ought to be 
hurt. The only protection that should be afforded any 
litigant from answering any interrogatories, which call 1 
for material facts for the plaintiff or the defendant, is to 
protect him in his constitutional rights, such as to be 
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compelled in a criminal case to be a Witness against 
himself, and in matters of public policy, where the statute 
prohibits disclosures, etc. Such a practice as here in­
dicated would tend to shorten trials, and materially aid 
the administration of justice, and that is the very pur­
pose of the rule under discussion. ' '  44 
Under the Washington statute interrogatories for dis­
covery are confined to matters " material to the support 
or defense of the action. ' '  46 In its narrower construc­
tion this has been taken to limit discovery to evidence 
in support of the issues as to which the party proponent 
has the affirmative under' the pleadings. For instance, 
the Washington Supreme Court has held that " since 
they were propounded by the defense, they must call for 
matters material to the defense. Those here propounded 
had no tendency in that direction. They rather required 
the plaintiff to state with particularity what evidence she 
intended to give in support of her complaint. • • • 
Seemingly, it ought not to require argument to demon­
strate that the statute furnishes no sanction for inter­
rogatories such as these. " 48 It is even possible, under 
this statute, to refuse discovery as to evidence in support 
of the case of the party applicant, for it has been held 
that : "It is not the purpose of the statute to enable the 
one party to a lawsuit to require the other party thereto 
to supply him with all the facts and documents that may 
be material to his side of the case, or even to secure ad­
missions against interest. Its purpose is to enable him 
to discover material facts and documents solely within 
44 Quirk v. Quirk (1919) 259 Fed. 597, 598. Accord: Perkins Oil Well 
Cementing Co. v. Owen (1923) 293 Fed. 759; Texas Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co. 
(1926) 12 F. (2d) 317. 
46 Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) see. 1226. 
48 Hill v. Hill (1923) 126 Wash. 560, 561, 219 Pae. 18, followed in 
Schmit v. Campbell (1926) 140 Wash. 376, 249 Pae. 487, and in Kelly­
Springfield Tire Co. v. Lotta Miles Tire Co. (1926) 139 Wash. 159, 245 
Pae. 921 : " It does not enable him to pry into the opposite party 's 
ease. " 
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the knowledge, possession, or control of the other party 
to which he has not access. ' '  47 
The New Jersey provision for written interrogatories 
in actions at law has been so construed as to limit the 
scope of the discovery to facts in support of the issues 
upon which the applicant for discovery has the burden 
of proof.48 Questions about · th� following items have 
been held improper in automobile negligence cases in 
New Jersey : extent of injuries ; time of confinement in 
hospital ; the value of the automobile before and after 
the accident.49 
South Carolina courts have restricted the scope of the 
examination for discovery. The supreme court, upon 
several occasions, has said that it would not compel " a  
disclosure before trial of the evidence by which the op­
posite party Will support his own allegations. ' '  110 These 
cases are based upon the amendment of 1923 requiring 
an order upon good cause shown before an adversary 
can be examined. The statute represents legislative pro­
test against the liberal rule laid down in the Fox case in 
1922 wherein it was held that a party to an action was 
entitled, as a matter of right, to examine his adversary 
before trial. As Mr. Justice Fraser has pointed out in 
his dissenting opinion in that case : "If the right to 
examine the adverse party is an absolute right, then 
the scope of the examination cannot be restricted. ' ' 111 
There is a rule of court in England to the effect that 
discovery may be allowed or disallowed, depending upon 
whether it is "necessary either for disposing fairly of 
4'7 Brooke v. Boyd (1914) 80 Wash. 213, 141 Pac. 357. 
48 Wolters v. Trust Co. (1900) 65 N. J. L. 130, 46 Atl. 627 ; Watkins 
v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. L. 143, 86 Atl. 545; Neske v. Burns (1930) 8 
N. J. Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761. 
49 Neske v. Burns (1930) 8 N; J. :Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761. 
&O People's Bank v. Helms (1927) 140 S. C. 107, 112, 138 S. E. 622 ; 
U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C. 56, 150 S. E. 
347. 
Ill Fox v. Clifton Mfg. Co. (1922) 122 S. C. 86, 114 S. E. 700. 
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the cause or matter or for saving costs. " 58 It is this 
provision which the English court has used to restrict 
the scope of the inquiry in automobile accident cases. In 
a recent decision Scrutton, L. J., explains the English 
practice in this regard : "In most accident cases both 
parties are able to call witnesses, and therefore to inter­
rogate upon small questions of fact relating to the de­
tails of the acci
'
dent cannot be necessary for the fair 
trial of the action, and interrogatories should not be 
allowed. • • • These considerations are probably 
sufficient to disentitle the party to interrogate in most 
accident cases. But there should be no other fetter. ' '  58 
The last sentence quoted refers to a prior English rule 
to the effect that interrogatories would not be allowed 
at all in automobile accident cases except for "very 
special reasons. "  54 Although the English court does 
not adhere to the view that a party is limited in discovery 
to the issues upon which he has the affirmative,66 yet it 
restricts the examination in accident litigation by use 
of the "necessity" factor. 
The Connecticut statute provides that discovery 
shall deal with matters "material to the support or de­
fense of the suit. ' '  66 The Connecticut Judicial Council 
has interpreted this provision as meaning : ' ' Discovery 
may be had of facts supporting the mover 's cause of 
action or defense either in chief or on rebuttal, but not 
of facts pertinent only to the adverse party's cause of 
action or defense. Thus, in an action for negligence the 
facts showing defendant 's co.nduct at the time of the acci­
dent may be discovered by the plaintiff, for he must 
establish the defendant's negligence. The defendant, 
however, in action for negligence may have discovery 
58 Annual Praetiee (1930) order 31, rule 2. 
58 Griebart v. Morris (1920) 1 K. B. 659, 666. 
114 See Interrogatories in Running Down Actions (1928) 72 Sol. Jour. 
421. 
55 Bray 's Law of Discovery, 458, 465, 531-533. 
56 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) see. 5764. 
DISCLOSURE oF PARTY's OwN" CAsE 139 
of facts tending to show that the plaintiff's conduct was 
negligent. ' '  67 
.. \ 
DISCLOSURE OF NAMES OF WITNESSES WHOM PARTY WILL 
INTRODUCE 
Chancery in granting bills of discovery adhered to the 
rule that a party could not be compelled to disclose the 
names of witnesses whom he intended to introduce at the 
trial.68 It was supposed that any contrary rule might 
encourage a party to tamper with his adversary's wit­
nesses. The rule has been preserved under modern dis­
covery practice in many jurisdictions.69 A somewhat 
unusual reason for retention of the rule has been given 
by the Committee on Legislation of the Massachusetts 
Bar Association : ' 'A danger applies to the disclosure 
of the names ..of witnesses, in the use of the system, not 
merely to ascertain the names of witnesses not known to 
the interrogating party, but to find out which of his 
witnesses are known to the other party with a view to 
gambling for a settlement or surprise if he is ignorant. 
The way to avoid this abuse seems to be for the court, 
before ordering a party to disdose the names of all of 
his witnesses, to require as a condition precedent that 
the interrogating party disclose the names of all of his 
witnesses in order that the court may know whether 
' justice requires ' a disclosure from the other party. ' '  60 
In sharp contrast with the theory underlying this reason 
is the terse statement of the late William Howard Taft, 
while he was Judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, 
Ohio : ' 'Witnesses do not belong to one party more than 
to another. ' ' 81 
57 Seeond Report (1930) p. 66. 
68 Bray 's Law of Diseovery, 471. 
59 In addition to the statutes whieh are set forth in the appendix 
at the baek of this volume, see Ex Parte Sehoepf (1906) 74 0. s. 1. 
60 The report of this eommittee is to be found in the Simplifieation of 
Proeedure Series, vol. 4, No. 46, Library of the Assoeiation of the Bar 
of the City of New York. · · 
81 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co. (1887) 9 0. Dee. Rep. 809, 812. 
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Inroads have been made upon the rule that a party 
need not disclose the evidence of his own case in some 
jurisdictions. The Massachusetts statutes, for instance, 
were amended to provide that the court may order a 
witness to disclose the names of witnesses " i£ justice 
requires ' '  it.68 The English court has held that in a 
libel action a plaintiff can be forced to disclose the names 
of persons to whom the libel was published even though 
such persons would be witnesses for the plaintiff, the 
reason being that the names of such persons are a sub­
stantial part of the facts of the case.68 The names of 
employees of a defendant who were immediately con­
nected with the transaction in question can be compelled 
in New Jersey.l14 A similar rule to the effect that dis­
covery can be had of the name of a person who was an 
active participant rather than a mere stranger to the 
affair in dispute is enforced by some of the Toronto 
examiners. The Missouri Supreme Court has hinted 
that it might allow a similar exception. In a case where­
in it was sought to compel the claim agent of a large 
corporation to tell the names of those persons known to 
him to have witnessed an a<Jcident, the court said : " We 
have not before us at this time the question whether one 
eye-witness may not be asked who the other eye-witnesses 
of an accident were. That information might be useful 
in chief to identify and earmark the transaction, or in 
rebuttal. But we do have the question whether one liti­
gant may compel the employee of the other to disclose 
the names of those persons his master may, might, or 
purposes to use as witnesses. We are of opinion he is 
not entitled to such discovery, absent a statute requiring 
611 Mass. Laws of 1913, ch. 815, preserved in Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) 
ch. 231, sec. 63, and in the amendment of 1922, Acts 1922, ch. 314. The 
history of this liberalization is found in the report of the Committee on 
Legislation of the Massachusetts Bar Association cited in ·the next to 
the last preceding footnote. 
68 Marriott v. Chamberlain (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 154. 
64 Neske v. Burns (1930) 8 N. J. Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761. 
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it. Such was the rule relating to discovery in chancery 
from which the rationale of this character of deposition 
is borrowed. ' '  66 In New Hampshire the servant of a 
corporation whose duty it is  to procure and report in 
writing the names of witnesses to an accident, may be 
compelled to disclose such information, when he is sum­
moned to give a deposition in an action against his em­
ployer.66 The reason assigned for this ruling is that the 
statutory exemption from discovery is limited in its 
terms to parties. In actual practice the rule is largely 
avoided by the expedient of the corporate investigator 
surrendering all of his reports to the corporate counsel, 
so as to make them privileged matter. 
The Wisconsin court has gone further than any other 
in the direction of abolishing the restriction upon dis­
covery of the names of witnesses. The problem as to 
whether a party could be compelled to disclose the names 
of his witnesses first came before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in an incidental way and was not expressly de­
cided.67 Some years later it was presented again. In 
this later case the court said : , "It is further insisted 
that a group of questions asking for names and ad­
dresses of witnesses were improper. For example, ques­
tion No. 405 reads : 'You say you had some reports con­
cerning the facts alleged to which I have called your 
attention. Who were those reports from Y ' Q. No. S71 : 
'Where can Mr. Jack Bates, one of your employees whom 
611 State ex rei. Evans v. Broaddus (1912) 245 Mo. 123, 142, 149 S. W. 
473. The court distinguishes Devoy v. Transit Company (1905) 192 
Mo. 197, 220, 91 S. W. 140, wherein it is said: " The deposition of 
respondent could have been taken timely and he could have been forced 
to uncover his witnesses. " See also State ex rei. Mo. Pae. Ry. v. Hall 
(Mo. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 1027. 
66 Petition of Bradley (1901) 71 N. H. 54, 51 .Atl. 264. 
67 Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. (1907) 130 Wis. 279, 110 N. W. 
207. In the brief of counsel in a later ease this statement is found: 
' ' The question came up incidentally in that ease but was not passed 
upon, and an examination of the record there shows that the court 
below while compelling an answer to many questions expressly omitted 
the names of the party's witnesses. ' '  Wis. Cases and Briefs, vol. 1104, 
No. 129, p. 29. 
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you got to call on Mr. Spiegel, be addressed so that he 
can be reached ? '  Q. 444 : ' What is the chemist 's name f '  
There was no abuse of discretion in ordering these ques­
tions answered under the authorities hereinbefore cited. 
Counsel cites, on this point, Collins v. Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 150 Wis. 305, 136 N. W. 628. In that case it was 
held on trial of the case not error to exclude a question 
on cross-examination of plaintiff as to whether he had 
subpoenaed a certain named witness, and as to whether 
he knew that such person would be a witness. The case 
has no bearing here. ' '  The court then distinguished the 
Massachusetts cases saying that they "turned upon a 
statute providing that the party interrogated shall not 
be obliged to disclose the names of the witnesses by 
whom, or the manner in which he will prove his own 
case. ' '  68 A further contention of the lQsing party was 
that ' ' the names of witnesses are not facts, nor are they 
points set out in the complaint. "  69 This latter conten­
tion raised the question of relevancy under the provision 
of the Wisconsin statute that a party shall not be com­
pelled to disclose matters not relevant to the issues. 
Some of the Wisconsin commissioners compel the dis­
closure of names of witnesses, while others do not. A 
bill was introduced before the Wisconsin legislature in 
1930 providing that one party might, by court order, ob­
tain the names of his adversaries ' witnesses. The chief 
objection offered by the opponents of the" bill, which was 
d�feated, was that it would enable lawyers for insurance 
companies to prepare cases with a minimum of effort by 
utilizing the preparation of their opponents. Judges 
and examining officers . frequently refuse to compel dis­
covery upon the ground that inquiries as to what wit­
nesses a party intends to call are irrelevant, rather than 
68 Horliek's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel & Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201, 
144 N. W. 272, 278. 
69 Wis. Oases and Briefs, vol. 1104, No. 129. 
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upon the ground that there is an absolute privilege. This 
is the reason assigned by the Wiscmi&in commissioners 
who refuse to compel disclosufe.70 Such a basis of ex­
clusion may indicate a want of confidence in the reality 
of the supposed danger of tampering with witnesses. At 
least it furnishes a relative standard as a substitute for 
what was formerly an absolute privilege, thereby en­
couraging devices for avoiding the rule. Realizing the 
irrelevancy of such blunt questions as, Who are your 
witnesses ? or, Have you any witnesses ?, lawyers are 
led to ask : Whom did you see at the scene of the acci­
dent ?, Was there anyone near you that you knew when 
you were injured �' Who was riding with you ?, and simi­
lar disguised questions of all sorts. By laying the proper 
foundation it is often possible, within the limits of rel­
evancy, to obtain the desired information. Two simple 
illustrations taken from trial court records illustrate the 
tactics which are employed to obtain the names of wit­
nesses : 
(1) In a frraud action : 
Q. Where was it that the defendant made these 
representations ? 
A. The Lakeview Apartments. 
Q. In your apartment ? 
A� No, a friend's apartment when I was there. 
Q. You and he were at this friend's apartment ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was this friend? 
(2) - In an automobile accident action : 
Q. Did Elizabeth see the motor car coming ? 
A. There was no motor car coming when she was 
going across the street. 
Q. Who did see it ? 
A. Well, I suppose the traffic cop would see it and 
some person else. 
'70 See also Montgomery Light and Traction Co. v. Harris (1916) 197 
Ala. 358, 72 So. 545. , 
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Q. Did they say it was going fast? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who are they 1 
DISCLOS�RE OF DocUMENTS BY W RICH pARTY WILL PROVE 
CASE 
Chancery adhered to the rule that a party could not 
be compelled to disclose the documents by which he in­
tended to prove his own case.n The chief application of 
the rule was to documents which proved title to land.78 
Some jurisdictions apply the same rule to modern dis­
covery practice. .In England it is held that a party need 
not disclose documentary evidence of his own case and 
especially that he need not disclose his title papers.78 
Documents are privileged from inspection if they relate 
exclusively to the party's own case and contain nothing 
supporting or tending to support his adversary 's case.74 
The party's statement as to the matter is conclusive un­
less the court is satisfied from certain sources of informa­
tion or upon his own inspection of the documents that 
the party has falsely or mistakenly claimed the privi­
_lege.71' There are certain well recognized limitations on 
the extent of the privilege. In an action where the title 
to land is in question, for example, a party must dis­
close the nature of his title, as distinguished from the 
evidence thereof, where that title is a fundamental part 
of the case.76 An exception is also made in the case of 
documents referred to in the pleadings, for these must 
always be disclosed. Discovery of all documents which 
relate .as much to the case of one party as to. the case of 
the other may be compelled.'7'7 Some jurisdictions which 
71 Wigram on the Law of Discovery, 13 Law Library Series, 41. '78 Combe v. London (1840) 4 Y. & C. 139, 155. '78 Bray's Law of Discovery, 445. 
'fi A. G. v. Newcastle (1899) 2 Q. B. 278. 
'76 Annual Practice (1929) 508, 532. 
'76 Stringer, The A. B. 0. Guide to Practice (1928) 68. '7'7 Bayley v. Griffiths (1862) H. & 0. 429. 
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are much more liberal than England regarding the gen­
eral scope of a discovery examip.ation restrict discovery 
of documentary evidence about as England does. This 
is the case in Massachusetts,'78 Ohio,79 New Hampshire,80 
and Ontario. 81 
78 Mass. den. Laws (1921) ch. 231, sec. 63. 
'79 Ex parte Schoepf (1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276. 
80 Eaton v. �armer (1865) 46 N. H. 200. 
81 Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 835. 
CHAPTER XVI 
APPLICATION OF ORDINARY RULES OF EVI­
DENCE TO DISCOVERY EXAMINATIONS 
PRIVILEGE 
Every objection which would be tenable as of right at 
the trial is tenable when the examination is held before 
the trial. It is as well a futile as an unjust thing to 
allow the discovery of evidence which can be excluded 
at the trial on the ground that it is privileged. There is 
no necessity to inquire into reasons behind the rules of 
privilege, for the paramount policies have already been 
decided in connection with the law of evidence generally. 
The safer course is to rely on the decisions in the law of 
evidence which have been developed over a much longer 
period of time and which have withstood the scrutiny 
of a more careful scholarship. The question to be asked 
is, would a similar objection be tenable upon the actual 
trial of the case ¥ Courts generally have applied such a 
theory of decision in regard to objections which raise 
questions of privilege.1 
Three objections as of right, or grounds of privilege, 
upon discovery examinations are generally recognized in 
England, the United States and Ontario. These are : 
(1) as being criminatory or penal ; (2 )  as being within 
the doctrine of professional privilege ; (3 ) as be-
l Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521; 
Warren v. Decoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505, 509; Lee v. 
Blumer (1920) 189 Iowa 1145, 179 N. W. 625; Winneshiek County State 
Bank v. District Court (1927) 203 Iowa 1277, 212 N. W. 391; Sloss­
Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167 Ala. 557, 52 So. 
751 ;  Watkins v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. L. 143, 86 A. 545. 
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ing injurious to the public interests.11 A comparison of 
the rules given by Bray on Discovery . and Wigmore on 
Evidence, respectively, indicates how closely the rules 
applied to discovery parallel those which have a recog­
nized standing in the law of evidence.8 Detailed cita­
tions to decisions which apply these rules to discovery 
examinations are purposely - omitted at this point. It 
seems futile to clutter up the law of discovery with mat­
ters which, if not more appropriate to the law of evi­
dence, at least have been more thoroughly tested in that 
branch of the law. Take for example the matter of privi­
lege from self-incrimination. Is it reasonable to suppose· 
that a privilege which has been accorded constitutional 
sanction in most jurisdictions would differ greatly 
whether applied to examinations before or at the trial Y 4 
While a party can safely refuse to disclose privileged 
matter regardless of the type of discovery procedure 
which obtains, there are differences as to the practical 
ease with which a party can protect his privilege in the 
several jurisdictions. Lawyers in states in which the 
pfficer in charg.e  of the examination has no power to I 
compel answers, but in which it is necessary to resort to 
the court, say that opposing lawyers instantly respect 
objections of privilege. A party can protect himself, for 
he knows that the examining lawyer dares not ask the 
8 Bray, Discovery, 298-551;  7 Standard Encyclopedia of Pleading and 
Practice, 560 ff. ; Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) vol. 3, 
p. 746 ff. 
8 Compare Wigmore on Evidence, IV, 2250 ff. (as to privilege from 
self-incrimination) ; Id. V, 2290 ff. (as to professional legal privilege) ; 
40 Cyc. 2391 (as to matters injurious to public interests) ; with the mat­
ter set forth in the last preceding citation. 
4 Representative decisions are: F. Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co., 
(1916) 232 Fed. 617 ; Quirk v. Quirk (1919) 259 Fed. 597 ;  French v. 
Venneman (1860) 14 Ind. 282 ; Whicher v. Davis (1899) 70 N. t H. 237, 
46 A. 458; Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167 
Ala. 557, 52 So. 751 ; Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911) 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 
781 ; De Camp v. Archibald (1893) 50 0. S. 618, 35 N. E. 1056; Ex parte 
Schoepf (1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276; Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow 
(1903) 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704; Knight v. Empire Land Company (1908) 
55 Fla. 301, 45 So. 1025; Ex parte Mumford (1874) 57 Mo. 603. 
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court to compel a disclosure of privileged matter. Law­
yers in states in which the notary has power to punish 
for contempt also respect objections of privilege as a gen­
eral rule, but there have been occasional instances of 
abuse under this type of procedure. 
The New Jersey court, for a season, adhered to the 
rule that a lawyer had no right to instruct his client to 
refuse to answer a question at a discovery examination, 
even though an answer to the question might incriminate 
the client. Said Chief Justice Gummere to a lawyer who 
had advised his client to refuse to answer certain ques­
tions : "It does not concern you, as an attorney, one 
iota whether the answer of your client to a question put 
to him will incriminate him or whether it will not. The 
fact that the answer may incriminate him does not make 
the answer incompetent. If it will incriminate him he 
may refuse to answer upon that ground ; but whether 
he will refuse to answer on that ground is a matter for 
him personally to determine, without advice from his 
lawyer or from the court. It is a personal privilege, 
which he may assert or waive, as he sees :fit.1 A ques­
tion is not objectionable at all merely because the answer 
will tend to incriminate ; and counsel has no business-I 
mean legal business-to object for any such reason to a 
question which is competent. Much less· is there any 
justification for his action in advising his client to re­
fuse, to answer a question for such a reason. " 5 From 
this and similar language in the Chief Justice 's opinion 
the New Jersey lawyers got t!J.e idea that a lawyer was in 
danger of contempt if he instructed his client to refuse 
to answer any question however improper it might be. 
Five years later the New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
a party examined before trial could not be held in con­
tempt for refusal to answer a question, unless the court 
had ordered an answer, and that counsel who directed 
5 Brown & Seccomb v. Shafman (1923) 2 N. J. Misc. 13, 14. 
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such a refusal to answer could not be held in contempt.6 
The court said : ' ' Our view is that, when the party is not 
examined before the judge him§elf, if he or his counsel 
deem a question improper, then, as the commissioner or 
master is not clothed with the judicial power of com­
pelling an answer, the party may refuse for the time be­
ing to answer, and the court or a judge is then to decide 
on the propriety of the question. As a rule, reputable 
counsel when in court, or even before. a commissioner, will 
refrain from putting questions plainly incompetent, and 
from advising their clients to refuse an answer to ques­
tions unless they are plainly incompetent ; and cases in 
which the parties reach an impasse on such an issue are 
too few to be of importance. When they do occur, the 
remedy is the extremely simple if somewhat inconvenient 
one of the judge taking over the examination himself ; 
and when this is done the trouble vanishes at once. But 
normally the purposes of justice are subserved by an 
appeal to the judge, who will pass on contested ques­
tions and give the parties the benefit of his view of the 
situation. " 7 ' 
RELEVANCY 
Objections that questions are irrelevant, if made at the 
trial, are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 
While the
. 
same general rules as to relevancy control at 
discovery examinations as at the trial, the practical appli­
cation of these rules differs. · Relevancy always pre­
supposes a standard, i. e. relevant to what ? Moreover it 
is equally clear that the standard must be a factual one, 
for no question can be relevant to a pure question of 
law. The standard is more certain by the time trial is 
reached because the issues of the case · have been deter­
mined. The basic rule that the interrogation must be 
6 Baekel v. Linn (1928) 104 N. J. L. 243, 140 Atl. 285. 
'7 ld. 286. ' 
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relevant to some matter in dispute between the parties 
applies to discovery examinations, but with this differ­
ence arising from the necessity of the case, namely, the 
matter in dispute is not likely to have been as accurately 
determined as it would be at the trial. For this reason 
some courts adopt the test thatdiscovery may be allowed 
if it is material for the determination of any matter 
in question about to come on for trial between 
the parties to the action. 8 Other courts say that the test 
is not whether the matter inquired of will be competent 
at the trial, but merely whether it may be.9 Still other 
courts adopt a "reasonably relevant" test.10 Such rea- 1 
soning has particular application when discovery before 
pleading is allowed. The only available standard is the 
more or less hypothetical case which the party seeking 
discovery sets up in his affidavit.11 
Where ordinary deposition, procedure is used for dis­
covery purposes there is great liberality as far as rel­
evancy is concerned for the reason that the statutes con­
template that the witness should answer all questions 
except those involving privilege, and that he should save 
all objections until the trial. The question arises whether 
a party or witness can safely refuse to answer a question 
merely because it is irrelevant. The answer necessarily 
is two-fold : The party · or witness can safely refuse to 
answer if the notary in charge of the examination has no 
power to punish for contempt. When the matter is taken 
to the trial judge upon motion to compel an answer the 
objection that the question is not relevant can be duly 
presented. If the notary has no power to punish for 
8 Free v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1907) 135 Iowa 69, 110 N. W. 143. 
See also Bray, Discovery, 11. 
9 Lyell v. Kennedy (1884) 50 L. T. 730 ; Boston & Maine R. R. v. 
State (1910) 75 N. H. 513, 77 Atl. 997. Contra: Ex parte Schoepf 
(1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276. 
10 Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow (1903) 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704. 
11 Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201, 
144 N. W. 272; Kelly v. Ry. Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521. · 
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contempt the witness does not need to obtain permission 
to refuse an answer to impertinent queries ; he may do 
so as of course. If, however, tb,e officer has power to 
punish but not to relieve from answering except upon 
grounds of privilege, the witness runs some danger in 
refusing to answer upon the mere ground of irrelevancy.111 
The Ohio Supreme Court has said : "If the witness 
assumes to decide these questions for himself at the 
time, unless the interrogatory involves a question of 
privilege, he must do so at his peril. If he should be 
right in his decision he would lose nothing ; if wrong, he 
must suffer the consequences. ' '  18 This is the general 
theory adhered to by courts in states ,in which the officer 
taking the deposition has power to punish for contempt. 
A witness who is examined for discovery, just as a wit­
ness whose testimony is taken for purposes of preserva­
tion of evidence, should answer all questions except those 
involving privilege. While there is a possibility of ob­
taining relief from the penalty if the witness refuses to 
answer question� which clearly are impertinent,l4 there 
are, as a practical matter, virtually no limits as to rel­
evancy under this type of procedure.15 One of the fac­
tors which called forth the provision for special com­
missioners to supervise the examinations in Missouri was 
that insufficient protection was afforded a witness who 
refused to answer upon the ground of irrelevancy.16 
Statistics indicate how infrequently lawyers actually 
object to questions during the course o:fa discovery exam­
ination. The records of 100 examinations for discovery 
were inspected in Wisconsin, 50 each in Milwaukee and 
111 Of. Ex parte Woodworth (1893) 6 Ohio Dee. 19. 
18 Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701. 
14 Ex parte Krieger ( 1879) 7 Mo. App; 367 ; Tyson v. Savings and 
Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo. 588, 57 S. W. 740; Ex parte Livingston 
(1882) 12 Mo. App. 80. 
1li Ex· parte Mumford (1874)" 57 Mo. 603. 
16 State ex rel. Wilson v. Barney (1916) 193 Mo. App. 326, 334, 18q 
S. W� .23. 
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Madison. In these 100 examinations there were 13487 
. folios of questions and answers, and only 785 objections 
to questions. This means that on the average only one 
objection was offered during the taking of each seventeen 
folios of the examination. Moreover no ruling was given 
to the great majority of the objections which were noted. 
A large portion of them evidently were raised merely as 
warnings to opposing counsel. Similarly, in Ontario 
only 83 out of 18437 questions which were asked during 
the course of 76 examinations for discovery were ob­
jected to. Less than ten per cent. of the objections were 
sustained by the special examiner. Not a single objec­
tion was registered in 50 out of the 76 examinations which 
were inspected. In a will contest case, for instance, 
where many objections might be expected, there was no 
objection to any of the 804 questions which were pro­
pounded. Similarly fraud, malpractice, and alimony ac­
tions were among those in the list in which no objections 
were registered. It is impossible to offer similar figures 
for all states for the reason that it is not always neces­
sary to note the objection.17 But lawyers say that ob­
jections are comparatively infrequent ; that for tactical 
reasons, it is preferable to let irrelevant matters come in 
rather than to object. 
The only complaint . that harm is done by the dis­
closure of impertinent matters. comes from lawyers in 
jurisdictions where officers in charge of the examination 
have power to punish for contempt. In other states law­
yers take the position that, as long as they can prevent 
the disclosure of harmful, irrelevant matter, they will 
not worry about irrelevancy in the usual case. Conse­
quently the conscious practice of many lawyers is to 
entirely refrain from objecting, unless the questions re-
· late to privileged matter. They explain that little harm 
is done by the disclosure of immaterial matter so long as 
l't<Jf. N� Y. Rules of Civil Practice 122, for instance. 
/ 
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it can be excluded from the jury's consideration at the 
trial. The chief cause of complaint arises when a notary 
compels an answer which discloses matter the privacy 
of which should be respected. This can only happen in 
states in which the notary has power to punish for con­
tempt. 
Rules of evidence in regard to' relevancy are tacitly 
rather than expressly applied at discovery hearings. 
Objections usually are addressed to the examining law­
yer. They serve as a word of warning that the question­
ing has reached the limits of its proper scope. Often­
times a question is argued informally among the lawyers 
and an adjustment effected. The norm which the law­
yers keep in mind is the general law of evidence, but 
there is recognition that the standard should be liberally 
applied in reference to discovery. Hence there is a prac­
tical disregard of the more technical rules. 
Jurisdictions which apply the New York rule that the 
examination cannot extend to the ,issues of which the 
adverse party has the affirmative under the pleading have 
little trouble with the question of relevancy. It is taken 
for granted that the questions must be relevant to the 
issues of the case because they must first of all be rel­
evant to the matters upon which the examination is 
sought, which is only that portion of the issues as to 
which the applicant has the burden of proo£.18 'fhis 
feature is made doubly perspicuous in New York by the 
fact that the general scope of the inquiry is settled be­
fore the examination starts. 
18 Hempel v. Heekseher (1928) 225 N. Y. B. 634; Sands v. Comerford 
(1925) 207 N .. Y. B. 398. See also Miller & Pardee v. Sweet Mfg. Co. 
(1924) 3 F. (2d) 198; Standard Oil Co. v. Univ. Oil Prod. Co. (1927) 
21 F. (2d) 159. 
CHAPTER XVII 
PENALTIES FOR UNJUST REFUSAL TO DISCLOSE 
Most jurisdictions provide that a party who refuses 
to disclose, when ordered by the court to do so, may be 
punished by having his pleading stricken. Such a pen­
alty is derived from the chancery practice.1 The ques­
tion has been raised in some jurisdictions whether there 
are not constitutional limitations upon the power of a 
court to strike a party 's pleading for failure to disclose. 
The question was first raised in the case of Hovey v. 
Elliott.• In that case the United States Supreme Court, 
speaking through Mr. Justice White, held that such a 
penalty lacked due process of law. But the particular 
disobedient act was a refusal to pay certain money into 
court. The circumstances show rather clearly that the 
punishment was given as for contempt. The court con­
sidered thoroughly the history of punishment for civil 
contempt, and less thoroughly the ancient chancery prac­
tice of taking the bills pro confesso upon refusal to dis­
cover by answer. A decade later in a case in which a 
similar punishment was meted out, but this time for 
unjust refusal to discover books and papers, the Supreme 
Court . distinguished the earlier case in a way which was 
in accord with the historic rules as to the penalty in dis­
covery proceedings in chancery. The gist of the dis­
tinction
·
. was that the earlier case only prohibited the 
striking of a pleading as a contempt penalty and did not 
1 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, 84. 
8 (1897) 167 u. s. 409. 
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prevent its use in imputing an admission of a want of 
merit in the pleading by refusal to discover.8 Since then 
the practical application of the doctrine of the Hovey 
case has been still further limited by the Supreme Court ' 
and the lowen federal courts have practically disregarded 
the case in so far as discovery .• proceedings are con­
cerned.6 
Many of the state courts have upheld the default pen­
alty without any quibbles over constitutional questions.6 
Others have expressly decided that there is no want of 
due process.7 The New York Court of Appeals has pre­
tended to follow the federal decisions in the matter. 
The exact position taken is evidenced by a quotation 
from an opinion by Pound, J. : "The line may thus be 
definitely drawn between the proper punishment for sup­
pressing evidence and the improper punishment as for 
contempt merely. ' '  8 The California court has held that 
the plaintiff's pleading may be stricken but that the de­
fendant 's may not. The latter is said to be unconstitu­
tional as restricting the right of defense.9 The default 
penalty has been held constitutional in Washington upon 
the ground that failure to answer may be construed as 
an admission. Hence it is held that the penalty can be 
applied only when the facts elicited are material and go 
to all of the issues of the case.10 Lawyers in ,various 
8 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas (1908) 212 U. S. 322. 
4 Roller v. Murray (1914) 234 U. S. 738. 
II Wittenberg Coal Co. v. Compagnie Havraise Peninsulaire de Naviga-
tion a Vapeur (1927) 22 F. (2d) 904. · 
6 See a long list of such eases cited in the ease in the preceding :foot­
note. 
7 Kwiatkowski v. Putzhaven (1919) 189 Ind. 119, 126 N. E. 3 ;  Ed­
monds v. Federal Securities Co. (1930) 131 Kan. 11, 290 Pae. 3 ;  Miles v. 
Armour (1911) 239 Mo. 438, 144 S. W. 424. · 
8 Feingold v. Walworth Bros. (1924) 238 N. Y. 446, 454, 144 N. E. 
675. See also comment of Dean Wigmore on the ease in 19 Illinois Law 
Rev. 594. 9 Summerville v. Kelliher (1904) 144 Cal. 155, 77 Pae. 889 ; Oneill v. 
Thomas Day Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 357, 92 Pae. 856. 
10 Lawson v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 26, 
86 Pae. 1120; Capps v. Frederick (1906) 44 Wash. 38, 86 Pae. 1128. 
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states say that there are several considerations which are 
worthy of note in regard to the practical enforcement of 
the default penalty. First, courts are very reluctant to 
actually enforce punishment.11 But it is possible some­
times to obtain a modified form of the penalty, namely, a 
stay of proceedings until discovery is granted. Such an 
expedient is encouraged under the New York practice 
by the rule that proceedings may be stayed if notice of 
the examination has been served upon the attorney for 
the party to be examined, whereas a party can be de­
faulted only after he has been served with subpoena.12 
It is said further that the very threat of the penalty has 
the effect of encouraging a full and voluntary disclosure ; 
that the indirect effect of the sanction is salutary. Judges 
say that, as a practical matter, it is easier to strike the 
party's pleading than it is to put him in jail for con­
tempt. There is seldom any necessity of a final appli­
cation of either penalty, but the gesture of the former is 
more easily accomplished. Indeed, such reasoning 
prompted the introduction of the penalty in Ontario, for 
it was thought that it provided a convenient escape for 
the court when it appeared undesirable to put the party, 
in jail. 
· 
All of the states whieh have a procedure for dis­
covery, except Connecticut, provide as one of the penal­
ties that the party may be punished as for contempt. 
Attachment for contempt is the only way a recalcitrant 
witness can be punished, for he has no pleading to be 
stricken. Lawyers in jurisdictions in which this penalty, 
and only this, obtains say that it offers a sufficient sanc­
tion for a full discovery. 
11 .An analysis of the eases in the .American Digest under "Discovery, " 
Key-Nos. 70, 77, 107, will show that this is so. 
18 Bloek v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1922) 198 N. Y. S. 305; Levine v. 
Moskowitz (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 597. See also Rothschild, The Simpli­
fication of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 738, 741. 
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Louisiana has adopted the view of the civil law and, 
accordingly, provides a pro tanto punishment. If a party 
wrongfully refuses to answer interrogatories the par­
ticular interrogatories, rather than the whole cause, are 
taken for confessed.18 Texas formerly had a similar 
prov1s1on. But curiously enough, that which was in­
tended as a pro tanto penalty turned out to be even more 
stringent in its practical operatipn than are penalties 
which are supposedly very harsh. Prior to 1897 if a 
party who was being examined for discovery refused to 
answer a question the notary simply noted down the 
refusal and the question, which might be in leading form, 
was deemed admitted. If the examining lawyer met with 
one refusal he could put the same question in such varied 
forms as to place his adversary in a very unfavorable 
position. Usually the lawyer would continue to ply 
questions until the party in desperation would give an 
answer rather than suffer such an imputed .admission. 
A Kentucky lawyer uses a rather novel expedient when 
a party whom he is examining refuses to answer. It is 
in the direction of the Texas practice. As soon as the 
party refuses to answer, the examining lawyer makes 
an avowal as to what he thinks the party would testify if 
he did answer. Of course the avowal has no legal status. 
But sometimes , it does incite the party to give his own 
answer, and the general psychological effect, it is said, 
is advantageous to the examiner. , 
Pro tanto penalties are effected by some of the special 
statutes for production and inspection of documents : 
if inspection is unjustly refused the court may exclude 
the document from evidence or may instruct the jury to 
believe it to be such as the applicant for discovery affirms 
that it is. 
18 Rev. Code of Prac. (Marr, 1927) sec. 349. 
CHAPTER XVIII 
USE AT TRIAL OF RECORD OF EX�ATION 
FOR DISCOVERY 
wHO MAY uSE RECORD 
There are three different types of provisions as to who 
may use the record of the discovery examination at the 
trial. Some ;Wrisdictions allow the taker only to use it. 
Others allow use by either party. The third type of 
provision is that neither party may use the deposition of 
a witness as original evidence unless the witness is un­
available for oral testimony, although the opponent of 
the party who calls the witness at the trial may use the 
deposition to contradict the witness ; that the taker only 
may use the deposition of an adverse party as evidence 
of an admission ; and that either party may use it in the 
event the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony at 
the trial. 
The following jurisdictions allow use by the taker 
only : Wisconsin, Massachusetts, England, Ontario, 
· Washington, Virginia, Indiana and New J ersey.1 The 
earlier Wisconsin provision was that either party could 
use the deposition at the trial. Later this was changed 
so as to allow use only by the party taking. Even then 
a few decisions seemed to indicate that once the depo­
sition had been offered in evidence either party could 
1 Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) page 806 :If. ; Denny v. 
Sayward (1894) 10 Wash. 422, 39 Pac. 119 ; Moore v. Palmer (1896) 14 
Wash. 134, 44 Pac. 142 ; Faut v. Miller (1867) 58 Va. 187 ; Annual Prac­
tice (1930) order 31, rule 24; Bray's Law of Discovery, 600. See also 
the statutes listed in the appendix and the cases in the next several 
footnotes. 
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use it,8 but the Revisor of Statutes in 1927 purposely 
modified the language of the statute so as to remove this 
possibility.8 The trend of development in Massachusetts 
has been in exactly the opposit'e direction. While the 
present provision is that only the proponent of the in­
terrogatories can use the answers thereto at the trial,� 
there is a considerable sentiment amongst the Massa­
chusetts bar for an amendment to the statute to the effect 
that either party be allowed to use. The proponents of 
the change argue that it would make a party more care­
ful as to the particular questions he propounds and thus 
eliminate considerable surplusage in interrogatories. 
Opponents of the change point out that it would increase 
the amount of self-serving material in the answers, and 
that it is founded upon a misconception of the basic pur­
poses of discovery. Massachusetts lawyers have con­
sidered the problem whether the examination should not 
be usable in behalf of the party making the answers in 
the event that he dies after answering and before the 
trial. Recently the Massachusetts Judicial Council has 
recommended 81 statutory change to the effect that : ' ' If 
a party who has filed sworn answers to interrogatories 
dies, so much of such answers ·  as the court finds have 
been made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased 
shall not be inadmissible as hearsay or self-serving if 
offered in evidence by a representative of the deceased 
party. ' '  11 The possibility that the examination may be 
used by the taker after the deponent has died and that 
a very partial story may be presented to the jury, a story 
lacking the direct testimony of the deponent, has troubled 
the Wisconsin bar. This has led to the suggestion that 
the taking of an adverse examination be made an addi-
a Lamberson v. Lamberson (1921) 175 Wis. 398, 184 N. W. 708; Lange 
v. Heckel (1920) 171 Wis. 59, 175 N. W. 788. 
a Revisor 's Notes (1927) on ch. 326, sec. 12. 
t Freeman v. United Fruit Co. (1916) 223 Mass. 300, 111 N. �. 789; 
Bradley Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Cutler (1925) 253 Mass. 37, 148 N. E. 101. 
II Sixth Report, p. 15. 
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tional cause for taking depositions under the general 
deposition statute. Another suggestion made by some 
Wisconsin lawyers is that the deposition statute be so 
amended as to allow taking of a deposition without show­
ing cause, with use thereof being conditioned upon the 
witness ' unavailability at the trial. This is the plan in 
states wherein the ordinary deposition procedure is the 
means of obtaining discovery before trial. 
Under the Ontario discovery procedure only the exam,­
ination of a party can be used as original evidence. 
Examinations of corporate officers, assignors, and other 
persons from whom discovery may be had, but who are 
not themselves adverse parties, are confined to the pur­
pose of discovery only and cannot be used at the trial 
against the parties to the action. This is explicitly pro­
vided as to examinations of corporate officers and serv­
ants and has been held equally applicable to other per­
sons not parties who have been examined for discovery.6 
This merely limits use of the examination as original evi­
dence. It does not prevent use to contradict the witness 
or to refresh his memory. This, again, is in the direction 
of the practice under the ordinary deposition procedure 
which obtains in other jurisdictions. 
The following jurisdictions allow either party to use 
the examination of a party, or representative of a party, 
at the trial : New York, South Dakota, Michigan, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Quebec, and Louisi­
ana.'7 The theory is adhered to in both Louisiana and 
Quebec that the answers to interrogatories for discovery 
become automatically a part of the record of the case 
6 Rule 327; Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 806. 
'7 This applies to the oral examination only in New Jersey. Only the 
interrogator can use answers to written interrogatories. Compare N. J. 
Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 4097, sec. 140, p. 4099, sec: 146, chancery rule 84, 
found in 1 N. J. Misc. 756. See in addition to the statutes which are 
listed in the appendix, Phillips v. Land Co. (1917) 174 N. C. 542, 94 
S. E. 12; Beck v. Wilkins Ricks Co. (1923) 186 N. C. 210, 119 S. E. 235 ; , 
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman (1928) 227 N. Y. S. 522. See also 
note in 1 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 94, for provisions under early codes. 
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and that hence no formal introduction as evidence is 
necessary. Mr. Justice Surveyer, of Montreal, has said· 
the .following concerning the Quebec practice : " Mr. 
Justice Mignault, whom I consutted with regard to the 
deficiencies of our Code, wrote me· on this subject : ' A  
• • • reform which would be  very useful would be  to 
render the discovery really a discovery. In the province 
of Quebec, the preliminary interrogatory forms a part of 
the proof which embarrasses the liberty of the attorney 
of the opposite party, because he exposes himself to the 
introduction in the procedure of testimony which his 
adversary otherwise could not make· except with a com­
mencement of proof in writing. In the other provinces, 
the adversary is freely questioned and then there is 
introduced into the proof of the case the parts of his 
deposition which are believed useful, saving the adver­
sary's right to demand the addition of the replies which 
· explain those which have been produced. ' I am not cer­
tain if, in view of our laws of evidence, the system for­
merly in force in the jurisdictions of which I spoke is 
not preferable for us. Following this system, the judge 
presiding over ' the case asks you whether or not you 
intend putting your preliminary interrogatory on the 
record. In the affirmative, it forms part of the record. 
If you are not satisfied, you are free to re-examine the 
party during the inquiry on the points where he replied 
favorably, saving, if it is less favorable the second time, 
to remind him of his previous declarations in accordance 
with article 329. " 8 
Texas, under the regular deposition procedure, allows 
depositions of parties and witnesses alike to be used at 
the trial by either party regardless of whether the de-' 
ponent is .present in court. . This procedure differs from 
that which obtains in other states in which a use has 
been made of the procedure for purposes of discovery 
' 
8 La Revue du Droit, vol. 2, p. 204 ff. 
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before trial in this respect, namely, there are neither 
restrictions upon the taking of depositions nor upon the 
use thereof. In a number of other states depositions may 
be taken as a matter of right, but their use at the trial is 
limited to instances in which the deponent is unavailable 
as a witness. But in Texas depositions are often used 
when the deponents are present in court. While some 
of the lawyers are of the opinion that it is within the 
discretion of the court whether a party will be allowed 
to read the deposition of a witness who is present in 
court in lieu of placing him upon tl;te stand, it is agreed 
that as a practical matter it is usually allowed. This 
practice is not a salutary one. The preferable mode of 
giving testimony is upon an oral examination in open 
court. Only when a witness is unavailable for the pur­
pose of giving his oral testimony in open court should 
written statements be received from him. There is a 
difference between taking depositions for the dual pur­
pose of preserving testimony in the event that the wit­
ness should become unavailable and of pinning him down 
to a definite story before trial on the one hand and tak­
ing depositions as the regular mode of adducing evidence 
on the other hand. In the former event the deposition 
serves merely as a dress-rehearsal for a trial conducted 
in the orthodox manner ; in the latter it .fosters all of the 
vices which are attendant upon a trial of the case on 
paper only. Specific vices attributable to this rule are 
pointed out by the Texas bar. Suppose, for example, 
that a lawyer takes the deposition of a witness, that he 
gets a favorable statement from him, and that the ad­
verse party does not see fit at the time to cross-examine 
the witness to any extent. The chances are that the 
lawyer will read the deposition to the jury and keep the 
witness off of the stand so that he may not be subjected 
to further cross-examination. Of course the adverse 
party could call the witness but in doing so he would 
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make the witness his own. The unfairness of such a prac­
tice is made more perspicuous when the witness happens 
to be a person of poor courtroom appearance or of weak 
voice and when the lawyer reads .• the deposition with-the 
added force of his own personality. There is a tendency 
upon the part of witnesses whose deposition has been 
taken to be reluctant to appear at the trial. They reason 
that there is no necessity that they should give further 
of their time when their depositions can be used instead.9 
All states which employ the regular deposition pro­
cedure as the mode of discovery before trial, except 
Texas, have the following rules in regard to use of the 
deposition at the trial : (1 )  Neither party may use the 
deposition of a mere witness as original evidence un­
less the witness is unavailable for oral testimony, but the 
opponent of the party who calls the witness at the trial 
may use the deposition to contradict the witness. (2 )  The 
taker only may use the deposition of an adverse party 
(but not of a mere witness) as evidence of an admission. 
(3) Either party, regardless of who has taken the depo­
sition and rega,rdless of whether it is the deposition of 
a party or of a witness, may use the deposition in the 
event the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony at 
the trial. 10 
PURPOSE FOR wHICH RECORD MAY BE uSED 
There are two principal purposes for which depositions 
may be used at the trial. The :first and most frequent use 
is for the purpose of coD;tradicting the deponent when 
9 The deposition of a party can be used by either party, but the 
deposition of a witness can be used by either party . only when there has 
been cross-interrogation. Tex. Stat. (1928) arts. 3764, 3769. 
10 For general statements of the above rules see, in addition to the 
statutes and the next several footnotes, the following decisions: Great 
Western Despatch South Shore Line v. Glenny (1884) 41 0. S. 166 (see 
also 14 Ohio Jurisprudence, p. 66 ff.) ; The Phenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
v. Cl�;trk (1877) 58 N. H. 164 ; Carter v. Beals (1862) 44 N. H. �i; 
In re Hammond (1909) 83 Neb. 636, 12� N. W. 203; Banks v. Refrigerat­
ing Co. (1911) 236 Mo. 407, 139 S. W. 545. 
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he testifies at the trial. Dean Wigmore has said : 
' '  • • • use of a deposition to show in it a contrary state­
ment of the deponent, who has already testified on the 
stand, is allowable even though the witness be present 
and available ; for the deposition is here used not as 
substantive testimony, but only as containing a state­
ment inconsistent with the same witness 's testimony al­
ready given. ' '  11 Lawyers in Boston, Massachusetts, say 
that even answers to written interrogatories for dis­
covery are more frequently used for purposes of contra­
diction than as original evidence. 
The second important mode of use is for the purpose 
of proving an admission. Dean Wigmore has stated the 
general rule thus : " The general principle that the wit­
ness must be shown unavailable for testifying in court 
does not apply to use of his party-opponent 's deposition 
(taken, as usual, under statutes allowing in common law. 
courts a process similar to a bill for discovery )-for the 
simple reason that every statement of an opponent may 
be used against him as an admission without calling him ; 
the opponent 's sworn statement, though called a depo­
sition, is no less an admission than any other statement 
of his. " 18 Lawyers sometimes exhibit to the jury a 
refusal upon the part of the witness at the discovery 
examination to answer particular questions with the pur­
pose of showing that the witness sought to conceal some­
thing. Such a practice seems to go unquestioned in most 
states, but the Massachusetts court has held that it is 
improper to refer to a party 's refusal to answer interrog­
atories before he has been ordered to answer by the 
court.18 
11 Wigmore on Evidence, III, 1416. 
18 Wigmore on Evidence, III, 1416. In addition to the cases cited 
therein see : Rettlia v. Salomon (1925) 308 Mo. 673, 274 S. W. 366 ; 
Douet v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 23 S. W. (2d) 1104; Sin· 
clair v. Columbia Telephone Co. (Mo. App., 1917) l95 S. W. 558; Robin· 
�n v. N�w England Cable Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 228) 111 A. 2g9, 
18 IDurington v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 300, 101 
N. E. 977. 
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There is usually no necessity of using the examination 
for discovery at the trial. Indeed, it is more frequent 
than otherwise that the sole purpose of the inquiry is for 
discovery and that no subsequent use is made of the 
deposition. The usual rule is that the proponent has the 
option of using all or any part of"the deposition, subject 
in the latter event to the right of the adverse party to 
demand the reading of other parts which are relevant to 
those which have been read.14 Alabama and Virginia 
require that all of the answers to written interrogatories 
be introduced, if any part are.16 The whole of a depo­
sition must be introduced in California and in Indiana 
if the purpose is to prove an admission, but a part may 
be used for the purpose of contradicting the witness.16 
There has been considerable trouble in Missouri con­
cerning the correct way of using a deposition for purposes 
of contradiction. In 1922 the Supreme Court criticized 
the practice of using detached portions only of deposi­
tions. Said the court : "We have, in no uncertain terms 
condemned the practice, that sometimes finds its way into 
court, of counsel, on cross-examination, reading a de­
tached portio.n of the deposition or instrument and then 
asking the witne'ss whether he made such a statement. ' '  n 
14 In addition to the statutes see: Converse v. Meyer (1883) 14 Neb. 
190, 15 N. W. 340; Security Bank v. Brown (1923) 110 Neb. 237, 193 
N. W. 336; Robinson v. New England Cable Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 228, 
111 Atl. 269; Whitman v. Morey (1885) 63 N. H. 448, 2 Atl. 899 i Ceto· 
fonte v. Coke Co. (1910) 78 N. J. L. 662, 75 Atl. 913, 27 L. R. A. 
N. S. 1058; Beakly v. Board (1911) 81 N. J. L. 637, 80 Atl. 457; National 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman (1928) 227 N. Y. S. 522; William L. Schupp 
& Sons v. Barnett (1924) 206 N. Y. S. 553 ; Gutzman v. Clancy (1902) 
114 Wis. 589, 90 N. W. 1081; Freeman v. United Fruit Co. (1916) 223 
Mass. 300, 111 N. E. 789; Bradley Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Cutler (1925) 
253 Mass. 37, 148 N. E. 101;. Great Western Despatch South Shore Line 
v� Glenny (1884) 41 0. S. 166; Allend v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co. 
(1891) 21 Wash. 324, 58 Pac. 244; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. R. 
Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 . 
. 111 Warren, Burch & Co. v. Gabriel & Co. (1874) 51 Ala. 235; Faut v. 
Miller (1867) 58 Va. 187 ; Vaughn v. Garland (1840) 38 Va. 251. 
16 Bank of Finnell (1901) 133 Cal. 475, 65 Pac. 976; Scott v. Indian­
apolis Wagon. Works (1874) 48 Ind. 75; Cook Brewing Co. v. llall (1899) 
22 Ind. APJI• 656, 52 N. E. 1002. · 
1'7 Littig v. Urbauer-Atwood Heating Co. (1922) 292 Mo. 226, 247, 237 
s. w. 779. ' 
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- The court pointed out that the correct mode of use was to 
show the deposition to the witness, ask him if he had 
signed it and then introduce the whole thereof in evi­
dence. Such a practice, however, was not satisfactory to 
the lawyers, the easier and more effective mode being to 
ask the witness whether he had not previously made 
such and such statements. The Supreme Court in 1926 
ameliorated its former ruling to the extent that it is now 
req�ired that ' ' the party attempting impeachment must 
refrain from garbling facts, must be fair to the witness, 
the court and the jury, in the examination, and must read 
in evidence all portions of the deposition that bear on 
the particular questions and answers about which the 
witness is interrogated. " 18 As a practical matter the 
impeaching party now uses such portions of the deposi­
tion as he cares to and the adverse party then reads the 
additional portions which he deems explanatory of those 
already read.19 The present practice is more satisfac­
tory to the bar. It also provides a more effective way of 
exposing a lying witness.10 
There is some complaint among the lawyers of several 
states that the examination for discovery is sometimes 
allowed to be used at the trial in such a way as to jeopard­
ize its orderly conduct. Wisconsin is the only state in 
which this compla1.nt is especially widespread. Two 
types of abuses were pointed out. It is said that the 
deposition is used as a weapon with which to argue with 
the witness and play up inconsistencies of an immaterial 
nature between the testimony given at the trial and that 
given at the discovery hearing ; and that the deposition is 
used as a means of covering the same point twice, so as 
18 Peppers v. Railway Co. (1926) '312 Mo. 1104, 1116, 295 S. W. 757. 
19 Of. Rettlia v. Salomon (1925) 308 Mo. 673, 681, 274 S. W. 366. 
20 Dean Wigmore 's comment on the Littig ease is: " This is unsound; 
a lying witness could not be exposed under such restrictions, e. g. Sir 
Charles Russell could never have exposed the forger Piggott, in the 
cross-examination quoted ante see. 1260. ' '  Wigmore on Evidence, IV, 
2103, note 1. 
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to impress the jury and encumber the record. Most law­
yers say that the remedy for the latter abuse is with the 
trial judge who can put a stop to the reading of the 
examination where the ground had already been covered. 
Some lawyers, however, feel that the former abuse re­
quires a specific rule. The Advisory Committee on Rules 
has been considering a proposal to the effect that, " In 
case the witness shall have been adversely examined be­
fore trial, his examination at the trial shall be limited to 
such facts as were not inquired about on the former 
examination, unless the scope of the examination be ex­
tended by permission of the court. " It has been sug­
gested that the proposed rule be modified to the extent 
of putting the onus of objecting to the use of the depo­
sition on the opponent, rather than requiring the pro­
ponent to obtain permission. The majority opinion 
among the lawyers seems to be that such a rule, in any 
form, would do more harni than good� They fear any 
tampering with the present rigorous cross-examination. 
They point to its effectiveness in revealing the truth. 
The proposed rule might also have the unsalutary effect 
of subordinating oral testimony to written testimony and 
of discouraging examinations ,before trial. 
The usual rule is that any objections to the questions 
and answers may be made for the first time at the trial 
when it is sought to introduce the examination in evi­
dence, except those going to the form of the question.81 
The same rule applies as to the competency of the 
deponent, except that some courts have held that a party 
who takes a deposition waives the objection that the wit­
ness is incompetent.88 Suppose the trial judge has al­
ready decided objections to particular questions and 
81 In re Hammond (1909) 83 Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203. The rule under 
the written interrogatory procedure in Indiana is contra, Combs v. 
Union Co. (1896) 146 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. 
Berdon. (1924) 195 Ind. 265, 150 N. E.  407. 
88 Gowdy v. Gowdy (1930) 230 Ky. 545, 20 S. W. (2d) 170. See also 
note in 18 Ky. L. Jour. 302. 
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.. answers at the discovery examination. Does such ruling 
precl.ude him from rejecting evidence at the trial which 
he has admitted at the discovery hearing 1 On principle 
it would seem that the trial judge can decide de novo 
whether the answers are admissible in evidence, because 
the standards i� regard to discovery are more liberal 
than in regard to evidence at the trial. But some of the 
trial judges in Massachusetts, at least, have decided 
otherwise. 
CoNCLUSIVE EFFECT UPoN' PARTY WHo UsEs RECORD 
The uniform rule is that introduction in evidence of 
the examination of the adverse party does not preclude 
the party who so introduces it from rebutting the testi­
mony by other evidence.28 The theory is that the situ­
ation is analogous to that where one witness called for 
a party contradicts the testimony of a previous witness.24 
Similarly, the New York Civil Practice Act provides that 
the examination when read in evidence ' ' has the same 
effect, and no other, as the oral testimony of a witness 
would have. " 25 The truth of the testimony stands as 
against the party introducing until contradicting evidence 
is introduced.26 
The usual rule is that a party does not lose the right 
to impeach the credit of a witness by taking his deposi­
tion, but that the party who uses the deposition, regard­
less of who took it, does lose the right since, by using the 
deposition, he makes the deponent his own witness. This 
rule does not prevent contradiction of the deposition by 
other testimony ; it merely prevents attacks upon the 
1!8 Woodman v. Powers (1922) 242 Mass. 219, 136 N. E. 352 ; Washburn 
v. Owens (1927) 258 Mass. 446, 155 N. E. 432; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls 
& N. R. Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972. 
114 Goodman v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1917) 82 N. J. L. 450, 81 Atl. 
848. 
115 Section 305. 
ll6 Minihan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1908) 197 Mass. 367, 83 N. E. 
871 ; Boudrean v. Johnson (1922) 241 Mass. 12, 134 N. E. 359. 
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credit of the deponent. Nor should it have even this 
effect in the event that the deponent is an adverse party. · 
The same reasons which 'are set forth by Dean Wigmore 
against application of the rule that• a party who calls a 
witness cannot impeach him, to the situation where the 
witness is a party-opponent, can be relied upon here : 
"If there is any situation in which any semblance of rea­
son disappears for the application of the rule against 
impeaching one 's own witness, it is when the opposing 
party is himself called by the first party, and is sought 
to be compelled to disclose under oath that truth which 
he knows but is naturally unwilling . to make known. To 
say that the first party guarantees the opponent 's cred­
ibility is to mock him with a false formula • • • ' ' " 
Of course the question may be raised whether the prob­
lem will arise in connection with discovery : i. e., will the 
party introduce his adversary 's deposition as original 
evidence unless he deems the testimony true f Does he 
not use it for the very purpose of proving an admission T 
If so, why should he desire to attack the credit of the per­
son who gave the litdmission � Such argument overlooks 
the fact that the party who introduces the deposition may 
rely upon the truth of parts thereof as admissions, and 
yet desire to impeach the credit of the deponent as a 
· whole. Yet it is true that one link in the reasoning in 
regard to the trial situation, namely, that the party can­
not tell whether his opponent will speak truly or falsely 
when he calls him as a witness, is missing as far as dis­
covery is concerned. The party already knows his op­
ponent 's testimony before he introduces it. 
rt Wigmore on Evidence, II, 916 (with citations to cases) ; m, 1856 a. 
CHAPTER XIX 
COST OF DISCOVERY EXAMINATION 
There are certain fixed charges for serving the sub­
poena, swearing the witness, and certifying the record of 
the examination. The exact amount allowed for ' each of 
these incidentals varies in the different states. While 
the amount for serving the subpoena usually is small the 
very fact that there is any charge is one of the things 
which encourages the taking of examinations by stipula­
tion. There is usually a requirement that witness ' fees 
be tendered or paid. Three plans are in use as to the 
fees for taking down the testimony : (1 )  The compensa­
tion may be upon the basis of the amount of the testi­
mony which is taken down, i. e., either by the page, folio 
or hundred words. This is the most extensively used 
plan. Representative allowances under this plan are : 
Wisconsin, twelve cents per folio ; New Jersey, twenty 
cents per page ; Missouri, fifteen cents per hundred 
words ; Ohio and Nebraska, ten cents per hundred words. 
(2) The compensation may be upon the basis of the 
amount of testimony, plus a fee to the officer for the 
general conduct of the examination. Some form of this 
plan is necessary in the states wherein a trained officer is 
employed in addition to the stenographer. (3) The com­
pensation may be upon the basis of the time consumed 
in taking down the examination. Only Ontario employs 
this plan. If there is no request for copies the only 
recompense is two dollars per hour. The· comparative 
smallness of the fee is revealed by the . testimony of re­
porters that approximately thirty-five to forty folios are 
taken down on the average per hour. 
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In · Wisconsin and in Missouri where a commissioner 
with legal training supervises the examination the fees 
run slightly higher. The fees allowed in Wiscomlin are 
as follows : three dollars per diem for the commissioner ; 
twelve cents per folio for taking down and writing up 
the original ; five cents · to eight cents for copies. The 
rate varies in different localities. The commissioner gets 
his per diem fee and in addition a portion of the fees 
for stenographic service. The division of fees between 
the commissioner and the reporter varies in different 
places and among different officers. In Madison the 
usual division is ten cents to the reporter and two cents 
to the commissioner on the original, with copies at five 
cents each going entirely to the reporter. Of course the 
commissioner keeps all of the per diem charges as well 
as the other incidental charges, if any. In Milwaukee 
there is a variance but the average division seems to be 
eight cents to the reporter and four cents to the com­
missioner on originals, and four cents to the reporter and 
two cents to the commissioner on copies. · Sometimes a 
flat fifty-fifty division obtains . .  In Milwaukee the busi­
ness of court commissioners is not unprofitable, some­
thing like one hundred thousand dollars being the 
combined earnings of the various commissioners. A dif­
ferent plan for the payment of the commissioner is fol­
lowed in Missouri. If either party requests the appoint­
ment of a commissioner, the latter must be paid an addi­
tional per diem charge, which supposedly shall not 
exceed ten dollars.1 
The average . cost per examination, excluding the cost 
of copies, seems to be between ten dollars and fifteen 
dollars in the states wherein the ordinary deposition pro­
cedure is used. Both the testimony of lawyers and in­
spection of records with the notary's fees marked there­
on indicates that this is' the average cost. Some lawyers 
1 Of. Manning v. Roberts (1900) 83 Mo. App. 627. 
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said that the average cost was nearer to twenty dollars 
per examination than to either fifteen dollars or ten dol­
lars. That the average figure in these states will not run 
over fifteen dollars is indicated by statistics concerning 
costs in Wisconsin, for there the fee rate is higher than in 
the states which use the deposition procedure. In Madi­
son, Wisconsin, the average cost,. excluding copies, among 
seventy-two examinations which were inspected was fif­
teen dollars and ninety-one cents, whereas the similar 
figure for fifty-eight examinations in Milwaukee was fif­
teen dollars and two cents. The highest cost found was 
sixty-six dollars and sixty cents, and the lowest, four 
dollars and twenty cents. Two devices for reducing ex­
pense in discovery examination are being used, especially 
in the smaller cities and towns. These are use of the 
stenographer of the examining lawyer 's office, by agree­
ment, rather than use of a special officer, and elimination 
of the necessity of having the stenographer 's shorthand 
notes transcribed. 
It is uniformly provided that the applicant for discov­
ery shall pay all costs of the examination in the first 
instance. The usual rule is that the costs of the deposi­
tion may be taxed to the losing party only in the event 
the deposition is used at the triaP The right to tax in 
Missouri is dependent upon whether the depositions are 
filed rather than upon whether they are used. This rule 
has caused the cost element to play an unusually prom­
inent part in discovery examinations . .  More objection 
is made by Missouri lawyers to the expense of deposi­
tions than to any other feature. Complaint is less notice­
able in other states where the theOI'Y is that until the 
deposition is used at the trial all expense incident there­
to should be considered as a part of the cost of prepara-
I In addition to the statutes see: Citizens Nat. Bank v. Alexander 
(1905) 34 Ind. App. 596, 73 N. E; 279. 
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tioil fo� trial and should be borne by the party taking 
the deposition. ., 
An illustration of the manner in which costs may be 
handled as a weapon to secure the effective administra­
tion of other incidents of an examination for discovery 
is afforded by the Missouri experience. If a party in 
taking a deposition requests the officer in charge to com­
mit the witness for a refusal to answer a question, and 
the circuit court' later decides that the refusal of the 
witness was justified, t4e court may force the party who 
requested the commitment to pay the witness all costs in­
curred by him in effecting his discharge, and in addi- · 
tion an attorney 's fee not exceeding twenty-five dollars, 
and may delay any further examination of the witness 
until such costs are paid.8 In Massachusetts the court 
may direct who shall bear the cost either by general rule 
or by special order in each case. In Ontario the costs 
of an examination are borne in the first instance by the 
party taking and cannot be taxed as disbursements un­
less the taxing officer so directs.4 He may allow either 
all or only a part to be taxed. Whether the deposition 
was used at the trial or not is not controlling as to 
whether the cost of the examination was reasonably in­
curred.11 In 1894 a rule was passed making costs of a 
discovery examination to be borne in any event by the 
party taking same unless otherwise ordered by the trial 
judge, but this rule was later changed so as to leave the 
matter in the discretion of the taxing officer as it is at 
present.6 As a matter of practice costs of discovery are 
usually taxed to the losing party. But tlie possibility 
that they may not be allowed has been found to be a salu­
tary protection. 
8 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) see. 5460; In re Whieker (1914) 187 Mo. App. 
96, 173 s. w. 38. 
4 Rule 654. 
II Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 1326. 
6 Cf. 39 Canada L. Jour. 772. ' 
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Defendants pay the greater portion of the costs of 
discovery examinations as a practical matter. Repre­
sentatives of insurance, railway and traction companies, 
make the most frequent use of the procedure. They 
regard costs as secondary to the successful defense or 
settlement of the action. If they are successful in de­
fending the action it usually happens that they cannot 
tax for depositions which they have taken, either be­
cause there has been no use of them at the trial, or be­
cause it is impossible to recover the costs from the plain­
tiff. If a settlement is effected, it is usually provided 
that the defendant will assume all costs. 
CHAPTER � 
RBVIBW OF RULINGS MADE UPON DISCOVERY 
EXAMINATION 
The following two principles are generally accepted : 
(1) Rulings granting or denying discovery usually are 
not proper subjects of a separate appeal ; (2 )  Rulings 
which enforce a penalty for contempt or which strike a 
pleading are appealable. The general rule in regard 
to interlocutory orders is the basis of the first principle. 
The policy behind the rule has been stated by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court thus : "To stop the trial ·of a 
cause, pending an appeal to this court, upon every iso­
lated question of practice, or the admissibility of evi­
dence, or the competency of a witness, and the like, 
would indefinitely protract litigation and swell its cost. ' ' 1 
The second principle is based upon the theory that an 
order which enforces a penalty is to be regarded as a 
final order and therefore is subject to a separate appeal. 
These principles are so widely accepted that it will be 
profitable to note only the exceptions.• 
While a ruling which disallows specific questions usu­
ally is not appealable as a separate item a clear abuse 
of discretion may make an appeal possible.• The chief 
1 Vann v. Lawrence (1893) 111 N. C. 32, 15 S. E. 1031. 
I For applications of the general rules see: Phipps v. Wis. Cent. Ry. 
Co. (1907) 130 Wis. 279, 110 N. W. 207; Neacy v. Thomas (1912) 148 
Wis. 91, 133 N. W. 580; Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor (1893) 112 N. C. 141, 
17 B. E. 69; State v. Superior Court (1910) 56 Wash. 649, 106 Pac. 150; 
Ex parte Jilz (1876) 64 Mo. 205; Landman v. Rashman (1928) 195 
Wis. 33, 217 N. W. 649 ; Johnson v. The Harriett Mills, Inc. (1928) 196 
N. C. 93, 144 B. E. 534; Holt v. Warehouse Co. (1895) 116 N. C. 480, 
21 B. E. 919. 
8 Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201, 
144 N. W. 272; ·American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co. 
(1912) 151 Wis. 385, 138 N. W. 1123. 
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application of this exception is to be found in cases 
.wherein the order of the trial court has ·amounted to a 
virtual denial of any discovery.4 The North Carolina 
court has evidenced unusual liberality in regard to ap­
peals. While the ordinary rule is that separate appeals 
will not be countenanced," appeals have been allowed 
in spite of the rule in several cases ; once where a ques­
tion of " first importance " was deemed to be involved,6 
and again where the order for the examination was not 
founded upon proper affidavits.7 Indication has been 
given that appeals will be allowed whenever substantial 
rights are involved.8 
The rule that a penalty for contempt is appealable 
seems to be followed generally except in the federal 
courts. While an order striking a pleading is regarded 
by the federal courts as final and reviewable separately,9 
an order, even though wrongfully made, which punishes 
for civil contempt is regarded as interlocutory.10 
The federal circuit court of appeals and the Supreme 
Courts of Washington and Iowa, respectively, have held 
that the extraordinary methods of review cannot be used 
as a means of obtaining separate review of discovery 
rulings.11 If the Missouri circuit courts attempt to in­
terfere with the right of a party to take depositions by 
4 Kuryer Pub. Co. v. Messmer (1916) 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948; 
State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 1097. 
6 Johnson v. The Harriett Mills Inc . .  (1928) 196 N. C. 93, 144 S. E. 534. 
6 Ward v. Martin (1918) 175 N. C. 287, 95 S. E. 621. 
7 Chesson v. Washington County Bank (1925) 190 N. C. 187, 129 S. E. 
403. 
8 Monroe v. Holder (1921) 182 N. C. 79, 108 S. E. 359. 
9 Carpenter v. Winn (1908) 165 Fed. 636; Francisco v. Chicago & 
A. R. Co. ( 1906) 149 Fed. 354. 
10 Doyle v. London Guaranty & Accident Co. (1907) 204 U. s: 599. 
11 Keaton v. Kennamer (1930) 42 F. (2d) 814 (writ of prohibition) ; 
State v. Superior Court (1910) 56 Wash. 649, 106 Pae. 150 (certiorari) ; 
Winneshiek County Bank v. District Court (1927) 203 lowa 1277, 212 
N. W. 391 (certiorari) .  There i s  a vigorous dissent in the last ease on 
the ground that if the order is oppressive certiorari should lie under 
the general constitutional power of the court " to secure justice to par­
ties. " Cf. Ward v. Martin (1918) 175 N. C. 287, 95 S. E. 621. 
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issuing an injunction, the Supreme Court will grant a· 
writ of prohibition against such injunction.12 
If a court wrongfully allows or disallows discovery 
of particular items of evidence find the case goes on to 
a final judgment may error be predicated upon the dis­
covery rulings ¥ If so, must prejudice be, shown or is the 
mere wrongful allowance or disallowance of discovery 
in itself prejudicial Y The second question really is the 
point of dispute, for the first question generally is an­
swered in the affirmative. In Washington it has been 
held that actual prejudice must be shown and that an 
erroneous ruling is not ipso facto prejudiciaJ.l8 The 
Indiana court has held that there is no prejudice if the 
facts which were sought and wrongfully denied upon the 
discovery examination are later proved by the evidence 
at the trial.14 The Massachusetts court takes a different 
view, as indicated by the following quotation from an 
opinion by Rugg, C. J. : ' ' The principle of trial evi­
dence, to the effect that ordinarily no exception will be 
sustained to the refusal to allow a question to be put 
unless the substance of the answer expected in reply 
is stated to the court, does not apply to interrogatories. 
Where questions are asked of a witness at the trial, if 
there has been proper preparation counsel usually has 
more or less well grounded reason for anticipating the 
testimony to be given. Interrogatories commonly are 
propounded to an adverse party for the purpose of as­
certaining material facts in advance of the trial. The 
interrogator may be in. utter ignorance of the informa­
tion likely to be disclosed, and be unable to  make any 
offer of proqf. His right to interrogate does .not depend 
primarily upon the question whether the answers will 
18 State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren (Mo. App., 1921) 229 S. W. 1097. 
18 Moberg v. McCauley (1929) 150 Wash. 494, 273 Pae. 739 ; Gostina 
v. Whitham (1928) 148 Wash. 72, 268 Pac. 132. 
· 
14 Meyer v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (1895) 144 Ind. 439, 43 N. E. 
448; Alesworth v. Brown (1869) 31 Ind. 270. 
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help or harm him in the ultimate decision of the case. 
On the other hand, exceptions ought not to be sustained 
unless there is solid foundation for belief that substan­
tial injury has resulted. Interrogatories should not be 
suffered to become a training field for the saving of 
exceptions possessing only a theoretical merit having 
no relation to the practical administration of justice. ' '  16 
While appeals in New York from the trial courts to 
the appellate divisions (intermediate courts of appeal ) 
of the four different departments of the supreme court 
may be had, appeals to the Court of Appeals (highest 
appellate tribunal) ,  on matters of discovery are gen­
erally not countenanced.16 Only where such questions 
as want of due process of law are raised, will appeal 
lie.17 
111 Cutler v. Cooper (1920) 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634, 637. 16 Middleton v. Boardman (1924) 210 N. Y. App. Div. 467, 206 N. Y. S. 
725, appeal dismissed 240 N. Y. 552, 148 N. E. 701. 
· 
17 Feingold v. Walworth Bros. (1924) 238 N. Y. 335, 144 N. E. 675. 
CHAPTER ·•XXI 
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS 
AscERTAINING WHAT DocuMENTs ARE IN PossEssiON oF 
ADVERSE pARTY 
The two primary problems connected with discovery 
of documents are : (1)  How may a party ascertain what 
documents are in the possession of the adverse party 
relating to the action? (2)  Having ascertained what 
documents are in the possession of the adverse party, 
how may he obtain an inspection of them before trial ! 
Provision has been made in a majority of the jurisdic­
tions of this country for the latter of these two problems 
but the first one has been ignored. Insufficient remedy 
is afforded the party who is unable to specify particular 
documents in the possession of his adversary and yet 
desires to asc�rtain what documents are in his posses­
sion. New York has attempted to correct this situation 
but the procedure is much less effective than that which . 
is used in England and in Ontario. The applicant for 
discovery must file an affidavit stating his belief that 
certain specified documents are in the possession or 
control of the adverse party and make a 'motion for an 
order that his opponent be required to disclose by affi­
davit whether or not he has these specified documents.1 
In some states it is possible, apart from statutory au­
thorization, to interrogate as to the docu�ents which the 
adverse party possesses during the course of the ex­
amination for discovery, and to adjourn the examination 
1 New York Civil Practice Aet, see. 328; Schmoll Fils Associated 
v. Baltic American Lines (1931) 247 N. Y. S. 305. 
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· for the production of the documents, the possession of 
which is admitted. Under the Massachusetts written 
interrogatory practice it is possible for the proponent 
of the interrogatories to ask : ' ' Do you have · in your 
possession or power such and such documents ? If so, 
will you furnish a copy of such document, or state the 
time and place that it may be inspected ¥ "  Or he may 
ask as a prefatory question to the entire interrogation : 
"Will you look into all the books and papers which you 
have relating to this action so that you can make com­
plete answers to the following questions � ' '  A consider­
ably more effective procedure has been established in 
England, Ontario and other British jurisdictions.2 The 
theory underlying the procedure is that there should,be a 
disclosure, as of course, of the identity of all documents 
relating to the action and that there should be a dis­
closure of the contents of the documents unless they are 
privileged. The English practice is for the party who 
, desires discovery of documents to apply to the court, 
or to a master in chambers, for an order requiring his 
opponent to give an affidavit of documents.3 An order 
of court no longer is required in Ontario, but the dis­
covery may be had upon mere notice to the party. The 
only reason from a policy standpoint that it is not re­
quired in every case that each party grant disclosure as 
of course of his own documents is that, in some cases, it 
might not be desired by the opposite party, in which 
event the costs might be increased unnecessarily. 
2 The English and Ontario provisions are set forth in the appendix at 
the back of this volume. Citations to the similar provisions in other 
British jurisdictions are : Alberta, Rules of Court (1914, as amended to 
1923) 364-378 ; Australia, County Court Practice, 130, 133 ;  British 
Columbia, Court Rules (1925) order 31; Manitoba, Acts Relating to 
Court of King's Bench (1914) 424-440; New Brunswick, Judicature Act 
and Rules of Court (1909), order 31; New Foundla\).d, Cons. Stat. (1919) 
ch. 83, order 31; Nova Scotia, Judicature Act (1920) order 30; Quebec, 
Code of Civ. Prac. (1922) 286-290 ; Queensland, Supreme Court Practice 
(1921) order 35; Saskatchewan, Cons. Orders and Rules of the Court of 
R;ing's Bench (1921) order 21; Victoria, Sup. Court Rules (1916) order 
31. 
3 Stringer, The A. B. C. Guide to Practice (1928) p. 66. 
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The affidavit of documents, as will be seen from the 
following form, must set forth respectively : ( 1 )  all the 
documents which the party has which he does not object 
to producing ; (2)  all documents \\1hich he has, but which 
he objects to producing, and the ground for such objec­
tions ; and (3)  all documents which the party formerly 
had in his possession or power but are now elsewhere, 
together with a rigid accounting for the same.• The fol­
lowing form is used : 
' ' In the High Court of Justice. 
Division. 
Between A. B., Plaintiff, 
and 
C. D., E. F., and G. H., Defendants. 
I, the above named defendant, C. D., make oath and 
say as follows : 
1. I have in my possession or power the documents 
relating to the matters in question in this suit set forth 
in the first and second parts of the first schedule hereto. 
2. I object to produce the said documents set forth 
in the second pa11t of the said :first schedule hereto (state 
grounds for objection) .  
3 .  I have had, but have not now, in my possession or 
power the documents relating to the matters in question 
in this suit set forth in the second schedule hereto. 
4. The last-mentioned documents were last in my 
possession or power on (state when, and what has be­
come of them, and in whose possession they now are) .  
5. According to the best of my knowledge, informa­
tion and belief I have not now, and never had in my 
possession, custody, or power, or in the possession, cus­
tody, or power of my solicitors or lj.gents, solicitor or 
agent, or in the possession, custody or power of any other 
persons or person on my behalf, any deed, account, book 
4 For a fine practical description of the composition of the affidavit 
of documents see the note of Sir Willes Chitty in 58 Law Journal 574. 
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of account, voucher, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper, 
or writing, or any copy of or extract from any such docu- · 
ment, or any other document whatsoever, relating to the 
matters in question in this suit, or any of them, or 
wherein any entry has been made relative to such mat­
ters, or any of them, other than and except the docu­
ments set forth in the said first and second schedules 
hereto. ' '  5 
As a matter of practice in Ontario, very few docu­
ments are entered in the schedule provided for those 
which the party objects to producing. Out of more than 
a hundred such affidavits inspected in the central office 
at Osgoode Hall, Toronto, in which hundreds of docu­
ments were listed, only three documents were specified, 
as to which production was objected to. Two of these 
were stated to be privileged as communications between 
counsel and client while the third entry was listed as 
"bank books " without any reason for the objection being 
assigned. In all other cases this particular schedule 
was either left blank or, as more often, filled only by 
the printed word ' ' NIL. ' '  In a fraud action, for in­
stance, the plaintiff and five defendants each filed sepa­
rate affidavits of documents, listing altogether more than 
300 items, yet no objection was made to the production 
of any of them. 
The affidavit of documents may not be contradicted 
by counter-affidavits. If a party has reason to believe 
that the affidavit of documents omits certain books or 
papers he may apply for a further affidavit as to these 
specific books or papers, according to the English prac­
tice. But when this further affidavit has been made it 
is practically conclusive of the matter, and the court 
usually will not disregard the oath.6 The Ontario rule 
is that only when the documents actually produced, or 
5 Annual Practice (1932) 1539. 
6 See annotation in Annual Practice (1932) p. 529. 
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admissions of the party himself� disclose additional docu:. 
ments, may the affidavit be ·attacked.' In practice, how­
ever, it is quite usual to :find a party seeking disclosure 
of documents not listed in the affidavit. When he :finds 
such the examination is adjourned until the documents 
are produced. The following excerpt from an actual 
record shows just how the matter is presented : 
Q. Have you got any record anywhere of that money? 
A. Yes, possibly I have. 
Q. I am asking if you have. If you have, I want it 
produced here now. 
A. I have not got it here now. 
Q. Is it mentioned in your affidavit on production 1 
A. I don't know that it is. 
Q. Show it to me-you signed the affidavit f 
A. It is some time ago. It is hard to remember every­
thing that is in here. 
Attorney for, party : I don't think there is anything 
in the affidavit on production. 
INSPECTION oF DocUMENTS 
After a party has ascertained what documents relating 
to the action are in the possession of his adversary he 
may desire to inspect them before trial. There are two 
ways by which he should be able to make inspection. He 
should be able to require their production and inspect 
them as an incident of, and during the progress of, an 
. oral examination for discovery or he should be able to 
inspect them separately, by virtue of a special statutory 
provision for inspection of documents. 
The Ontario practice is illustrative of the way in 
which the affidavit of document procedure can be in­
tegrated with the general procedure for an oral examina­
tion before trial. By the affidavit ot documents a party 
'7 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) vol. 3, p. 731. 
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can ascertain the identity of documents which may be of 
help to him in preparing his case. Then he can compel 
production for inspection of the particular books and 
papers which he desires to see. According to the literal 
rule production and deposit for inspection must be made 
·at the office where the proceedings are being taken. In 
practice, however, it is customary for the inspection to 
be arranged by the solicitors in the manner most con­
venient to all concerned. Usually after the inspection 
the party knows which documents he will want produced 
at the oral examination for discovery and the opposite 
party either agrees to bring these along or is directed 
by the notice of appointment to do so. At the examina­
tion the documents actually referred to are marked as 
exhibits and returned to the party until the trial. In 
almost all cases wherein oral examinations for discovery 
are had affidavits and production of documents are first 
required. This was true in forty-three out of the fifty 
consecutive cases, the records of which were studied in 
Toronto. In addition affidavits of documents are re­
quired in many cases wherein no oral examination is 
used. 
In most of the states which allow use of the ordinary 
deposition procedure for purposes of discovery before 
trial, it is possible for the party to require, by the service 
of a subpoena duces tecum, that the party to be examined 
bring with him specified books and papers. This is the 
practice in Ohio,8 Nebraska,9 Indiana and Kentucky.10 
The Missouri court, on the contrary, has held that a 
party cannot be forced to produce his books and papers 
for inspection as an incident of an examination for dis-
B Ra Raugh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701 ; Ex parte Schoepf (1906) 
74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276. 
. . 9 Old Line Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witt (1913) 92 Neb. 743, 139 
N. W. 641. 
10 This is the actual practice in Indiana and Kentucky, alt�o�gh 
there are no clear-cut decisions on the matter. 
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covery before either a notary or a commissioner.11 There 
is a difference of opinion among the lawyers of New 
Hampshire as to whether a party whose deposition is 
being taken can be forced to produce his documents for 
inspection.12 In 1889 the Wisconsin statute on discovery 
was so amended as to authorize the officer in charge of 
a discovery examination to compel the party examined 
to produce his books and papers, by contempt proceed­
ings. Inspection is easily obtained under this plan. The 
form of the notice for an adverse examination contains 
the words : "You are further commanded that you bring 
with you and have at the time and place above named," 
followed by an appropriate blank. Known papers are 
specified and a blanket clause covering ' ' all other papers 
relating to the action ' '  is added. It is permissible at the 
examination to interrogate thoroughly as to what other 
documents the party has in his possession or power. If 
others are disclosed the examination can be adjourned 
until they are produced. If the books are too large to 
carry or if the inspection would consume too much time, 
there is usually a stipulation allowing inspection at the 
party's offices. Usually the documents are not copied, 
nor are they kept with the record. Rather they are re­
ferred to, marked for identification, and returned to the 
party until the trial. 
There is a conflict among the New York decisions as 
to how largely discovery and inspection of documents 
may be had in connection with an oral examination of a 
party for discovery before trial. The extreme degree 
of liberality is evidenced by the Appellate Division of 
the Second Department which, in a recent memorandum 
decision, seems to hold that" production of papers may be 
11 State ex rei. Stroh v. Kiene (1918) 276 Mo. 206, 207 S. W. 496; 
State ex rei. McCulloch v. Taylor (1916) 268 Mo. 312, 187 S. W. 1181. 
lll The view that a party can be forced to produce seems to be BUB· 
tained in Boston & Maine R. R. v. State (1910) 75 N. H. 513, 77 A. 996. 
The contrary vie'Y is attributable to the wording of N. H. Public Laws 
(1926) ch� 33&, sec. ·25; · · . · . · 
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required at the examination by a mere notice to pro­
duce.18 At the other extreme is a decision from the 
Appellate Division of the Fourth Department to the 
effect that proceedings for the discovery and inspection 
of documents are entirely separate from examinations of 
parties and witnesses.14 The view more generally fol­
lowed and. the one which seems more in accord with the 
statutory provisions is that, while there may be no pro­
duction and inspection if the examination for discovery 
is initiated by notice, there may be a combined court 
order allowing both the examination and the inspection.16 
Under such a view the proper procedure is to name the 
books and papers of which inspection is desired in the 
application for an order for the examination so that 
the court can combine the two things in its order .16 There 
have been several rulings to the effect that production 
of documents at an adverse examination before trial may 
be compelled by subpoena duces tecum but that the only 
use which can be made of the documents after they are 
produced is to identify them or refresh the memory of 
the witness by them.1'7 The actual practice in New York 
as to discovery of documents is very illiberal. 
Most jurisdictions also provide procedure for the in­
spection of documents other than and apart from pro­
cedure for discovery of testimony generally. The Eng­
lish practice is for the party applicant to serve a notice 
18 Meretsky v. Wolff (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 776. (Possibly the docu­
ments were sue}!. as to come within sec. 327 of the Civil Practice Act, 
but it is not so specified.) 
14 Citizens' Trust Co. of Utica v. R. Prescott & Son (1927) 223 N. Y. S. 
184. Note that the only case cited in support of this decision does not 
go so far as a matter of fact. 
16 Fey v. Wisser (1923) 202 N. Y. S. SO; Bartholomay Co. v. Regan 
(1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745; Ritzwoller v. Lurie (1923) 198 N. Y. S. 754; 
Zeltner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 356; Schmoll Fils 
Associated v. Baltic American Line (1931) 247 N. Y. S. 305. 
16 Fey v. Wisser (1923) 202 N. Y. S. 30; New York Civil Practice 
Act, sec. 296; Rules of Civil Practice 122. 
17 Kertz v. Liberty Bapk of Buffl!lo (1929) 233 N. Y. S. 472; N. Y. 
City Car Adv. Co. v. Regensburg ,& Sons (192�) 200 N. Y. s, 152; Klapp 
v. Merwin (1924) 203 N. Y. s. 694. See nbte in 1 N. Y. Civ. Ptoe. R. 
17'6 to't rulings 'llnder tl1e code. 
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upon the party who has admitted .. possession of relevant 
documents to produce them for inspection. If production 
is refused an order may then be applied for.18 The court 
then makes an order for inspection in such place and in 
such manner as he thinks fit, unless the document is privi­
leged or unless inspection is unnecessary either for dis­
posing fairly of the cause or for saving costs.19 A ma­
jority of the jurisdictions of this country have provision 
for production and inspection of documents. But in many 
of them the procedure is clumsy, and the limitations upon 
its use make it very ineffective. The most serious limi­
tation concerns the time of tl;te discovery. In the federal 
law courts and in quite a few of the states the statutes 
seem to intend only production at the trial and not in­
spection before the trial. The federal statute is repre­
sentative of these provisions : ' ' In trials of actions at 
law, the courts of the United States may, on motion 
and due notice ,thereof, require the parties to produce 
books or writings in their possession or power, which 
contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and 
under circumstances where they might be compelled to 
produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in 
chancery. • • • ' '  80 For . more than a century trial 
courts disagreed as to whether this allowed inspection 
before trial or was limited to production at the trial, but 
the United StatE�s Supreme Court has now finally decided 
that it is the latter.11 
The procedure for obtaining production and inspection 
of documents varies as to details in different jurisdic­
tions.•• The following jurisdictions have statutes which 
provide that the court, on application and notice, may 
order the party to give inspection and copy of docu-
18 Annual Practice (1930) order 31, rule 15 ff. 
19 Id. rule 18. 
10 U. S. C. A. tit. 28, sec. 636. 81 Carpenter v. Winn (1911) 221 U. S. 533. 
II The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the back of this 
volume. 
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mentary evidence, without need of a prior demand : Ala­
bama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro­
lina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Porto Rico, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, United States Admiralty, 
United States Court of Claims, United States Law, Utah, 
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Statutes in the 
following states require that the party applicant first 
make a demand on the adverse party, which upon his 
refusal may be followed by a motion for an order for 
inspection : Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma 
and Wyoming. The following states require the appli­
cant for discovery of documents to file a petition or 
, application in writing : Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Virginia. 
Special provision is made in many jurisdictions for in­
spection of documents which are referred to in the 
pleadings. Inspection of such documents is a matter of 
right.18 In some of the jurisdictions of this country this 
includes only such documents as are the foundation of 
the action, but in England and some states of this coun­
try it includes all documents referred to in either plead­
ings or affidavits. This latter has proved so highly 
desirable that its application has been extended, by con­
struction, beyond its patent intent to include affidavits 
of documents also.•• In Victoria the statute goes even 
further and makes inspection a matter of right as to all 
documents referred to in writ, pleading, particulars or 
affidavit.86 
28 A list of the statutes may be found in Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 
III, sec. 1859 a, note 4. 
M Bray, Digest of the Law of Discovery, sec. 66. 
a& Victoria Supreme Court Rules (1916) order 51, sec. 15. 
CHAPTER XXII 
EXAMINATION OF PROPERTY AND PERSON 
Dean Wigmore has summed up the respective view­
points and practices of the courts of common law and 
of chancery thus : ' ' So far as concerned chattels and 
premises in his possession or control, the adversary in 
common law actions, like the true gamester that the law 
encouraged him to be, held safely the trump cards of the 
situation, free from any legal liability of disclosure be­
fore trial ; in this respect there was not recognized even 
the . limited right of inspection which after the days of 
Lord Mansfield had been conceded for documentary evi­
dence. But in chancery, under the same wholesome prin­
ciple and practice by which bills of discovery were al­
lowed for ascertaining the opponent 's testimony and the 
documents in his possession the inspection of chattels 
and premises in his possession or control was obtainable 
wherever fairness seemed to demand it. ' '  1 
It is the practice now in England for the court, or 
a master on a summons for directions, upon the applica­
tion of a party after notice to his opponent, to order 
the inspection of any property or thing which is the 
subject of the cause or matter, or as to which any ques­
tion may arise therein. The court or master may also 
authorize persons to go on the land or property and 
inspect it or to make any necessary observations and 
experiments, or take any necessary samples. 1 In a 
proper case the court will allow photographs to be taken, 
if this is necessary to preserve the evidence for trial.1 
1 Wigmore on Evidence, lli, 1862. 
I Annual ·Praetiee (1932) order 50, rules 2-6. 
8 Lewis v. Ltd. Londesborough (1893) 2 Q. B. 191. . 189 
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Similar rules also obtain in most of the Canadian prov-. ' mces. 
Several American states have statutes which provide 
for the inspection of property, which are rather limited 
in scope. In some of them, the provision is apparently 
limited to special kinds of actions, as for instance the 
California provision that the court may order inspec­
tion in actions for the recovery of real property or for 
damages for an injury thereto.6 A still more conspic­
uous limitation is like that noted in connection with 
statutes authorizing inspection of documents, namely, it 
is not clear whether the statutes contemplate inspection 
before trial or not. In New York and Wisconsin and 
Michigan, however, it is clear that the inspection may be 
had before trial. 6 The New York statute provides : "A 
court of record, other than a justices ' court in a city, by 
order may compel a party to an action pending therein to 
produce and discover, or to give to the other party, an 
inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy or 
photograph of a book, document or other paper, or to 
make discovery of any article or property in his pos­
session or under his control, relating to the merits of the 
action, or of the defense therein. The procedure for 
obtaining such order shall be regulated by rules. " The 
Wisconsin statute is as follows : "In any civil action 
or proceeding in a court of record the court or the pre­
siding judge may, after issue joined, and on application, 
order a party to permit an opposite party and his wit­
nesses to inspect any property, the inspection of which 
may be deemed material and necessary. ' ' The New 
Michigan Court Rules provide : "In any action for dam-
4 Ontario, Cons. Rules of Practice (1913) rule 266; Ross on Discovery 
(Boulton, Can. Ed.), 126. 
6 Cf. Wigmore on Evidence, III, sec, 1862, and note 8, in which a 
number of such special statutes are cited. 
6 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 324, Rules of Civ, Prac., 
rules 14(}-142; Wis. Stat. (1927), ch. 269, sec. 57. See also American 
Judicature 's proposed Rul�s of Civil Procedure Act, Art. 21, sec. 16. 
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ages for injuries to person or property, or to recover 
upon any policy of insurance respecting sickness or 
bodily injuries or damages or injuries to property, physi­
cal examination by physicians of the person sick or in­
jured, or by the defendant or his agent of the property 
damaged or injured, may be ordered in advance of the 
trial, on motion with due notice, upon such just and rea­
sonable terms and conditions as the court may pre­
scribe. ' '  7 
It is of great facility in determining the exact nature, 
extent and probable duration of the injury in personal 
injury cases that the defendant be allowed to have an 
examination of the plaintiff by a competent physician. 
On the other hand, it is necessary that the examination 
be so conducted and supervised that no abuse or unnec­
essary violation of the rights of personal privacy may be 
allowed. 
A decided majority of the decisions are to the effect 
that a court has power upon the trial to require the plain­
tiff to submit' to a physical examination by p4ysicians 
selected by the court.8 On principal it would seem that 
no substantial injustice would be done the plaintiff by 
moving up the time for such an examination, and allow­
ing it to be ordered before the trial. This would prove 
a time saving expedient as far as the court and jury 
are concerned. But, apart from statute, the courts have 
been rather equally divided as to whether or not there 
is inherent power in the courts to compel submission to 
such an examination before trial. 'J:.1here is one line of 
authority, headed by the United States Supreme Court, 
which has held quite flatly that courts have no such 
power.9 Other courts have taken the position that the 
7 Michigan Court Rules (1930) rule 41, sec. 5. 8 Belt Electric Line Co. v. Allen (1898) 102 Ky. 551, 44 S. W. 89, 
and numerous cases cited in Wigmore on Evidence, IV, 2220, and in 23 
L . . R. A. (N . . S.) 465. 
9 Railway Co. v. Botsford (1890) 141 U. S. 250. See also the opinion 
of Holmes, C. J., in Stock v. Railroad (1900) 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 
686; McQuigan v. Railroad Co. (1891) 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235. 
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discovery of truth and the prevention of fraud is so nec­
essary in administering justice in personal injury cases 
that the slight inroad on the right of personal privacy 
must be tolerated and that the courts have inherent 
power to allow physical examinations.10 
After the New York Court of Appeals had held that 
trial courts had no power, apart from statute, to order 
a physical examination of a party before trial, the legis­
lature promptly enacted a statute which conferred this 
power upon the courts. The New York statute provides : 
"In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, 
if the defendant shall present to the court satisfactory 
evidence that he is ignorant of the nature and extent 
of the injuries complained of, th� court, by order, shall 
direct that the plaintiff submit to a physical examina­
tion by one or more physicians or surgeons to be desig­
nated by the court or judge, and such examination shall 
be had and made under such restrictions and directions 
as to the court or judge shall seem proper. If the party 
to be examined shall be a female she shall be entitled to 
have such examination before a physician or surgeon 
of her own sex. The order for such physical examina­
tion, upon the application of the defendant, may also 
direct that the testimony of such party be taken by 
deposition pursuant to this article. ' '  11 Subsequently 
five other states have adopted similar measures.11 The 
constitutionality of such measures has been upheld in 
New York 13 and New Jersey.u The New Jersey statute 
was attacked on the ground that if the examination were 
allowed before trial, it would constitute an infringement 
10 The cases are fully listed in 14 L. R. A. 466, and 23 L. R. A. 
N. S. 465. 
11 New York Civil Practice Aet, see. 306. 
111 Ariz. Session Laws, 1921, .eh. 131; Mich. Court Rules (1931) rule 
41, see. 5; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 2226; S. D. Session Laws, 1921, 
eh. 179; Wash. Codlp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) sees. 1230-1231. 
18 Lyon v. Railway Co. (1894) 142 N. Y. 298, 37 N. E. 113. 
1t McGovern v. Hope (1899) 63 N. J. L. 76, 42 Atl. 830. 
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of the constitutional right of a party in a civil suit to be 
confronted by witnesses, but the court rejected the con­
tention. No such provision is to be found in the general 
rules regarding discovery in England, but a special stat­
ute was enacted in 1868, which still is in force, whereby 
a person who is injured in a railway accident can be 
compelled to submit to a physical examination.15 Ontario 
allows physical examinations in all personal injury 
actions.16 
The following practical problems have arisen in the 
various jurisdictions in regard to the conduct of the 
medical examination : May an X-ray examination be re­
quired T Is a female party entitled to demand a physi­
cian of her own sex Y May the physician ask questions 
of the pa�ty while he is making the physical examina­
tion T There is a division of authority as tp the use of 
the X-ray in Ne,w York, although the predominant view 
seems to be that it is permissible.17 Only in New York is 
a female party entitled to demand that the examination 
be conducted by a physician of her own sex.18 The ex­
amining physician, under the Ontario practice, is not 
allowed to ask questions of the person whom he is ex­
amining. The court, in so construing the rule, said : ' ' To 
permit the plaintiff to be physically examined is a suffi­
cient invasion of his personal rights without giving the 
surgeon the right to hold an inquisition on him. " 19 
15 31 & 32 Viet., ch. 119, sec. 26. 
16 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) III, 792. 
1'7 Gilbert v. Iqar (1928) 228 N. Y. S. 183 (the court will take judicial 
knowledge that there is little or no danger from such examinations at 
the present time) ; Boyland v. Libman (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 632; Hollister 
v. Robertson (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 514. Contra : Lacqua v. General Linen 
Supply & Laundry Co. (1929) 237 N. Y. S. 197; Van Orden v. Madow 
(1923) 201 N. Y. S. 954. 
18 Young v. Fairfax (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 815. 
19 Falconbridge, J., in Clouse v. Coleman (1895) 16 P. R. 496. See 
generally as to the Ontario practice, Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 
1915) page 234; Ross on Discovery (Canadian Ed.) page 125. 
CHAPTER XXIII 
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING ADMISSIONS 
NoTICE TO AnMiT ExiSTENCE OF FACTS 
England and several American jurisdictions provide a 
special procedure by which either party may call upon 
his adversary to admit, for purposes of the trial only, 
the existence of facts. The penalty for unjust refusal 
to admit is the cost of proving the items concerning which 
admissions were asked and refused. A chief reason for 
the adoption of this procedure in England is that written 
interrogatories have proved a somewhat inadequate 
means of discovery before trial, and have proved burden­
some upon the parties and the court. One of the attrac­
tions of this special admission procedure is that it is 
extra-judicial in its operation. Massachusetts judges 
have encouraged use of the device for the express pur­
pose of relieving themselves of a part of the administra­
tive burden in connection with interrogatories. A Boston 
judge instructed the members of the bar who practiced 
before him that he would not allow interrogatories in the 
event the same result could be obtained by notices to 
admit. The following quotation from Kekewich, J., indi­
cates the use of the procedure in England and its relation 
to other pre-trial devices : ' ' The modern practice of 
exacting particulars and admission of facts not really 
in dispute, added to the large means of discovery by dis­
closure of documents and, where occasion requires it, 
inspection of premises or machinery, has rendered un­
necessary and inconvenient interrogatories of the ancient 
type which were always open to objection. My practice 
is to decline applications for leave to administer inter-
194 . 
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rogatories where the object is to demand admission of 
fact alleged by the interrogating party, and denied or not 
admitted by the opponent, or to obtain information which 
may equally well be supplied by particulars. As regards 
admissions of fact, it is often urged, as it was here, that 
a litigant will hestitate to state on oath what he will 
without hesitation state in pleadings, and that there is 
difficulty in otherwise obtaining admission of facts, even 
though not really in dispute ; and it is further urged that 
an admission by an affidavit in answer to interrogatories 
is useful in limiting the issues to be tried, and therefore 
in reducing the time occupied by the trial and the costs. 
I recognize the importance of this in the abstract ; but 
practically I find that the interrogated party seldom 
makes such clean admissions as secure the advantages 
aimed at, and, failing that, little if anything is gained. 
As regards facts not really in dispute, I believe that the 
power of requiring admissions is not sufficiently used. 
If parties insist, as they generally do, on asking 'their 
opponents to admit facts, dates and events about which 
there is room for doubt or argument, of course the en­
deavor to obtain admissions breaks down ; but if the 
demand is limited to facts not really in dispute, that is, 
which can be admitted cleanly, or subject to some simple 
qualifications, I find that it is generally acceded to, and 
the power which the court has of throwing the costs on 
any one who has increased them by declining reasonable 
admissions is not forgotten. ' '  1 
The notice to admit facts is employed in England, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey and 
Wisconsin. The English provision is as follows : 
' ' Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not 
later than nine days before the day for which notice of 
trial has been given, call on any other party to admit, 
for the pull>oses of the cause, matter, or issue only; any 
1 Clarke v. Clarke (1899) 34 w. N. 130, 131. 
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specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in 
�se of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six 
days after service of such notice, or within such further 
time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the costs 
of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party 
so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the 
cause, matter, or issue may be, unless at the trial or hear­
ing the court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit 
was reasonable, or unless the court or a judge shall at 
any time otherwise order or direct. Provided, that any 
admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be 
deemed to be made only for the purposes of the partic­
ular cause, matter, or issue, and not as an admission to 
be used against the party on any other occasion or in 
favour of any person other than the party giving the 
notice : provided also, that the court or a judge may at 
any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any 
admission so made on such terms as may be just. ' '  2 
The Massachusetts statute is as follows : 
' ' In any action at law or suit in equity a party by 
written notice filed in the clerk's office and served by copy 
on the other party or his attorney, not less than ten days 
before the trial of the action or suit, may call upon the 
other party to admit, for the purposes of the case only, 
any material fact or facts or the execution of any mate­
rial paper or document which he intends to use at the 
trial. The court may delay the trial until such notice 
is answered and on motion before trial may strike out of · 
such notice or any answer filed in response thereto any 
matter which is irrelevant, immaterial or improperly in­
cluded therein. If no answer is filed in the clerk 's office 
within ten days after the filing therein of said notice or 
within such further time as the court may on motion 
allow, the truth of the fact or facts or the execution of 
th� paper .or document shall, for the purposes of the case, 
be held to be admitted. Suc11 notice, in so ·far as· it 
2 Annual Prac. (1932) order 32, rule 4. 
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relates to a material fact or document, and any answer 
filed in response thereto shall, if offered by the party 
who filed such notice, be admitted in evidence. If the 
party upon whom such notice is served refuses to admit 
any fact or the execution of any paper or document men­
tioned in the notice, the reasonable expense of proving 
such fact or the execution of such paper or document, as 
determined after summary hearing by the justice pre­
siding at the trial, shall, unless the justice certifies that 
the refusal to admit was reasonable, be paid by said 
party to the other party and the amount thereof shall be 
added to the taxable costs of the party in whose favor 
such amount is awarded or deducted from the amount of 
any judgment. or decree against him. ' '  8 
The new Michigan Court Rules make the following 
provision for admission of facts : 
' 'Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than 
ten days before the trial, may call on any other party to 
admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue 
only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. 
In case of refusal or. neglect · to admit the same within 
four days afte!i service of such notice, or within such 
further time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, 
the expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts, in­
cluding a reasonable counsel fee for the time and atten- · 
tion devoted thereto, must be ascertained at the trial 
and paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, what­
eve� the result of the cause, matter or issue may be, 
unless at the trial or hearing, the court or a judge certify 
that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the 
court or a judge, at any time, shall order or direct other­
wise. Any admission made in pursuance of such notice 
is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the 
particular cause, matter or issue, and not as an admis­
sion to be use� against the party on any other occasion 
or .in favor of any person other than the party giving 
a Mass. Clim. Stats. (1927) ch, 231, see. 69. 
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the notice. The court or a judge, at any time, may allow 
any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made 
on such terms as may be just. " 4 
The New York Civil Practice Act provides that : 
' 'Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than 
ten days before the trial, may call on any other party 
to admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue 
only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. 
In case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within 
six days after service of such notice, or within such fur­
ther time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the 
expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts must be 
ascertained at the trial and paid by the party so neglect­
ing or refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter 
or issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court 
or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was reason­
able, or unless the court or a judge, at any time, shall 
order or direct otherwise. Any admission made in pur­
suance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only 
for the purposes of the particular cause, matter or issue, 
and not as an admission to be used against the party on 
any other occasion or in favor of any person other than 
the party giving the notice. The court or a judge, at 
any time, may allow any party to amend or withdraw any 
admission so made on such terms as may be just. ' '  6 
The New Jersey statute is as follows : 
' 'Any party may call upon any other party, by written 
notice, to admit (but only for the purposes of the cause) ,  
the existence, due execution, signing or  mailing of any 
document ; and to admit .any other specific facts relevant 
to the issue mentioned in the notice. In case of refusal 
or neglect to make such admission within such time as 
may be fixed by rules or special order, the reasonable 
expense of proving the same (to be taxed by the court) 
shall be paid by the party so notified, whatever the result 
4 Mieh. Court Rules (1931> rule 42, sec. 2. I New York Civil Practice Aet, sec. 323. 
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of the trial may be, unless the trial judge shall certify 
that the neglect or refusal was reasonable. But the court 
may allow any party to amend or withdraw such admis-
sion on terms. ' '  8 
· 
The Wisconsin statute is as follows : 
' 'Any party to an action may, by notice in writing de­
livered not later than ten days before the trial, call upon 
any other party within five days after receiving the 
notice, to admit or deny under oath, or to state under 
oath what the fact is, according to the best of his knowl­
edge, information and belief with regard to, or to state 
under oath that he has no knowledge or information suf­
ficient to form a belief with regard to : (a) The existence, 
due execution, correctness, validity, signing, sending or 
receiving of any document, or, (b) The correctness of 
any specific fact or facts material in the action and stated 
in the notice. 
' ' Such admission if made shall be taken as conclusive 
evidence against the party making it, but only for that 
particular action and in favor of the party giving the 
notice ; it shall not be used against him in any other 
action or proceeding or on any other occasion, and shall 
not be received in evidence in any other action or trial. 
"If the party receiving such notice fails to comply 
therewith within the time specified, the facts therein 
stated shall be taken to be admitted. 
' ' In case of refusal to make such admission, the rea­
sonable expense of proving any fact or document men­
tioned in the notice shall be paid by the party so notified 
in any event, unless the court is satisfied the refusal was 
reasonable·. 
· 
' ' The court may allow the party making any such 
admission to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as 
may be just, and may, for good cause shown, relieve a 
party from the consequences of a default. ' '  7 
8 N. J. Laws (1912) ch. 231, sec. 18. 
7 Wis. Stat. (1927) ch. 327, sec. 22; see proposed amendments in Re· 
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The notice to admit facts is required to be served at 
least nine days before the day set for trial in England, 
and at least ten days in Massachusetts, New York and 
Wisconsin. The New Jersey statute does not specify 
the time within which the notice must be served. The 
usual rule is that the notice may be served informally by 
counsel upon opposing counsel. Recently the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Court has required that notices to 
admit be served by an officer of the court.8 This ruling 
has proved decidedly unpopular with the bar, for as the 
Massachusetts Judicial Council has said, '.' This inter­
pretation reverses the practice of thirteen years and ap­
pears to require the unusual method of notifying the 
attorney of the other side by an officer. The new inter­
pretation of the statute has caused much confusion and 
uncertainty and involves the additional expense of serv­
ice in making use of a statute which was intended to 
. reduce expense. ' '  9 
One of the most troublesome points in the actual use 
of the procedure concerns the type of fact which is the 
proper subject of a request to admit. Is it intended that 
a party may call upon his adversary to admit detailed 
· items of evidence, about which there is room for argu­
ment and doubt, or is it intended that notices to admit 
shall include only items which are either true or false 1 
The different jurisdictions exhibit a variety of practice 
in this regard. 
The following excerpt from the opinion of Kekewick, 
J., indicates that the problem has been encountered in 
England and that no definite rule has been reached : 
' ' If parties insist as they generally do, on asking their 
opponents to admit facts, dates and events about which 
there is room for doubt or argument, of course the en-
port of Advisory Committee on Rules to the Supreme Court (1930) 
item 19. 
s Boston Morris Plan Co. v. Barrett (1930) 272 Mass. 487, 172 N. E. 
603. 
9 Sixth Report (1931) p. 14; 
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deavor to obtain admissions breaks down ; but if the 
demand is limited to facts not really in dispute1 that is, 
which can be admitted cleanly, or subject to some sim­
ple qualifications, I find that it 'is generally acceded to 
• • •  " 10 
The New York court has criticized the practice of 
covering the whole field of evidence under notices to 
admit : " In the present case we have what probably is 
to date the most comprehensive notice and demand made 
under section 323� This notice covers 115 folios, and 
contains 226 separately numbered paragraphs. It ap­
parently covers to a great extent the field of the defend­
ant 's proof. To allow all these demands would be call­
ing upon the plaintiff to prove his adversary's case, to 
disprove his own, and at the same time to payt all the 
expense. Some of the demands, if allowed, would call 
upon plaintiff to go to trouble and expense to acquire 
the knowledge to admit facts that are peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the defendant itself ; some call for what, 
insofar as the papers before me show, is purely opinion 
evidence, or evidence that would be inadmissible at the 
trial. Others of the demands call for what, for want of 
a better term, we shall call half a fact, which standing 
alone, might have to the court or jury an entirely differ­
ent meaning than if the whole fact were presented. ' '  11 
Some Wisconsin lawyers are using the device in ex­
actly the same fashion which the New York court has 
criticized. They call upon their opponents to admit 
practically every item of evidence. Several cases were 
found in which as many as one hundred specific admis­
sions had been requested. The chief use of admission 
procedure in such a form is as a tactical weapon, rather 
than as a means of eliminating undisputed items of proof. 
Thus far, however, the Wisconsin courts have not con­
demned the practice. 
10 Clarke v. Clarke (1899) 34 W. N. 130, 131. 
11 Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Portalis & Co. (1922) 
195 N. Y. S. 24. 
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The following ' two forms indicate the practice which 
is contemplated in England and in Massachusetts. The 
model English form is as follows : 
"Take notice that the plaintiff (or defendant) in this cause 
requires the defendant (or plaintiff) to admit, for the pur­
poses of this cause only, the several facts respectively here­
under specified ; and the defendant (or plaintiff) is hereby re­
quired, within six days from the service of this notice, to · ad­
mit the said several facts, saving all just exceptions to the 
admissibility of such facts as evidence in this cause. 
Dated, &c. 
G. H., solicitor (or agent) for the plaintiff (or defendant) .  
To E. F., solicitor (or agent) for the defendant (or plaintiff) .  
The facts, the admission of which is required, are-
1. That John Smith died on the 1st of January, 1890. 
2. That he died intestate. 
3. That James Smith was his only lawful son. 
4. That Julius Smith died on the 1st of April, 1896. 
5. That Julius Smith never was married. ' '  11 
The following excerpt from the record of a Massa­
chusetts case indicates the form of the statement of the 
facts of which an admission is requested : 
" (1)  That on June 23, 1930, the defendant was the owner 
of a motor vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Regis-
tration No . . . . . . .  . 
(2) That on June 23, 1930, a certain motor vehicle bearing 
Mass. Motor Vehicle Registration No . . . . . . . . was registered 
in the name of the defendant. 
(3) That on June 23, 1930, a motor vehicle bearing Massa­
chusetts Motor Vehicle Registration No . . . . . . . .  stood in the 
name of the defendant. 
( 4) That on June 23, 1930, J. L. D.-was in the employ of 
the defendant. 
(5) That on June 23, 1930, at about 4 :30 P. M. a motor 
vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Registration 
No . . . . . . . .  was being operated by J. L. D. 
(6) That on June 23, 1930, at about 4 :30 P. M. a motor 
vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Registration 
11 Annual Prae. (1930) Appendix B, form 12. 
No . . . . . . . .  was operated by an employee of 
'
the defendant in 
the course of his employment. ' '  18 
The statutes provide that the party who is served with 
a notice to admit facts must either admit or refuse to 
admit them within a certain time after the notice is 
served. The time requirement varies : in England and 
New York it is six days ; in Massachusetts, ten days ; and 
in Wisconsin and New Jersey, five days. Orily Wis­
consin requires that the admission be made under oath. 
The form of admission which is used in England is as 
follows : 
"The defendant (or plaintiff) in this cause only, hereby 
admits the several facts respectively hereunder specified, sub­
ject to the qualifications or limitations, if any, hereunder speci­
fied, saving all just exceptions to the admissibility of such 
facts, or any of them, as evidence in this cause. 
' 'Provided that this admission is made for the purposes (If 
this action only, .and is not an admission to be used ag�t 
the defendant (or plaintiff) on any other occasion, or by any­
one other than the plaintiff (or defendant, or party requiring 
the admission) .  
Delivered, &c. 
" E .  F., solicitor (or agent) for the defendant (or plaintiff) .  
" To G. H., solicitor (or agent) for the plaintiff (or defend­
ant) . "  
Qualifications o r  Limitations, 
Facts Admitted if Any, Subject to Which 
They Are Admitted 
1. That John Smith died on 1. 
the 1st of January, 1870. 
2. That he died intestate. 2. 
3.  That James Smith was his 3. But not that he was his 
lawful son. only lawful son. 
4. That Julius Smith died. 4. But '"llot that he died on 
That Juli� Smith never 
the 1st of April, 1896. 
5. 5. 
was married. 
18 Su1folk Superior Court Record No. 249952. 
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England, New York and New Jersey provide that 
where the adverse party neither admits nor refuses to 
admit within the prescribed time, such action shall consti­
tute a refusal to admit. Massachusetts and Wisconsin, 
on the contrary, provide that a failure to either admit 
or deny shall be treated as an admission. Thus a fail­
ure to admit is more drastically penalized than a refusal 
to admit. 
The statutes uniformly provide that the reasonable 
cost of proving a fact, an admission of which is unjustly 
refused, shall be taxed against the party making the 
refusal, regardless of the outcome of the trial. The trial 
judge is supposed to decide summarily (1 )  whether the 
refusal to admit was reasonable and justifiable, and (2)  
what cost shall be  allowed. 
' 
' ) The question has arisen in England and in New York 
as to whether a party may apply to the trial court for 
��lief when he thinks he has been served with an im­'
, · 'proper notice to admit. The English practice is indi-
,
' 
cated by the following excerpt from an opinion by Field, 
J. : " I  cannot strike out proceedings, unless there is ex­
press power to do so. There is a specific power given 
by the Rules to strike out interrogatories and pleadings ; 
there is no power given to strike out a notice such as 
this. On the contrary a remedy is provided by the rule, 
which makes such an application unnecessary ; namely, 
that the notice can be left unanswered. If the refusal to 
admit is reasonable, the party so refusing will suffer 
nothing from the notice having been served upon him. ' '  14 
It has been held in New York that the only appropriate 
and allowable motions in connection with demands to 
admit are : ( 1 )  for an extension of time ; ( 2 )  for per­
mission to amend or withdraw an admission.16 There 
was an indication at first that applications to strike no-
14 Crawford v. Chorley (1883) 18 W. N. 198. 
16 Colonial Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. (1923) 199 
N. Y. S. 854. 
. 
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tices -to admit might be entertained.16 Later, however, 
this position was expressly repudiated, on the ground 
that it would cast too great a buMen on the trial judges, 
and on the further ground that a party has sufficient 
protection if he waits until the trial and presents the 
facts in support of his contention that the refusal to ad­
mit was reasonable.17 
Under the English practice it is possible for the party 
to add certain limitations and qualifications to the ad­
missions which he makes. The -Supreme Court of New 
York County, on the contrary, has held that a qualified 
admission is no admission and may be treated as a re­
fusal to admit.18 The Wisconsin statute gives the party 
the right to admit, deny, or " state what the fact is. " 
This innovation has not proved satisfactory. Sometimes 
a party is served with a notice to admit facts which cover 
practically all of the evidence of the case. He, in turn, 
instead of admitting or denying, takes advantage of his 
right to ' ' state what the fact is ' '  and seeks to evade in 
a mass of word!il. The fact that the answer must be un­
der oath encourages such a practice. The result is that 
the answer is even more voluminous than the a:lready 
lengthy notice to admit.19 
Lawyers in New York, Wisconsin and Massachusetts 
say that the procedure is not used by the bar as a whole 
but thai some lawyers have found it very helpful. The 
following are typical instances of effective and legitimate 
use which various lawyers say they have made of the 
device : (1)  in a case involving a shipment by express, 
16 Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Portalis & Co. (1922) 
195 N. Y. S. 24. 
17 Banca Nazionale di Credito v. Equitable Trust Co. ( 1927) 224 N. 
Y. S. 611. 
18 Corr v. Hoffman (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 65. _ 19 The Advisory Committee on Rules to the Supreme Court has rec­
ommended that the two features which have caused this trouble be 
eliminated, namely, the allowance that the party state what the fact 
is, and the requirement that he make his answer under oath. Report 
(1930), item 19. Of. Bulletin . XIV of the American Judicature Society, 
p. 153. 
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to prove that certain routine inspections were made at. 
each stop between Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Rochester, 
New York ; ( 2 )  to prove a municipal ordinance ; ( 3) to 
prove that a certain highway on which an accident had 
occurred was a public highway ; (4) to prove the owner­
ship of a certain automobile ; (5)  to prove an employer­
employee relationship. A member of the Wisconsm 
bar has related still another effective type of use in 
an address before the Board of Circuit Judges of Wis­
consin in 1927 : ' 'Almost immediately after its publica­
tion, I saw a very effective use of this statute. An action 
had been brought on a contract in which the defendant 
had agreed to indemnify the plaintiff against failure of 
title to certain lands covered by a mortgage sold to the 
plaintiff. The mortgagor had made an entry under the 
homestead laws ; but had died before the time when he 
would have been entitled to a patent. It was alleged in 
the complaint that his sole heir was a minor son. It was 
alleged in the answer that his heirs were a brother and 
a sister, that a patent had subsequently been issued to 
the heirs and that these heirs were ready to confirm the 
lien of the mortgage. That a minor could not do. The 
plaintiff had been endeavoring to locate the former wife 
of the mortgagor ; and finally succeeded in doing so in 
one of the Pacific states. The defendant 's attorneys 
were immediately so advised and called upon to admit the 
fact and told that the demand was made with the inten­
tion of asking the imposition on the defendant of the 
entire expense of proving the fact if the demand were not 
complied with. Within forty-eight hours, they replied 
stating that they were ready to sign a . stipulation as to 
the fact. This left in the case no substantial issue ex­
cept that of damages ;  and an agreement on the subject 
of damages was arrived at and the case was disposed of 
without trial. If it weTe not for the fact that this 
remedy was thus open; the plaintiff would have been 
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compelled to employ counsel, to instruct them, to have 
them communicate with the witness and to prepare for 
the taking of the deposition, to issue a notice and to for­
ward instructions to the officer before whom the deposi­
tion was to be taken and, in addition, to pay the fees of 
the officer and of the witness. Under this statute, the 
plaintiff whether successful in the action or not, would 
have been entitled to an order allowing to him the entire 
expense, including a reasonable allowance for the serv­
ices of his attorneys and their corresponding counsel. ' '  110 
NOTICE TO ADMIT EXECUTION OR GENUINENESS OF 
DocuMENTS 
England,111 and some twenty of the United States 118 
have statutes or rules allowing a party to call upon his 
adversary for an admission of the execution or the gen­
uineness of writings. This differs from the notice to 
admit facts only to the extent that documents, and not 
facts generally, are the subject of the admission. 
The following statutory provisions in England, New 
York and Michigan, respectively, are representative of 
those in the various jurisdictions. The English provi­
sion is : 
" Either party may call upon the other party to admit 
any document,• saving all just exceptions ; and in case of 
10 Hardgrove, Reduction of Trial Issues Under Wisconsin Practice, 
Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges (1927) 35, 47. In 
this address Mr. Hardgrove pointed out a number of othE!r possible 
uses for the procedure. 
Ill Annual Prae. (1930) Order 32. 
II Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) see. 5776, Rules Under the .Practice Act, 
rule 9, see. 233; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (1927) see. 4554; Kans. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923), eh. 60, art. 2840; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) eh. 92, 
see. 122; Mass. Ge:q.. Laws (1921), eh. 231, see. 69; Mich. Court Rules 
(1931) rule 42; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) see. 1379 ; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) 
see. 8901; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 2097; N. Mex. Ann. Stat. (1915) 
see. 4218; New York Civ. Prae. Act, see. 322 ; N. C. Cons. Stat. 
(1919) see. 1825; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), see. 7860; Ohio Gen. 
Code (Throckmorton, 1926) see. 11550; S. C. Code (1922), see. 691; S. D. 
Rev. Code (1919) see. 2711; U. S. Equity Rule 58; Utah Comp. Laws 
(1917), see. 7178; Wis. Stat. (1927) eh. 327, see. 22 ; Wyo. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. (1920) see. 5854. 
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refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs 
of proving any such document shall he paid by the party 
so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the 
cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing 
the court or a judge shall certify that the refusal to 
admit was reasonable ; and no costs of proving any 
document shall be allowed unless such notice be given, 
except where the omission to give the notice is, in the 
opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense. ' '  
The New York provision is : 
" The attorney for a party, at any time before the 
trial, may exhibit to the attorney for the adverse party, 
a paper material to the action and request a written 
admission of its genuineness. If the admission is not 
given within four days after the request, and the paper 
is proved or admitted on the trial, the expenses incurred 
by the party exhibiting it in order to prove its genuine­
ness must be ascertained at the trial and paid by the 
party refusing the admission, whatever the result of the 
cause, matter or issue may be ; unless it appears to the 
satisfaction of the court that there was a good reason 
for the refusal. ' '  
The Michigan provision is : 
' ' Either party may exhibit to the other or to his attor­
ney at any time before the trial, any paper material to 
the action, and request an admission in writing of its 
. genuineness. If the adverse party or his attorney fail 
to give the admission within four days after the re­
quest, and the delivery to him of a copy thereof, if such 
copy be · required, and if the party exhibiting the paper 
be afterward required to prove its genuineness, and the 
same be finally proved or admitted on the trial, thtl ex­
pense of proving the same, including a reasonable coun­
sel fee for the time and attention devoted thereto, to be 
ascertained and summarily taxed at the trial, shall be 
paid by the party refusing the admission, unless it shall 
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appear to the satisfaction of the court that there were 
good reasons for the refusal, and an attachment or exe­
cution may be granted to enforce payment of such ex­
pense. ' '  
The party who desires admissions, or his attorney, 
should exhibit to his adversary or his attorney the paper 
or document and request a written admission of its gen­
uineness. In case of unjust refusal or neglect to so ad­
mit the costs of proof fall on the party so refusing or 
neglecting. 
The following form is provided for admission of docu­
ments in England : 88 
NoTICE TO ADMIT DocuMENTS 
In the High Court of Justice 
Division 
, Between A. B., Plaintiff 
and 
C. D., E. F., and G. H., Defendants. 
Take notice that the plaintiff ( or defendant ) in this cause 
proposes to adduce in evidence the several documents here­
under specified, and that the same may be inspected by the 
defendant ( or plaintiff) ,  his solicitor or agent, at . . . . . . . .  , 
on . . . . . . . .  , between the hours of . . . . . . . .  ; and the defend-
ant ( or plaintiff) is hereby required, within forty-eight hours 
from the last mentioned hours, to admit that s�ch of the said 
documents as are specified to be originals were respectively 
written, signed, or executed, as they purport respectively to 
have been ; that such as are specified as copies are true copies ; 
and such documents as are stated to have been served, sent, or 
delivered, were so served, sent, or delivered respectively ; saving 
all just exceptions to the admissibility of all such documents 
as evidence in this cause. 
Dated &c. (Signed) 
G. H., solicitor ( or agent) for plaintiff ( or defendant ) 
To E. F., solicitor ( or agent) for defendant ( or plaintiff) . 
88 See Annual Prac. ( 1930) Appendix B, form 11. 
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( Here describe the documents, the manner of doing which may 
be as follows :) 
ORIGINALS 
Description of Documents 
Deed of covenant between A. B. and C. D. 
first part and E. F. second part. 
Indenture of lease from A. B. to C. D. 
Indenture of release between A. B. and 
C. D. first part, &c. 
Letter-defendant to plaintiff. 
Policy of insurance on goods by ship ' '  Isa­
bella " on voyage from Oporto to London 
Memorandum of agreement between C. D., 
captain of said ship, and E. F. 
Bill of exchange for £100 at three months 
drawn by A. B .  on and accepted by C. D., 










Description of Documents Dates 
Original or Duplicate 
Served, Sent or Deliv­
ered When, How and 
Register of baptism of A. B. 
in parish of X Jan. 1 
Letter-plaintiff to defend-
ant Feb. 1 
Notice to produce papers Mar. 1 
Record of a judgment of the Trinity 
Court of Queen 's Bench, Term, lOth 
in an action F. S. v. F. N. Viet. 
Letters patent of King 
Charles II in the Rolls Jan. 1, 
Chapel · 1680 
by Whom 
Sent by general post, 
February 2, 19-
Served Mar. 2, 19- on 
defendant 's attorney 
by E. F. of 
CHAPTER XXIV 
USE OF DISCOVERY IN PREPARATION OF TRIAL 
BRIEF 
A division of labor is effected in many law firms so 
that much of the work of preparing for trial is done by 
men other than those who conduct the actual trial. 
Younger members of the staff do most of the preparation 
for trial and the older and more experienced members 
handle the trial proper. The former compile what is 
known as a trial brief. Such a brief usually contains an 
analysis of the pleadings and issues of the case, memo­
randa of the relevant points of law, statemente� from wit-
- nesses, list of the papers and documents which will be 
introduced, suggested questions to be asked during the 
examination of the witnesses and drafts of such motions 
and instructions as may become necessary. The trial 
lawyer then uses this brief as a basis for conducting the 
case. Often the clerk who has prepared the particular 
brief accompanies his senior to court and aids him there. 
This serves the additional purpose of giving the clerk 
an opportunity to see how well his work measures up to 
the needs of the occasion and to get some little trial 
experience. 
Procedure for discovery fits in well with the system 
which is thus employed in law offices. It affords means 
of preparation which are quite necessary in the compila­
tion of a trial brief. The very fact that the adverse 
party can be examined is in itself a great help. The 
record of the examination forms an excellent basis for 
cross-examination at the trial. Many lawyers take an 
adverse examination and then rearrange and rephrase 
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the questions in such a fashion as to make the trial cross­
examination more effective and more businesslike. N ec­
essary documentary evidence in the possession of the 
adverse party can be obtained and arranged so that de­
lay and confusion at the trial may be avoided. There is 
also provided a means of compelling statements from 
witnesses who refuse to give them voluntarily and a 
, means of preserving the testimony of important wit­
nesses against the contingency of death or removal. 
Even law firms and individual lawyers who do not 
employ an elaborate trial brief system have found that 
discovery examinations furnish an excellent basis of 
preparation for trial. The following statement from an 
active trial lawyer in a large city in the middle west is 
representative of the way in which such an examination 
can be used : "When a case is called for trial I ask that 
the file record of the case be brought to me. Decidedly 
the most enlightening part and the part which will give 
me an insight into the case in a hurried fashion is the 
adverse party 's deposition. Without it I would have 
difficulty in effecting any intelligent sort of handling of 
the case. ' '  
The trial brief system offers a possible way by which 
disclosure of the principal points of a controversy and 
of the principal items of evidence can be made known 
prior to the trial. At least one federal judge requires 
the lawyer on each side to furnish him before trial with 
a short statement of the issues, what it is proposed to 
prove and the principal items of evidence which will be 
adduced. This enables the judge to get a fairly accurate 
knowledge of the character of the case and affords him 
a more intelligent basis upon which to decide questions 
which may arise at the trial. Suggestions have been 
made at various times that lawyers for the plaintiff and 
defendant exchange trial briefs prior to the trial as well 
as furnish them to the court. Quite early Jeremy Bent-
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ham proposed what he termed "An anticipative survey 
of the budget of evidence on both ·sides. ' '  1 Recently a 
visiting French lawyer, Pierre le Paulle, the delegate of 
· the French Society of Comparat,lve Law to the American 
Bar Association, suggested that there _should be some 
device to require ' ' the parties to prescribe by writing . 
before the trial the facts they want to prove by wit­
nesses," and " oblige the lawyers to communicate the 
written evidence they have to their colleagues on the 
other side. " 11 Similar proposals have been to the effect 
that each party be required to file a trial brief, setting 
forth the facts which would be proved by the witnesses. 
The object of such a brief, of course, would be to en­
lighten both the court and the adverse party and to guar­
antee preparation for trial upon the part of each lawyer. 
The most recent form of this sugg�stion is represented 
by the following bill which was recently proposed in the 
California Legislature : 
' ' In every civil action, within ten days after issues of 
fact are joined, plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the 
court, without service, a statement of issues and wit­
nesses, with affidavits of all witnesses to be used by plain­
tiff at the trial with as many copies of each as there are 
defendants. Said statement shall recite in brief num­
bered paragraphs what plaintiff considers to be the prin­
cipal issues of fact, with the names under each issue of 
the witnesses by whom plaintiff expects to prove such 
issue. Within thirty days after issues of fact are joined, 
each defendant shall file a like statement of issues and 
witnesses, and affidavits of all witnesses to be used by 
defendants at the trial, with as many copies of each as 
there are plaintiffs. 
1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (Bowring 's Ed.) vol. 7, 
p. 368. Cf. a similar proposal by Lord Denman, Arnould 's Life of Lord 
Denman, I, 210. 
2 LePaulle, Administration of Justice in the United States, 4 Docket 
3192. 
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' ' Said affidavits shall state in brief numbered para­
graphs the principal facts known to such witness relevant 
to the said issues, including the date and parties to all 
documents and writings relevant thereto known to the 
witness. 
' ' The clerk shall treat all such statements and affidavits 
as confidential and not permit examination of any of 
them until all are filed ; after which time he shall, as soon 
as convenient, furnish to each party a copy of the state­
ments and affidavits filed by his opponent. 
' 'Persons having knowledge of facts, documents and/ or 
writings relevant to the said issues, shall, upon request 
of and upon reasonable notice by a party or his attorney, 
make affidavit thereto. A party or his attorney may, in 
case of need, compel the attendance of such a witness 
before such party or attorney or a notary public, by sub­
poena at. a time and place appointed, to then and there 
make said affidavit. 
"Upon receipt of such copies of statement and affi­
davit, or affidavits, it shall be the duty of each party to 
the action to earnestly and actively seek a satisfactory 
settlement with the other party or parties thereto, to the 
end that a trial may be avoided. If it is not possible 
after diligent effort to settle the controversy in whole 
or in part, the questions of fact remaining in controversy 
may be tried, and any party to the action may move to 
set the action for trial. No motion to set for trial may 
be made until after all such statements and affidavits 
have been exchanged by the clerk, and said efforts to 
settle have been made and proven unsuccessful, and said 
facts are shown to the court. 
' ' Thereafter, the court shall compare statements and 
affidavits in reference to the issues remaining in con­
troversy, and designate the portions thereof considered 
by the court to be important in determining said issues. 
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' 'At the trial the court shall require the testimony of 
witnesses to be directed especially to the designated im­
portant facts relating to the issues upon which the wit­
nesses appear by their affidavits or testimony to dis­
agree. Unless for good cause sho.wn, a witness shall not 
be permitted to testify unless the said affidavit of said 
witness as described in section 597 has been previously 
filed and copy furnished, nor shall a witness be permitted 
to testify to important facts not contained in said affi­
davit. Upon good cause appearing however, any such 
witness may be permitted to testify, upon such terms and 
conditions, and under such circumstances as the court 
may determine to be just. ' '  .8 
8 4 Southern Cal. L. Rev. 193. 
CHAPTER XXV 
USE OF DISCOVERY IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PRACTICE 
Summary judgment procedure is a device by which 
judgment may be entered summarily for the plaintiff in 
certain types of actions, on motion setting forth his de­
mand and his belief that there is no defense to it, unless 
the defendant shows that he has a bona :fide defense. 
The procedure has great usefulness in actions for a debt 
or Ilquidated demand in money. 'Its chief virtue is its 
effectiveness in securing speedy justice for creditors. 
It has long been an established feature of English prac­
tice and its popularity with the bar of this country is 
increasing rapidly. The usefulness of the device in Eng­
land is indicated by the fact that in the year 1930, 5,535 
summary judgments were rendered in the King's Bench 
Division of the High Court of Justice, while only 1,226 
judgments after trial were entered.1 Similarly, in 1929, 
summary judgments outnumbered judgments after trial 
to the extent of 4,409 to 1,310.1 The Ontario summary 
judgment procedure likewise is extensively used. In five 
hundred consecutive case records which were analyzed in 
Toronto, cases in which summary judgment was re­
quested outnumbered other cases in the ratio of approxi­
mately three to two. There was no contest by the defend­
ant in the great majority of the former cases and judg­
ment was granted forthwith. Use of summary judg­
ment procedure has become increasingly extensive in 
New York. The provision took effect October 1, 1921. 
1 Civll Judicial Ste.tisties for England and Wales (1930) p. 16. l id. 
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Only 11 motions for summary judgment were brought 
during the three months remaining in 1921. In 1922 
there were 174 motions ; in 192� there were 447 ; and in · 
1924 there were approximately 700.8 Summary judg­
ment procedure is proving popular with the MiQhigan 
bar. During the eight months· from August 1, 1930 to 
March 31, 1931, 526 applications for summary judg­
ments were made in the circuit court for Wayne County 
(Detroit),  Michigan. Of these applications 409 were 
granted and 1,17 refused. During the same period of time 
there were 633 jury trials, and 1201 non-jury trials.' 
These various statistics indicate that summary judgment 
procedure affords a remedy for congested court cal­
endars and delay in the .  triBJ of cases. 
A way has been suggested by which summary judg­
ment procedure can be made even more effective than it 
is at present. The American Judicature Society has sug­
gested that discovery examinations be employed as a 
means of ascertaining whether the defendant has a bona 
fide defense. 'Several jurisdictions already allow a lim­
ited use of discovery as an aid to summary practice. 
The procedure recommended by the American Judicature 
Society would allow the plaintiff, as soon as the defend­
ant has filed his defense or notice of defense, to move for 
judgment upon discovery. The court would then order 
an examination of the defendant for discovery and upon 
the basis of the examination decide whether summary 
judgment should be rendered.5 The procedure for sum­
mary judgment which is now in use in England and in 
several American jurisdictions is in effect a judgment 
upon discovery. 6 Under this practice in England the 
8 Boesel, Summary Judgment, Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board 
of Circuit Judges (1926) p. 27. 
, ' These figures were obtained from statistics furnished the Judicial 
Council of Michigan by the clerk of the Circuit Court for Wayne County. 
& Am. Jud. Soc., Rules of Civ. Pro. (1919) art. 23. 
6 A
.
nnual. Pr�ctice (1929), ,  ot:der" s1 rul� 6; �rd,er, 14t rylle 1; N• ,-:Y• �:ules !>�, Ci,v. Prae., :.;Uie HS; .Rules �'f N'ew ,Jersey �ullreme Court; l'liles 
S0-84, found in 2 Mise. 1225; Michigan Court ltutes (1931) iuie M. 
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creditor, instead of going through all the formalities of 
pleading, specially endorses the summons with a descrip­
tion of the debt, and files an affidavit made by himself, or 
any other person who can swear positively to the facts, 
verifying the claim and stating the belief that there is no 
defense. It is then up to the defendant to satisfy the 
judge by affidavit, by his own oral evidence, or otherwise, 
that he has a good defense to the action on the merits, 
or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to 
entitle him to defend. If he does not do so judgment is 
rendered against him.7 The practice in the United States 
is somewhat different, the case proceeding as any ordi­
nary action up until the time the answer is filed. After 
that the procedure is substantially similar to that used 
in England. Some American statutes have provided less 
effective procedures, whereby judgment is rendered un­
less the defendant files an affidavit of merits.8 
While the present form of summary judgment in most 
jurisdictions is a judgment upon disclosure, just as that 
advocated by the American Judicature Society is a judg­
ment upon disclosure, the two procedures differ in the 
means of effecting the disclosure. Under the present 
practice the disclosure is effected by affidavits, or by oral 
proof before the court. Under the scheme suggested the 
disclosure would be effected by an examination for dis­
covery. The latter should prove a more thorough means 
of eliciting the truth. The chief trouble with the present 
American summary judgment procedures, especially 
those which merely require the defendant to file an affi­
davit of merits1 is that they do not necessarily disclose 
7 Annual Practice (1929), order 3, rule 6; order 14, rule 1. For the 
practical operation and efficiency of this procedure see: Sunderland, An 
Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 Mich. L. Rev., 109, . 111 ; Report of 
Robert G. Dodge on Certain Features of English Practice for the Massa­
chusetts Judicial Council, 11 Mass. L. Q. 671 70; Stringer, The A. B. C. 
Guide to Practice, 186; Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 
38 Yale L. Jour. 423. 
8 See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L. Jour. 
423, for a det!J,iled s.urvey of ail of thE\ jurisdietiQM, 
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whether or not there is a real defense. This defect would 
be remedied by a more thorough method of examining 
the defendant. 
Several jurisdictions have allowed a greater use of 
discovery in connection with summary practice. The 
first American summary judgment procedure, that which 
was adopted in South Carolina about 1800 and which was 
a conspicuous feature of South Carolina judicature until 
the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1870, em­
ployed a method of obtaining discovery in connectiop 
therewith. One of the rules of court for the successful 
administration of the summary judgment provided: " If  
the plaintiff in an action by summary process shall desire 
to have the benefit of the defendant 's oath, he shall state, 
in writing, the points to which he shall require his oath, 
and serve him with a copy thereof, with notice of such 
intention, at least one day before the hearing of the 
cause ; and the defendant may either give his answer in 
writing, to be sworn to before the clerk, or ore tenus in 
open court ; and if a defendant shall desire the benefit of 
the plaintiff's oath, he shall proceed to require it in the 
same manner. ' ', 9 
Discovery is used in connection with summary prac­
tice in Ontario. In specified types of actions where a 
debt or liquidat\)d demand in money is the subject of the 
action the plaintiff may specially endorse the originating 
summons with a statement of his claim. Contrary to the 
English practice there is no need for the plaintiff to file 
an affidavit stating that in his belief the defendant has 
no just defense. No complaint was found among Ontario 
practitioners to this innovation. They say that the pre­
sumption should always be against the defendant in ac­
tions to which summary procedure is applicable. The 
9 Cited by Professor Millar in his, Three American Ventures in Sum­
mary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L. Jour. 193, 199. Professor Millar is 
· unstinted in his praise of this procedure and, in particular, of the 
discovery feature of it. 
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defendant is required to file an affidavit that he has a 
good defense upon the merits and showing the nature of 
the defense together with the facts and circumstances 
which he deems entitle him to defend.10 The plaintiff is 
allowed to cross-examine as to its contents. Often plain­
tiff examines the defendant before a special examiner in 
the same mode as if for discovery. Sometimes there is a 
stipulation between parties that the one examination 
shall serve for discovery also should the defendant be 
allowed to defend the action and summary judgment be 
refused. This connection between discovery generally 
and summary judgment has proved very effective. The 
principle is adhered to that the examination as for dis­
covery in aid of summary procedure is for the sole pur­
pose of further probing the defendant as to whether he 
has any real defense to the action. 
Under the Indiana practi�e a party is allowed to use 
the evidence obtained by discovery as the basis for a 
motion to strike the pleading of an opposite party on the 
ground that it is sham, false, frivolous, or intended for 
delay.U - However, discovery by written interrogatories 
only, and not discovery by an oral examination is so 
usable. The latter expedient has been declared unavail­
able simply as a matter of statutory construction and 
without regard to questions of policy.18 The practice 
would seem especially useful in actions for liquidated 
sums, as for instance actions on promissory notes, 18 but 
it can be used in other actions as well.14 It furnishes a 
convenient weapon with which to attack a general de-
10 Rules 33, 56. See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 
38 Yale L. Jour. 423, 436 for a good description of the Ontario practice. 
11 Ann. Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 409. 
18 Stars v. Hammersmith (1903) 31 Ind. App. 610, 67 N. E. 554. 
18 Lowe v. Thompson (1882) 86 Ind. 503; Hollander v. Fletcher (1916) 
62 Ind. App. 149, 112 N. E. 847. 
lt Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Fraze (1898) 150 Ind. 576, 50 N. E. 576 
(action for damages for personal injury) ; Tilden v. Louisville Company 
(1901) 157 Ind. 532, 62 N. E. 31 (action for damages . for personal in· 
jury) ; Jones v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 328, 163 N. E. 260 (election con· 
teat case). · 
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nial.15 The court will strike the pleading as sham only 
when it is clear that there is no defense. It is not suffi­
cient simply to elicit answers tending to show that the 
pleading is false, for the court will construe all doubts 
in favor of the pleader.18 The latent possibilities of this 
procedure are ignored by many Irtdiana lawyers. Some 
lawyers said they had never known a pleading to be 
stricken on the ground that it was sham. There is, how­
ever, a use of interrogatories to anticipate and prevent 
the effect of a sham pleading. By this use it is possible 
to avoid the effect of an unverified general denial. A 
few questions of the following character are attached to 
the petition in debt collection actions for the purpose of 
encouraging allowance of judgment by default : 
1. What merchandise, if any, has been sold by plain­
tiff to you, or any one for you, at your request up to the 
present time sine Y 
2. What merchandise, if any, has been delivered by 
plaintiff to you, or anyone for you, at your request up 
to the present time sine Y 
3. What, if anything, was the cost price to you for 
merchandise, if any, that has been sold and delivered by 
plaintiff to you or anyone for you, at your request, up to 
the present time sine 7 
4. How much, if anything, have you paid to plaintiff 
up to the present time since Y 
5. How much, if anything, is ,now due and owing by 
you to plaintiff Y 
6. What, if any, allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
are incorrect T 
The practical advantages of this expedient are that : 
if the defendant answers the questions honestly and fully, 
it may be the means of getting what is virtually summary 
judgment ; if the defendant answers evasively or answers 
. 15 Jones v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 328, 163 N. E. 260. 
18 Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Fraze (1898) 150 Ind. 576, 50 N. E. 576; 
Atkinson v. Wabash R. Co. (1895) 143 Ind. 501, 41 N. E. 947. 
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that he does not know, it may be the means of limiting 
his proof at the trial ; and if the defendant does not 
answer at all, a practice which the filing of questions 
encourages, judgment as by default may be had. There 
is an especial need in Indiana ·of some scheme of this 
sort, to discourage the filing of unverified general de­
nials for the mere purpose of obtaining a delay. Inas­
much as the answer to interrogatories must be under 
oath, it is possible to avoid the effect of the unverified 
general denial in two respects, by getting a specification 
of the basis of the denial and that under oath. 
A few Ohio lawyers make an effective use of discovery, 
both by deposition and written interrogatories, as an aid 
to summary collection in actions for liquidated amounts, 
and more particularly account actions. The practice is to 
either take the defendant 's deposition or annex interrog­
atories for him to answer, and then to use the information 
obtained as the basis for a motion to strike his answer 
as sham.17 Such tactics are effective in that they often 
discourage the defendant from filing an answer. 
The new Michigan Court Rules provide for the use of 
depositions as well as affidavits as a means of disclosing 
the absence of real issues of fact in connection with mo­
tions for summary judgment.18 
While New York has a summary judgment practice 
which is rather extensively used and which requires the 
defendant "by affidavit or other proof" to show that he 
is entitled to defend, it is not possible to use discovery 
in connection with this practice. The reason is that dis­
covery is generally limited to the case of the party appli­
cant whereas the subject of examination in summary pro­
ceedings would be the case of the opposing party. 
A member of the New York City bar made the follow­
ing suggestion before the New York State Bar As so-
1'7 See White v. Calhoun (1911) 83 0. S. 401, 94 N. E. 743; Butterick 
Pub. Co. v. Smith (1925) 112 0. S. 73, 146 N. E. 898. 
18 Michigan Court Rules (1931) rule 30, sees. 6-7, 
SuMMARY JuDGMENT 223 
ciation in 1916 : "Now the result (of liberal discovery 
before trial) is this : the very fact that evidence will be 
disclosed speedily by those having a knowledge of the 
facts, acts as a deterrent upon the litigant who would put 
in a false pleading. It is notice to him in a way that 
prosecution for perjury is impending. If you combine 
those provisions for obtaining evidence and summary re­
lief • • • I dare say you would come to the end of 
your litigation in most cases, not in five years, but in five 
months. ' '  19 
The decisions as to the constitutionality of summary 
judgment practice in general indicate the extent to which 
discovery could be used as an aid to the procedure. In 
upholding the constitutionality of the summary practice 
employed in the District of Columbia, the United States 
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna, 
has said : ' ' There is but one element in this contention­
the right of a jury trial. In pl).ssing upon it we do not 
think it necessary to follow the details in counsel 's 
elaborate argument. • • • If it were true that the rule 
deprived the plaintiff in error of the right of trial by 
jury, we should pronounce it void without reference to 
I 
cases. But it does not do so. It prescribes the means 
of making an issue. The issue made as prescribed, the 
right of trial by jury accrues. The purpose of the rule is 
to preserve the court from frivolous defenses and to de­
feat attempts to use formal pleading as a means to delay 
the recovery of just demands. ' '  20 
The Massachusetts experience in regard to constitu­
tional problems arising in connection with summary pro­
cedure may throw some light as to the extent to which 
ordinary discovery procedure can be used as an adjunct 
of summ�ry practice. In 1925 the Judicial Council 's first 
report, after according high praise to the English sum-
19 Report of N. Y. Bar Ass'n (1916) p. 403. 20 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 315, 319. 
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mary practice, stated : ' ' The constitutional right to a 
trial by jury prevents the adoption of the English system 
under which the court or master may make an absolute 
order for summary judgment after hearing instead of 
merely advancing the case for speedy trial as is done 
here. " 111 In their second report, however, the Council 
changed its stand on the matter. This report stated : 
"We believe that the legislation should go further than 
the proposed Act which we drafted a year ago. While 
the. constitutional right to a jury trial sets a limit to the 
power of the legislature it seems clear that the right does 
not exist unless the court can be satisfied that there is a 
real issue of fact to be tried. ' '  And after setting forth 
the New York case of General Investment Company v. 
Interborough Rapid Transit Company 118 as one of the 
reasons for changing its stand the Council further stated : 
" It is' plain that it would be within the constitutional 
power of the legislature to provi<:fe that in an action to 
recover a debt, where the plaintiff by affidavit verifies 
his cause of action and asserts that there is no defense, 
the defendant must do more than merely claim a trial 
by jury to become entitled to a jury trial and that he 
must by affidavit or otherwise satisfy the court that 
there is a bona fide dispute involving a substantial ques­
tion of fact, the decision of which in his favor would 
establish a defense. We are led by these considerations 
to go further than we did a year ago and to recommend 
legislation providing for the entry of judgment forth­
with, if the defendant fails to satisfy the court that there 
is a real question of fact to be tried. • • • ' '  88 An opin­
ion rendered by Rugg, C. J., which also influenced the 
Judicial Council, defines more definitely the limits upon 
the use of discovery in connection with summary pro­
cedure : " Great preponderance of the apparent weight 
11 Page 33. 
II (1923) 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216. 
18 Pages 45, 46. 
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of testimony will not warrant a denial of trial by jury 
provided there is seemingly enough to require a sub­
mission of the case to the jury under the familiar prin­
ciples. • • • Doubtless it would be within the province 
of the court under the rule to require the parties to state 
the substance of the evidence which each expected to offer 
at the trial, and to ascertain whether there was upon such 
a statement any disputed question of fact to be found 
either directly or by inference ; and also in appropriate 
instances to frame questions, answers to which would 
settle such disputed fact or facts; Of course great care 
must be exercised in the use of this power and the fullest 
opportunity given to parties to · make a complete state­
ment with the knowledge that it is to be made the basis 
of a ruling of law upon the rights of the parties. But 
there is no fundamental objection to a ruling of law made 
upon a fair statement of what the evidence is expected 
to be. " 114 
There was an unusual handicap to the constitutionality 
of summary procedure in New York due to the fact that 
in 1871 it ha,d been held that a verified answer, even 
though it interposed only the general issue and could be 
shown to be absolutely false, could not be stricken out as 
sham pleading.115 This led to the widespread belief among 
the bar that summary judgment would be unconstitu­
tionaJ.II8 But the New York Court of Appeals, when the 
matter was actually presented, in the famous test case 
which upheld the constitutionality of summary judg­
ment procedure under the Civil Practice Act, said : ' ' The 
argument that rule 113 infringes upon the right of trial 
by jury guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be sus-
114 Farnham v. Lenox Motor Car Co. (1918) 229 Mass. 478, 482, 118 
N. E. 874. 
116 This case and the cases following it are given in Report of N. Y. 
State Bar Ass'n (1916) p. 404. 
118 Cf. Discussion before New York State Bar Association in 1916, in 
the report mentioned in preceding note, at pages 305, 402, 404. See also 
Pogson, Truth in Pleadings, 8 N. Y. Univ. L. Quar. Rev. 41. 
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tained. The rule in question is siinply one regulating and 
prescribing procedure, whereby the court may summarily 
determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists be­
tween the parties to the action. A determination by the 
court that such issue is presented requires the denial of 
an application for summary judgment ·and trial of the 
issue by jury at the election of either party. On the 
other hand, if the pleadings and affidavits of plaintiff 
disclose that no defense exists to the cause of action, and 
a defendant, as in the instant case, fails to controvert 
such evidence and establish by affidavit or proof that it 
has a real defense and should be permitted to defend, 
the court may determine that no issue triable by jury 
exists between the parties and grant summary judg­
ment. ' '  17 
It �s clear from these decisions that the viewpoint 
which safeguards the conf?titutionality of any summary 
judgment procedure is that the judge merely decides 
whether there is any bona fide defense, rather than that 
he determines the merit of any defense which is sufficient 
to raise an issue. Is this viewpoint any more jeopardized 
by requiring the disclosure to be made by a deposition 
taken upon an adverse examination than it is by requir­
ing such disclosure to be made by affidavit T Indeed, does 
not such an examination come the nearer of the two to 
meeting the desiderata outlined by Judge Rugg, supra, 
that the ' ' fullest opportunity be given to the parties to 
make a complete statement ' '  T 
1'7 General Investment Co. v. Interlxlrough R. T. Co. (1923) 235 N. Y. 
133, 142, 139 N. E. 216. 
CHAPTER XXVI 
., 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PRE-TRIAL PRACTICE 
It has been said that ' ' a  disputed matter of fact or law 
or of both, cannot be resolved into simple, ultimate ques­
tions of the merits of a controversy by any system of pro­
cedure which leaves the formulation of these issues to 
the adversaries themselves. ' '  1 Two methods of judicial · 
control of the pre-trial stage of litigation have been em­
ployed under modern English procedure. These meth­
ods are known as settlement of issues and summons for 
directions. The purpose of both is· to give the court a 
greater part in the formulation of the issues to be tried 
and in shaping the subsequent course of the action. 
Variations of the English practice have been attempted, 
but without especial success, in New York and in . New 
Jersey. . 
Procedure fQr settling issues was first employed in 
Scotland and later introduced in a modified form into 
English practice. In Scotland there is first a simple 
pleading procedure aided by an auxiliary which is strik­
ingly similar to the old positional procedure. The action 
is commenced by a summons which discloses only the 
general nature of the action.• Then the plaintiff files 
what is called a condescendence but which is in fact noth­
ing more than charges of evidence or detailed allegations 
of fact to .which he desires the defendant 's personal an­
swer .8 The defendant may pursue a like course as to 
1 Kocourek, The Formula Procedure of Roman Law, 8 Va. L. Rev. 337, 
338. 
li Balfour, Handbook of Court of Session Practice, p. 23; :Maclaren, 
Court of Session Practice, 356. 
l id. 
227 
228 DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 
any affirmative defense which he has. After this stage 
is completed, together with all pleas in law, the record 
is closed and a procedure is then in order with which we 
are especially concerned here, namely, the settlement of 
issues. Each party lodges the issues proposed by 
himself, and then the parties and the judge get together 
and decide on the issues which shall go to the jury. The 
issue is nothing more nor less than a succinct statement 
of the question the jury are desired to answer .4 ' ' Thus, 
in an action of damages for personal injury, " as Balfour 
explains, " it may take the form whether on or about 
(date) ,  and at or near (place) the pursuer (plaintiff) was 
injured in his person through the fault of the defender 
to his loss, injury and damage. Damages laid at • • • . ' '  
Similarly, "In an action for reduction of a will on the 
ground of incapacity it may be 'whether the pretended 
will, is not the deed of the late A. B. ? '  ' ' 5 
A variation of the Scottish practice has been intro­
duced in England under the following rule of court : 
"Where in any cause or matter it appears to the court 
or a judge that the issues of fact in dispute are not 
sufficiently defined, the parties may be directed to pre­
pare issues, and such issues shall, if the parties differ, be 
settled by the court or a judge. ' '  6 A famous English 
judge said that it was always his practice to get counsel 
to agree at the beginning of a trial as to the issues of 
fact to be tried.7 This provision merely moves up the 
time for such an agreement. Other British jurisdictions 
employ a similar plan. In Manitoba the judge, if he 
thinks the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues 
of fact, may make ' ' an order defining and setting forth 
the issues between the parties. ' '  8 The court rule in 
4 Id. 
I ii  d. 
6 Annual Practice (1929) order 33. . 
7 Jessel, M •. R,1 in Lowe -r• Lo�e ( 1876) 10 C. D .. 432. 8 Alits relating to Court of King's Bench (1914) 844. 
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Victoria is similar to the English one except that it has 
an additional provision which appears feasible, namely, 
any party may at any stage of the cause apply to the 
court for a direction to have issues prepared, and all of 
the parties, their solicitors, and other persons may be 
examined viva voce and all documents which may be 
necessary to the inquiry may be required to be produced 
for inspection.9 Other British states have enacted the 
English rules without any vital change.10 
Lord Denman advocated the adoption of the principle 
which was basis of the settlement of issues procedure, but 
he urged that it be adopted in a different form which 
has come to be known as the summons for directions. · 
Said he : ' 'After the action is commenced measures 
should be at once taken for affording to the litigants a 
pause for consideration, and opportunities for adjust­
ment. The way ought to be cleared for a fair trial of the 
real point at issue, if tried it must be. A judge at cham­
bers, or some similar authority, should bring the parties 
together, and require from both reasonable admissions, 
which ought to be preserved and handed forward for 
subsequent use • in the progress of the cause. " 11 It was 
through the influence of Lord Shand, of the English Rule 
Committee, that this principle was actually enacted into 
a rule of court in 1881. The procedure adopted )Vas first 
known as the ' ' omnibus summons' '  and is now known 
as the " summons for directions. "  
A summons of directions is an official document which 
notifies the parties to appear before a master at an ap­
pointed time so that he can get the parties together and 
with their aid shape the future course of the litigation. 
9 Victoria Court Rules (1916), order 33, rule 1 A. 10 Alberta Rules of Court (1914, as amended to 1923) ,  224; British 
Columbia Court Rules (1925), order 33; New Brunswick Judicature Act 
and Rules of Court (1909) order 33 ; Newfoundlan,!l Cons. Stat. (1,918), 
787 ; Saskatchewan Cons. Orders and Rules of the Court of King's Beneh 
(1921), ordet 24. 
11 Arnouid ;s Life of Loro Denman, I, 201. 
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It is compulsory that it be applied for in practically every 
case, and at the hearing an order may be made covering 






6. Inspection of documents 
7. Inspection of real or personal property 
8. Commissions 
9. Examination of witnesses 
10. Place of trial 
11. Mode of trial 
12. Related matters 18 
This procedure has been appropriately called the 
"traffic officer "  of English litigation.18 It is framed 
upon the two simple principles that the easiest way to 
find out the facts is to get the parties together for that 
purpose, and that the court, through an authorized offi­
cer, should at any early stage of the litigation obtain a 
measure of control over the suit, and supervise the pro­
ceedings. 
The device is more neede<l in England than in jurisdic­
tions which employ an oral examination for discovery. 
Indeed the procedure is used in the administration of the 
general scheme of discovery by written interrogatories 
and, by bringing the parties together, it supplies some 
of the advantages which would be attendant upon an oral 
examination. Lawyers in states which have an oral 
examination for discovery have not deemed this device 
necessary. William E. Fisher, a member of the Wis-
18 Annual Practice (1930), order 30. 
18 An equally apt phrase was used by the late Chief Justice Taft in 
describing such procedure before an English master: " He knocked the 
heads . of the parties togethet' so that a clear · issue between them was 
quickly reached." 
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consin bar who studied the English procedure at first 
hand at the request of the Wisconsin State Bar Asso­
ciation, makes this significant remark : " We have many 
machines in our exhibit of pleading and practice that are 
superior to any existing elsewhere, including England. 
Of first importance in my opinion in this category, is 
section 4096 (the provision for an oral examination for 
discovery) • • •. You have often heard of the work of 
the English masters in eliminating upnecessary matters, 
and narrowing the issues before trial. The superiority 
of this work of the masters over the systems in vogue in 
the American states is largely because the other states f 
have no provision similar to section 4096. ' '  14 Similarly 
Mr. Justice Middleton, who for many years has been 
regarded as a leading Ontario authority on matters of 
practice, has said : ' ' The summons for directions which 
has been adopted in the English practice has not com­
mended itself to me. ' '  
A majority of the American lawyers who have visited 
English courts and watched in a more or less casual way 
the actual operation of the procedure before a master 
on a summons for directions have .come back with high 
praise for it. They have seen the externalities of the 
practice-the sgeed with which the master despatches 
the hearings, the businesslike attitude of the lawyers, 
the number of cases handled-and they have marvelled.15 
A number of attempts have been made to introduce the 
summons for directions into the New York practice. The 
Commission on the Law's Delays in 1904 recommended 
the adoption of a practice similar to the English Sum-
li Reports of Wisconsin State Bar Association, vol. 15, p. 178. 
15 See the following representative reports: Boesel, Wisconsin St. Bar 
Ass'n Reports, vol. 15, p. 165; Dodge, in 11 Mass. L. Q. 69; Higgins, 
English Courts and Procedure, 7 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 185 ;  ·Leaming, 
Masters : The Time Savers; 5 Mass. L. Q. 250; Loring, Procedure in 
English High Court of Justice, 8 A. B. A. J. 609; Sunderland, An Ap­
praisal of English Procedure, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 109, 115; Taft, Possible 
and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the Federal 
Courts, Reports of American Bar Ass 'n, vol. 47, pages 250, 264. 
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mons for Directions.16 The Commission made its recom­
mendation after correspondence with leading English 
judges and lawyers.17 The chief reason that the proposal 
was defeated in the legislature was that it was accom­
panied by a bill providing for a body of standing and 
salaried commissioners to take the part of the English 
masters.18 In the years ·which intervened before the ap­
pearance of the report of the Board of Statutory Con­
solidation in 1915 leaders of the bar continued to stress 
the importance of this procedural device. Characteristic 
statements as to the effectiveness of the similar English 
practice made before the New York ' State Bar Associa­
tion during this period are : 
(1 )  " They (the English rules ) have been framed on 
the theory that the sooner the litigants are brought face 
to face and compelled to disclose to each other the 
strength or weakness of their respective lines of attack 
or defense, the more expeditiously and thoroughly will 
justice be done between them. ' '  19 
(2 )  " These masters sit in London on every business 
day and dispose each of about three hundred cases a 
week. Generally all the preliminaries up to the time of 
trial are under their control. The proceedings before 
the master are exceedingly simple and informal. He sits 
behind an office table in his room, and the solicitors or 
counsel who appear before him state their motions and 
argue their points in a conversational way. " 80 
(3)  " The master accepts the statements of the par­
ties or their solicitors or counsel as to the nature of the 
action, the proposed line of defense, and the assistance 
they respectively need to enable them properly to prepare 
for trial. ' ' 11 
16 Of. Reports of N. Y. State Bar Ass'n (1911) p. 59 ff. 
1'7 Of. Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n (1917) p. 133. 
18 N. Y. State Bar Ass'n Report (1912) page 238. 
19 Elbridge L. Adams, of the New York Bar, in Reports of New York 
State Bar Association (1908) p. 64. 
10 Id. at pp. 65, 66. 
11 Id. at p. 69. 
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( 4 )  ' ' I  venture to say that there is not a judge on 
the bench, or a lawyer at the bar, who, in ten minutes 
informal talk with the two lawyers in the case, • • • 
would not know more clearly and correctly what inter­
locutory relief should be accorded parties than he would 
know from the perusal of realms of affidavits. ' '  11 
It is no wonder, therefore, that by 1917 a member of 
the bar of the City of New York was able to say : ' ' Our 
Bar Associations in this city are all committed to the 
summons for directions. The judges are all in favor of 
it in this department. ' '  18 In 1909 the Special Committee 
of the Bar of the City of New York sponsored a bill in 
the legislature which would have inaugurated such a 
practice, but after it had passed both houses of the legis­
lature it was vetoed by the governor.•• Finally in 1911, 
however, a modified form of the English practice was 
enacted in the form of an ' ' Omnibus Motion. ' '  111 It was 
optional as to whether the parties used this procedure, 
and not compulsory as in England. It seems that the 
New York bar made little or no use of the device. 
Just at the time when it seemed that this agitation 
would be fruitful in introducing a more elaborate provi­
sion into the New York Civil Practice Act, Samuel Rosen­
baum, who had made a detailed special study of English 
civil procedure, read a paper before the New York State 
Bar Association in which he severely criticized the Eng­
lish practice. �aid Mr. Rosenbaum : "I note with a 
great deal of interest that a large number of New York 
lawyers seem to favor the procedural step commonly 
called an omnibus summons or summons for directions. 
There has been discussion about that. Always the term 
has been mentioned as though it offered some relief from 
Ill Joseph M. Proskauer of the New York Bar in Report of the N. Y. 
State Bar Ass 'n (1912) p. 230. 
ll8 Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass'n (1917) p. 133. 
lit Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n (1911) p. 416. 
llli N. Y. Laws of 1911, ch. 763. 
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present defects in procedure. That surprised me a great 
deal, because the summons for directions, although, of 
course, it is a part of the English procedure at present 
is a most unsatisfactory part of that procedure, and is 
generally admitted to be a complete failure from the 
point of view of improving procedure, and I think you 
will pardon me for bringing to your attention a view 
which should be considered on account of the agitation 
concerning it in the New York practice. 
' ' The reason for the adoption of that summons in 
England was not so much an effort to simplify procedure, 
but principally a desire to get away from the high cost 
of pleadings in the English practice. As you, of course, 
know there are solicitors and barristers in the English 
courts, and the practice is that solicitors never draft 
pleadings, but always retain counsel for drafting plead­
ings, no matter how small they are, so that right at the 
outset of a case the client is confronted with the expense 
of retaining not only a solicitor but also a barrister. 
Furthermore, under the English practice, every pleading 
over seven hundred twenty words has to be printed and 
every figure is counted as a word, and you have that 
expense. Added to that is the wretched system in the 
English courts for itemizing costs, by which every little 
step is separately charged for. Lord Bramwell charac­
terized it as the ' apothecary's bill ' system of itemizing 
costs. There is a separate fee for the solicitor for giving 
instructions for the statement of claim, then one for the 
barrister for drawing up the statement of claim, a sepa­
rate fee for reading the proof when it comes from the 
printer, possibly a separate fee for conferring with the 
barrister for drawing up the statement of claim, always 
another for delivering it, and before very long the client 
finds he has run up a bill of fifteen or twenty dollars just 
to deliver a statement of claim. As a consequence of a 
popular out-cry against . this, some effort has been made 
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to require upon the commencement of an action, that 
every action should come before an officer, who would 
determine whether the delivery of pleadings was neces­
sary in that case. Now, while that may be very well in 
theory, in practice it has not worked well at all. The 
intention was to give the counsel or solicitor the right 
to appear before one of the masters of the court and lay 
before him in an informal way the facts of the case and 
then obtain from him general instructions as to the con­
duct of the case ; • • • whether or not pleadings should 
be filed, whether there should be discovery or not ; jury 
or nonjury trial ; where the trial should take place ; 
whether interrogatories should be administered or not, 
etc. The fact is when the writ is issued the solicitor 
knows little or nothing about the case, about the details, 
and the order is always made in a purely formal manner. 
The master is not told about the case, because the solic­
itors do not know anything about it themselves. 
' ' A  great deal of thought should be given before the 
summons for directions is inserted in the New York pro­
cedure, where it may not be doing any good. Mr. Justice 
Chitty, who is, perhaps, the greatest living authority on 
English civil procedure, says at present in the great ma­
jority of cases it is a useless expense. Testifying before 
the 1913 Royal Commission on Delay in the King 's Bench 
Division, he said : 
' '  ' At present, in the great majority of cases, it is a 
useless expense, 
'
and not an improvement on the system it 
displaced. The idea of the summons for directions is 
excellent, but in practice it fails, because as a rule neither 
of the representatives of the parties attending it knows 
anything about the nature of the requirements of the 
action in which it is taken out. It comes to this, if I 
might explain it : A summons is taken out and comes 
before the master. It is a document which leaves blanks 
to be filled in for the time at which the pleadings are to be 
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delivered and various other steps taken. In a great many 
cases you turn to the plaintiff's solicitor or representa­
tive and he says, ' ' This is a country case. ' '  You say, 
" What is it about ? "  He says, "I  do not know; the writ 
says it is an action for breach of contract. ' '  ' ' Cannot you 
tell me something about it ? "  "No, that is all I know ; I 
have only had it up this morning. " Then you turn to the 
defendant 's solicitor or representative and you say, 
"What is the defense to the action T "  He says, "I  do not 
know ; I do not even know what the claim is yet. " Of 
course all you have to do in that state of things is to fill 
in the number and say that the plaintiff must deliver his 
claim in so many days, and the defendant his defense in 
so many days and the plaintiff his reply in so many days ; 
and then there must be discovery, because it is no use for 
you to ask the parties whether they want discovery ; they 
do not know. 
' '  ' Then you have to fix the mode and place of trial. 
At one time we used to leave it over until we knew some­
thing more about what the action was going to be, but 
owing to Order LIV, Rule 32, which was made some little 
time ago, it was considered compulsory upon us to fix 
the mode and place of trial in the first instance. That 
having to be done without any information you look at 
where the parties live and put in where the parties live, 
and if either of the parties ask for a jury you put in 
" jury" so that in this state of things all the master can 
do is to order pleadings and discovery and fix the mode 
and place of trial. All this might as well be done by a 
rule applicable to all cases, which would save the costs 
of the summons in each case. ' 
' 'Another prominent witness before the same com­
mission was Lord Justice Phillimore, who said of the 
order made under a summons for directions : 
' '  ' Wh.en you have drawn up that order, all you have 
done is to draw up an order that the case be conducted as 
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the rules say it shall be. You have established nothing. 
You have left the skeleton exactly where it was before. 
The only thing that has been done is, you have saved 
some stamps from the revenue because future applica­
tions can be made without a summons stamp. If you 
want interrogatories, you have to have a fresh summons ; 
if you do not want trial by jury, you have to have a fresh 
summons ; if you want to shift the venue from the place 
originally named, because nobody knows where it was to 
be, you have to have a fresh summons. In nine cases out 
of ten you do not get anything decided by the summons 
for directions, except that the case shall be tried accord­
ing to the rules. ' 
" Finally I shall quote Mr. Justice Middleton, of 
Toronto, the draftsman of the 1913 Revised Rules of the 
High Court of Ontario. In the preface to the rules he 
says : 
" ' The summons for directions which has been adopted 
in the English practice has not commended itself to me. 
Iri practice in England it appears not to have accom­
plished that which was hoped from it. No doubt if coun­
sel of ability, fa�iliar with the details of the particular 
case, appear before an experienced judge and discuss the 
procedure in the particular case, the result ought to be 
satisfactory ; but the actual result is far otherwise when 
the factors are different ; and in practice it has been 
found that in most instances a stereotyped form of order 
is used which follows the general provisions found in the 
rules. ' 
" In a contributed article in the Law Times (133 L. T. 
565) ,  it is said : ' The compulsory summons for direc­
tions, from which certain judges hoped for so much, has 
proved very ineffective, and is deemed by all barristers 
in large practice with whom I have discussed it to per­
form the same functions as the fifth wheel of a coach. 
One has only to read the orders made on these sum-
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mouses to see that they are all of a stereotyped character 
and in the majority of cases wholly unnecessary. ' The 
editorial comment on this is : ' It is quite difficult to see 
what useful purpose the summons for direction has 
served, and in the vast majority of cases it is wholly 
unnecessary. ' 
" These objections were foreseen from the beginning. 
At the time the summons was first invented in 1882, it 
was caricatured by a contemporary writer as 'this won­
derful summons, requiring from the master the sagacity 
and prescience of Mr. Micawber at once to see and pre­
scribe for all contingencies up to trial. ' ' ' 86 
New Jersey only, among American jurisdictions, has 
any procedure similar to the English summons for direc­
tions at the present time. The New Jersey Practice Act, 
which contains several innovations from the English 
practice, has provided an adaptation of the English Sum­
mons for Directions. The New Jersey procedure is 
called ' 'Preliminary Reference. ' '  ll'7 The idea, of course, 
is to relieve the trial judge of the necessity of hearing 
matters preliminary to trial and interlocutory matters 
generally, by placing a part of this burden on commis­
sioners.  But in contrast to the English system, the use 
of the device is not mandatory. An outline of the prac-
86 Report of New York State Bar Ass 'n (1917), vol. 40, pp. 121-126; 
Mr. Rosenbaum has expressed a similar opinion in his book, The Rule­
making Authority in the English Supreme Court, pp. 144, 259: " Un­
fortunately the summons as administered is not fulfilling the purposes 
for which it was intended. The intention was that some idea of the 
nature of the case should be imparted to the master upon the first hear­
ing so that his order could be molded to fit the requirements of each 
particular case. The fact is, however, that the solicitors ' clerks who 
appear before the master when the summons is first heard usually know 
little or nothing about the case, and the order made is almost always in 
common form : pleadings by each side in so many days, mutual discovery, 
trial in London with or without a jury, and ' leave to apply. ' "  "In 
his (MORter T. Willes Chitty) testimony before the 1913 Royal Commis­
sion on Delay in the King's Bench Division, he laid much stress upon 
the failure of the Rules on summons�s for directions to complement 
properly the Rules on proceedings under such summonses. " 
ll'7 Supreme Court Rule 80, found in 2 Misc. 1225; Supreme Court 
Rules 92-95, found in 2 Misc. 1231; Chancery Rules 176-180, found in 
1 Misc. 797. 
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tice is as follows : at any time after service of the com­
plaint either party may take out a summons approxi­
mately like the following : 
John Doe 
v. Commissioner's Summons 
Richard Roe 
To Richard Roe, Defendant : 
On motion of plaintiff you are notified that on the lOth day 
of January, instant at 10 o 'clock A. M., at my office, No. 10, 
. . . . . . . . street, Trenton, I will hear any motion that may be 
made by either party in the above stated cause respecting the 
pleadings, issues, evidence or any other matter preliminary to, 
and in preparation for trial ; and will make such order respect­
ing the same as the parties respectively may be entitled to. 
Dated January 4, 1912 . 
. 
Supreme Court Commissioner 
After the parties have appeared and been heard the com­
missioner may make an appropriate order as to any one 
or more of these items : Pleadings, issues, particulars, 
admissions, interrogatories, or discovery of documents.88 
The possibilities of this device have been almost entirely 
neglected by the bar. Instead the supreme court judges 
still hear the practice motions at special motion hours 
and find relief fr0m their excessive burdens by distribut­
ing some of the trial work among the district court 
judges, as well as some preliminary matters incidental 
thereto.89 Perhaps the device may yet be utilized, for in 
1929 the Committee on Law Reform of the State Bar 
Association recommended the ' ' appointment of six ade­
quately paid Supreme Court Commissioners to act under 
sec. 17 of the 1912 supplement to the Practice Act, that 
is to say, to take care of all practice motions and matters 
88 There is a full discussion of this procedure in the Report of the 
Board of Statutory Consolidation of New York (1915), I, 109, 205, 350. 
89 N. J. Laws of 1926, p. 103; Rule of Supreme Court, as amended in 
1�29, found in 7 Misc. 1134. 
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preliminary to trial, thus relieving the Supreme Court 
judges of this work, which is somewhat a burden to them, 
and which because of the pressure of their other work 
does not receive adequate judicial attention. ' '  80 
One of the most striking features of the new German 
procedure is a provision for a preliminary hearing as a 
means of preparing the cause for decision by the court. 
It is not entirely unlike the English summons for direc­
tions. It was adopted in 1924 as a method of economiz­
ing judicial labor. A preliminary hearing may be held 
before an associate judge. The power and practice of 
the associate judge at the hearing is as follows : " He 
attempts, first of all, to bring about a conciliation ; he 
decides the issue of law or fact arising upon most kinds 
of dilatory exceptions where these are not reserved for 
determination with the merits ; he renders judgment in 
case of withdrawal of the action, renunciation of the 
claim or confession of the action, as also in case of de­
fault on the part of one of the parties, or under certain 
circumstances, on the part of both. He is explicitly 
charged with the duty of bringing about a discussion of 
the cause in all of its aspects and of seeing that it is so 
far forwarded as to admit of disposition, where feasible, 
at a single hearing before the collegial court. ' ' 81 Similar 
expedients have been adopted in Italy and in Austria.82 
80 N. J. State Bar Ass'n Year Book (1928-29) page 63. 
81 Millar, The Reeent Reforms in German Civil Procedure, 10 A. B. A. 
Jour. 703, 705. 
U ld. 
CHAPTER XXVII 
ADVANTAGES IN COMBINING DISCOVERY WITH 
PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY 
A number of American jurisdictions have combined 
the methods for discovering and preserving testimony 
into a single deposition procedure. General principles 
of policy would seem to favor such a combination. It is 
sound policy to consolidate previously separated devices 
which are related in their origins and functions. The 
end of reform is simplification. True reform does not 
confuse-:-it integrates, it synthesises, it leads back to 
:first principles. Lawyers are already sufficiently ac­
quainted with the procedure for taking depositions to 
insure its orderly operation from the start if it is used 
for purposes of discovery. Use of deposition procedure 
eliminates the necessity for an elaborate and detailed 
statutory prov�sion for discovery. Statutory provisions 
for interlocutory practice should be both concise and 
simple in order that the occasion for appeals may be 
reduced and in order that the actual practice may be 
worked out in accordance with considerations of adminis­
trative facility rather than in obedience to pre-arranged 
technicalities. By making the right to take depositions 
unconditional liberal means of discovering as well as 
preserving testimony is provided. 
The combination of discovery and preservation of 
testimony has proved expedient from the standpoint of 
the detailed incidents of practice which are involved. 
Practically all of the problems which have arisen in con­
nection with discovery procedure have been more easily 
solved under the ordinary deposition statutes than under 
241 
242 DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 
elaborate statutory provisions dealing with discovery as 
such. 
Discovery is available in all types of actions in states 
in which a combination of discovery and preservation of 
testimony has been effected. This is a more salutary rule 
than the one which obtains in New York, for instance, 
which limits discovery in certain types of actions. If 
discovery is abused in certain types of actions, the rem­
edy seems to be in keeping the record of the examination 
secret rather than in curtailing the right to discovery. 
The problem as to the persons from whom discovery 
should be allowed is easily handled under the ordinary 
deposition procedure. Such a solution has the several 
advantages over the elaborate statutory provisions which 
obtain in New York, Wisconsin and elsewhere. By 
elimination of complex statutory provisions, the occasion 
for appeals is lessened. The statute need only provide 
that depositions may be taken, without further specifica­
tion. This eliminates the necessity of determining who 
is a party for purposes of discovery, because depositions 
of parties and witnesses alike may be taken. It elim­
inates the several problems as to who is examinable on 
behalf of a corporation by allowing the examination of 
any representative as a mere witness, with the question 
as to the use of the examination against the corporation 
being reserved for the trial. This is already the direction 
· of development under . several of the special discovery 
statutes. It allows discovery from witnesses as well as 
from parties. There are sufficient inhibitions upon the 
use of the process in this regard to prevent its abuse, and 
yet not enough to prevent its use in a proper case, name­
ly, when an important witness refuses to give a voluntary 
statement. Finally, such a provision makes discovery 
equally available to the plaintiff and to the defendant. 
The ordinary deposition procedure offers the most 
expedient solution of the problem as to whether dis-
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covery before pleading should be allowed. It usually 
allows the defendant such discovery as of right, but re­
quires that the plaintiff file some sort of pleading as a 
guaranty of his bona fides. By filing a skeleton pleading, 
taking depositions, and then amending, the plaintiff in 
reality obtains discovery before pleading. This process 
works satisfactorily enough in the states wherein it is 
employed. It has not been the subject of the numerous 
appeals which have attended the provisions in New York 
and Wisconsin which allow examinations for the purpose 
of enabling a party to plead, yet it accomplishes virtually 
the same purpose. 
A primary requisite to the usefulness of any pro­
cedural device is that the lawyers know the details of the 
procedure. This is true of the particular item of dis­
covery. If elaborate details are provided by statute it 
takes some time for the bar generally to become ac­
quainted with them. Already most lawyers have an 
adequate knowledge of the procedural details incident to 
the taking of depositions. The experience of the states 
in which this regular deposition procedure has been used 
for discovery purposes is that the practitioners soon 
learn to vary certain details and to ignore others in such 
a fashion as to accommodate the procedure to its new 
use. This has' proved true of the following_ items which 
are discussed in preceding chapters of this text : ( 1 )  
The initiating step : with the allowance of an examination 
as of right upon the mere service of notice and sub­
poena, lawyers soon accord the same voluntarily. In 
contrast, the special New York provision ·for notice­
order procedure has not proved as satisfactory. (2) 
The place of the examination can be adjusted to the con­
venience of all parties involved. (3)  Lawyers have 
learned to adapt their own tactics so as to obtain the 
most effective discovery, and to solve the few problems 
which arise as to the orderliness of the proceeding. 
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(4) The procedure is adaptable to differences between 
the practice in c;ities and in smaller communities, and 
between the large and small law offices, as far as the 
necessity of having the shorthand notes transcribed is 
concerned. ( 5) Problems concerning the right of the 
deponent to make substantial corrections can be solved 
by practical expedients apart from special statutory reg­
ulation. ( 6 )  Lawyers have disregarded statutes and 
rules in regard to filing the deposition and have adapted 
their practices to their own convenience and to the most 
effective discovery. Any inadequacies which obtain in 
regard to any of these items in the practice of an indi­
vidual laWy-er are the subject of education rather than of 
legislation. 
The most feasible solution of the problem of adminis­
tering discovery examinations has been to allow the 
examination to be taken down by a mere reporter, who is 
qualified to take depositions, with all disputes being re­
ferred to the trial court. Most of the attempts to provide 
a different machinery have approximated this practice in 
their actual operation. Only in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
and in isolated cases in the larger cities of Missouri does 
a substantially different practice actually obtain. While 
there are some advantages in having an officer who can 
decide objections summarily and coerce answers, it is so 
difficult to obtain officers with sufficient knowledge and ex­
perience to exercise these powers intelligently that the 
chances of abuse outweigh the incidental benefits. More­
over the Missouri experience indicates that such an officer 
is not needed in the majority of cases. Trial courts can 
supply most of the benefits incident to the employment of 
such an officer by granting speedy and expeditious hear­
ings to the disputes which are referred to them. The plan 
suggested has the following advantages :  It uses a 
machinery already provided by the statutes and does not 
require special legislation; it is easily adapted to differ-
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ences of practice between the large and small city, and be.:. 
tween the large and small office ; it is the least expensive ; 
it offers the least chance of abuse of parties and witnesses, 
because each party and witness can safely refuse to an­
swer any question which he deems improper until ordered 
to answer by the court ; it provides for a sufficiently 
liberal discovery ; it allows most of the disputes which 
arise to be adjusted informally among counsel, without 
resort to the court. Finally, if such a plan does not work 
satisfactorily in a particular locality, the Missouri plan 
appears to be the most feasible remedy, let the court 
appoint a practicing lawyer to supervise the examination 
if one of the parties requests it. 
The comparative experience of states which try to 
restrict the examination and of states which allow it to 
be as broad as at the trial, respectively, indicates that 
the practical advantages are with the latter plan. The 
restrictive rules which have been applied by the New 
York courts have defeated their own ends. On the con­
trary, an examination before trial, restricted by the rules 
of evidence only, has proved a deterrent of perjury and 
an aid of disclosing the truth. It is noteworthy that 
states which have allowed use of deposition procedure 
for purposes of discovery before trial have not limited 
the scope of the .inquiry. 
Rules of evidence offer sufficient checks upon the scope 
of the examination. This has proved true in the taking 
of depositions. When lawyers for the examiner and the 
examined, respectively, know that answers to questions 
cannot be compelled without resort to the trial court by 
the examiner, but that this can be accomplished expedi­
tiously, the following experience obtains : The lawyers 
adjust the majority of the objections among themselves ; 
the inarticulate rationale of this adjustment is the law 
of evidence, modified in its application by due regard 
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for the practicalities of the situation and for the purposes 
of discovery. Under such a practice objections of privi­
lege are respected forthwith. The liberality which ob­
tains in regard to rules of relevancy is of the lawyers ' 
own making and does little or no harm because irrelevant 
evidence can be stricken before it gets to the jury. 
There are two penalties for unjust refusal to disclose, 
namely, attachment for contempt and default or nonsuit. 
The experience with these has been satisfactory. They 
furnish a sufficient sanction so that it seldom is neces­
sary to actually apply either one, and so that a full dis­
closure is encouraged. Any dissatisfaction with the 
penalty provisions of the statutes has been attributable 
rather to the mode of their enforcement than to the pen­
alties themselves. 
The ordinary deposition procedure provides the most 
satisfactory solution of the problem as to who may use 
the discovery examination at the trial, and also as to 
the purpose of its use. The rules under this practice are : 
Neither party may use the deposition of a mere witness 
as original evidence unless the deponent is unavailable at 
the trial, but the taker may use it to contradict the wit­
ness. The taker only may use the deposition of an 
adverse party as evidence of an admission. Either party, 
regardless of who has taken the deposition, and regard­
less of whether it is the deposition of a party or of a 
witness, may use the deposition in the event the deponent 
is unavailable for oral testimony at the trial. While this 
plan does not answer categorically that either the taker 
only may use the examination, or that both parties may 
use it, it effects a happy compromise by answering that 
only the taker may use ordinarily, but that the opposite 
party may also use when he really needs to, namely, when 
the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony. In this 
way use both for discovery and for preservation of testi­
mony is made feasible. 
CHAPTER XXVIII 
LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR AN ADEQUATE 
DISCOVERY PR-OCEDURE 
The experience of the various jurisdictions which 
exhibit an effective discovery practice suggests a way 
by which other jurisdictions can accomplish the same 
end with a minimum of legislation. The followi:ng three 
short and concise amendments to the statutes should 
afford the basis for an adequate discovery procedure and 
liberalize the procedure for preservation of testimony. 
I. Amend the section of the statutes which sets forth 
the right to take depositions to read as follows : ' 'Any 
party may take testimony by deposition as of right at 
any time after the court has acquired jurisdiction over 
the action, suit or proceeding, and the persons of the 
parties thereto against whom the depositions are to be 
introduced. Depositions may be taken of parties and of 
witnesses, and for the purpose either of discovering or 
of preserving testimony. An adverse party may be 
examined as if under cross examination upon the taking 
of his deposition. ' '  
II. Amend the section of  the statute which provides 
for the use of depositions at the trial so as to incorporate 
the conditions as to the unavailability of the witness 
which at present are contained in the section regarding 
the right to take depositions. If these conditions already 
are provided in the section regarding the right to use 
rather than in the section regarding the right to take, 
there is no necessity for such an amendment. The 
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enumeration of these conditions could be left exactly itS 
it is at present in the particular state. The essential 
change is that it be made clear that the conditions apply 
to the use only and not to the taking of depositions. 
III. Amend the statutory provision on discovery and 
inspection of documents to read as follows : ' ' Any party, 
at any time after the court has acquired jurisdiction over 
the action, suit or proceeding, and the persons of the 
parties thereto, may by notice require any other party 
within ten days to make a disclosure upon oath of all the 
documents which are or have been in his possession or 
power, relating to any matters in question in the action. 
Such a disclosure shall be made upon a printed form of 
the following kind which shall be kept available in the 
office of every clerk of a court of record : 
Affidavit of Documents 
State of . . . . . . . . . .  { 




I, the above named . . . . . . . . . . make oath and say as fol­
lows : 
1. I have in my possession or power the following docu­
ments relating to the matters in question in this action : 
2. I object to produce the following of the do�uments which 
are listed in part I above : 
3. The grounds upon which I object to produce these docu­
ments are : 
4. I have had but have not now in my possession or power 
the following documents relating to the matters in question 
in this suit : 
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5. The last mentioned documents were last in my possession 
or power on . . . . . . . . . .  , and to the best of my knowledge and 
belief are now located as follows : 
6. According to the best of my knowledge, information 
and belief, I have not now and never have had in my possession, 
custody or power or in the possession, custody or power of my 
attorneys or agents, or in the possession, custody or power of 
any other person or persons on my behalf, any deed, account, 
book of account, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper or writing 
or any copy of or extract from any such document or any other 
document whatsoever relating to the matters in question in 
this action or any of them wherein any entry has been made 
relative to such matters or any of them other than and except 
the documents which have been set forth above and the plead­
ings and other proceedings in the action. 
Subscribed and sworn to by 
Affiant 
Production for inspection of documents which are thus 
disclosed may be required from the party who has pos­
session or control of them by notice to produce. If a 
party refuses to make an affidavit of documents or to 
produce in response to the notice the .court may order 
him to do so, and may enforce such order by the penal­
ties which are applicable in the event a party refuses to 
answer a question during the taking of his deposition, 
after being ordered to answer by the court. ' '  
Procedural d�tails can be left exactly as they are at 
present under the various statutes on depositions. While 
there are some defects in the deposition statutes of par­
ticular states, it is of greater moment in the initiation of 
the new use of the procedure that the lawyers be ac­
quainted with the procedural details than that these lat­
ter be perfect. Glaring defects which become apparent 
during the actual use of the procedure may be remedied 
later by special statutes. Moreover, the experience of 
the states which have used this plan is that the bench 
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and bar adjust the detftils to suit the purpose, without 
the aid of legislation, once they are convinced that the 
purpose itself is justifiable. Only in the event that the 
statutes in the particular state do not allow the taking 
of depositions upon oral interrogatories need the pro­
cedure be changed at the start. Practically all jurisdic­
tions already have subordinated the taking of depositions 
by written interrogation to the taking upon oral ques­
tions. The former method is used only in the event that 
the witness resides at such a distance as to make oral 
questioning impracticable, if it is used at all. 
CHAPTER XXIX 
CONTRIBUTION OF DISCOVERY TO THE 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
The description and evaluation of any particular 
mechanism of the legal machinery is incomplete unless it 
takes into account the relation of the part to the whole, 
for none of the interrelated processes can exist unto 
themselves. Innovations in pre-trial practice are to be 
judged by their contribution to the general administra­
tion of justice, and by their functional relationship to 
the other incidents of legal procedure. They are also to 
be judged by their contribution to the practical needs of 
the lawyer and the court. 
Many have been the complaints in recent years in re­
gard to the unscientific and unbusinesslike approach of 
legal procedure toward its various problems. Judges 
and lawyers in the states which allow a full and mutual 
discovery before trial say that it has had a salutary effect 
upon the whole tenor of the litigious process. Perhaps 
their views can be.st be summarized by quoting two terse 
sentences which, are representative of the views encoun­
tered in field investigations in the various states : 
' 'Litigation is no longer regarded as a game. ' '  
' ' The lawyer who does not use discovery procedure is 
in the position of a physician who treats a serious case 
without first using the X-ray. ' '  
Lawyers in states in which a full and equal discovery 
before trial is allowed say that it is a great aid i� ascer­
taining the truth and a great preventative of perjury. 
Only where a limited or unequal discovery obtains has it 
been found that perjury, manufactured testimony and 
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kindred evils are fostered. Where a full and equal dis­
covery is allowed lawyers say that they come much 
nearer to obtaining the truth because : 
(1 )  The witness is examined while his memory is 
fresh ; 
( 2 )  The witness usually is not coached in preparation 
for the trial, and consequently his testimony is more 
spontaneous ; 
( 3 )  A party who has been pinned down to a definite 
and detailed story early in the litigation can ill afford 
to manufacture testimony contrary to this story, for he is 
already bound. 
Sometimes a lawyer does not know the truth of his own 
client 's story until after the opposing lawyer has exam­
ined him for discovery. A lawyer is often deceived as 
to the merit of his case, by the mere recital of the facts 
by the client. For instance, at the end of an examination 
for discovery in a certain case the attorney arose and 
addressed his client thus : ' 'Why-you did not tell me 
any such story in the office. I am sorry but I will have to 
withdraw from the case. ' '  Numerous incidents of a simi­
lar character were related in the various jurisdictions 
which were visited. 
Discovery is a help in the ascertainment of truth in 
the conduct of litigation by reason of the further fact that 
. it furnishes a means of preserving testimony. All too 
often injustice has been done because of the unavailabil­
ity of necessary witnesses. A liberal provision for the 
discovery and preservation of evidence gives greater 
assurance that the facts of the case may be presented in 
full upon the trial. 
Settlements have been greatly increased by liberal 
allowance of discovery before trial. The Wisconsin ex­
perience in this regard is especially significant both as 
to the extent of settlements and the manner of arriving 
at settlements. Similar, though less pointed, testimony 
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was giv�n by lawyers in other jurisdictions. The follow­
ing statement from a Milwaukee attorney is repre­
sentative of the views which were encountered generally 
during the investigation in Wisconsin : " It is fair to 
say that a very large proportion of the controversies in 
which lawyers are consulted are disposed of without the 
commencement of · any action. In the larger cities, at 
least, it is also true that only a relatively small portion 
of the actions which are commenced are brought to trial. 
They are disposed of by the attorneys in settlements 
which, in the majority of cases, are very carefully and 
deliberately worked out. These settlements have been 
made possible in a great many cases through the use of 
the discovery examination. The lawyers of Wisconsin 
have become quite skillful in the use of this examination. 
Many of them use it either solely or partly for the pur­
pose of reducing the issues, much after the manner in 
which that is sought to be done elsewhere by a bill of par­
ticulars. After examinations have been had on both 
sides, it is a very common thing for the opposing attor­
neys to sit down and discuss the case anew with the issues 
for trial more clearly defined in the minds of the attor­
neys on each side and with all of them better able to 
judge of the probable result of a trial. The better trained 
the opposing attorneys are in the sifting of evidence and 
in the application of rules of law, the more reason is 
there to expect that the litigation will terminate in a fair 
and just settlment. ' '  1 General counsel for some insur­
ance companies require that local counsel send up copies 
of the examination for settlement recommendations. Nor 
is there any considerable complaint on the part of plain­
tiffs ' lawyers, for they say the more skillful insurance 
lawyers have tried enough automobile accident · cases to 
1 :J. G. Hardgrove, Reduction of Trial 1ssues Under Wisconsin Prac­
tice, Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges (1927), 
� - . I 
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be able to predict rather accurately what the case would 
bring if tried, after all the facts and the condition of the 
injured party have been fully disclosed upon an adverse 
examination, supplemented by a physical examination , 
if necessary. Some lawyers say that they welcome the 
examination of their . own client by the adversary, that 
often they have not obtained a true picture of the case 
until after such examination. One circuit judge says 
that he has maintained a record for several years of 
effecting settlements in four out of five cases docketed 
for trial. He calls the lawyers into his office before time 
for the trial and asks what the prospects of settlement 
are. After a short discussion one of the lawyers sug., 
gests that the parties be called in. The judge explains in 
an informal way to the parties the uncertainties of litiga­
tion. Often the result is a settlement. In such a case 
the adverse examination is either expressly or tacitly 
used as the basis for the agreement. 
But more often than otherwise the case does not get 
this far after discovery is had. Sometimes a settlement 
is effected in the presence of the commissioner before the 
examination is finished. In most cases the discovery re­
sults in a re-evaluation of the case by both sides and a 
consequent weighing of the probabilities of further liti­
gation. 
The following statement from a lawyer in a large city 
in the middle west indicates the use of the procedure by 
representatives of liability insurance companies and 
similar interests in the large cities : ' 'When a case is 
filed against us we often find that we know almost nothing 
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. We . call the de­
fendant, whom we represent, to the office. It develops 
that his story is decidedly different from that related in 
the plaintiff's petition. What is the truth ? It is worth 
a good deal to us just to be able to force the plaintiff to 
come in and give his story. Our chief purposes in exam-
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ining him are : To see what he looks like, whether he 
seems to be honest, and especially, how he stands up 
under questioning, and to question him in detail as to 
the extent of his injuries. If we :find that the party has 
a good case and will make a good witness at the trial, we 
make every effort to effect a settlement. ' '  
One attorney made the following statement which gives 
a very trenchant comparison of discovery and separate 
procedures for arbitration or conciliation : " The law­
yers, after an adverse examination, really constitute 
themselves a board of arbitration in the case. And it is 
much more effective than regular arbitration and con­
ciliation practice, because it is not artificial. I do not 
care for the type of arbitration which forces an award on 
the party, but in this way the lawyers and parties strike 
their own agreement. ' '  There is afforded the judge the 
materials with which to foster the kind of conciliation 
which, after all, is most feasible, namely, conciliation 
handled by the established courts.• The other type of 
conciliation procedure, by special conciliation tribunals, 
has been described as operating thus : ' ' The conciliator 
points out the uncertainty of litigation, the burdensome 
expense of it, the danger of personal estrangement be­
tween neighbor� and friends, and that, by slight con­
cession on the part of each, the differences may be ad­
justed. ' '  8 It has been pointed out that the judge of the 
established court can bring about such conciliation as 
well as a special conciliator. Discovery provides a means 
whereby the judge can do so upon an intelligent basis. 
Moreover the parties are in a position which is more 
conducive to their acceptance of the suggestion of the 
judge if they have already ascertained the testimony 
which can be expected at the trial. Or, to put the same 
8 Cf. Randall, Conciliation as a Function of the Judge, 18 Ky. L. 
Jour. 330. · 
8 John A. Cline, in an address before the Ohio State Bar Association 
in 1925, Reports, vol. XL VI, p. 63. 
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idea in a slightly different manner, may not the "very 
soul of conciliation procedure, that before a person shall 
involve his neighbors and himself in legal warfare there 
shall be made an effort to secure a legal peace ' '  4 be more 
readily attained " if a party, long before his legal battle 
is staged in the trial court, can go into his adversary 's 
camp and inspect his battle array, • • • learn how 
strong his adversary is, and enter negotiations for peace 
or prepare for battle intelligently" ?  6 
Automobile accident litigation occupies as much time 
as all other types of litigation in courts generally at the 
present time. In many of the larger cities the ratio in 
the trial dockets is approximately two to one. In no 
type of litigation can plaintiffs, as a general rule, less 
afford to wait a long time for compensation, and in no 
type of litigation are defendants more often subjected to 
non-meritorious claims. The signs of the times indicate 
that unless the judicial system can speedily devise some 
way of remedying the situation, measures akin to the 
industrial accident compensation plan will be introduced. 
Discovery procedure offers a way of improving the 
handling of negligence cases. In every state in which an 
investigation was conducted, except New York, the great­
est use of discovery procedure is in connection with per­
sonal injury litigation. The explanation for the New 
York exception is the arbitrary limitation which the 
courts have placed upon use of discovery in such litiga­
tion. Especially do lawyers for insurance companies 
favor the procedure. It enables them to arrive at settle­
ments on an intelligent basis. Consequently in several 
states the main instruction in the use of discovery pro­
cedure has come from the head counsel for the insurance 
companies, who have sent instructions to counsel in out­
lying dist�icts to take discovery examinations in every 
Hd. page 67. 
6 Max W. Nohl, Discovery Proceedings, 2 Marquette L. Rev. 137. 
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case involving their interests and to "Bend the same to 
them for settlement recommendations. Plaintiffs ' law­
yers generally are as well satisfied with discovery as are 
the defendants '  lawyers. The procedure provides them 
with a means of investigation which allows them to com­
pete with the larger firms which have at their disposal 
independent means of investigation. To the firm which 
already has more cases than it can conveniently try, it 
affords a way to dispose of some of them and to collect 
fees, without needlessly protracted litigation. The lawyer 
who is prosecuting what he regards as a good case is 
glad to have his client examined with a view to obtain­
ing a favorable settlement. 
An oral examination for discovery affords as simple a 
way of arriving at the truth in automobile accident cases 
as could be had under any administrative tribunal. It 
has all of the elements of informality, avoidance of the 
ultra-technical rules of evidence, and general conciliation 
features, which any of the existing workmen 's compensa­
tion plans affords. And it has the advantage that it is 
more easily adapted to, and supervised by, the existing 
judicial organization. It is integrated with the regular 
structural plan of the courts, and the business of lawyers, 
rather than being a separate system in itself. While 
possessing many of the advantages of extra-judicial pro­
cedure, it has less disadvantages. 
The report of the Massachusetts Special Commission 
to Study Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance is of sig­
nificance in this regard. Its recommendation is the more 
interesting in view of the fact that a majority of the 
commission were laymen. As an item in its discussion of 
the relation of court procedure to the compulsory auto­
mobile insurance situation, the commission stated : "Hav­
ing thus suggested a prompt, informal and fair method of 
settling honest claims of those who wish them thus set­
tled, with or without the assistance of lawyers, we now 
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turn to the matter of procedure for dealing with claims 
of parties who are not willing to submit to such judicial 
arbitration. These claims may be honest, or they may be 
false or exaggerated. How shall they be sifted out so 
that each may receive such, and only such, consideration 
as the facts merit T It is a commonplace, in the dis­
cussion of the administration of the criminal law, to say 
that a prompt hearing and disposition of a case while the 
evidence is fresh, and before the whole story is stale, is 
the most important object to be attained as a deterrent 
to crime. In our opinion this same promptness of in­
vestigation, hearing and disposition is essential in deal­
-ing with automobile accidents and unwarranted claims 
arising out of them. 
"As pointed out by the Judicature Commission in its 
final report of 1920, Bentham a century ago criticized 
the orthodox methods of inquiry in many legal proceed­
ings as ' epistolary' as distinguished from the stronger 
and more direct 'confrontatory ' method which he advo­
cated. Now, after a suit is brought, we have had for 
many years an ' epistolary' method by which each party 
may examine the other by written interrogatories to be 
answered in writing. While this system is useful and 
has been much used, it is cumbersome, it takes up a large 
amount of time and effort upon the part of the judges in 
passing upon objection to certain interrogatories before 
they are answered, and it has the weakness of an astute, 
and sometimes evasive, question and answer writing con­
test between the lawyers over the signatures of their 
clients, with a view to getting as much and giving as little 
information as their respective consciences will allow. 
In some other states they have more direct methods, and 
the Judicature Commission called attention particularly 
to the statute of New Hampshire which allows each party 
to take the oral deposition of the other party and of wit­
nesses at any time after suit is brought. These deposi-
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tions are taken, like the deposition of any witness under 
our own · practice, upon notice to the other party, and 
may be used at the trial unless the other party produces 
the witness. Our practice allows such examination only 
of witnesses who are more · than thirty miles from the 
place of trial, or who are so ill as to · be unlikely to be 
able to attend the trial, and they cannot be used at the 
trial unless the illness or other reason for taking them 
still continues. We have no provision for ·an oral exam­
ination of the parties to the case until the actual trial is 
reached, which, as already pointed out, may be several 
· years after the accident, when the memory of everybody 
may have been dulled, or unduly stimulated, to such an 
extent as to create more controversy than would arise 
if the story could be obtained under oath at an earlier 
period. 
''Now we believe that the apparent frequency of un­
warranted or exaggerated claims in connection with auto­
mobile accidents in Massachusetts today under our law is 
such as to demand the experiment, in that branch of liti­
gation, of machinery for the pro�pt oral examination 
of parties and witnesses to the suit similar to the ma­
chinery which they have in New Hampshire. • • • It 
seems to us that the opportunity given to either party to 
examine the other and witnesses orally after suit is 
brought is the 'first necessary method of sifting the char­
acter of claims sued upon. ' '  8 
It is important from the standpoint of substantive law 
to improve the fact-sifting process by adoption of dis­
covery procedure. Of course any device which will 
simplify legal procedure and help it to assume its proper 
relation of handmaid rather than mistress to the work 
of justice,' will, to that extent, effect an improvement of 
substantive law. This is poignantly true of the fact- · 
8 Report of the Spe�ial Col!l�i.ssion to Stu!Jy CompUlsory JLotol' Vehie1e 
InliUranee . �nd Related !Latter�. (19�0) �· 98 ff. 
'7 ct. Colllnti; JL. R,, in :Btl Coles (1967) 1 K. :a. 4. 
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selecting process. The exact form in which the facts of a 
controversy are presented for decision has an important 
bearing both upon the determination of the rights of 
the parties in the particular case and also upon the deter­
mination of the scope of the authority of the decision 
under the doctrine of stare decisis.8 If all of the factual 
details of a controversy are presented, without any dis­
criminating selection of the important facts, the judging 
function is handicapped by the very multiplicity of data.9 
Not only is it _necessary that there be an efficient fact­
sifting process, but it is equally necessary that it be in­
dulged prior to the time set for application of the law 
to the facts, the trial. Otherwise there is danger that 
the relative importance of particular facts be obscured in 
the riot of facts. 
" Discovery has a salutary effect upon the various 
mechanisms of legal procedure. Especially does it have 
a vital interrelation to pleadings, both in purpose and 
in function. The two together effect a division of labor 
toward a common end, namely, the formulation of the 
dispute into a justiciable form by disclosing the material 
controverted facts and eliminating the uncontroverted 
and unessential facts in each case prior to its final pres­
entation for decision. Discovery procedure and plead­
ing approach the problem from the same basic stand­
point : both are equally ill harmony with the traditional 
Anglo-American doctrine of party-formulation of issues. 
An oral examination for discovery is even more largely 
extra-judicial in its practical operation than are plead­
ings. Whatever are the theoretical arguments for the con-
8 Cf. Green, Judge and Jury, 268, 274 ; Pound, Theory of Judicial Deci­
sion, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641 ; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
142. 
9 Dean Green has shown convincingly that ' ' the net-work of theory 
increases in complexity with the multiplicity of data ' '  and that there is 
a.cc!)rdingly more rqom for an improper grouping of facts to bolster up 
a particular theory which has happen!ld to catch judicial fancy . .  Green, 
Judge and Jury, p. 25 ff. · · 
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trary principle of judicial control of pre-trial practice, 
the fact remains that under our present court structure 
the judges already have more than they can do. The 
practical necessities of the situation make the conserva­
tion of judicial energy a more important consideration 
at present than judicial formulation of issues. 
The difficult problem under our present practice of 
pleading has been to determine just where to draw the 
distinction between facts, law and evidence.10 The dis­
tinction, it has been pointed out, is one of degree only, 
the " real problem " being " how specific must the pleader 
be ? ' '  11 With an adequate system of compelling dis­
covery this problem vanishes, for when a party can ob­
tain notice of all the facts by discovery he is not likely 
to complain that too small a percentage of the disclosure 
is effected by the pleadings. Likewise the issue-forming 
function of pleading can more conveniently be made 
secondary to the notice-giving function, as it should be, 
when some auxiliary is provided to eliminate unessential 
facts. Indeed, discovery has been recognized in England 
as a necessary complement of simplified pleading.111 A 
fortiori it has been recognized as an absolute necessity 
by the advocates of what is known as notice pleading.18 
Not only in Anglo-American procedure but in the Conti­
nental systems as well there has been a recognition of the 
need for some such auxiliary to pleadings. The words 
of a prominent student of comparative procedure and of 
continental procedure in particular, Judge Gustaf Fahl­
crantz, of Stockholm, Sweden, before the Universal 
Congress of Lawyers and Jurists in 1904 are significant 
in this regard : . ' ' But in order to avoid useless con­
troversy and to keep the whole case most closely to the 
10 Cf. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416. 
· 11 Clark on Code Pleading, 155. 
18 Rosenbaum, Rule-Making Authority, 72. 
18 Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501. 
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actual issues, there is need at the very outset of the law­
suit to require the parties to state the true facts. In 
addition to the pleadings it is necessary to give the right 
to the parties to make interrogatories to be answered by 
the opponent under oath or under legal responsibility 
along with discovery and inspection of documents. And 
I take the liberty to consider such a right of the parties, 
or the exercise of that right of theirs, as a very part of 
the pleadings or a necessary appendix to them, because 
without that the pleadings must frequently be void of 
their proper effect and illusory. ' '  14 
Pleading alone has never furnished an adequate basis 
of preparation for trial. Any formal process like writ­
ten pleading has a natural tendency to become formal­
istic and even ritualistic. The natural tendency of law­
yers, as of human beings generally, is to adopt the easiest 
course, and this accentuates the ineffectiveness of plead­
ings as a fact-sifting device. Why not, therefore, let 
pleadings assume the very character which it is their 
tendency to assume, namely, a mere preliminary forecast 
of the issues, and supplement them by a more workable 
fact-sifting device T There is abundant evidence that dis­
covery aids in reducing and clarifying the issues. New 
Hampshire lawyers said that the simple pleadings in use 
in the state were made possible largely by the discovery 
practice. Ontario trial judges say the same is true un­
der their practice. They say that they are able to co_me 
to the trial of many cases without. ever having read the 
pleadings ; that by the use of discovery the issues are so 
narrowed down that it will suffice to simply ask the law­
yers at the opening of the trial : ' ' Well, what 's the dis­
pute about 7 ' '  While Wisconsin lawyers are rather in­
definite about this particular contribution of discovery 
to the administration of justice it is a noticeable fact that 
pleadings are less technical than in many other states. 
14 Ofileial Re'port of th"e Congress, p. SO. 
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, Under the Massachusetts written interrogatory practice 
it is possible to point to one way by which discovery af­
fects the pleadings. Under the prevalent practice in 
Boston of having printed forms for the defendant to use, 
containing a general denial and pleas that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent and that the automobile was 
operated by a person without authority from the defend­
ant, it sometimes happens that the defendant :files such a 
form without really intending to press all of these mat­
ters. Cases of record were found in which interrog­
atories had brought to light exactly which of these items 
the defendant did intend to rely upon. In this connection 
the words of the Massachusetts Judicature Commission 
are significant : ' ' The discussion of pleading naturally 
leads to the consideration of methods of defining issues 
before trial which the earlier technical system of plead­
ing was intended to accomplish, and which the present 
looser system does not accomplish. " 111 
While there is. this salutary effect on the pleading stage 
when a full discovery before trial is allowed, exactly the 
reverse may be true under a partial discovery before 
trial. Since the defendant can have no discovery except f 
on his affirmative defenses in New York he often puts in 
fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of securing an 
examination of his adversary. Indeed, several New York 
lawyers pointed to this as one of the chief defects of the 
present New York system of discovery. 
Discovery relieves the trial machinery in at least two 
distinct ways. It furnishes a means of eliminating a 
large number of non-meritorious cases and of settling · 
others so that they are not allowed to reach the already 
overcrowded trial dockets. By eliminating such cases 
greater guaranty is given that meritorious cases will be 
accorded an expeditious trial. Discovery serves to pre-
111 Second and Final Report of the Massachusetts Judicature Commis· 
sion {1921) p. 106. 
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pare the form of the controversy, in the cases which 
merit a trial, so that the trial proper can be expedited. 
The trial is expedited in proportion to the measure of 
clarity in the definition of the issues and freedom from all 
elements of surprise. As the element of surprise, which 
is the psychological child of trial by battle, is eliminated, 
the expectation of trials becoming more nearly business­
like meetings is realized. There is no better way to pre­
vent such surprise than by allowing a dress-rehearsal be­
fore the trial. The commissioners who drew up the first 
New York Code of Procedure set forth still another way 
in which discovery aids in the trial of cases : ' ' One of 
the great benefits to be expected from the examination of 
the parties is the relief it will afford to the rest of the 
community in exempting them, to a considerable degree, 
from attendance as witnesses, to prove facts, which the 
parties respectively know, and ought never to dispute, 
and would not dispute if they were put to their oaths. To 
effect their object, it should seem necessary to permit the 
examination beforehand, that the admission of the party 
may save the necessity of a witness." 16 
The practical operation of discovery procedure is 
rather interesting in light of the widespread demand for 
liberalization of the rules of evidence. One of the attrac­
tions of procedure before administrative tribunals is the 
relative freedom from the more technical rules of evi­
dence. Discovery examinations and examinations before 
administrative tribunals exhibit similar conditions in 
this respect. In both instances the norm which lawyers 
keep in mind is the general law of evidence, but in both 
instances there is a practical disregard of the more tech­
nical rules. Yet there is this difference in the case of 
discovery : while ther� is freedom in finding the truth, 
there may be limitation upon use of the truth found, for · 
it may subsequently be non-usable at the trial if it fails 
16 Report of Commissioners on Practice and Pleading (1848) p. 244. 
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to comply with the various rules of evidence. In this 
way a happy compromise is effected between the two 
schools of thought to which, respectively, the rules of evi­
dence are either nonsense or the height of wisdom. 
A noticeable tendency in the reform of appellate pro­
cedure is to allow a broader scope of review of the con­
troverted facts by the appellate court. Can this not 
prove more p:vacticable when some way has been found 
to forever dispose of the uncontroverted and unessential 
facts at th-� beginning of the litigation so that they may 
not later be resurrected to confuse the issues on appeal Y 
Cannot our appellate courts afford to spare the time nec­
essary to review more thoroughly a few contested ques­
tions of fact Y Is not the present limitation upon the 
scope of review maintained partly because the fact-range 
in the cases which are appealed is unnecessarily broad 1 
Discovery also offers a means of reducing the size of the 
record on appeal. When the issues are not clarified and 
reduced before trial the transcript of testimony becomes 
unnecessarily large and the expense incident · thereto be­
comes unnecess{lrily great. Dress-rehearsals before trial 
in the form of discovery examinations should make it 
possible to eliminate umi.ecessary circuity and prolixity 
in interrogation at the trial. To this extent the size of 
the transcript of testimony is reduced. 
Not only has discovery procedure improved the gen­
eral administration of justice, but it has also contributed 
to the practical needs of the lawyer and the court. Law­
yers in jurisdictions in which the device has been thor­
oughly tested say that it has been advantageous to their 
personal interests as well as to the larger interests of 
justice. Interviews with several hundred lawyers in 
thirteen representative jurisdictions a;s well as cor­
respondence with lawyers in fifteen other jurisdictions 
indicate tliat the bar favors allowance of an oral exam­
ination for discovery before trial, co-extensive in scope 
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with an examination at the trial, and available to both 
parties equally. In states where a partial discovery only 
is allowed [partial because : (a) not an equal discovery, 
(b) not a discovery as to all of the issues of the con­
troversy, or (c)  written interrogatories are the means of 
obtaining the discovery] there is a sharp division of 
opinion among the lawyers as to the merits of the pro­
cedure. The basic reasons why a full and equal dis­
covery is acceptable to lawyers are that it furnishes a 
means of thorough preparation for trial, and that it 
makes possible the disposal of many cases without pro­
tracted litigation, the collection of fees earlier, and the 
handling of a greater volume of litigation. 
The work of the judge is simplified in the states which 
employ an oral examination before trial. A considerable 
part of the pre-trial machinery for the formulation of 
the terms of the controversy becomes extra-judicial in 
practical operation. A great many cases are eliminated 
before they ever reach the trial dockets. The greater 
clarity in the definition of the issues and the elimination 
of elements of surprise expedites the actual trial in cases 
which must be tried. In many respects, therefore, dis­
covery has made a vital contribution to the general ad­
ministration of justice. 
APPENDIX 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON DISCOVERY IN 
THE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS 
United States Federa.l Courts 
There is the following provision for discovery before 
trial in the federal equity courts : 
' ' The plaintiff at any time after filing the bill and not 
later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and 
the defendant at any time after filing his answer and not 
later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and 
either party at any time thereafter by leave of the court 
or judge may file interrogatories in writing for the dis­
covery by the opposite party or parties of facts and 
documents material to the support or defense of the 
cause, with a note at the foot thereof stating which of 
the interrogatories each of the parties is required to 
answer. But no party shall file more than one set of 
interrogatories to the same party without leave of the . 
court or judge. 
" If  any party to the cause is a public or printe corpo­
ration, any opposite party may apply to the court or 
judge for an order allowing him to file interrogatories to 
be answered by any officer of the corporation, and an 
order may be made accordingly for the examination of 
such officer as may appear to be proper upon such inter­
rogatories as the court or judge shall think fit. 
· 
' ' Copies shall be filed for the use of the interrogated 
party, and shall be sent by the clerk to the respective 
solicitort of record, or to the last known address of the 
opposite party, if there be no record solicitor. 
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" Interrogatories shall be answered, and the answers 
filed in the clerk 's office, within fifteen days after they 
have been served unless the time be enlarged by the court 
or judge. Each interrogatory shall be answered sepa­
rately and fully and the answers shall be in writing, un­
der oath, and signed by the party or corporate officer 
interrogated. Within ten days after the service of inter­
rogatories, objections to them, or any of them, may be 
presented to the court or judge, with proof of notice of 
the purpose so to do, and answers shall be deferred until 
the objections are determined, which shall be at as early 
a time as is practicable. In so far as the objections are 
sustained, answers shall not be required. 
' ' The court or judge, upon motion and reasonable no­
tice, may make all such orders as may be appropriate to 
enforce answers to interrogatories or to effect the in­
spection or production of documents in the possession 
of either party and containing evidence material to the 
cause of action or defense of his adversary. Any party 
failing or refusing to comply with such an order shall be 
liable to attachment, and shall also be liable, if a plain­
tiff, to have his bill dismissed, and if a defendant, to have 
his answer stricken out and be placed in the same situ­
ation as if he had failed to answer. 
' ' By a demand served ten days before the trial, either 
party may call on the other to admit in writing the exe­
cution or genuineness of any document, letter or other 
writing, saving all just exceptions ; and if such admission 
be not made within-five days after such service, the costs 
of proving the document, letter or writing shall be paid 
by the party refusing or neglecting to make such ad­
mission, unless at the trial the court shall find that the 
refusal or neglect was reasonable. ' '  1 
The chief difficulties in the practical operation of the 
federal equity discovery practice have been said to be 
1 Hopkins New Federal Equity Rules (6th ed.) 58. 
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that answers to interrogatories are usually so evasive as 
not to give the desired disclosure and that the burden of 
administration upon the trial courts is very heavy.8 
Learned Hand, J., has said concerning the practice that, 
" Much the more convenient way would be for the parties 
to agree upon a master and allow the plaintiff an oral 
examination. This, however, I cannot compel ; but much 
the same result may probably be obtained, though it must 
be confessed with the maximum of expense and time and 
labor, by allowing interrogatories to be renewed as often 
as justice requires. ' '  8 
There is no provision for discovery in the law side of 
the federal courts. Nor do the federal statutes on depo­
sitions offer great possibilities in this regard. The fed­
eral statutes on depositions, from the original act of 
1789 to the present time, always have made the right to 
take depositions conditional. . The provision which ob­
tains at present is as follows : 
' ' The testimony of any witness may be taken in any 
civil cause depending in a district court by deposition 
de bene esse, when the witness lives at a greater distance 
from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is 
bound on a voy;age to sea, or is about to go out of the 
United States, or out of the district in which the case is 
to be tried, and to a greater distance than one hundred 
miles from the place of trial, before the time of trial, or 
when he is ancient and infirm. The deposition may be 
taken before any judge of any court of the United States, 
or any clerk of a district court, or any chancellor, justice, 
or judge of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief 
magistrate of a city, judge of a county court or court of 
common pleas of any of the United States, or any notary 
public, not being of counsel or attorney to either of the 
parties, nor interested in the event of the cause. Reason-
I Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 294. 
8 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1917) 241 Fed. 964, 
967. 
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able notice must first be given in writing by the party or 
his attorney proposing to take such deposition, to the 
opposite party or his attorney of record, as either may be 
nearest, which notice shall state the name of the witness 
and the time and place of the taking of his deposition ; 
and in all cases in rem, the person having the agency or 
possession of the property at the time of seizure shall 
be deemed the adverse party, until a claim shall have 
been put in ; and whenever, by reason of the absence from 
the district and want of an attorney of record or other 
reason, the giving of the notice herein required shall be 
impracticable, it shall be lawful to take such depositions 
as there shall be urgent necessity for taking, upon such 
notice as any judge authorized to hold courts in such 
district shall think reasonable and direct. Any person 
may be compelled to appear and depose as provided by 
this section, in the same manner as witnesses may be 
compelled to appear and testify in court. ' '  4 
The following federal statute was enacted in 1892 : 
" In addition to the mode of taking the depositions of wit­
nesses in causes pending at law or equity in the district 
courts of the United States, it shall be lawful to take the 
depositions or testimony of witnesses in the mode pre­
scribed by the laws of the state in which the courts are 
held. " 5 The Supreme Court has held that this statute 
merely regulates the mode of taking and does not enlarge 
the grounds for taking so as to allow examinations be­
fore trial for purposes of discovery in accordance with 
local practice.6 
Judge Woolsey, of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York recently made a vigorous criticism 
4 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sec. 639. 
5 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sec. 643. 
6 Hanks Dental Association v. International Tooth Crown Co. (1904) 
194 U. S. 303. There has been some confusion in the decisions of the 
lower federal courts on this matter in spite of the Supreme Court ruling. 
See annotations to U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sees. 635, 6�3. 
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of a federal rule as to discovery. He said : " In a former 
case I had occasion to express my regret that, after the 
commencement of an action on the law side of this court, 
so little could be done to facilitate the preparation of 
either party for the trial. 
- ' ' That at this date the practice on the law side of the 
federal courts should be so lacking in plasticity with re­
gard to interlocutory remedies seems extraordinary, 
when it is remembered that under the procedure in almost 
all the states, through examination before trial or other­
wise, the plaintiff can secure evidence and documents in 
advance which he can use at the trial, and also that 
throughout the British Empire, including all its domin­
ions, India and the Crown Colonies, every paper or let­
ter, even remotely connected with a case, must, unless 
privileged, be discovered to the opposing party and re­
main available to him pendente lite that he may, if he 
wishes, offer it at the trial. It is unfortunate that the 
practice of automatic compulsory discovery is not in 
force here. • � • . 
"In view of several illuminating experiences which I 
have had in cases pending in the . English courts, I feel 
hospitable to every form of interlocutory discovery. 
• • • 
' "The rationale of this attitude is, of course, not only 
that the court wants to know the truth, but also that it 
is good for both parties to learn the truth far enough 
ahead of the trial not only to enable them to prepare for 
trial, but also to enable them to decide whether or not it 
may be futile to proceed to trial. The number . of cases 
which have been dropped before trial owing to the rigor­
ous discovery practiced in the English courts is, I under­
stand, almost unbelievable. ' '  7 
'1 Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corp. (1931) 46 F. (2d) 
319, 320. 
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There is the following federal statute regarding pro­
duction of books and writings : 
" In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United 
States may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the 
parties to produce books or writings in their possession 
or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, 
in cases and under circumstances where they might be 
compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of 
proceedings in chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply 
with such order, the court may, on motion, give the like 
judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit ; and 
if a defendant fails to comply with such order, the court 
may, on motion, give judgment against him by default. " 8 
For more than a century trial courts disagreed as to 
whether this statute authorized inspection before trial 
or was limited to production at the trial, but the United 
States Supreme Court finally decided that only produc­
tion at the trial was authorized.9 
Alabama. 
There is the following provision for examination of 
parties by written interrogatories, in both law and equity 
actions in Alabama : 
" Either party to a civil suit, whether in a court of law, 
or in a court of equity, and including proceedings on 
contest of answer of a garnishee, his agent or attorney, 
desiring the testimony of the other party, may file with 
the clerk or registe;r interrogatories to be propounded to 
him, with an affidavit that the answers thereto will be 
material testimony for him in the cause. 
' ' Upon the filing of such interrogatories, the clerk or 
register must issue a copy thereof, which must be served 
by the · sheriff upon the party to whom the interrogatories 
are addressed, or his attorney of record, if either re­
sides within the state. If such party and his attorney 
8 U. 8. C. A., Tit. 28, see. 636. 
9 Carpenter v. Winn (1911)"221 U. 8. 533. 
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are non-residents, the clerk or register must send such 
copy by mail, postage prepaid, to one of them at his 
place of residence. The sheriff, clerk or register, as the 
case may be, must endorse upon the original interrog­
atories the fact, "manner, and date of such service. 
' ' The answers to such interrogatories may be sworn to 
before any officer authorized to take and certify affida­
vits ; or if the party testifying be a nonresident, before 
one of the officers mentioned in section 7761 (3965 ) of 
this code, or a commissioner appointed by the clerk or 
register on the application of such party. 
" When the party to whom the interrogatories are ad­
dressed is a corporation, the answers thereto must be 
made by such officer, agent, or servant of the corporation 
as may be cognizant of the facts. 
' ' The answers to such interrogatories are evidence in 
the cause when offered by the party taking them. 
" If the interrogatories are not pertinent to the issue 
or matter in dispute between the parties, there shall be 
no obligation to answer them, and if answered, the an­
swers may be suppressed by the court at the trial. 
' ' If answer,s to the interrogatories are not filed within 
sixty days after service of a copy of the interrogatories, 
or when the answers are not full, or are evasive, the court 
may either attach the party and cause him to answer 
fully in open court, or tax him with so much costs as may 
be just, and continue the cause until full answers are 
made, or direct a nonsuit or judgment by default or de­
cree pro confesso, to be entitled, or render such judg­
ment or decree as would be appropriate if such default­
ing party offered no evidence. 
" A  resort to this mode of obtaining evidence does not 
preclude the party calling for it from adducing other 
proof of the same facts, or from contradicting it. 
" Under the provision of this article, the party is bound 
· to answer all pertinent interrogatories unless by the 
answers he subjects himself to a criminal prosecution. 
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The party may be required by the court to attach to his 
answers copies of letters and documents, the originals 
of which are in his possession or under his custody or 
control. 
"If the court does not, of its own motion, enforce the 
penalties for failure to answer interrogatories, as is re­
quired by section 7770 ( 4055) of this Code, the party 
propounding the interrogatories, on failure of the other 
party to answer within sixty days, may file his motion 
with the judge of the circuit court for the enforcement of 
the penalties provided by statute after notice for ten 
days given to the opposite party so in default ; and upon 
the hearing of such motion, the court may enforce the 
penalties, as is provided for in section 7770 of the 
Code." 10 
Alabama has the illiberal type of deposition statute 
which imposes conditions as to the unavailability of the 
witness upon the taking rather than upon the use merely : 
' ' The evidence of witnesses in civil cases may be taken 
by deposition by· either party-
' '  1. When the witness is a woman. 
' '  2. When the witness, from age, infirmity, or sick­
ness, is unable to attend court. 
' '  3. When the witness resides more than one hundred 
miles from the place of trial� computing by the route 
usually traveled, or resides out of, or is absent from the · 
state. 
"4. When the witness is about to leave the state, and 
will probably not return until after the trial. 
' '  5. When the claim or defense, or a material part 
thereof, depends exclusively on the evidence of the wit­
ness. 
' '  6. When the witness is the governor, secretary of 
state, state treasurer, state auditor, attorney-general, 
superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture 
and industries, examiner of public accounts, or the head 
10 Ala. Code (1928) sees. 7764:-7773. 
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of any other department or bureau of the state govern­
ment, judge or clerk of any court of record, register in 
chancery, or sheriff ; or president, director, or other offi­
cer of a bank incorporated in the state ; postmaster or 
other officer of the United States ; or practicing physician 
or lawyer ; or a person constantly employed on any steam­
boat or other water craft, or on any turnpike, or manu­
factory, or about the engine or other machinery of a rail­
road, or is a superintendent, secretary, treasurer, master 
of road repairs, or conductor of any railroad, or is a 
telegraph operator ; or a teacher of a public or private 
school actually engaged in teaching, or a minister of the 
gospel, or pastor of a religious society in charge of any 
diocese, parish, church, district or circuit. ' '  11 
There is the following statutory provision on pro­
duction of books and writings : 
" In the trial of actions at law the court may, on mo­
tion and due notice thereof, require the parties to pro­
duce books, documents or writings in their possession, 
custody, control or power which contain evidence perti­
nent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where 
they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordi­
nary rules of proceedings in chancery cases. 
"If plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the court 
may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant 
as in cases of nonsuit ; and if the defendant fails to com­
ply with such order, the court may, on motion, give judg­
ment against him by default. "  11 
Arizona.. 
There is the following provision in Arizona for taking 
the deposition of the opposite party: 
' 'Either party to ·an action may take the deposition of 
the opposite party as .a witness, or if a corporation, the 
deposition of the president, secretary, or other principal 
officer or general managing agent of such corporation, in 
11 Id. sees. 7744, 7745. 
ll ld. see. 77 44. 
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the manner and by the same process, and subject to the 
same rules, provided for the taking of depositions of 
other witnesses. The party taking such depositions shall 
not be concluded thereby, but may rebut the same, and 
may ask leading questions. The right to take such depo­
sition is absolute and not dependent upon the residence 
of the person whose deposition is to be taken or upon 
sickness, infirmity, or attendance of such person upon the 
trial. If a party refuses to answer, the officer taking the 
deposition shall so certify and any question which the 
party refuses to answer or which he answers evasively 
shall be taken as confessed. ' ' 18 
There is the following provision for inspection of 
books and papers : 
' ' The court in which an action is pending, may order 
either party to give to the other with a specified time 
an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of 
any book, document or paper in his possession or under 
his control, containing evidence relating to the action. 
If compliance with the order be refused, the court may 
exclude the book, document or paper from being given in 
evidence, or may presume it to be such as the party 
applying alleges it to be ; and may also punish the party 
refusing, for a contempt. This section shall not prevent 
a party from compelling another to produce books, pa­
pers or documents when he is examined as a witness. 
In an action by or against a corporation the court may 
compel the officers of the corporation to produce the 
books and records of the corporation, and to permit in­
spection and the making of copies thereof. ' '  14 
Arkansas. 
Arkansas has the following provision for interroga­
tories annexed to pleadings in equity actions : 
"In actions by equitable proceedings either party may 
annex to his complaint, answer or reply written interrog-
18 Rev. Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928) sec. 4444. 
14 Id. see. 4465. 
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atories to any one or more of the adverse parties con-
. cerning any of the material matters in issue in the action ; 
the answers to which, on oath, may be read by either 
party, as a deposition between the party interrogating 
and the party answering. " 111 
There is a limited provision for interrogatories in ac­
tions at law : 
"In actions by proceedings at law either party may, in 
like manner, annex written interrogatories to his com­
plaint, answer or reply, directed to any one or more of 
the adverse parties concerning any material matter in 
issue in the action in the following cases : First. Where 
the party interrogated does not reside in the same or an 
adjoining county. Second. Where the party inter­
rogated is unable to attend court on account of age, in­
firmity or imprisonment, or is a female. ' '  16 
Arkansas has the liberal type of deposition statute 
which imposes conditions upon the use rather than the 
taking : 
' 'Depositions may be used on the trial of all issues, and 
upon all motions in actions by equitable proceedings, 
except. where th'e court otherwise directs on an issue tried 
by a jury. 
' ' They may be used on the trial of all issues in any 
action in the following cases : 
' 'First. Where the witness does not reside in the 
county where the action is pending, or in an adjoining 
county, or is absent from the state, or is in the military 
service of the United States, or of this state. 
" Second. Where the witness is the governor, secre­
tary of state, auditor or treasurer of this state, a judge 
or clerk of a court, a president, cashier, teller or clerk 
of a bank, a practicing physician, surgeon or lawyer, or 
keeper, officer or guard of the penitentiary. · 
16 Ark. Stat. (1921) see. 1248. 
18 Id. see. 1252. 
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' ' Third. Where, from age, infirmity, or imprisonment, 
the witness is unabl� to attend court, or is dead. 
' ' Fourth. Where the witness resides thirty or more 
miles from the place where the court sits in which the 
action is pending, unless the witness is in attendance at 
the court. " 17 
Arkansas lawyers say that very little use is made of 
deposition procedure for purposes of discovery before 
trial. There is a statute which authorizes the court to 
compel production of books and papers at the trial but 
not before the trial.18 
California.. 
Discovery by deposition is authorized in California by 
the following statute : 
" The testimony ora witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action at any time after the service 
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant, and 
in a special proceeding after a question of fact has arisen 
therein, in the following cases : 
' '  1. When the witness is a party to the action or pro­
ceeding or an officer or member of a corporation which 
is a party to the action or proceeding, or a person for 
whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is pros­
ecuted or defended ; 
' '  2. When the witness resides out of the county in 
which his testimony is to be used, or resides in the county 
but more than :fifty miles distant from the place of trial 
or hearing by the nearest usual traveled route ; 
' '  3. When the witness is about to leave the county 
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con­
tinue absent when the testimony is required ; 
' '  4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the 
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend ; 
, ' '  5. When the testimony is required upon a motion, 
or in any other case where the oral examination of the 
witness is not required ; 
1'7 Id. sees. 4205, 4206. 
18 Id. sec. 4137. 
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" 6. When the witness is the only one who can estab­
lish facts or a fact material to the issue ; provided, that 
the deposition of such witness shall not be used if his 
presence can be procured at the time of the trial of the 
cause. " 19 It should be noted that the California plan 
constitutes virtually a compromise between the liberal 
type of deposition statute which allows unconditional tak­
ing of depositions of parties and witnesses alike and the 
illiberal type of statute which imposes conditions upon 
the taking of depositions of parties and witnesses alike. 
There is an absolute right to take the deposition of a 
party and a conditional right to take the deposition of 
witnesses generally.10 
The following provision is made for inspection of writ­
ings : 
' 'Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof may, upon notice, order either party to give to 
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy, 
or permission to take a copy, of entries of accounts in 
any book, or of any document or paper in his possession, 
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the 
merits of the . action, or the defense therein. If compli­
ance with the order be refused, the court may exclude the 
entries of accounts of the book, or the document, or pa­
per from being given in evidence, or if wanted as evi­
dence by the party applying may direct the jury to pre­
sume them to be such as he alleges them to be ; and the 
court may also punish the party refusing for a con­
tempt. This section is not to be construed to prevent a 
party from compelling another to produce books, papers, 
or documents when he is examined as a witness. ' '  81 
Correspondence with lawyers in Los Angeles and in 
San Francisco indicates · that discovery procedure is 
19 Code of Civ. Pro. (Deering, 1931) sec. 2021. 
110 For a description of the California practice see Harkleroad, The 
La:w. of Discovery i� the Courts of California, 4 Southern Cal. L. Rev. 
169, 185. ' . . . . • 
11 Code of Civ. Pro. (Deerln�, 1931) sec. 1000. 
280 DISCOVERY STATUTES 
widely used. Several lawyers said that they use it as of 
course in practically all cases. Others said that one par­
ty or the other takes depositions for discovery in more 
than three-fourths of all seriously contested actions. Sat­
isfaction with the procedure appears to be general. 
Colorado. 
The Colorado plan for discovery before trial is mod­
elled after that used in California. The statutes provide 
that : 
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action, at any time after the service 
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and 
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has 
arisen therein, in the following cases : 
' ' First. When a witness is a party to the action or 
proceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the 
action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended. 
' ' Second. When the witness resides out of the county 
in which his testimony is to be used. 
' ' Third. When the witness is about to leave the county 
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con­
tinue absent when the testimony is required. 
' 'Fourth. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend 
the trial, is, nevertheless, too infirm to attend. 
" Fifth. When the witness is for any other cause ex­
pected to be unable to attend the trial. ' '  118 
Inspection and copy of documents is authorized by the 
following statute : 
' 'Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof, may upon notice, order either party to give to 
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy, 
or permission to take a copy of any book, document or 
paper in his possession or under his control, containing 
evidence relating to the merits of the action or the de­
fense therein. If OOlllplianee with the order be refu!tea, 
ft Coio. Coile of Clv. Pro. (ltl$1) see. 316. 
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the court may exclude the book, document or paper from 
being given in evidence ; or if wanted as evidence, by the 
party applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be 
such as he alleges it to be ; and the court may also punish 
the party refusing for a contempt. This section shall 
not be construed to prevent a party from compelling 
another to produce books, papers or documents, when he 
is examined as a witness. ' '  81 
Connecticut. 
The following statutory procedure for discovery be­
fore trial exists i:u. Connecticut : 
' ' In any civil action in the superior court, any court 
of common pleas or any city court, the plaintiff at any 
time after entry of action, and the defendant at any time 
after answer, may file a motion praying for a disclosure 
of facts or production of papers, books or documents ma­
terial to the support or defense of the suit, within the 
knowledge, possession or power of the adverse party, and 
such facts, pap�rs, books or documents, being disclosed 
or produced, may be given in evidence by the party filing 
such motion. Upon affidavit being made by the person 
filing such motion, that he verily believes all the matters 
therein set forth to be true, the person of whom such 
disclosure or production is sought shall plead, answer or 
demur in s'uch time as the court shall prescribe. If inter­
rogatories shall be filed with such motion, each interrog­
atory shall be answered separately and fully and the 
answers shall be in writing, signed by the party and upon 
his oath. If a party shall fail to comply with such order 
of disclosure or production, he shall be nonsuited or de­
faulted ; and, upon motion to set aside such nonsuit or 
default, the court may grant the motion upon compliance -
with such terms as it may impose. 
' ' If a corporation shall be a party to.  ail action, the 
opposite party may examine tlie p':tesident, ·t-teas'u:ier, 
aa Id. set. 890. 
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secretary, clerk or any director or other officer thereof in 
the same manner as if he were a party to the suit. 
" In the conduct of any hearing or trial, a party inter­
rogated shall not be obliged to answer a question or pro­
duce a document the answering or producing of which 
would tend to incriminate him or to disclose his title to 
any property the title whereof is not material to the hear­
ing or trial in the course of which he is interrogated, and 
the right to refuse to answer a question, produce a docu­
ment or disclose a title may be claimed either by the 
party interrogated or by counsel in his behalf. 
" When either party in any action shall have obtained 
from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the 
matters alleged in any pleading, the disclosure shall not 
be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any 
other testimony. ' '  " 
This procedure is very clumsy and ineffective and little 
used by the bar. The Connecticut Judicial Council re­
cently has suggested a revision to make it more effec­
tive.26 Connecticut has the illiberal type of deposition 
statute which imposes conditions upon the taking of 
depositions as well as upon the use thereof at the trial : 
" If any witness in a civil action shall live out of the 
state or more than twenty miles from the place of trial, 
shall be going to sea or out of the state or, by reason of 
age or infirmity, shall be unable to travel to court, or 
shall be co�ned in jail, his deposition may be taken by 
a judge or clerk of any court, justice of the peace, notary 
public or commissioner of the superior court ; but reason� 
able · notice shall be given to the adverse party or his 
known agent or attorney, or left at his usual place of 
abode, to be present at the time of taking such depo­
sition ; and depositions may be taken in any other state 
or country by a notary public, a commissioner appointed 
84 Conn . . Gen. Stat. (1930) sec�. 5,635-5.638. 
85 See Report of Connecticut Judicial Council (193d) pp. 6p, 74. 
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by the governor of this state or any magistrate having 
power to administer oaths and, if taken out of the United 
States, before any foreign minister, secretary of lega­
tion, consul or vice-consul, appointed by the United 
States, or any person by him appointed for the purpose 
and having authority under the laws of the country 
where the deposition is to be taken ; and the official char­
acter of any such person may be proved by a certificate 
from the secretary of state of the United States. All 
witnesses giving depositions shall be cautioned to speak 
the whole truth, and carefully examined, and shall sub­
scribe their depositions, and make oath before the au­
thority taking the same, who shall attest the same and 
certify whether or not the adverse party or his agent was 
present, and whether or not he was notified, and shall 
also certify the reason of taking such deposition, seal it 
up, direct it to the court where it is to be used and 
deliver it if desired to the party at whose request it was 




The illiberal type of deposition statute which imposes 
conditions upon the taking as well as the use obtains in 
Delaware : 
" If it appear, by affidavit, that there is a material 
witness residing out of the County, whose attendance it 
is not practicable to procure, the justice may make a 
rule that his deposition be taken before a commissioner 
named by him ; and, unless it shall be otherwise agreed, 
the party applying for such rule shall file in writing all 
the questions to be put to such witness, giving at least 
four days ' notice to the other party, who may file other 
questions. The justice shall forward a copy of the rule 
and the questions to the commissioner, with a copy of 
this section. The deposition must be taken in writing, 
signed by the witness, certified by the commissioner, and 
86 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 5584. 
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sent, sealed up, to the justice. The witness must first be 
sworn, or affirmed, by the commissioner, to answer the 
questions truly ; neither party shall be present at the 
taking of deposition, and no question shall be put but 
those sent by the justice. ' '  " 
The statute on production of books and writings is as 
follows : 
' 'At any time during the pendency of actions at law, 
the court, on motion and due notice thereof, may order 
a party to produce books, or writings, in his possession, 
or control, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, 
under circumstances in which the production of the same 
might be compelled by a court of chancery ; and the court 
making such order, shall have the same power for en­
forcing it which is exercised by a court of chancery in 
like cases. Upon failure of a plaintiff to comply with 
such order, the court, on motion, may render judgment 
against him as in cases of nonsuit ; and upon a like fail­
ure of a defendant, the court, on motion, may render 
judgment against him by default. ' '  88 
England. 
Order XXXI of the rules of the Supreme Court outline 
the present English procedure in regard to discovery and 
inspection. Order XXXI reads as follows : 
"In any cause or matter the plaintiff or defendant by 
leave of the court or a judge may deliver interrogatories 
in writing for the examination of the opposite parties, or 
any one or more of such.parties, and such interrogatories 
when delivered shall have a note at the foot thereof stat­
ing which of such interrogatories each of such persons 
is required to answer : Provided that interrogatories 
which do not relate to any matters in question in the 
cause or matter shall be deemed irrelevant, notwith-
1'7 Dela. Rev. Code (1915) sec. 4052. 
88 Id. sec. 4228. 
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standing that they might be admissible on the oral cross­
examination of a witness. 
' 'A copy of the interrogatories proposed to be de­
livered shall be delivered with the summons or notice of 
application for leave to deliver them at least two clear 
days before the hearing thereof (unless in any case the 
court or judge shall think fit to dispense with this re­
quirement) and the particular interrogatories sought to 
be delivered shall be submitted to and considered by the 
court or judge. In deciding upon such application, the 
court or judge shall take into account any offer, which 
may be made by the party sought to be interrogated to 
deliver particulars, or to make admissions, or to produce 
documents relating to any matter in question, and leave 
shall be given as to such only of the interrogatories as 
shall be considered necessary either for disposing fairly 
of the cause or matter or for saving costs. 
"In adjusting the costs of the cause or matter inquiry 
shall at the instance of any party be made into the 
propriety of exhibiting such interrogatories, and if it is 
the opinion of the taxing officer or of the court or judge, 
either with or without an application for inquiry, that 
such interrogatories have been exhibited unreasonably, 
vexatiously, or at improper length, the costs occasioned 
by the ·said interrogatories and the answers thereto shall 
be paid in any event by the party in fault. 
"If any party to a cause or matter be a body corporate 
or a joint-stock company, whether incorporated or not, 
or any other body of persons, empowered by law to sue 
or be sued, whether in its own name or in the name of 
any officer or other person, any opposite party may ap­
ply for an order allowing him to · deliver interrogatories 
,to any member or officer of such corporation, company, 
or body, and an order may be made accordingly. 
"Any objection to answering any one or more of sev­
eral interrogatories on· the grot:tnd that it or they is or 
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are scandalous or irrelevant or not bona fide for the 
purpose of the cause or matter, or that the matters in­
quired into are not sufficiently material at that stage, or 
on any other ground, may be taken in the affidavit in an­
swer. 
"Interrogatories shall be answered by affidavit to be 
filed within ten days, or within such other time as a judge 
may allow. 
"If any person interrogated omits to answer, or an­
swers insufficiently, the party interrogating may apply 
to the court or a judge for an order requiring him to 
answer, or to answer further, as the case may be. And 
an order may be made requiring him to answer or answer 
further, either by affidavit or by viva-voce examination, 
as the judge may direct. 
"Any party may, without filing an affidavit, apply to 
the court or a ·  judge for an order directing any other 
party to any cause or matter to make discovery on oath 
of the documents which are or have been in his posses­
sion or power, relating to any matter in question therein. 
On the hearing of such application the court or judge 
may either refuse or adjourn the same, if satisfied that 
such discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that 
stage of the cause or matter, or make such order, either 
generally or limited to certain classes of documents, as 
may, in their or his discretion be thought fit. Provided 
that discovery shall not be ordered when and so far as 
the court or judge shall be of opinion that it is not neces­
sary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or 
for saving costs. 
' ' The affidavit to be made by a party against whom 
such order as is mentioned in the last preceding rule has 
been made, shall specify which, if any, of the documents 
therein mentioned he objects to produce. 
" On the hearing of any application for discovery of 
documents the court or judge in lieu of ordering an 
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affidavit of documents to be filed may order that the party 
from whom discovery is sought shall deliver to the oppo­
site party a list of the documents which are or have been 
in his possession, custody or power relating to the mat­
ters in question. Provided that the ordering of such list 
shall not preclude the court or judge from afterwards 
ordering the party to make and file an affidavit of docu­
ments. 
"It shall be lawful for the court or a judge, at any time 
during the pendency of any cause or matter, to order 
the production by any party thereto, upon oath, of such 
of the documents in his possession or power, relating to 
any matter in question in such cause or matter, as the 
court or judge shall think right ; and the court may deal 
with such documents, when produced, in such manner as 
shall appear just. 
" Every party to a . cause or matter shall be entitled, at 
any time, by notice in writing, to give notice to any other 
party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made 
to any document, to produce such document for the in­
spection of the party giving such notice, or of his solici­
tor, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof ; 
and any party •not complying with such notice shall not 
afterwards be at liberty to put any such document in 
evidence on his behalf in such cause or matter, unless 
he shall satisfy the court or a judge that such document 
relates only to his own title, he being a defendant to the 
cause or matter, or that he had some other cause or ex­
cuse which the court or judge shall deem sufficient for 
not complying with such notice, in which case the court 
or judge may allow the same to be put in evidence on 
such terms as to costs and otherwise as the court or 
judge shall think fit. 
' ' The party to whom such notice is given shall, within 
two days from the receipt of such notice, if all the docu­
ments therein referred to have been set forth by him in 
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the affidavit, or if any of the documents referred to in 
such notice have not been set forth by him in any such 
affidavit, then within four days from the receipt of such 
notice, deliver to the party giving the same a notice stat­
ing a time within three days from the delivery thereof 
at which the documents, or such of them as he does not 
object to produce, may be inspected at the office of his 
solicitor, or in the case of bankers ' books or other books 
of account or books in constant use for the purposes of 
any trade or business at their usual place of custody, and 
stating which (if any) of the documents he objects to 
produce, and on what ground. 
"If the party served with notice omits to give such 
notice of a time for inspection or objects to give inspec­
tion, or offers inspection elsewhere than at the office of 
his solicitor, the court or judge may, on the application 
of the party desiring it, make an order for inspection in 
such place and in such manner as he may thin!r fit : Pro­
vided that the order shall not be made when and so far as 
the court or a judge shall be of opinion that it is not 
necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or 
matter or for saving costs. 
' 'Any application to inspect documents, except such as 
are referred to in the pleadings, particulars, or affidavits 
of the party against whom the application is made, or 
disclosed in his affidavit of documents, shall be founded 
upon an affidavit showing of what documents inspection 
is sought, that the party applying is entitled to inspect 
them, and that they are in the possession or power of the 
other party. The court or judge shall not make such 
order for inspection of such documents when and so far 
as the court or judge shall be of opinion that it is not 
necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or 
matter or for saving costs. 
' 'An order upon the lord of a manor to allow limited 
inspection of the court rolls may be made on the appli-
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cation of a copyhold tenant, supported by an affidavit 
that he has applied for inspection and that the same has 
been refused. 
"Where inspection of any business book is applied 
for, the court or a judge may, if they or he shall think 
fit, instead of ordering inspection of the original books, 
order a copy of any entries therein to be furnished and 
verified by the affidavit of some person who has examined 
the copy with the original entries, and such affidavit shall 
state whether or not there are in the original book any 
and what erasures, interlineations, or alterations. Pro­
vided that, notwithstanding that such copy has been 
supplied, the court or a judge may order inspection of 
the book from which the copy was made. 
" Where on an application for an order for inspection 
privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful 
for the court or a judge to inspect the document for the 
purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of 
privilege. 
' ' The court or a judge may, on the application of any 
party to a cause or matter at any time, and whether an 
affidavit of documents shall or shall not have already 
been ordered or made, make an order requiring any 
other party to state by affidavit whether any particular 
document or documents or any Class or classes of docu­
ments specified or indicated in the application, is or are, 
or has or have at any time been, in his possession, cus­
tody or power ; and, if not then in his possession, custody 
or power when he parted with the same and what has 
become thereof. Such application shall be made on an 
affidavit stating that in the belief of the deponent the par­
ty against whom the application is made has, or has at 
some time had in his possession, custody or power the 
particular document or documents or the class or classes 
of documents specified or indicated in the application, 
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and that they relate to the matters in question in the 
cause or matter, or to some or one of them. 
' ' If the party from whom discovery of any kind or 
inspection is sought objects to the same, or any part 
thereof, the court or a judge may, if satisfied that the 
right to the discovery or inspection sought depends on 
the determination of any issue or question in dispute in 
the cause or matter, or that for any other reason it is 
desirable that any issue or question in dispute in the 
cause or matter should be determined before deciding 
upon the right to the discovery or inspection, order that 
such issue or question be determined first, and reserve 
the question as to the discovery or inspection. 
" If any party fails to comply with any order to 
answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection 
of documents, he shall be liable to attachment. He shall 
also, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his action dismissed 
for want of prosecution, and, if a defendant, to have his 
defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same 
position as if he had not defended, and the party inter­
rogating may apply to the court or a judge for an order 
to that effect, and an order may be made accordingly. 
' ' Service of an order for interrogatories or discovery 
or inspection made against any party on his solicitor 
shall be sufficient service to found an application for an 
attachment for disobedience to the order. But the party 
against whom the application for an attachment is made 
may show in answer to the application that he has had 
no notice or knowiedge of the order. 
' 'A solicitor upon whom an order against any party 
for interrogatories or discovery or inspection is served 
under the last preceding rule, who neglects without rea-: 
sonable excuse to give notice thereof to his client, shall 
be liable to attachment. 
' 'Any party may, at the trial of a cause, matter, or 
issue, use in evidence any one or more of the answers or 
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any part of an answer of the opposite party to interrog­
atories without putting in the others or the whole of such 
answer : Provided always, that in such case the judge 
may look at the whole of the answers, and if he shall be 
of opinion that any others of them are so connected with 
those put in that the last-mentioned answers ought not 
to be used without them, he may direct them to be put in. 
' ' Any party seeking discovery by interrogatories or 
otherwise may be ordered upon making application for 
discovery to pay into court to a separate account in the 
action to be called ' Security for Costs Account, ' to abide 
further order the sum of 5l., or any less sum, and may be 
ordered further to pay into court such additional sum as 
the court or a judge shall direct. If · security be so or­
dered the party seeking discovery shall, with his interrog­
atories or order for discovery serve a copy of the receipt 
for the said payment into court, and the time for answer­
ing or making discovery shall in such cases commence 
from the date of such service, and the party from whom 
discovery is sought shall not be required to answer or 
make discovery unless and until the said payment if so 
ordered has. bef'.,n made. 
' ' Unless the court or a judge shall at or before the 
trial otherwise order, the amount standing to the credit 
of the ' Security for Costs Account ' in any cause or mat­
ter, shall after the cause or matter has been finally dis­
posed of be paid out to the party by whom the same was 
paid in on his request, or to his solicitor on such party's 
written authority, in the event of the costs of the cause 
or matter being adjudged to him, but in the event of 
the court or judge ordering him to pay the costs of the 
cause or matter, the amount in court shall be subject to 
a lien for the costs ordered to be paid to any other party. 
"If after a cause or matter has been finally disposed 
of, by consent or otherwise, no taxation of costs shall be 
req�ired, the taxing officer or . Master (as the case may 
292 DISCOVERY STATUTES 
be) may, either by consent of the parties, or on being 
satisfied that any party who has lodged any money to 
the ' Security for Costs Account ' in such cause or matter 
has become entitled to have the same paid out to him, 
give a certificate to that effect, which certificate shall be 
acted on and have effect in all respects as if the same 
had been an order made in the said cause or matter. 
"In any action against or by a sheriff in respect of 
any matters connected with the execution of his office, 
the court or a judge may, on the application of either 
party, order that the affidavit to be made in answer either 
to interrogatories or to an order for discovery shall be 
made by the officer actually concerned. 
" This order shall apply to infant plaintiffs and de­
fendants, and to their next friends and guardians ad 
litem. " 119 
The following British jurisdictions have provisions for 
discovery by written interrogatories which are fashioned 
after the English procedure : 
(1)  Australia ; 80 (2) British Columbia ; 81 (3)  New 
Brunswick ; 811 (4) Newfoundland ; 88 (5)  Nova Scotia ; 84 
(6)  Queensland ; 85 ( 7 )  South Australia ; 88 (8)  Victoria.87 
Florida. 
Discovery from adverse parties is provided by the fol­
lowing statutes in Florida: 
" The courts of this state may, on the trial of causes 
cognizable before them respectively, upon ten days ' no­
tice to the opposite party or his attorney, require the 
party notified as aforesaid to produce books and other 
ll9 Annual Practice (1932) Order XXXI. 
80 County Court Prac. p. 136 ff. 
81 Court Rules (1925) Order XXXI; British Columbia also has pro­
vision for an oral examination for discovery. 
82 Judicature Act and Rules of Court (1909) Order XXXI. New Bruns-
wick also allows an oral examination for discovery. 
88 Cons. Stat. (1916) vol. 2, p. 780 ff. 
84 Judieature Act (1920) Order XXXI. 
86 Supreme do'urt Practice (1921) p. 23. , 
88 Of. Wint'e'l:bot'tom v. 'Varaou & ,Sous, . 192,1 s. A. R. R. 365. 
8'7 Supreme Court ltules (1916) drdet XXXI. 
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writings in his possession, power or custody, which shall 
contain evidence pertinent to the issue ; and if he shall 
fail to comply with such order, or to satisfy the court why 
the same is not complied with, it shall be lawful for the 
court, if the party so refusing be plaintiff, to give judg­
ment for the defendant, as in case of nonsuit ; and if 
defendant, to give judgment against him by default. The 
party requiring the production of books or papers as 
aforesaid shall, in all cases, satisfy the court of their 
materiality in the cause therein pending. 
"In all causes in any of the courts of this state, the 
plaintiff may, at any time, after filing declaration, or the 
defendant, after filing plea, deliver to the opposite party, 
or his attorney, interrogatories in writing upon any mat­
ter as to which discovery may be sought, and require such 
party, or in case of a body corporate, any of the officers 
of such body corporate, within ten days, to file in the 
court in which the cause is pending, written answers 
under oath to such interrogatories. Such answers shall 
be evidence against, but not for, the party making them. 
A failure to answer such interrogatories shall be deemed 
a contempt of' court. 
"In cases of omission without just cause to answer 
sufficiently such written interrogatories, the court may, 
at its discretion, direct an oral examination of the inter­
rogated party as to such points as it may direct, either 
before the court, or a person to be appointed by the 
court, and the court may command the attendance of 
such party for the purpose of being orally examined as 
. aforesaid, or the production of any writings or other 
documents to be mentioned in such rule or order, and 
may impose therein such terms as to such examination, 
and the costs of the application, and of the proceedings 
thereon and otherwise, as to it shall seem just. 
" The deposition taken as aforesaid shall be reduced 
to writing and returned to and ke'pt in the court in which 
the J5r'oeeedings a�e pending. 
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' '  The person taking the examination shall, if required 
by either party, report to the court the absence or con­
duct of the person to be interrogated, and the court may 
make such order as to contempt or otherwise as it may 
see fit. ' '  88 Florida has the illiberal type of deposition 
statute which makes the taking conditional.89 
Georgia.. 
The following provision for discovery · is made in 
Georgia: 
' ' The superior court in equitable proceedings may com­
pel either party to discover facts within his knowledge, 
beneficial to the other party and material to his case ; and 
this either upon a petition for discovery and relief, or 
for discovery alone, ancillary to some other civil pro­
ceedings. But the party seeking relief may waive dis­
covery, and in such case the defendant 's answer is not 
evidence. 
" No party shall be required to discover matters tend­
ing to criminate himself; or to expose him to a penalty 
or forfeiture, nor to make discovery of irrelevant mat­
ters, nor the advice of his professional advisers, nor his 
consultation with them, nor matters relating to his own 
and not the plaintiff's case ; nor can official persons be 
called on to disclose any state matters of which the 
policy of the state and the interest of the community re­
quire concealment. 
' ' The discovery must be full and free as to all matters 
of fact of which it is properly sought, and must include 
the respondent 's information and belief. If documents 
are. desired, in defendant 's possession or power, he must 
produce or satisfactorily account for them. 
' ' The discovery must be under oath or affirmation, but 
may be confined to those points. to which. special inter­
rogatories are placed in the petition. 
88 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (1927) sees. 4405-4407. 
89 Id. see. 4413. 
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' ' The answer of a defendant, as to facts within his 
own knowledge, responsible to the discovery sought, is 
evidence in his favor, and can be rebutted only by two 
witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circum­
stances :  Provided, discovery is expressly prayed for in 
the plaintiff's petition. The petitioner is not bound to 
read any portion of the answer, except that responsive to 
the petition. The defendant may read all as pleading. 
If the petition is for discovery alone, then the whole 
answer must be read together. And in the latter case the 
petitioner must pay the cost. 
"What is responsive is a question for the court. Any 
explanation of an admission made, or fact necessarily 
connected with it, is part of the response. Any matter 
in avoidance thereof is new matter, and must be proved. 
" The answer of one defendant is evidence for another, 
whenever it states facts against his own interest, and in 
favor of his co-defendants. 
' 'Discovery may be had from the opposite party, either 
nominal or real, in any case pending in any court in this 
state. 
' ' The party seeking such discovery may either sub­
poena the other party as a witness, or else file interrog­
atories, and sue dut a commission, as in cases provided 
for other witnesses. In the latter event, the right of 
cross-examination exists as in other cases. 
' ' And in all cases in any of the courts of this state, 
where either the plaintiff or defendant is a corporation, 
either foreign or domestic, public or private, it shall be 
the right of the opposite party to file, with the clerk of 
the court where such case is pending, interrogatories 
directed to the president, secretary, treasurer or other 
officer or agent of said corporation, and it shall be the 
duty of the officer or agent named in such interrogatories 
to sue out a commission directed to himself, and to have 
said interrogatories executed and returned to the next 
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term of the court ; the opposite party, or his attorney, 
shall give twenty days ' notice before the sitting of said 
court, to the attorney of record, or to any officer or agent 
of such corporation in the county where suit is pending, 
that interrogatories have been so filed. · Said corporation · 
or its agent shall not be required to advance the costs of 
executing said interrogatories. 
" When interrogatories are filed in office, and notice 
given thereof, it shall be the duty of the party sought to 
be examined to see to the execution and return of the 
same before the return term thereof. 
" A  party failing to appear, without sufficient excuse, 
when properly subpoenaed, or failing or refusing to 
answer either orally or to the interrogatories filed, . or 
answering evasively, shall be subject to attachment for 
contempt, and the court may also dismiss his case if he be 
· plaintiff, or strike his pleas if he be defendant, or give 
such other direction to the cause as is consistent with 
justice and equity ; and if either party be a corporation, 
the officer called on to give testimony shall be subject to 
attachment for contempt upon his failure to answer, and 
the court may dismiss the case or strike the plea, accord­
ing as the party corporation may be plaintiff or defend­
ant, upon the failure of any of its officers or agents to 
give testimony or to execute and return interrogatories 
as provided by law. 
" No party shall be required to testify as to any matter 
which may criminate or tend to criminate himself, or 
which shall tend to work a forfeiture of his estate, 
or which shall tend to bring infamy or disgrace or public 
contempt upon himself or any member of his family. ' '  40 
The Georgia deposition statute imposes conditions as 
to the availability of the witness for trial upon the taking 
as well as the use of the depositions.41 
40 Ga • .Ann. Code (Park, 1914) sees. 4543-4554. 
41 Id. see. 5886. 
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. Idaho. 
The following liberal provision on depositions obtains 
in Idaho : 
"In all actions depositions may be taken by either par­
ty in vacation or term time ; at any time after service of 
summons, without order of court therefor. They may be 
used in the trial of all issues, in any action in the follow­
ing cases : 
' '  1. When the witness does not reside in the county, or 
when he resides in a county adjoining and more than 30 
miles from the place of trial, or is absent from the state. 
' '  2. When the deponent is so aged, infirm or sick as 
not to be able to attend the court or place of trial, or is 
dead. 
' '  3. When the depositions have been taken by agree­
ment of parties, or by the order of the court trying the 
cause. 
"4. When the deponent is a state or county officer, or 
judge or a practicing physician, or attorney at law, and 
the trial is to be had in any county in which the deponent 
does not reside. In either of the foregoing cases the 
attendance of the witness can not be enforced. 
· 
" 5. When notice is given fixing the time of taking any 
deposition on a day in term time, the court, if in session, 
or the judge thereof in vacation may, on notice given by 
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing the 
motion, fix another day for such taking, and the court on 
the hearing of such motion, may fix the time for such 
taking, from which there shall be no appeal. ' '  ta 
The following statute provides for inspection of writ­
ings : 
' 'Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof, may, upon · notice, order either party to give · 
to the other, within a specified time, an inspection and 
copy, or permission to take a copy, of entries of account 
ta Ida. Comp. Stat. (1919) sec. 8006. 
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in any book or of any document or paper in his posses­
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to 
the merits of the action or the defense therein. If com­
pliance with the order be refused, the court may exclude 
the book, document or paper from being given in evi­
dence, or if wanted as evidence by the party applying, 
may direct the jury to presume them to be such as he 
alleges them to be, and the court may also punish the 
party refusing, for a contempt. This section is not to 
be construed to prevent a party from compelling another 
to produce books, papers or documents when he is exam- . 
ined as a witness. ' '  48 
Illinois. 
The illinois · Chancery Act preserves the ancient 
method of obtaining discovery before trial, namely, by 
inserting interrogatories in the chancery bill.44 There 
is an unconditional right to take depositions of resident 
witnesses in chancery : 
" When the testimony of any witness, residing or be­
ing within this state, shall be necessary in any suit in 
chancery in this state, the party wishing to use the same 
may cause the deposition of such witness to be taken 
before any judge, justice of the peace, clerk of a court, 
master in chancery or notary public, without a commis­
sion or filing interrogations for such purpose, on giving 
to the adverse party or his attorney ten days ' notice of 
the time and place of taking the same, and one day in 
addition thereto ( Sundays inclusive) for every fifty 
miles travel from the place of holding the court to the 
place where such deposition is to be taken. If the party 
entitled to notice and his attorney resides in the county 
where the deposition is to be taken, five days ' notice shall 
be sufficient. ' '  45 
48 Id. sec. 7193. 
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 22, sees. 22-26. 
46 Id. ch. 51, sec. 24. 
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The illiberal type of deposition statute, however, ob­
tains in actions at law in Illinois : 
' ' And it shall also be lawful, upon satisfactory affida­
vit being :filed, to take the depositions of witnesses resid­
ing in this state, to be read in suits at law, in like manner 
and upon. like notice as is above provided, in all cases 
where the witness resides in a different comity from that 
in which the court is held, is about to depart from the 
state, is in custody on legal process, or is unable to at­
tend such court . on account of advanced age, sickness or 
other bodily infirmity. " 46 
There is the following provision for production of 
books and writings : 
' ' The several courts shall have power, in any action 
pending before them, upon motion, and good and suffi­
cient cause shown, and reasonable notice thereof given, 
to require the parties, or either of them, to produce books 
or writings in their possession or power which contain 
evidence pertinent to the issue. ' '  47 
Section 32 of the Chicago Municipal Court Act pro­
vides for interrogatories in civil cases as follows : 
' ' That the municipal court in any civil suit pending 
therein, at any time before the trial or :final hearing 
thereof, may permit the :filing therein of interrogatories 
to be answered by any party to such suit or any person 
for whose immediate benefit such suit is prosecuted or 
defended, or by the directors, officers, superintendent or 
managing agents of any corporation which is a party to 
the record in such suit, at the instance of the adverse 
party or parties or any of them, and to require an answer 
under oath to all such interrogatories as the party to be 
interrogated might be required to answer, if called as a 
witness upon the trial or hearing of such suit, but the 
party :filing such interrogatories shall not be concluded 
46 Id. ch. 51, sec. 25. 
47 Id. ch. 51, sec. 9. 
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by the answers thereto, if he shall elect to introduce the 
same or any or either of them upon the trial or final 
hearing." a 
Indiana. 
There are a variety of provisions for discovery before 
trial under the Indiana practice. There is the following 
express provision for examination of parties : 
' 'A party to an action may be examined as a witness 
concerning any matter stated in the pleading(s) ,  at the 
instance of the adverse party, or of any one of several 
adverse parties ; and, for that purpose, may be compelled, 
in the same manner, and subject to the same rules of 
examination, as any other witness, to testify either at the 
trial, or conditionally, or upon commission. 
' ' The examination, instead of being had at the trial, 
may be had at any time before the trial, at the option of 
the party claiming it, before any officer authorized to 
take depositi01rs, on a previous notice to the party to be 
examined and any other adverse party of at least :five 
days, unless, for good cause shown, the court orders 
otherwise. But the party to be examined before the trial 
shall not be compelled to attend in any other county than 
that of his residence. 
' ' The attendance of the party to be examined may be 
enforced, and the examination shall be taken and :filed as 
a deposition, in the cause, and may be read by the party 
taking it, at his option ; but if not read, the party causing 
the examination shall pay the costs thereof. 
' ' The evidence of the party thus taken may be rebutted 
by adverse testimony. 
' 'Any party refusing to attend and testify, as above 
provided, may be punished as for a contempt ; and his 
complaint, answer or reply may be stricken out. ' '  49 
48 Gilbert, Municipal Court of Chicago, 294. 
f9 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sees. 564-568. 
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Discovery by written interrogatories may also be had 
by virtue of the following statute : 
' ' Either party may propound interrogatories, to be 
filed with the pleadings, relevant to tij.e matter in con­
troversy, and require the opposite party to answer the 
same under oath. And corporations, through their 
proper officers, agent or agents, shall be required to 
answer interrogatories as natural persons. All inter­
rogatories must be answered within the time limited, 
positively and without evasion, and the court may en­
force the answers by attachment or otherwise ; and the 
party may, in addition thereto, set forth, in his answers, 
all relevant matter in avoidance. The answers to the 
interrogatories may be used on the trial or not, at the 
option of the party requiring it : Provided, that in the 
absence of such opposite party, the filing of the inter­
rogatories shall not work a continuance of the cause, un­
less it be shown to the court, by affidavit, that the party . 
who files such interrogatories expects to elicit facts by 
the answers material to him on the trial ; that he believes 
such facts to be true ; that he can not prove the same by 
any witness ; and that he files the interrogatories, not for 
delay merely, hq.t to obtain substantial justice at the 
trial. ' '  60 
The liberal type of deposition statute obtains in Indi­
ana. This allows discovery before trial from witnesses 
generally as well as from parties. The statute provides : 
"In all actions, depositions may be taken by either 
party, in vacation or term time, at any time after service 
of summons, without order of court therefor. They may 
be used in the trial of all issues, in any action, in the 
following cases : 
' ' First. Where the witness does not reside in the 
county, or in a county adjoining the one in which the 
trial is to be held, or is absent from the. state. 
&O Id. see. 383. 
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' ' Second. When the deponent is so aged, infirm, or 
sick, as not to be able to attend the court or other place 
of trial, or is dead. 
' ' Third. When the depositions have been taken by 
agreement of parties, or by the order of the court trying 
the cause. 
' ' Fourth. When the deponent is a state or county 
officer, or a judge, or a practicing physician, or attorney 
at law, and the trial is to be had in any county in which 
the deponent does not reside. In either of the fore­
going cases, the attendance of the witness can not be 
enforced. 
' ' Fifth. When notice is given fixing the time of taking 
any deposition on a day in term time, the court may, if 
in session, or the judge thereof in vacation, on notice 
given by the adverse party of the time and place of hear­
ing the motion, fix another day for such taking, and the 
. court, on the hearing of such motion, may fix the time for 
such taking, from which there shall be no appeal. ' ' 61 
There are the following provisions for production and 
inspection of books and papers : 
' ' The court, or judge . thereof, may, upon affidavit of 
their necessity and materiality, upon motion, compel, by 
order, either party to produce, at or before the trial, any 
book, paper or document in his possession or power ; the 
order may be made upon application of either party, upon 
reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney. 
If not produced, parol evidence may be given of its con­
tents. 
' ' The court, or a judge thereof, may, under proper 
restrictions, upon due notice, order either party to give 
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy 
of any book or part thereof, paper or document in his 
possession, or under his control, containing evidence re­
lating to the merits of the action, or the defense therein. 
lil Id. see. 465. 
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If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on 
motion, may exclude such evidence, or punish the party 
refusing, or both. ' '  61 
Oral examinations for discovery are quite extensively 
used in the larger cities of Indiana. Attorneys for rail­
way, traction and insurance companies use discovery as 
a matter of coursi3. Written interrogatories are em­
ployed only when the action is of such a nature as not 
to justify the expense of an oral examination, or where 
the action is for a simple debt or account and it is thought 
that the filing of. written interrogatories may encourage a 
failure to defend, or where it is desired to dispense with 
mere formal matters of proof. 
Iowa. 
There is the following provision for interrogatories an­
nexed to pleading: 
' ' Either party may annex to his petition, answer, or 
reply written interrogatories to any one or more of the 
adverse parties, concerning any of the material facts in 
issue in the action, the answer to which, on oath., may be 
read by either party as a deposition between the party 
interrogating and the party answering. ' '  68 
There is the illiberal type of deposition statute in 
Iowa : 
' 'After the commencement of a civil action or other 
proceeding, if the witness is, or is about to go, beyond 
the reach of a subpoena, or is for any other cause ex­
P!'lCted to be unable to attend court at the time of trial, 
the party wishing his testimony may take his deposition 
in writing before any person having authority to ad­
minister oaths ; and if the action is triable by equitable 
proceedings, then without any other reason therefor 
either party may so take the deposition of any wit­
ness. ' '  st-
61 Id. sees. 535, 536. 
6S Ia. Code (1931) sec. 11185. 
6t Id. see. 11358. 
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The statute on production of books and papers fol­
lows : 
' ' The district or superior court may in its discretion, 
by rule, require the production of any papers or books 
which are material to the just determination of any cause 
pending before it, for the purpose of being inspected and 
copied by or for the party thus calling for them. " 66 
Kansas. 
There are the following provisions for taking deposi­
tions in Kansas : 
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in 
the following cases : 
" First. When the witness does not reside in the coun­
ty where the action or proceeding is pending, or is set 
for trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom. 
' ' Second. When from age, infirmity or imprisonment, 
the witness is unable to attend court, or is dead. 
' ' Third. When the testimony is required upon a mo­
tion, or in any other case where the oral testimony of 
the witness is not required. 
' 'Either party may commence taking testimony by 
deposition at any time after service upon the defendant 
of summons or the date of first publication of notice. 
"In any action now pending or hereafter instituted in 
any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, any 
party shall have the right to take the deposition of the 
adverse party, his agent or employee, and in case the 
adverse party is a joint-stock association, corporation 
or copartnership, then of any officer, director, agent or 
employee of any such joint-stock association, corpora­
tion or copartnership, when such adverse party, or officer, 
director, agent or employee of such adverse party is 
without the jurisdiction of the court or cannot be reached 
by the process of the trial court ; and in case said adverse 
party, when duly served with notice of the taking of such 
6i Id. sec. 11316. 
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deposition, as provided by the code of civil procedure 
for the taking of depositions, shall fail to appear at the 
place fixed in said notice, which place shall be in the city 
or county of the usual place of residence or place of 
bu..siness of said witness, and testify and produce what­
ever books, papers and documents demanded by the par­
ty taking such deposition, or shall fail to produce at the 
time and place specified in such notice such officer, di­
rector, agent or employee the court before whom such 
action is pending may, upon application of the party 
seeking to take such deposition, and upon notice to the 
adverse party of such application, and upon hearing had 
to the trial court, strike the pleadings of such adverse 
party from the files and render judgment in favor of the 
party so seeking to take such depositions, in whole or 
in part, as prayed for in his pleadings. " 66 
The Kansas court early ruled that deposition pro­
cedure could be used for purposes of discovery before 
trial.67 The court reversed itself later and forbade the 
use of deposition procedure for what it termed ' 'fishing 
expeditions. ' '  58 
Inspection or copy of documents is provided for in the . 
following manner : 
' ' Either party or his attorney may demand of the ad­
verse party an inspection and copy, or permission to 
take a copy of a book, paper or document in his posses­
sion or under his control containing evidence relating to 
the merits of the action, or defense therein. Such de­
mand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or 
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other 
party to distinguish it ; and if compliance with the de­
mand within four days be refused, the court or judge, on 
motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their 
116 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) sees. 2819-2821. 
li'7ln re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451. 
118 In re Davis (1888) 28 Kan. 408, 16 Pac. 790; In re Cubberly (1889) 
39 Kan. 291, 18 Pac. 173; Hanke v. Harlow (1911) · 83 Kan. 738, 112 
Pac. 616. 
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discretion order the adverse party to give to the other 
within a specified time an inspection and copy or per­
mission to take a copy of such book, paper or document ; 
and on failure to comply with such order the court may 
exclude the paper or document from being given in evi­
dence, or if wanted as evidence by the party applying 
may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party 
by affidavit alleges it to be. This section is not to be 
construed to prevent a party from compelling another. 
to produce any book, paper or document when he is exam­
ined as a witness. ' '  59 
Kentucky. 
Discovery may be had under the ordinary deposition 
procedure in Kentucky. It is provided that : " The plain­
tiff may commence taking depositions immediately after 
the service of the summons ; and the defendant imme­
diately after filing his answer. n 60 It is further provided 
that : 
' ' A  party may be examined as if under cross-examina­
tion at the instance of the adverse party, either orally or 
by deposition as any other witness ; but the party call­
ing for such examination shall not be concluded thereby, 
but may rebut it by counter testimony. ' '  61 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held upon several 
occasions that discovery before trial is authorized under 
this procedure. 68 The bar of Louisville and of Lexington 
use the procedure quite extensively but the practice has 
gained little headway in the smaller towns of Kentucky. 
Written interrogatories may be allowed in certain 
events under the Kentucky statutes :  
' ' In equitable actions, a party may•annex to his plead­
ing written interrogatories to the adverse party, concern-
59 Iran. Rev. Stat. (1923) sec. 2850. 
80 Ky. Code (Carroll, 1927) sec. 557. 
61 Id. sec. 606, sub-sec. 8. 
68 Wesj;ern Union Tel. Co. v. Williams (1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S. W. 
651 ; Owensboro City Ry. Co. v. Rowland (1913) 152 Ky. 175, 153 S. W. 
206; Willis v. Bank of Hardinsburg (1914) 160 Ky. 808, 170 S. W. 188 ; 
Ky. Utilities Co. v. McCarty 's Adm'r ( 1916) 169 Ky. 38, 183 S. W. 237. 
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ing any material allegation thereof ; and answers there­
to, on oath, may be read by either party, as a deposition 
between the party interrogating and the party answering. 
' ' The party answering shall not be confined to respond­
ing merely to the interrogatories, but may state any facts 
concerning tlie cause of action to which the interrog­
atories refer, and they may likewise be read as a deposi­
tion. 
"Interrogatories annexed to a petition shall be an­
swered when the party is required to answer the peti­
tion ; if annexed to any other pleading, they shall be 
answered in twenty days after notice of the filing thereof 
shall be given to the adverse party or his attorney ; but 
if answered twenty days before the term at which the 
action stands regularly for trial, the action shall not be 
postponed on account of their not being sooner answered. 
' ' In ordinary actions, a party may annex to his plead­
ing written interrogatories to an adverse party concern­
ing any material allegation-
' '  1. If the party interrogated do not reside within 
twenty miles from the place where the action may be 
pending. 
' '  2. If the party interrogated be unable to attend 
court on account of infirmity or imprisonment, or be a 
female. ' '  68 
There is the following statute which authorizes pro­
duction of documents : 
" The process by which the attendance of a witness is 
required is a subpoena. It is a writ directed to the sher­
iff, requiring him to summon the person named therein 
to attend at a particular time and place, to testify as a 
witness. It may, when the court or the judge thereof so 
directs, require the witness to bring with him any book, 
writing or other thing, under his control, which he is 
bound by law to produce in evidence. ' '  K 
68 Ky. Code (Carroll, 1927) sees. 140-143. 
84 Id. see. 528. 
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Louisiana.. 
Louisiana has a procedure which is called ' '  Interroga­
tories on Facts and Articles "  and which is of similar 
derivation. There are the following provisions in the 
code of practice : 
' 'Both plaintiff and defendant are permitted to annex, 
either to their petition or their answer, interrogatories 
on facts and articles. 
"Interrogatories on facts and articles are questions 
put in writing, in the form 'of articles, and annexed to a 
petition or to an answer, to which one of the parties to 
the suit prays that the other be ordered to respond, under 
oath, in order to make use of his answers as testimony 
in support of his demand, or to aid him in his defense. 
' ' The party interrogated on facts and articles is bound 
to answer, on oath and categorically, each of the ques­
tions put to him, unless he can not do so without con­
fessing himself guilty of some crime. · 
"Except in the above case, if the party interrogated 
refuse or neglect to answer, on oath, to all the questions 
put tp him, the facts concerning which he shall have so 
refused or neglected to answer, shall be taken for con­
fessed, provided that no court shall make an order re­
quiring a female to answer interrogatories on facts and 
articles, in open court, unless the party propounding 
them, or his or her agent or attorney, shall make oath, to 
the materiality of the interrogatories, and that they are 
not propounded for the purpose or in the hope oft having 
them taken for confessed, but with the bona fide desire 
to have them truly answered by the party interrogated. 
" To enable the defendant to obtain the answer of the 
plaintiff to interrogatories, he shall subjoin to the in­
terrogatories proposed to be answered, his affidavit of 
their materiality, and that in his opinion the answer of 
the plaintiff would assist him in making his defense ; but 
the party interrogated may object in writing,to any of the 
questions as not pertinent, and the judge shall decide 
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summarily whether he ought to answer or not ; if ordered 
to answer, he must do it, otherwise the facts unanswered 
will be deemed confess�d. 
' ' The party propounding the interrogatories may re­
quire the party interrogated to answer in open court, and 
in his presence, on the day appointed to that effect by the 
judge, if the party interrogated reside in the p�rish 
whe·re the court holds its sittings. 
" In all cases where a party interrogated resides out 
of the parish where the suit is pending, and whether 
within or without the state, it shall be his duty to file his 
answer to the interrogatories propounded to him within 
· such period as shall be :fixed by the court, on the motion 
of the party interrogating, and notice of which order, fix­
ing the delay, together with a copy of the interrogatories 
propounded, shall be served on the attorney representing 
the party interrogated ; provided, that when the party 
interrogated resides out of the state, his answers shall 
be taken by commission. 
"In answering a question, the party must simply con­
fess or deny ,the fact. Nevertheless, the party interro­
gated may state some other facts tending to his defense, 
provided they be closely linked to the fact on which he 
has been questioned and an appeal made to his conscience. 
His declarations, in such case, shall have as much effect 
as his answer to the question itself. 
' ' The answers of the party interrogated are evidence, 
but do not exclude adverse testimony, and shall be 
weighed by the judge as other testimony. 
' ' The party who sues for recovery of a debt, or the 
execution of an obligation arising from a written act, 
may be interrogated on the reality or simulation of the 
act. 
' ' The party wishing to avail himself of the confessions 
made by the adverse party in his answer to an inter-
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rogatory on facts and articles, must not divide them ; they 
must be taken entire. ' '  65 
Maine. 
The ancient chancery practice is preserved in actions 
in equity in Maine : 
' 'If discovery is sought, it may be by bill, with or 
without interrogatories annexed thereto, for the purpose 
of such discovery. Answers thereto shall be made within 
thirty days after the return day of such bill, or within 
such time as the court orders, and questions arising there­
on shall be determined by the rules established by said 
court as herein provided, and in the absence thereof, by 
the rules applicable to bills of discovery in equity pro­
cedure. ' '  66 
The illiberal type of deposition statute which imposes 
conditions upon the taking of depositions as well as the 
use thereof at the trial is provided by the Maine stat­
utes.67 
There is the following provision for production of 
books and papers : 
" Where books, papers or written instruments material 
to the issue in any action at law pending in the superior 
court, are in the possession of the opposite party, and 
access thereto refused, the court upon motion, notice, and 
hearing, may require their production for inspection. In 
case of unreasonable delay or refusal in complying with 
such requirement the court may order a nonsuit or de­
fault as the case may require. ' '  68 
Maryland. 
The following statute on depositions offers a means of 
discovery before trial : 
' ' Either party in any action depending in said courts, 
after due notice to the other party or his attorney, agree-
65 La. Rev. Code of · Prac. (Marr, 1927) Arts. 347-356. 
66 Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) ch. 91, sec. 45. 
6'1 ld. ch. 121, sec. 4. 
68 Id. ch. 96, sec. 23. 
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ably to such rule as shall be made by the said courts, 
respectively, may take the deposition of any witness be­
fore any of the said commissioners, to be used as testi­
mony on the trial of such action, in case only of the death 
of such witness, · or on proof to the satisfaction of the 
court of the inability of the party to produce the attend­
ance of such witness at the time of trial and the probable 
continuance of said inability until and at the next term, 
before the court shall permit such testimony to be used ; 
and the opposite party shall be entitled to 'cross-examine 
any witne.ss whose deposition shall be so taken, or to 
examine him or her on notice, before the same or any 
other commissioner. ' ' 89 
There is the following statutory provision for dis­
covery of documentary evidence : 
' ' The court shall have power in the trial of actions at 
law, on motion made at the first court after the appear­
ance court, supported by affidavit that the same is not 
intended for delay, and due notice thereof being given, 
to require the pal'ties to produce copies, certified by a 
justice of the peace, of all such parts of all books or 
writings in their possession or power as contain evidence 
pertinent to the issue, or to answer any bill of discovery 
only which may be filed by the second court after the 
appearance court, in cases and under circumstances 
where they might be compelled to produce said original 
books or writings or answer such bill of discovery by the 
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery, and if a plain­
tiff shall fail to comply with any such order to produce 
such books or writings or answer such bill of discovery, 
it shall be lawful for the said courts on motion to give 
the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of non­
suit, and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such 
order to produce books or writings, or to answer any bill 
of discovery only, it shall be lawful for the court, on 
. motion, as aforesaid, to give judgment against him by 
88 Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 35, see. 21. 
312 DISCOVERY STATUTES 
default ; provided, that any plaintiff or defendant may, 
in compliance with any rule for producing extracts of 
such books or papers, bring into court the original books 
or papers. ' ' 70 
Ma.ssa.chusetts. 
The following provision is made in Massachusetts for 
written interrogatories for discovery: 
' ' Any party, after the entry of a writ or the :filing of a 
bill or petition, may interrogate an adverse party for the 
discovery of facts and documents admissibl� in evidence 
at the trial of the case. The word ' party, ' in this section, 
in sections sixty-two to sixty-five, inclusive, and in sec­
tion sixty-seven, shall be deemed to include parties inter­
vening or otherwise admitted after the beginning of the 
suit. 
' ' The answers shall be in writing, on oath, and signed 
by the party interrogated, who shall, before making 
answer, make such inquiry of his agents, servants and 
attorneys as will enable him to make full and true an­
swers to the interrogatories. 
" Interrogatories shall be :filed in the clerk 's office, and 
notice of such :filing, with a copy of the interrogatories, 
shall be sent by the party interrogating to the party inter­
rogated, �r to his attorney of record. If, within ten days 
after such notice, or in a district court within such less 
time as the court may by general or special order direct, 
the party interrogated does not answer the interrog­
atories, the court shall, upon motion, order the party 
. interrogated to answer such of the interrogatories as it 
:finds proper, within such time as it may :fix ;  but no party 
interrogated shall be obliged to answer a question or 
pr<;>duce a document tending to criminate him or to dis­
close his title to any property the title whereof is not 
material to an issue in, the proceeding in the course of 
which he is interrogated, nor to disclose the names of 
70 Id. Art. 75, sec. 106. 
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witnesses, except that the court may compel the party 
interrogated to disclose the names of witnesses and their 
addresses if justice seems to require it, upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems expedient. A party 
shall not interrogate an adverse party more than once 
unless the court otherwise orders, except as to any new 
matters disclosed by answers to interrogatories previ­
ously filed. 
"If a corporation is a party, the adverse party may 
examine the president, treasurer, clerk or a director, 
manager or superintendent, or other officer thereof, as if 
he were a party. If a municipal corporation is a party, 
the mayor or the chairman of the board of selectmen may 
be examined as if he were a party, except that no city or 
town official shall be interrogated concerning matters of 
public record. If a minor or person under guardianship 
is a party, the adverse party may examine as if said 
party were not a minor or under guardianship ; provided, 
that if the minor be not of such age as to appreciate an 
oath, or the person under guardianship be mentally in­
competent to answer, the person appearing in the suit 
as the guardian, guardian ad litem or next friend of such 
party shall make answer .. 
' ' Such order may be made respecting costs, in the ac­
tion or cause or otherwise, as the court may direct by 
general rule, or by a special order in each case. 
" Sections sixty-one to sixty-six, inclusive, shall not 
affect the right of a party interrogated, under the direc­
tion of the court, to seal up or otherwise protect from 
examination such parts of any document, book, voucher 
or other writing as contain matters not pertinent to the 
subject of the action, or affect the power of the court to 
protect said right, or any right of the party interrogated, 
by suitable order. " 71 
71 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) ch. 231, sees. 61-67. 
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Interrogatories are widely used by the Massachusetts 
bar. Interrogatories were found to be on :file in ap­
proximately half of three hundred consecutive case rec­
ords which were inspected in the clerk 's office of the Su­
preme Court of Suffolk County (Boston) .  There have 
been several problems in connection with the administra­
tion of the procedure, however. Answers often are too 
evasive to be of any use to the party applicant ; mimeo­
graphed forms with many questions have proved a bur­
den on the court and on the lawyers. The majority of 
the Boston bar seem to be satisfied with the present pro­
cedure althoug)l there is considerable sentiment in favor 
of the adoption of an oral examination for discovery be­
fore trial similar to that which is employed in New 
Hampshire. 
The following statute authorizes inspection of docu­
ments : 
" Every party to any cause or proceeding may inspect 
and take copies of any document referred to in the plead­
ing or particulars of any ot�r party and relied on by 
such other party, unless the court is satisfied that the 
same is not in his possession or control or that he has 
some other reasonable excuse for not producing the same 
for such inspection, and the court may make orders for 
production of said purposes, enforceable in like manner 
as orders to answer interrogatories. ' ' 711 
The illiberal type of deposition statute is employed in 
Massachusetts : 
" If a witness or party whose testimony is wanted in a 
civil cause or proceeding pending in the commonwealth 
lives more than thirty miles from the place of trial, or is 
about to go out' of the commonwealth and not to return 
in time for the trial, or is so ill, aged or infirm as to make 
it probable that he will not be able to attend at the trial, . 
his deposition may be taken. ' '  78 
'7ll d. ch. 231, sec. 68. 
'78 Id. ch. 233, sec. 25. 
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Michigan. 
The new Michigan Court Rules make the following pro­
vision for discovery by deposition : 
' ' Any party to an action or suit may cause to be taken 
· by deposition according to the practice regulating the 
taking of depositions, at a:p.y time after action commenced 
and before trial, the testimony of any other party, o:t any 
person who has verified a pleading of another party, 
which is material and necessary in the prosecution or 
defense of the action or suit. A party to such action or 
suit also may cause to be so taken the testimony, which is 
material and necessary, of the original or prior owner of 
a claim which constitutes, or from which arose, a cause 
of action acquired by the adverse party by grant, convey­
ance, transfer, assignment or endorsement, and which is 
set forth in his pleading as a cause of action or claim of 
set-off or recoupment. 
" When an adverse party, or an original owner of a 
claim mentioned in the foregoing section, whose testi­
mony may be taken as provided in such section by depo­
sition, is a corporation, joint stock association, or other 
unincorporated association, the testimony of one Qr more 
of its officers, directors, managing agents or employees; 
which is material and necessary, may be so taken. 
' ' The notice of taking such deposition shall include a 
statement as to the matters upon which such persons are 
to be examined. Such notice shall operate as an order. 
' ' Any question as to the right to take the testimony of 
such party, or the officers and employees of a corpora­
tion, joint stock association or other unincorporated asso­
ciation, or as to the time or place, or as to the matters 
as to which the testimony is to be taken, or as to the per­
son before whom it is to be taken, may be raised by a 
motion to vacate or modify the notice. Such motion may 
be supported by affidavits and opposed by counter affida­
vits. The service of notice of the motion, if made for the 
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first sitting of court at which the motion can be heard, 
shall operate to stay the taking of testimony until the 
determination of the motion. If the taking of the testi­
mony be not authorized by the provisions of the preced­
ing paragraphs, the notice shall be vacated. 
" In any action for damages for injuries to person or 
property, or to recover upon any policy of insurance 
respecting sickness or bodily injuries or damages or in­
juries to property, physical examination by physicians 
of the person sick or injured, or by the defendant or his 
agent of the property damaged or injured, may be or­
dered in advance of the trial, on motion with due notice, 
upon such just and reasonable terms and conditions as 
the court may prescribe. ' ' 74 
There is the following procedure for production of 
books and papers : 
' ' Application may be made by petition to any court of 
record in term time, or to the judge thereof in vacation, 
to compel the production and discovery of books, papers 
and documents relating to the merits of any action or 
suit pending in such court, or of any defense to such 
action or suit, in the following cases : . 
(a ) By the plaintiff, to compel the discovery of pa­
pers or documents in the possession of or under the 
control of the defendant, which may be necessary to 
enable the plaintiff to declare or answer to any pleading 
of the defendant. 
(b) The plaintiff may be compelled to make the dis­
covery of papers or documents, where the same shall be 
necessary to enable the defendant to answer any plead­
ing of the plaintiff. 
( c) The plaintiff may be compelled, after declaring, 
and the defendant, after pleading, to produce and dis­
cover all papers or documents on which the action or 
defense is founded. 
'74 Mich. Court Rules (1931) Rule 41. 
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(d)  After issue joined in any action, either party 
may be compelled to produce and discover all such books, 
papers and documents, as may be necessary to enable 
the party applying for such discovery to prepare for 
the trial of the cause. 
' ' The petition for such discovery shall state the ·facts 
and circumstances on which the same is claimed, and 
shall be verified by affidavit, stating that the books, pa­
pers and documents whereof discovery is sought are not 
in the possession or under the control of the party apply­
ing therefor, and that the party making such affidavit is 
advised by his counsel and verily believes, that the dis­
covery of the books, papers and documents, mentioned 
in such petition, is necessary to enable him to declare, 
or answer, or to prepare for trial, as the case may be. 
' ' The rule granting the discovery shall specify the 
mode in which the same is to be made, which may be 
either by requiring the party to deliver sworn copies of 
matters to be discovered, or by requiring him to produce 
and deposit the same with the clerk of the court in which 
the trial is to be had. The order shall also specify the 
time within which the discovery should be made. 
' ' The court, or presiding judge thereof, in granting 
such order, shall be governed by the principles and prac­
tice of the court of chancery in compelling discovery, 
except that the costs of such proceedings shall always 
be awarded in the discretion of the court. 
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court, or 
the judge granting the same : 
" (a )  Upon satisfactory evidence that it should not 
have been granted. 
" (b)  Upon the discovery sought being obtained. 
" (c) Upon the party requiring to make discovery 
denying on oath the possession or control of the books, · 
papers or documents ordered so to be produced. 
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" The order directing the discovery of books, papers 
or documents, shall operate as a stay of all other pro­
ceedings in the cause, until such order shall have been 
complied with or vacated ; and the party obtaining such 
order, after the same shall have been complied with or 
vacated, shall have the like time to declare, plead or 
answer, to which he was entitled at the time of making 
the order. 
"In case of the party refusing or neglecting to obey 
such order for a discovery, within such time as the court 
shall deem reasonable, the court may nonsuit him, or 
may strike out any plea or notice he may have given, or 
may debar him from any particular defense in relation 
to which such discovery was sought ; and the power of 
the court to compel such discovery shall be confined to 
the remedies herein provided, and shall not extend to 
authorize any other proceedings against the person or 
property of the party so refusing or neglecting. 
' ' The books, papers and documents, or sworn copies 
thereof, produced under any order made in pursuance of 
the preceding rules, shall have the same effect, when 
used by the party requiring them, as if produced upon 
notice according to the practice of the court. ' '  76 
Minnesota.. 
The Minnesota statute on depositions is as follows: 
' ' The deposition of a witness whose testimony is 
wanted in any civil cause pending in this state before 
a court, magistrate, or other person authorized to exam­
ine witnesses, or in a controversy submitted to arbi­
trators, may be taken, upon notice to the adverse party of 
the time and place of such taking, by or before any officer 
authorized to administer an oath in the state or terri­
tory in which the same may be taken, when the witness : 
' '  1. Is within , the state and lives more than thirty 
miles from the place of trial or hearing ; or is about to 
'1& Id. Rule 40. 
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go out of the state, not intending to return in time for 
the trial or hearing ; or is so sick, infirm or aged as to 
make it probable that he will not be able to attend at 
the trial or hearing. 
'-' 2. Is without this state, and within any state or 
territory of the United States. " 76 
There is the following statute on inspection of docu­
ments : 
'- ' The court before which an action is pending may 
order either party to give to the other, within a specified 
time, an inspection and copy, or perinission to take a 
copy, of any book, document, or paper in his possession 
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the 
merits of the case. If compliance is refused, the court 
may exclude the book, document, or paper, or, if wanted 
as evidenc& by the party applying, may direct the jury to 
presume it to be as alleged by him. The court may also 
punish the party refusing as for a contempt. "This sec­
tion shall not be construed to prevent a party from com­
pelling another to produce books, papers and documents 
when he is examined as a witness. ' '  77 
Mississippi. 
Mississippi has retained the ancient chancery practice 
of inserting interrogatories in the bill.78 
The following, illiberal type of . deposition statute ob­
tains : 
' 'After the declaration, bill or petition has been filed 
and summons served' the plaintiff, complainant or peti­
tioner may take the depositions of witnesses residing or 
being within the state in civil causes, including any mat­
ter in the chancery court, and the defendant, or cross 
complainant, or respondent may likewise take deposi-
76 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) sec. 9820. 
'7'7 Id. sec. 9886. 
78 Miss. Code (1930) sec. 373. 
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tions, after filing of his plea or answer or cross bill, in the 
following cases : 
' '  1. When the person whose testimony is required 
shall be about to depart from the state, or, by reason of 
age, sickness, or other cause, shall be unable, or likely to 
be unable, to attend the court. 
' '  2. When the claim or defense, or a material point 
thereof, shall depend upon the testimony of a single 
witness. 
"3. When the person whose testimony is required 
shall be a judge of the Supreme Court, or circuit court, 
or chancellor, or any other officer of the government of 
the state or of the United States, who, on account of his 
official duties, cannot conveniently attend the court to 
give evidence. 
"4. When the testimony of the clerk of any court of 
record, or of any sheriff or justice of the peace, shall be 
required beyond the limits of the county of his residence. 
" 5. When the witness shall be a female. 
' '  6. When the witness shall reside within the state, 
and more than sixty miles from the place of trial. ' '  ,9 
There is the following provision for discovery of docu­
mentary evidence : 
' ' The court in which any action or suit is pending 
may, on good cause shown, and after notice of the appli­
cation to the opposite party, order either party to give to 
the other, within a specified time, and on such terms as 
may be imposed, an inspection and copy, or permission to 
take a copy, of any books, papers, or documents in his 
possession or under his control containing evidence re­
lating to the merits of the action or proceeding or of the 
defense thereof ; and if compliance with such order be 
refused, such books, papers or documents shall not be 
given in evidence in the action or proceeding by the party 
so refusing ; and the court may punish the recusant party 
'79 Id. sec. 1538. 
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as for a contempt of court ; and if a complainant, or 
plaintiff, fails to comply with such order, the court may, 
on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as 
in cases of nonsuit or dismissal ; and if a defendant fails 
to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give 
judgment or decree against him by default or con­
fession. " 80 
Missouri. 
The right to take depositions is unconditional in Mis­
souri by virtue of the following statutes : 
' ' Any party to a suit pending in any court in this state 
may obtain the deposition of any witness, to be used in 
such suit, conditionally. 
"When the witness is found in this state, the deposi­
tion may be taken by the proper officer thereof without 
any commission or order from any court or clerk : Pro­
vided, that whenever a notice shall be given as required 
by law in a cause pending in any city which has, or which 
shall hereafter have, a population of over fifty thousand 
inhabitants at the time such notice shall be served, to 
take the depositions of witnesses at any place in such city, 
the party upon whom such notice shall be served, as 
provided by law, may at any time after the service of 
such notice, anq before the taking of such depositions 
shall be commenced, after having given the party or his 
attorney, on whose behalf such notice shall have been 
given, one day 's notice, in writing, to be served by de­
livering a copy thereof to the adverse party or his attor­
ney of record, of his intention to apply for the appoint­
ment of a special commissioner to take such depositions, 
and of the time and place of making such application, 
apply to the circuit court, or the clerk or any judge there­
of, to appoint a special commissioner to take the deposi­
tions under such notice, and thereupon such circuit court, 
or the clerk or judge thereof, upon such application, and 
80 I d. sec. 7 44. 
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upon . proof of service of the notice of such application, 
as above required, shall forthwith appoint such special 
commissioner to take such depositions, which said 
special commissioner shall be an attorney of record in 
such court, learned in the law, disinterested, and of no 
kin to either party to such cause ; and the said court, 
judge or clerk, in the order appointing such special com­
missioner, shall designate the time and place at which 
such special commissioner shall take said depositions. 
Such special commissioner so appointed shall be alone 
authorized to take such depositions, but any subpoena 
which shall have been issued by any officer authorized 
by law to issue subpoenas in such cases, and which shall 
have been served upon any witness, as required by law, 
commanding his presence at the time and place desig­
nated in such notice to take depositions aforesaid, shall 
be effectual to require the attendance of such witness be­
fore such special commissioner at the time and place 
specified in such subpoena, or at the time and place desig­
nated by such court, judge or clerk in the order appoint­
ing such special commissioner as aforesaid ; and in case 
such witness shall not attend in obedience thereto, such 
special commissioner shall be authorized to compel the 
attendance of such witness by attachment, as if such 
subpoena had been issued by such special commissioner 
under the authority conferred by this section. Such spe­
cial commissioner, for the purposes of taking such depo­
sitions and of certifying and returning the same as re­
quired by law, shall possess the same power and author­
ity and be subject to the same duties and obligations as 
now are or hereafter shall be conferred and imposed by 
law upon officers authorized to take depositions : Pro­
vided, however, that such special commissioner shall have 
power and authority to hear and determine all objections 
to testimony and evidence, and to admit and exclude the 
same, in the same manner and to the same. extent as the 
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circuit court might in a trial of said cause before such 
circuit court ; ' and whenever the special commissioner 
shall sustain such objection to testimony or evidence, the 
party against whom such ruling shall be made shall have 
the right to have such ruling reported by the special com­
missioner to the said circuit court, or a judge thereof, and 
it shall be the duty of such special commissioner to re­
port the same forthwith, or at the close of the examina­
tion of any witness who may be under examination at the 
time such objection shall be made, or at the close of the 
taking of all the depositions to be taken under such no­
tice, or at such other time during the taking thereof as 
shall be determined by such special commissioner to such 
circuit court, or any judge thereof ; and upon such report 
being presented to the circuit court or judge thereof, the 
said court, or said judge thereof, shall forthwith pass 
upon the ruling so reported, and make an order affirming 
such ruling or reversing the same ; and in case such rul­
ing so reported shall be reversed by said circuit court, or 
judge thereof, the said circuit court or judge thereof shall 
enter an order of record, directing said special commis­
sioner to cause the testimony or evidence so excluded to 
be admitted ; and whenever the said special commissioner 
shall report hi111 ruling to the circuit court as aforesaid, 
or to a judge thereof, said special commissioner shall 
adjourn the further taking of said depositions to such 
time and place as he may direct, and enforce the attend­
ance of any witness thereat, by attachment or otherwise, 
so as to enable any party to have any question answered 
which the said special commissioner shall have ruled out, 
and which such circuit court, or judge thereof, may di­
rect to be answered, together with such other questions 
as may appear proper under the ruling of such circuit 
court, or judge thereof, in reversing the ruling of such 
special commissioner. " 81 
81 Rev. Mo. Stat. (1929) sees. 1753, 1759. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court has held that these stat­
utes authorize taking of depositions for purposes of dis­
covery before trial.811 The bar of St. Louis and of Kansas 
City use the procedure extensively. Satisfaction with it 
appears to be general. 
There is the following rather elaborate statutory pro­
vision for production and inspection of books and papers : 
' ' Every court or judge thereof shall have power to 
compel any party to a suit pending therein to produce 
any books, papers and documents in his possession or 
power, relating to the merits of any such suit, or of any 
defense therein. 
' ' To entitle a party to the production of such books, 
papers and documents, he shall present a petition, veri­
fied by the affidavit of himself or some other credible per­
son, to the court, or to the judge thereof in vacation, upon 
which an order may be granted by such court or officer 
for the production of such books, papers and documents, 
or that the party show cause why the prayer of the peti­
tion should not be granted. 
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court or 
officer granting the same : First, upon satisfactory evi­
dence that it ought not to have been granted ; second, 
upon the party required to produce the books, papers and 
documents denying, on oath, the possession or control 
thereof. 
" If the party neglect to obey such order for the pro­
duction. of books, papers and documents, within such time 
as the court or judge shall prescribe for that purpose, the 
court may nonsuit him, or strike out any answer, or 
debar him from any particular defense in . relation to 
which such books, papers and documents �ere required 
to be produced, or may punish him as for a contempt. 
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a 
judge thereof, in vacation, may, in his discretion, and 
upon due notice, order either party to give to the other, 
at Tyson v. Savings and Loan Ass'n (1900) 156 Mo. 588, 57 S. W. 
740. 
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within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per­
mission to take a copy, or to make a photograph of a, 
paper in his possession or under his control, containing 
evidence relating to the merits of the action or defense 
therein. If compliance with the order be refused, the 
court, on motion, may exclude the paper from being given 
in evidence, or punish the party refusing as for contempt, 
or both. ' '  81 
Montana.. 
There is the following statute on depositions, modeled 
after the California statute, which allows discovery from 
parties :  
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action at any time after the service 
of the summons or appearance of the defendant, and in a 
special proceeding after a question of fact has arisen 
therein, in the following cases : 1. When the witness is a 
party to the action or proceeding, or an officer or member 
of a corporation which is a party to the action or pro­
ceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the ac­
tion or proceeding is prosecuted or defended. 2. When 
the witness resiaes out of the county in which his testi­
mony is to be used. 3. When the witness is about to 
leave the county where the action is to be tried, and will 
probably continue absent when the testimony is required. 
4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the trial, 
is nevertheless too infirm to attend. 5. When the testi­
mony is required upon a motion, or in any other case 
where the oral examination of the witness is not required. 
6. When the witness is the only one who can establish 
facts or a fact material to the issue ; provided, that the 
deposition of such witness shall not be used if his pres­
ence can be procured at the time of the trial of the 
cause. " 84 
88 Rev. Mo. Stat. (1929) sees. 924-928. 
K Rev. Mont. Code (1921) sec. 10645. 
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Inspection of documents is authorized by the following 
statute : 
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof, may, upon notice, order either party to give to 
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy, 
or permission to take a copy, of entries of accounts in 
any book, or of any document or paper in his possession, 
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the 
merits of the action, or the defense therein. If compli­
ance with the order be refused, the court may exclude the 
entries of accounts of the book, or the document, or paper 
from being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence 
by the party applying, may direct the jury to presume 
them to be as he alleges them to be ; and the court may 
also punish the party refusing for a contempt. This 
section is not to be construed to prevent a party from 
compelling another to produce books, documents, or pa­
pers, when he is examined as a witness. ' ' 8& 
Nebraska.. 
Discovery under the ordina.ry deposition procedure is 
authorized ·by the following Nebraska statute : 
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in 
the following cases : First. When the witness does not 
reside in the county where the action or proceeding is 
pending, or is sent for trial by change of venue, or is 
absent therefrom ; Second. When, from age, infirmity 
or imprisonment, the witness is unable to attend the 
court, or is dead ; Third. When the testimony is re­
quired upon a motion or in any other case where the oral 
examination of the witness is not required. 
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by 
depositions, at any time after service upon the defend­
ant. ' '  88 
86 Id. see. 9771. 
86 Nebr. Comp. Stat. (1929) eh. 20, sees. 1246, 1247. 
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska has upon several 
occasions made liberal interpretation of this statute and 
has held that discovery before trial is authorized there­
under.87 The statute is used by Omaha lawyers for tak­
ing the deposition of adverse parties in approximately 
ten per cent. of all cases but depositions of witnesses are 
less frequently taken. The Nebraska bar seems to be 
well satisfied with the practice. 
Discovery of documentary evidence is authorized by 
the following statutory provision : 
' ' Either party or his attorney may demand of the 
adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission to 
take a copy, of a book, paper or document in his posses­
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to 
the merits of the action or defense therein. Such demand 
shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or docu­
ment, with sufficient particularity to enable the other 
party to distinguish it, and if compliance with the de­
mand within four days be refused, the court or judge, on 
motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their dis­
cretion order the adverse party to give the other, within 
a specified time, · an inspection and copy, or permission 
to take a copy, of such book, paper, or document ; and on 
failure to comply'with such order, the court may exclude 
the paper or document from being given in evidence, or 
if wanted as evidence by the party applying, may direct 
the jury to presume it to be such as the party by affidavit 
alleges it to be. This section is not to be construed to 
prevent a patty from compelling another to produce any 
book, paper or document when he is examined as a wit­
ness. 
" Either party or his attorney, if required, shall deliver 
to the other party or his attorney, a copy of any deed, 
8'7 Dogge v . . State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; Ulrich v. Mc­
Conaughey· (1901) 63 Neb• 10, 88 N. W. 150 ; Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 
71 Neb. 17, 98 N. W. 415. 
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instrument or other writing whereon the action or de­
fense is founded, or which he intends to offer in evidence 
at the trial. If the plaintiff or defendant shall refuse to 
furnish the copy or copies required, the party so refusing 
shall not be permitted to give in evidence, at the trial, 
the original, of which a copy has been refused. This sec­
tion shall not apply to any paper a copy of which is filed 
with a pleading. ' ' 88 
Nevada. 
The following Nevada statute authorizes taking of the 
deposition of the adverse party for purposes of discovery : 
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action at any time after the service 
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and 
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has arisen 
therein, in the following cases : 1. When the witness is 
a party to the action or proceeding, or a person for whose 
immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted 
or defended. 2. When the witness is the president, vice­
president, secretary, treasurer or general manager of a 
corporation· for whose benefit the action is prosecuted 
or defended. 3. When the witness resides out of the 
county in which his testimony is to be used. 4. When 
the witness is about to leave the county where the action 
is to be tried, and will probably continue absent when the 
testimony is required. 5. When the witness, otherwise 
liable to attend the trial is nevertheless too infirm to 
attend, or resides within the county, but more than fifty 
miles from 'the place of trial. ' '  89 
Inspection of books and papers is provided for in the 
following terms : 
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof may, upon notice, order either party to give to the 
other within a specified time an inspection and copy, or 
permission to take a copy of any book, document, or 
88 Nebr. Comp. Stat. (1929) ch. 20, sees. 1267, 1268. 
89 Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9001. 
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paper in his possession, or under his control, containing 
evidence relating to the merits of the action, or the de­
fense therein. If compliance with the order be refused, 
the court may exclude the book, document or paper from 
being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence by the 
party applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be 
such as he alleges it to be ; and the court may also punish 
the party refusing for a contempt, This section shall 
not be construed to prevent a jury ',from compelling an­
other to produce books, papers, or documents when he is 
examined as a witness. ' '  90 
New Hampshire. 
The following concise and simple provision has fur­
nished the means of a very liberal discovery practice in 
New Hampshire : 
' ' The deposition of any witness in a civil cause may be 
taken and used at the trial unless the adverse party pro­
cures him to attend so that he may be called to testify 
when the deposition is offered. ' '  91 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that this 
statute authorizes examinations for discovery before 
triai.911 Today the New Hampshire bar uses the pro­
cedure extensively and with apparently uniform satis­
faction. So satisfactory has been the New Hampshire 
experience that tllere is a strong sentiment in neighbor­
ing states, especially in Massachusetts, in favor of the 
adoption of a similar practice. 
New Jersey. 
The following provision for discovery before trial by 
written interrogatories obtains in New Jersey: 
' ' After an action is at i�sue either party may serve on 
the adverse party, whether such party be a natural per-
90 Id. sec. 8963. 
91 N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) ch. 337, sec. 1. 
911 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200; LaCoss v. Lebanon (1917) 
78 N. H. 413, 101 Atl. 364. 
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son or body corporate, written interrogatories upon any 
matter material to the issue, and written answers to the 
same under oath shall be served in ten days after serv­
ice ; the answers shall be strictly responsive, and in the 
case of a body corporate shall be under the oath of such 
of the officers, agents or employees of the corporation 
as have personal knowledge of the facts or custody of 
the books, records or papers a discovery of which is· 
sought ; the court or a judge may for the purpose of com­
pelling an answer attach for contempt, suppress the de­
fense or stay or dismiss the proceedings ; the answer 
shall be evidence in the action if offered by the party 
proposing the interrogatories, but not otherwise ; pro­
vided, the court or a judge may for good cause and on 
notice to the adverse party order any of the interrog­
atories to be stricken out or amended or new ones to be 
added or grant further time for answering or order or 
permit the answers to be amended. ' '  98 
An oral examination of the adverse party before trial 
is also allowed under the following statutory provisions : 
' ' Any party to an action may by order of the court or 
a judge thereof or by a judge of the Court of Common 
Pleas, in the county in which such action is pending, in 
the absence of a Supreme Court justice a Circuit Court 
judge, if the action is pending in the Supreme Court or 
Circuit Court, be examined as a witness at the instance 
of the adverse party or any one of several adverse parties 
after issue joined and before trial ; such examination may 
be before the court or a judge or a Supreme Court Com­
missioner or Examiner Master in Chancery on four days ' 
notice to the party to be examined, unless a shorter time 
is; for good cause prescribed ; the granting of said order 
shall be discretionary ; the service of the order shall be 
sufficient summons and notice to the party named therein 
98 N. J. Oomp. Stat. (1910) p. 4097. 
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to attend before the court, judge or officer named there� 
in, and such attendance and examination may be enforced 
in the same manner as answers to interrogatories. 
' 'No party who shall reside in this state shall be com­
pelled to attend and testify in any other county than that 
where he resides, but any party residing out of this state 
may be compelled to attend and testify in any county 
named in . the order or in the state or country where he 
resides ; a nonresident party may be served out of this 
state with personal notice to attend such examination. 
' ' The examination and cross-examination shall be re­
duced to writing and shall be signed by the party so exam­
ined and certified by the court, judge or officer, and filed 
with the clerk of the county where the cause is to be tried, 
and said examination may be used by either party at the 
trial ; where the examination is made before the court 
or a judge, such court or judge may authorize the same 
to be reduced to writing by the clerk of any circuit court 
or by an attorney or counselor ; any question may be ob­
jected to and the answer taken subject to the objection ; 
if the party refus� to answer, the court or a judge shall 
compel the party to answer, if the party examining is 
legally entitled to have an answer ; the examination thus 
taken shall not be conclusive but may be rebutted at the 
trial. 
' ' The party examined shall receive the same fee as if 
subpoenaed and attending as a witness on the trial of an 
action, and the commissioner or examiner taking the 
testimony shall receive the same fees for his services as 
are allowed by law to a master il:t chancery for taking 
testimony in a cause. 1 
' ' The party examining shall in the first instance pay 
the witness fees and all the costs and expenses of the 
examination, unless the court or a judge otherwise or­
der, and shall tax therefor in his bill of costs only such 
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sum as the court or a judge shall certify to be reason­
able and proper. " 94 
There is the following statute which allows inspec­
tion of books and papers : 
' ' The court in which an action is pending or a judge 
may on four days ' notice and upon terms order either 
party to give to the other within a specified time an 
inspection and copy or permission to take a copy of any 
books, papers or documents in his possession or under 
his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of 
the action or the defense thereto, and if compliance with 
the order be refused, such books, papers or documents 
shall not be given in evidence in such action, and the 
court may punish the party so refusing as for contempt. 
' ' Every such application shall be in writing and shall 
state the grounds upon which it is made, verified by the 
oath of the party or his attorney or agent ; the affidavit 
of the adverse party or his attorney or agent may be 
read in opposition to such application without notice of 
the taking of such affidavit or either party or any other 
witness may on such application be examined in relation 
thereto. ' '  96 
The New Jersey statute on depositions generally is of 
the illiberal type and provides as follows : 
"If any material witness in an action or suit of a civil 
nature, or any material witness for any defendant in any 
indictment pending in any of the courts of this state, be 
in this state, but is ancient or very infirm, or is sick, or 
is about to go out of this state, then the deposition of 
such witness may, at the option of either party, in such 
civil suit, or at the option of the defendant in such indict­
ment, be taken de bene esse before any justice of the 
supreme court, or judge of the court of common pleas, or 
supreme court commissioner, or master in chancery ; pro­
vided, that the officer before whom the deposition is to 
94 Id. p. 4098 as amended by Laws of N. J. (1924) ch. 93, p. 183. 
96 Id. p. 4098. 
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be taken shall cause notice to be given to the adverse 
party immediately, or at such short day as the case in 
the opinion of the said officer may require, to attend and 
be present at the taking thereof, and to put questions and 
cross-examine, if he shall think fit. ' '  96 -
New Jersey courts at the present time are very strict 
in their allowance for discovery before trial. Newark 
lawyers stated that the only application for an oral exam­
ination which had been granted there during several 
months was made in the case of an infant plaintiff who 
had been struck by an automobile and who had not a 
single witness in his behalf. It is said the courts are so 
very strict in allowing examinations and that even when 
they allow them they restrict the scope of them to such 
an extent that they have little practical value to the pro­
fession. 
New Mexico. 
The following provision for depositions Is made in 
New Mexico : 
' ' Depositions of witnesses to be used in any court in 
this state, in all oivil cases and proceedings, may be taken 
in the following cases : First. When, by reason of age, 
infirmity, sick:pess or official duty, it is probable that the 
witness will be unable to attend the court. Second. When 
the witness resides without the state or the county in 
which the suit is pending. Third. When the witness has 
left, or is about to leave the state or county in which 
the suit or proceeding is pending, and will probably not 
be present at the trial. ' ' 91 
The New Mexico provision for inspection of papers in 
the possession of the opposite party is as follows : 
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or the 
judge thereof, may, in his discretion and upon due notice, 
order either party to give to the other, within a specified 
96 ld. p. 2230. 
9'7 N. Mex. Stats. (1929) ch. 45, sec. 101. 
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time, an inspection and a copy or permission to take a 
copy of a paper in his possession or under his control 
containing evidence relating to the merits of the aotion. 
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on 
motion, may exclude the paper from being given in evi­
dence or punish the party refusing as for a contempt, or 
both. 
" If the party neglect to obey such order for the pro­
duction of books, papers and documents within such time 
as the court or judge may prescribe for that purpose, the 
court may nonsuit him or strike out any answer, or 
debar him from any particular defense in relation to 
which such books, papers and documents were required 
to be produced, or may punish him as for a contempt. 
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court or 
officer granting the same : First. Upon satisfactory 
evidence that it ought not to have been granted. Second. 
Upon the party required to produce the books, papers· 
and documents denying, on oath, the possession or con­
trol thereof. ' '  98 
New York 
A short summary of the origin and history of the New 
York discovery practice is a necessary preface to an 
understanding of the complicated practice which exists 
today. The Code of Procedure of 1848 made a simple yet 
liberal provision for an oral examination before trial. A 
rule of court was adopted in 1870 limiting the scope of 
discovery to facts "material in proving the case or de­
fense of the party. ' '  99 Thereafter for about twenty years 
the rules which were applied became so strict as to defeat 
almost entirely the right to discovery.100 The so-called 
' ' Throop Code ' ' effected even greater stringency by com-
98 Id. sees. 831-833. 99 Rule 21, quoted in Adams v. Cavanaugh (1885) 37 Hun 232, 233. 
100 N. Y. State Bar Association Report (1917) page 467; Report of the 
Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simpli1ieation of Civil Praetiee 
of New York (1915) vol. 1, p. 332 tf. 
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bination of the several modes of taking testimony before 
trial into a single deposition procedure. In 1904 the Com­
mission on the Laws Delays urged liberalization of the 
rules in regard to discovery.101 In 1907, in the case of 
Goldmark v. U. S. Electro-Galvanizing Company/08 a 
great liberalization was effected and examinations for 
discovery became more nearly a matter of right. In 
1910 the Special Committee of the Bar of the City of 
New York on the Simplification of Procedure recom­
mended ' ' that either party might call his opponent, or 
any officer of any corporation that is a party, and cross­
examine him. ' '  A bill to this effect was sponsored in 
1910 but was defeated by the Senate.108 This would have 
enlarged the scope of the discovery as well as the right 
to discovery. During the years from 1910 to 1916 lead­
ers of the New York Bar praised the English system of 
discovery in extravagant 'terms and urged that examina­
tions for discovery in New York be allowed as of 
course.104 In 1912 and in 1915 the Board of Statutory 
Consolidation made its first reports on the Simplification 
of Procedure and therein recommended some liberaliza­
tions as to the discovery rules but still did not go so far 
as to make discov�ry a matter of course. The provisions 
as to discovery were contained in the proposed rules · 
appended to the Act, rather than to the Civil Practice 
Act itself.106 The following year, 1916, the New York 
State Bar Association 's Committee, appointed to exam­
ine the report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation, 
made its report, and one of the few points of difference 
was as to discovery. This committee recommended a 
considerably more liberal practice as to discovery, and 
101 See Doll v. Smith (1904) 43 Mise. 417. 
108 111 A. D. 526, 97 N. Y. S. 1078. 
108 See Report of N. Y. State Bar Association (1911) p. 434. 
104 See Reports of N. Y. State Bar Association (1911) p. 432 (1912) pp. 232, 249, 250. 
106 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simplifiea· tion of the Civil Praetiee of New York (1915) Vol. 1, p. 98 ff. 
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in addition recommended that the provisions be put in 
the Civil Practice Act itself, as well as in the Rules. The 
examination was to be had, unless the opposing party 
got an order from the court limiting the examination.106 
The Joint Legislative Committee, which was appointed to 
study the report of the Board of Statutory Consolida­
tion and which finally concluded that an independent 
revision should be its task, made some very liberal 
recommendations in its preliminary reports regarding 
discovery.107 In its final report, however, the Committee 
concluded that there was such a division of opinion in 
regard to discovery that "the provisions on this subject 
should be restored for the present in practically the same 
language as they now exist. "  However, the committee 
added : ' ' The Committee recommends that the subject of 
examination of parties and witnesses before trial be fur­
ther considered by the lawyers of the state to the end 
that a more simple procedure may be presented to the 
legislature. ' ' 108 Later the Joint Legislative Committee 
made a supplemental report as to the particular matter 
of evidence before trial. The provisions of the supple­
mental report required that the applicant for discovery 
show that the testimony was material and necessary. It 
provided further that discovery examinations could be 
initiated either by court order or by notice, the latter of 
which could' be contested by the opponent by a motion 
to vacate the notice. The Civil Practice Act of 1920 
adopted the provisions recommended in the supplemental 
report. 
106 Report of N. Y. State Bar Association (1916) pp. 332, 352. 
107 Of. Preliminary Report, No. 4 (1918) p. 9: " A  party to an action in a court of record may examine an adverse party and have his deposi­
tion taken, within or without the state, after issue joined and before 
trial, and procure an order therefor as a matter of right, without show­
ing the materiality of the expected testimony or the necessity for such 
examination. " It was clear also from the explanatory notes that it was 
intended that the scope of discovery was to be broadened so as ' ' not to 
exclude an inquiry pertinent to the issue. ' '  
108 Final Report (1919) found in Legislative Document No. 111, 
p. 44. 
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New York has the most elaborate statutory provisions 
for discovery before trial which exist in any of the vari­
ous states, yet the actual practice thereunder is very 
illi'Qeral and unsatisfactory. The following provisions of 
the Civil Practice Act outline the framework of the pro­
cedure : 
' ' Any party to an action in a court of record may cause 
to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own testimony 
or that of any other party which is material and neces-
. sary in the prosecution or defense of the action. A 
party to such an action also may cause to be so taken 
the testimony which is material and necessary, of the 
original owner of a claim which constitutes, or from 
which arose, a cause of action acquired by the adverse 
party by grant, conveyance, transfer, assignment or 
endorsement and which is set forth in his pleading as a 
cause of action or counterclaim. Any party to such an 
action also may cause to be so taken the testimony of 
any other person, which is material and necessary, where 
such person is about to depart from the state, or is with­
out the state, or resides at a greater distance from the 
place of trial than one hundred miles, or is so sick or 
infirm as to afford reasonable grounds of belief that he 
will not be able to attend the trial, or other special cir­
cumstance,s render it proper that his deposition should 
be taken: 
" When an adverse party, or an original owner of a 
claim mentioned in the foregoing section, whose testi­
mony may be taken as provided in such section by deposi­
tion, is a corporation, joint stock association or other 
unincorporated association, the testimony of one or more 
of its officers, directors, managing agents or employees, 
which is material and necessary, may be so taken. 
' ' A  party to an action desiring to obtain testimony 
therein by deposition shall give reasonable notice to his 
adversary, or if his adversary has appeared by attorney, 
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to such attorney, stat!ng in writing : 1. The person be­
fore whom the testimony is to be taken ; 2. The time 
and place at which it is to be taken ; 3. The name or 
names of the person or persons to be examined ; 4. The 
matters upon which such person or persons are to be 
examined. 
' 'Any question as to the right to take the testimony, 
or as to the time or place, or as to the matters as to 
which the testimony is to be taken, or as to the persons 
before whom it is to be taken, may be raised by a motion 
to vacate or modify the notice. The service of notice of 
the motion, if made for the first term or sitting of court 
at which the motion can be heard, shall operate to stay 
the taking of the testimony until the determination of 
the motion. If the motion is brought on by order to 
show cause, the order may be returnable either at cham­
bers or to the court and may contain such a stay. The 
motion shall be heard upon the notice of the taking of 
testimony, the pleadings, if any, and upon such affidavits 
in support of such notice, and in answer thereto, as the 
parties may submit. If the taking of the testimony be 
not authorized by the provisions of this article the court 
shall vacate the notice. 
' ' A  party entitled to take testimony by deposition may 
obtain an order of the court therefor in the first instance, 
instead of proceeding by notice. The motion shall be 
upon notice to the other parties who have appeared or 
answered. 
" Upon. motion, made upon notice and upon proof of 
facts and circumstances which render proper the taking 
of testimony by deposition during the trial of the action, 
or after judgment in order to carry the judgment into 
effect, the taking thereof may be ordered by the court. 
' ' Testimony which is material to an expected party in 
the prosecution or defense of an action about to be 
brought in a court of record may be taken at his instance, 
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by deposition, if the taking or preservation thereof is 
necessary for the protection of his rights. Such testi­
mony may be taken only in pursuance of an order of a 
court in which the action may be brought, or a judge 
thereof. 
" If the deposition is to be taken pursuant to an order, 
the order may require, in a proper case, the production 
of books and papers in the custody of the party or per­
son to be examined, as to the contents of which an exam­
ination or inspection is desired, and on the examination 
the books and papers or any part or parts thereof may 
be offered and received in evidence in addition to the 
use thereof by a witness to refresh his memory. ' '  109 
The following details of practice are added by the 
Rules of Civil Practice which are made pursuant to the 
Civil Practice Act : 
' ' The notice of taking testimony by deposition shall 
contain the title of the action and be subscribed with the 
name and address of the person giving the same and 
shall be ser.ved at least five days before the time speci­
fied therein for the taking of the testimony. 
" If a party desire to take the deposition of an adverse 
party or a witness to obtain information to enable him, 
to draw a complaint, he shall apply for an order, or if he 
shall apply for an order to take testimony by deposition 
under any provision of article twenty-nine of the civil 
practice act, he must present proof by affidavit that stat­
utory grounds exist for taking the same ; that the testi­
mony of such person is material and necessary for the 
party making such application, or the prosecution or 
defense of such action. If an adverse. party, or the orig­
inal owner of a claim� whose testimony is sought, be a 
corporation, joint-stock or other unincorporated associa­
tion, the affidavit must state the office or position in such 
corporation or association held by the person whose 
109 N. Y. Civ. Prae. Act, sees. 288-293, 295, 296. 
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testimony is material and necessary. If the production 
of books and papers be desired, the affidavit must describe 
them, so far as practicable, and state facts to show that 
their production is material and necessary. 
' ' On an application for an order allowing testimony to 
be taken by deposition for use in an action about to be 
brought in a court of record, the applicant shall present 
to the court in which the action may be brought an affida­
vit setting forth the nature of the controversy which is 
expected to be the subject of the action and the circum­
stances which render it necessary for the protection of 
the applicant 's rights that the witness ' testimony be 
perpetuated. 
' ' If a party on whom a notice to take testimony by 
deposition is S(;)rved shall move to vacate, modify or 
limit the same, he shall specify in his notice of motion the 
grounds of the motion, and may support the same by 
affidavit, which shE!,ll be served with the notice of mo­
tion. If the court or judge who hears the motion shall 
deem that the testimony sought to be taken is not ma­
terial or necessary for the party who served the notice, 
or for any reason that the interests of justice would not 
be subserved by such examination, an order may be made 
vacating and setting aside the notice to take the testi­
mony or limiting the scope of the examination. If the 
court or judge shall deem that the testimony should be 
taken at a time or place, or before a person, other than 
specified in the notice, an order may be made fixing a 
different time or place for the taking of the testimony, 
and designating some other person to take the same, and 
imposing reasonable terms or conditions. ' '  110 
Discovery and inspection of documentary evidence is 
authorized under the following provisions : 
' ' A  court of record, other than a justices ' court in a 
city, by order may compel a party to an action pending 
110 N. Y. Rules of Civ. Prae., 121-124. 
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therein to produce and discover, or to give to the other 
party, an inspection and copy, or permission to take a 
copy or photograph of a book, document, or other paper, 
or to make discovery of any article or property, in his 
possession or under his control, relating to the merits of 
the action, or of the defense therein. The procedure for 
obtaining such order shall be regulated by rules. 
"Where an order directs a discovery or inspection, the 
party in whose behalf it was made upon proof that the 
adverse party has fl!-iled to obey it and upon notice to 
him, may apply to the court for an order to punish him 
for the failure. Upon the hearing of the application, the 
court, upon the payment of such a sum for the expenses 
of the applicant as the court fixes and upon compliance 
with such other terms as it deems just to impose, may 
permit the party in default to comply with the order for 
a discovery and inspection ; and, for that purpose, it may 
direct that the application to punish him stand over to a 
future time. Upon the final hearing of the application 
to punish the party in default, the court, in a proper 
case, may direct that his complaint be dismissed or his 
answer or reply be stricken out and that judgment be 
rendered accordingly ; or it may make an order striking 
out one or more causes of action, defenses, counterclaims 
or replies, interposed by him ; or that he be debarred 
from maintaining a particular claim or defense in rela­
tion to which the discovery or inspection was sought. 
Where the party has failed to obey an order allowing an 
inspection by the adverse party and requiring him to 
furnish a copy or permit a copy to be taken, the court 
may also direct that the . book, document or other paper 
be excluded from being given in evidence ; or it may pun­
ish the party for a contempt ; or both. 
' ' A book, document or other paper produced under an 
order for its discovery has the same effect, when used by 
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the party requiring it, as if it was produced upon notice, 
according to the practice of the court. 
' 'Every party to an action shall be entitled, at any 
time, by notice in writing, to give notice to any other . 
party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made 
to any document, to produce such document for the in­
spection of the party giving such notice, or of his attor­
ney, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof ; 
and any party not complying with such notice shall not 
afterward be at liberty to put any such document in evi­
dence on his behalf in such cause or matter, unless he 
shall satisfy the court that such document relates only 
to his own title, he being a defendant, or that he had 
some other cause or excuse which the court shall deem 
sufficient for not complying with such notice ; in which 
. case the court may allow the same to be put in evidence 
on such terms as to costs and otherwise as the court shall 
think fit. 
' ' The court, on the application of any party to an ac­
tion, also may make an -order requiring any other party 
to state by affidavit whether any one or more specific 
documents, to be specified in the application, is or are, 
or has or have at any time been in his possession or 
power, and if not then in his possession, when he parted 
with the same, and what has become thereof. Such appli­
cation shall be made upon an affidavit stating that in the 
belief of the deponeJ!t the party against whom the appli­
cation is made has, or has at some time had, in his 
possession or power the document or documents specified 
in the application, and that they relate to the matters in 
question in the case or matter, or to some of them. " 
" A  party to an action may apply to the court for an 
order requiring an adverse party to show cause why he 
should not be compelled to produce and discover, or. to 
give an inspection and copy of, or permission to take a 
copy or photograph of a book, document, paper, machine 
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or other article, or to make a discovery of any article or 
property in his possession or under his control, relating 
to the merits of the action or of the defense therein. Such 
order to show cause shall be granted on an affidavit show­
ing that the book, document, paper, machine, article or 
property whereof discovery or inspection is sought is 
not in the possession or under the control of the party 
applying therefor but is in the possession or under the 
control of the party against whom discovery or inspec­
tion is sought, or of his agent or attorney. 
' ' On the return of such order to show cause, the court 
shall make such an order with respect to the discovery 
or inspection prayed for as justice requires. The order 
for discovery or inspection shall specify the time, place 
and manner in which it is to be made. The order may 
stay any other proceedings in the action until such order 
shall have been complied with or vacated. 
"If discovery or inspection be directed, a referee may 
be appointed by the order to direct and superintend it, 
whose certificate, unless set aside by the court, is pre­
sumptive, and, except in proceedings for contempt, con­
clusive evidence of compliance or non-compliance with 
the terms of the order. "  m 
North Carolina. 
There is the following statutory provision for examina­
tion of parties before trial: 
"No action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of 
the prosecution or defense of another action, shall be al-' 
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on 
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre­
scribed by this article. 
' ' A party to an action may be examined as a witness 
at the instance of any adverse party, and for that pur­
pose may be compelled, in the same manner and subject 
to the same rules of examination as any other witness, 
111 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, sees. 324-328; Rules of Civ. Prac� 140-142. 
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to testify, either at the trial or conditionally or upon 
commission. Where a corporation is a party to the ac­
tion, this examination may be made of any of its officers 
or agents. 
' ' The examination, instead of being had at the trial, as 
provided in the preceding section, may be had at any 
time before trial, at the option of the party claiming it, 
before a judge, commissioner duly appointed to take 
depositions, or clerk of the court, on a previous notice to 
the party to be examined, and any other adverse party, 
of at least five days, unless for good cause shown the 
judge or court orders otherwise. 
' ' The party to be examined, as provided in the pre­
ceding section, may be compelled to attend in the same 
manner as a witness who is to be examined conditionally ; 
but he shall not be compelled to attend in any county 
other than that of his residence or where he may be 
served with a summons for his attendance. The exam­
ination shall be taken and filed by the judge, clerk or com­
missioner, as in case of witnesses examined conditionally, 
and may be read by either party on the trial. 
' ' If a party refuses to attend and testify, as provided 
in the preceding sections, he may be punished as for a 
contempt and his pleadings may be stricken out. 
' ' The examination of the party thus taken may be re­
butted by adverse testimony. 
" A  party examined by an adverse party, · as provided 
in this article, may be examined in his own behalf, sub­
ject to the same_ rules of examination as other witnesses. 
But if he testifies to any new matter, not responsive to 
the inquiries put to him by the adverse party, or neces­
sary to explain or qualify his answers thereto or to dis­
charge himself when his answers would charge himself, 
the adverse party may offer himself· and must be re­
ceived as a witness in his own behalf or in respect to the 
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new matter, subject to the same rules of examination as 
other witnesses. 
' ' A  person for whose immediate benefit the action is 
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action, 
may be examined as a witness, in the same manner, and 
subject to the same rules of examinations, as if he was 
named as a party. 
' 'A party may be examined on behalf of his co-plaintiff 
or co-defendant as to any matter in which he is not jointly 
interested or liable with such co-plaintiff or co-defendant, 
and as to which a separate and not joint verdict or judg­
ment can be rendered. He may be compelled to attend 
in the same manner as at the instance of an adverse par­
ty ; but the examination thus taken cannot be used in be­
half of the party examined. When one of several plain­
tiffs or defendants who are joint contractors, or are 
united in interest, is examined by the adverse party, the 
other of such plaintiffs or defendants may offer himself, 
and must be received, as a witness to the same cause of 
action or defense. ' '  ttll 
It is also possible to obtain discovery by use of the 
following ordinary deposition procedure in North Caro­
lina : 
' 'Any party in a civil action or special proceeding, 
upon giving notice to the adverse party or his attorney 
as provided by law, may take the depositions of persons 
whose evidence he may desire to use, without any special 
order therefor, unless the witness shall be beyond the 
limits of the United States. 
' 'Every deposition taken and returned in the manner 
provided by law may be read on the trial of the action 
or proceeding, or before any referee, in the following 
cases, and not otherwise : 1. If the witness is dead, or 
has become insane since ·the deposition was taken. 2. If 
the witness is a resident of a foreign country, or of an-
1111 No. Car. Code (1931) sees. 899-907. 
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other state, and is not present at the trial. 3. If the 
witness is confined in a prison outside the county in 
which the trial takes place. 4. If the witness is so old, 
sick or infirm as to be unable to attend court. 5. If the 
witness is the President of the United States, or the head 
of any department of the federal government, or a judge, 
district attorney, or clerk of any court of the United 
States, and the trial shall take place during the term of 
such court. 6. If the witness is the governor of the 
state, or the head of any department of the state govern­
ment, or the president of the university, or the head of 
any other incorporated college in the state, or the super­
intendent or any physician in the employ of any of the 
hospitals for the insane for the state. 7. If the witness 
is a justice of the supreme court, or a judge, presiding 
officer, clerk or solicitor of any court of record, and the 
trial shall take place during the term of such court. 
8. If the witness is a member of the congress of the 
United States, or a member of the general assembly, and 
the trial shall take place during a session of the body of 
which he is a member. 9. If the witness has been duly 
summoned, and at the time of the trial is out of the state, 
1 or is more than seventy-five miles by the usual public 
nfode of travel from the place where the court is sitting, 
without the procurement or consent of the party offering 
his deposition. 10. If the action is pending in a justice 's 
court the deposition may be read on the trial of the ac­
tion, provided the witness is more than seventy-five miles 
by the usual public mode of travel from the place where 
the court is sitting. ' ' 118 
Inspection of writings is authorized under the follow­
ing statute : 
" The court before which an action is pending, or a 
judge thereof, may, in their discretion, and upon due no­
tice, order either party to give to the other, within a 
specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission to 
118 Id. sec. 1809 (in part), 1821. 
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take a copy, of any books, papers and documents in his 
possession or under his control containing evidence re­
lating to the merits of the action or the defense therein. 
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on 
motion, may exclude the paper from being given in evi­
dence, or punish the party refusing, or both. ' '  114 
North Dakota. 
There is the following statute for examination of par­
ties before trial : 
" No action to obtain discovery under oath in aid of 
the prosecution or defense of another action shall be al­
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on 
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre­
scribed by this chapter. 
' ' A  party to an action, or in case a corporation is 
a party, the president, secretary or other principal offi­
cer or general managing agent of such corporation, may 
be examined as a witness at the instance of an adverse 
party or any of several adverse parties and for that pur­
pose may be compelled in the same manner and subject to 
the same rules of examination as any other witness to 
testify either at the trial, or conditionally, or upon com­
mission. 
' ' The examination instead of being had at the trial as 
provided in the last section may be had at any time be­
fore the trial at the option of the party claiming it before 
a judge of the court, or by a referee appointed by the 
judge of the court for that purpose, on a previous notice 
to the party to be examined and any other adverse party 
of at least five days, unless for good cause shown the 
judge orders otherwise ; but the party to be examined 
shall not be compelled to attend in any other county than 
that of his residence or where he may be served with a 
subpoena for his attendance. Where a referee shall be 
so appointed the referee shall take the testimony either 
114 Id. see. 1823. 
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himself or by a stenographer in his presence, which testi­
mony shall be certified to by the referee. 
' ' The examination of the party thus taken may be 
rebutted by adverse testimony. 
"If a party refuses to attend and testify, he may be 
punished as for a contempt and his complaint, answer 
or reply may be stricken out. 
' ' A party examined by an adverse party may be ex�­
ined on his own behalf, subject to the same rules of exam­
ination as other witnesses. 
"A person for whose immediate benefit the action is 
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action, 
may be examined as a witness in the same manner and 
subject to the same rules of examination as if he was 
named as a party. 
' 'A party to the record of any civil action or proceed­
ing, or a person for whose immediate benefit such action 
or proceeding is prosecuted or defended, or the directors, 
officers, superintendent or managing agents of any cor­
poration which is a party to the record in such action or 
proceeding, may be examined upon the trial thereof· as if 
under cross-examination at the instance of the adverse 
party or parties or any of them, and for that purpose 
may be compelled in the same manner and subject to the 
same rules for examination as any other witness to 
testify, but the party calling for such examination shall 
not be concluded thereby, but may rebut it by counter 
testimony." 111 
The liberal type of deposition statute which makes the 
right to take depositions unconditional is used in North 
Dakota : 
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in 
the following cases : 
' '  1. When the witness does not reside in the county 
where the action or proceeding is pending or is sent for 
trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom. 
11& No. Dak. Comp. Laws (1913) sees. 7862-7870. 
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' '  2. When from age, infirmity or imprisonment the 
witness is unable to attend court or is dead. 
' '  3. When the testimony is required upon a motion or 
in any other case when the ·oral examination of the wit­
ness .is not required. 
' ' Either party may commence taking •testimony by 
depositions at any time after service upon or the appear­
ance of the defendant in the action. ' '  116 
Inspection and copy of documents is authorized by the 
following statute : 
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a 
judge thereof, may in its or his discretion and upon due 
notice order either party to give to the other within a 
specified time an inspection and copy, or permission, to 
take a copy of any books, papers and documents in his 
possession or under his control, containing evidence re­
lating to the merits of the action, or the defense therein. 
If compliance with the order is refused, the court may on 
motion exclude the paper from being given in evidence, 
or punish the party refusing, or both. ' '  117 
Ohio. 
The Ohio statutes provide that : "Either party may 
commence taking testimony by deposition at any time 
after service upon the defendant. ,. , 118 
' ' At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be 
examined as if under cross-examination, either orally, 
or by deposition, like any other witness. If the party be 
a corporation, any or all the officers thereof may be so ex­
amined at the instance of the adverse party. The party 
calling for such examination shall not thereby be con­
cluded but may rebut it by counter testimony. ' '  ue 
These two statutory provisions have been the means of 
establishing a very effective discovery practice in Ohio. 
The bar generally, in cities like Cleveland, Toledo and 
118 Id. sees. 7889, 7890. 
117 Id. sec. 7861. 
111 Ohio Oode (Throckmorton, 1930) aec. 11526 • 
. 119 Id. sec. 11497. 
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Cincinnati, and to a lesser extent throughout the state, 
use the procedure extensively. There is apparently gen­
eral satisfaction with the results obtained. 
There is also provision for annexing interrogatories 
for discovery to pleadings : 
' ' A party may annex to his pleading, other than a 
demurrer, interrogatories, pertinent to the issue made in 
the pleadings, which interogatories, if not demurred to, 
shall be plainly and fully answered under oath, by the 
party to whom they are propounded, or if such party is 
a corporation, by the president, secretary or other officer 
thereof, as the party propounding requires. 
"When annexed to the petition, the interrogatories 
shall be answered within the time limited for answer to 
the petition ; when annexed to the answer, within the time 
limited for a reply ; and when annexed to the reply, with­
in the time allowed for an answer. But further time may 
be allowed in all cases by the court, or a judge thereof in 
vacation. 
"Answers to interrogatories may be enforced by an 
order of dismissal, judgment by default, or by attach­
ment, as the justice of the case requires. On the trial, 
such answers, so far as they contain competent testimony 
on the issue or issues made, may be used by either 
party. " 110 This provision is not used often by the bar. 
Interrogatories are employed only when the action is 
of such a nature as not to justify the expense of an oral 
examination or when it is desired to dispense with mere1 
formal matters of proof. When a thorough probing of 
the adverse party is desired, an oral examination is al­
ways employed in preference to written interrogatories 
in Ohio. 
Discovery before pleading is authorized under the fol-
lowing statute : 
-
"When a person claiming to have a cause of action, 
or a defense to an action commenced against him, with-
1110 Id. sees. 11348-11350. 
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out a discovery of the fact from the adverse party, is 
unable to file his petition or answer, he may bring an 
action for discovery, setting forth in his petition the 
necessity therefor, and the grounds thereof, with such 
interrogatories relating to the subject matter of the 
discovery as are necessary · to procure the discovery 
sought, which, if not demurred to, must be fully and 
directly answered under oath by the defendant. Upon 
the final disposition of the action, the costs thereof shall 
be taxed in such manner as the court deems equitable. ' '  111 , 
Inspection and copy of books and documents is pro­
vided for as follows : 
" Either party or his attorney, in writing, may demand 
of the adverse party, an inspection and copy, or permis­
sion to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his 
possession, or under his control, containing evidence 
relating to the merits of the action or defense, specifying 
the book, paper, or document with sufficient particularity 
to enable the other party to distinguish it. If compliance 
with the demand within four days be refused, on motion 
and notice to the adverse party, the court or judge may 
order the adverse party to give the other, within the time 
specified, an inspection and copy, or permission to take 
a copy, of such hooks, paper, or document. On failure to 
comply with such order, the court may exclude the paper 
or document if offered in evidence, or, if wanted as evi­
dence, by the party applying, may direct the jury to 
presume it to be such as such party, by affidavit alleges 
it to be. This section shall not prevent a party from 
compelling another to produce any book, paper or docu­
ment when he is examined as a witness. 
"If the party in possession of any such book, paper, 
writing or document, alleges that it, or a part thereof 
is of mere private interest, or of such character that it 
ought not to be produced, or an inspection or copy allowed 
181 Id. see. 11555. 
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or taken, on motion of either party, the court may direct 
a private examination of it by a master. If he finds that 
such book, paper, writing, or document contains matter 
pertinent to the case, and proper to be produced, in­
spected or copied, he shall report it to the court, or a 
copy of such part as he finds pertinent to the case, and 
proper to be produced, · inspected or copied. The book, 
paper, writing or document, or part thereof, so reported, 
shall be admitted in evidence on the trial, unless for 
proper cause the court excludes it. 
" Either party, or his attorney, if required, shall deliver 
to the other party, or his attorney, a copy of any instru­
ment of writing whereon the action or defense is founded, 
or :which he intends to offer in evidence at the trial. If 
the plaintiff or defendant refuses to furnish the copy 
required the party so refusing shall not be permitted to 
give the original in evidence at the trial. · This section 
does not apply to a paper, a copy of which, as required 
by law, is filed with a pleading. " 112 
oklahoma. 
The following statute on depositions obtains in Okla­
homa: 
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in 
the · following cases : 
' ' First. When the witness does not reside in the 
county where the action or proceeding is pending or is 
sent for trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom. 
' ' Second. When, from age, infirmity, or imprisonment, 
the witness is unable to attend court or is dead. 
' ' Third. When the testimony is required upon a mo­
tion, or in any other case where the oral testimony of 
the witness is not required. 
' 'Either party may commence taking testimony by 
deposition at any time after service of summons upon 
the defendant. ' '  118 
1ft Id. sees. 11152-11154. 
118 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) sees. 612, 613. 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, following the lead of 
the Kansas Supreme Court, has held that this statute 
does not authorize discovery before trial in spite of the 
fact that the statute apparently gives an unconditional 
right to take depositions.184 
There is the following provision for inspection of doc­
uments held by the adverse party : 
" Either party, or his attorney, may demand of the 
adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission to 
take a copy of a book, paper or document in his posses­
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to 
the merits of the action or defense therein. Such de­
mand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or 
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other 
party to distinguish it, and if compliance with the de­
mand, within four days, be refused, the court or judge, 
on motion and notice to tne adverse party, may, in their 
discretion, order the adverse party to give to the other, 
within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per­
mission to take a copy, of such book, paper or document ; 
and on failure to comply with such order, the court may 
exclude the paper or document from being given in evi­
dence, or, if ·wanted as evidence by the party applying, 
may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party, 
by affidavit, alleges it to be. This section is not to be 
construed to prevent a party from compelling another to 
produce any book, paper or document when he is ex­
amined as a witness. ' '  116 
Onta.r.io. 
The rules of practice and procedure of the Supreme 
Court of Ontario make the following provision for oral 
examination for discovery: 
' ' A party to an action whether plaintiff or defend­
ant, may, without order, be · orally examined before the 
trial touching the matters in question by any party ad-
llfi Guinan v. Readdy (1920) 79 Okla. 111, 191 Pac. 602. 
1111 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) sec. 634. 
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verse in interest, and may be ,compelled to attend and 
testify in the same manner, upon the same terms, and 
subject to the same rules of examin�tion as a witness 
except as hereinafter provided. 
" In  the case of a corporation any officer or servant 
of such corporation may, without order, be orally 
examined before the trial touching the matters in ques­
tion by any party adverse in interest to the corporation, 
and may be compelled to attend and testify in the same 
manner and upon the same terms and subject to the same 
rules of examination as a witness except as hereinafter 
provided ; but such examination shall not be used as evi­
dence at the trial. 
"After the examination of an officer or servant of a 
corporation a party shall not be at liberty to examine 
any other officer or servant without an order. 
"Where a party to be examined is out of Ontario the 
court may order the examination to be taken at such 
place and in such manner as may seem just and con­
venient, and service of the order and of all papers nec­
essary to obtain the examination may be made on the 
solicitor of the party, and any conduct money may be 
paid to him unless the order makes other provisions 
therefor. 
' ' The court may order the examination for discovery 
at such place and in such manner as may be deemed just 
and convenient of an officer residing out of Ontario of 
any corporation party to an action, and service of the 
order and of all papers necessary to obtain such examina­
tion may be ·made upon the solicitor for such party, and 
conduct money may be paid to him, and if the officer fails 
to attend and submit to such examination pursuant to 
such order the corporation shall be liable if a plaintiff 
to have its action dismissed, and if a defendant to have 
its defense struck out and to be placed in the same posi­
tion as if it had not defended. Such examinations shall 
not be used in evidence at the trial. 
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' 'Any party may, at the trial of an action or issue, use 
in evidence any part of the examination of the opposite 
party ; but the judge may look at the whole of the ex­
amination, and if he is of opinion that any other part is 
so connected with the part to be so used that the last 
mentioned part ought not to be used without such other 
part, he may direct such other part to be put in evi­
dence. 
' 'Any person who refuses or neglects to attend at the 
time and place appointed for his examination, or refuses 
to be sworn or to answer any proper question put to him, 
shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court and pro­
ceedings may forthwith be had by attachment. He shall 
also be liable, if a plaintiff, to have his action dismissed, 
and if a defendant, to have his defense, if any, struck 
out. 
" When an infant is a party the opposite party may 
examine the next friend or guardian of the infant or at 
his option t�e infant, if he is competent to give evidence. 
' ' Any person examined for discovery may be further 
examined on his own behalf, or on behalf of the corpora­
tion whose officer or servant he is, in relation to any 
matter respecting which he has been so examined, and 
such explanatory examination shall be proceeded with 
immediately after the examination in chief. 
' ' A ·person for whose immediate benefit an action is 
prosecuted or defended may without order be examined 
for discovery. 
" Where an action is brought by an assignee the as­
signor :n;tay without order be examined for discovery. 
' ' Examination for discovery may take place at any 
time after the statement of defense of the party examin­
ing or to be examined has been delivered or after the 
pleadings have been noted as closed as against the party 
to be examined, and the examination of a party to an 
issue may take place at any time after the issue has been 
filed. 
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' ' A  party within Ontario shall attend for examina­
tion for discovery before the proper officer in the county 
in which he resides upon service of an appointment upon 
his solicitor seven days before the day appointed for the 
examination, and conduct money shall be paid or ten­
dered to the solicitor. 
' ' The solicitor shall forthwith communicate the ap­
pointment to the party required to attend, and shall 
not apply the money to any debt due to the solicitor or 
any other person, or pay the same otherwise than to such 
party for his conduct money, and the same shall not be 
liable to be attached. 
"Any witness examined shall be subject to c:t;oss-ex­
amination and re-examination ; and the examination, 
cross-examination and re-examination shall be conducted 
as nearly as may be as at a trial. 
' ' The examination (:unless otherwise ordered or 
agreed) shall, if the examiner is a shortha!ld writer or a 
shorthand writer is available, be taken in shorthand by 
the examiner or· by a shorthand writer approved and duly 
sworn by him and shall be taken down by question and 
answer ; and it shall not be necessary for the depositions 
to be read over to, or signed by, the person examined. 
' ' A  copy of the depositions so taken, certified by the 
person taking the same as correct, and if such person be 
not the examiner, also signed by the examiner, shall be 
received in evidence saving all just exceptions. 
" The depositions taken by the examiner shall, upon 
payment of his fees, be returned to and filed in the office 
in which the proceedings are carried on. 
' ' The person to be examined or any party to the action 
shall, if so required by the subpoena or notice, produce 
on the examination all books, papers and documents re­
lating to the matters in issue which he could be required 
to produce at a trial. 
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' 'Where any person admits, upon his examination, 
tb:at he has in his custody or power any such document 
the examiner may direct him to produce it for the inspec­
tion of the party examining, and for that purpose allow 
a reasonable time. 
· 
"If any person under examination objects to any ques­
tion put to him, the question and the objection shall be 
noted, and the validity of such objection shall be decided 
by the examiner, whose decision shall also be noted. 
' 'Any direction or ruling of the examiner shall be sub­
ject to review upon any motion with respect to such ex­
amination without an appeal. 
" Any party who is liable to be examined may be 
required to attend before the proper officer in the county 
in which he resides, for examination, upon being served 
with an appointment and upon payment of the proper 
fees. 
' ' Any person not a party, liable to be examined, shall 
be served with a subpoena. 
' ' The party examining shall serve the appointment for 
such examination upon the solicitor of the opposite party 
at least forty-eight hours before the examination. 
' 'An order may be made for the examination of any 
person liable to · be examined as aforesaid before any 
other person or in any other county. ' ' 188 
Discovery of documentary evidence is provided for as 
follows : 
" Each party, after the defense is delivered, or an issue 
has been . filed, may by notice require the other within 
ten days to make discovery on oath of the documents 
which are or have been in his possession or power, relat­
ing to any matters in question in the action ; and to pro­
duce and deposit the same with the proper officer for the 
usual purposes. A copy of such affidavit shall be served 
forthwith after filing. · 
188 Ont. Cons. Rules of Prae. (1928) rules 327-347. 
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' ' The court may at any time order production and in­
spection of documents generally or of any particular 
document in the possession of any party. 
" When a document is in possession of a person not 
a party to the action and the production of such docu­
ment at a trial might be compelled, the court may at the 
instance of any party, on notice to such person and to 
the opposite party, direct the production and inspection 
thereof, and may give directions respecting the prepara­
tion of a certified copy which may be used for all pur­
poses in lieu of the origi:O:al. 
' ' A  party shall be entitled to obtain the production, 
for inspection, of any document referred to in the 
pleadings or affidavits of the opposite party, by giving 
notice to his solicitor, and shall be entitled to take copies 
of such documents when so produced for inspection. 
' ' The party to whom such notice is given shall 
forthwith deliver to the party giving the same a notice 
stating a time within two days from the delivery thereof 
at which the document may be inspeGted at the office of 
his solicitor, and shall at the time named produce the 
document for inspection. 
' ' If the party from whom discovery of any kind or 
inspection is sought objects to the same, or any part 
thereof, the court, if satisfied that the right to the dis­
covery or inspection sought depends on the determina­
tion of any issue or question in dispute in the action, or 
that for any other reason it is, desirable that any issue or 
question in dispute should be determined before deciding 
upon the right to the discovery or inspection, may order 
that such issue or question be determined first, and re­
serve the question as to the discovery or inspection. 
"If a party fails to comply with any notice or order for 
production or inspection of documents, he shall be liable 
to · attachment and shall also be liable, if a plaintiff, to 
have his action dismissed, and if a defendant, to have his 
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defense, if any, struck out. Service of the notice of mo­
tion upon the solicitor of the party is, unless the court 
otherwise directs, sufficient. ' ' 1117 
Discovery procedure is extensively used and with 
uniform satisfaction by the bar of Ontario. Inspection 
of records of five hundred consecutive cases in Toronto 
indicates that discovery is used as of course in approx­
imately fifty per cent. of all seriously contested cases. 
Toronto practitioners said that discovery examinations 
form one of the most satisfactory and salutary features 
of Ontario practice.1811 
Oregon. 
There is an unconditional right to take the deposition 
of a party before trial under the following Oregon 
statute : 
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action at law or suit in equity at any 
time after the service of the summons or the appearance 
of the defendant ; and in a special proceeding after a 
question of fact has arisen therein, in the following 
cases : 
" 1. When a witness is a party, or an agent, officer, 
servant, or employee of a corporation which is a party 
to the action or proceeding by the adverse party. 
' '  2. When the witness 's residence is such that he is 
not obliged to attend in obedience to a subpoena. 
' '  3. When the witness is about to leave the county and 
go more than twenty miles beyond the place of trial. 
" 4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the 
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend. 
-
' '  5. Wh,en the testimony is required upon a motion, 
or in any other case where the oral examination of the 
1117 Id. rules 348-353. 
188 For general appraisals of the Ontario practice, see address of Mr. 
Justice William Renwick Riddell before the .American Bar .Association 
in 6 .Am. Jud. Soc. Jour., 6, 11. See also rules of civil procedure rec­
ommended in 1919 by the .American Judicature Society, Bulletin XXIV, 
. p. 93, for a description and appraisal of the Ontario practice. 
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witness is not required ; providing, however, that in any 
case provided for in subdivision 1 of this section, such 
deposition may be taken only before the court in which 
said suit or action is pending, or before a judge of a court 
of record within the county where such suit or action is 
pending ; but in case such ' witness be not within said 
county such deposition may be taken before any judge 
of a court of record in any county within the state where 
such witness may reside or be found. ' '  119 
There is the following statutory provision for inspec­
tion of books and papers : 
' ' The court or judge thereof, while an action or suit is 
pending, may order either party to give the other, within 
a sp�cified time, an inspection and copy, or permission 
to take a copy of any book, document, or paper in his 
possession, or under his control, containing evidence or 
matters relating to the merits of the action or suit, or the 
defense therein. If obedience to the order be neglected 
or refused, the court may exclude the book, document, 
or paper from being given in evidence, or if wanted as 
evidence by the party applying therefor, may direct the 
jury to presume it to be such as he alleges it to be ; and 
the court may also punish the party so neglecting or re­
fusing as for a contempt. This section is not to be con� 
strued to prevent a party from compelling another to 
produce books, documents, or papers, when he is ex­
amined as a witness. ' '  180 
Pennsylvania.. 
There is a Pennsylvania statute which provides that : 
' ' In any civil proceeding the testimony of any com­
petent witness may be taken 'by commission or deposi­
tion, in accordance with the laws of this commonwealth 
and the rules of the proper court. ' '  181 
189 Ore. Code (1930) eh. 9, see. 1503. 
180 Id. eh. 7, see. 203. 
181 Purdon's Penna. Stat. Ann. (1930) Tit. 281 see. 5. 
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It has been held, however, that a rule of court which 
provides that a rule may ' ' be entered by either party 
to take the depositions of witnesses without regard to the 
circumstances of their being aged, infirm or going wit­
nesses, stipulating, however, eight days ' notice to the 
adverse party" is contrary to law and void.181 The effect 
of this construction of the statute is to make the right 
to take depositions conditional upon the prospective un­
availability of the witness at the trial. 
There is the following statute on production of books 
and papers : 
' ' The supreme court, and several courts of common 
pleas. in this state, shall have power, in any action de­
pending before them, on motion, and upon good and suffi­
cient cause shown, by affidavit or affirmation, and due 
notice thereof being given, to require the parties, or 
either of them, to proquce books or writings in their pos­
session or power, which contain evidence pertinent to 
the issue ; and if either party shall fail to comply with 
such order, and to produce such books or writings, or to 
satisfy said courts why the same is not in the party's 
power so to do, it 'shall be lawful for the said courts, if 
the party so refusing shall be a plaintiff, to give judg­
ment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit, and if a 
defendant, to give judgment against him or her by de­
fault, as far as relates to such parts of the plaintiff's or 
plaintiffs' demand, or the defendant's or defendants ' 
defense, to which the books or papers of the party are 
alleged to. apply. ' '  188 
Quebec. 
The Quebec discovery practice is a combination of the 
Ontario, practice and the Continental interrogatory pro­
cedure.1" 
181 International Coal Mining Co. v. Pa. R. R. Co. (1906) 214 Pa. 
496, 63 Atl. 880. ' 188 Purdon's Penna. Stat. Ann. (1930) Tit. 28, sec. 61. 
lit See the able articles of Judge E. Fabre-Surveyer in 2 La Revue du 
Droit, pp. 173, 204, 440 as to the respective French and English in1luences 
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There is the following provision for an oral examina­
tion before trial : 
' 'After defence filed, any party may, after one clear 
day's notice to the attorney of the opposite party, sum­
mon any of the following persons to answer as a witness, 
before the judge or the prothonotary, upon all facts re­
lating to the action or the defence : 
' '  1. The opposite party, his bookkeeper, agent or man­
ager ; 
' '  2. When the opposite party is a corporation, the 
president, manager, treasurer, or secretary of such cor­
poration ; 
" 3. When the opposite party is a foreign firm or cor­
poration doing business in this province, the agent of 
such firm or corporation. 
' ' The rules governing the summoning, examination 
and punishment of witnesses and the taking of evidence, 
apply, in so far as may be, to the cases mentioned in the 
preceding article. 
" If any dispute arises during the examination before 
the prothonotary, the parties are sent before the judge 
to have it decided. 
' ' The deposition taken by virtue of the preceding ar­
ticles shall be used as evidence in the case ; but if the 
party examined as a witness is still in the province, and 
can be produced at the trial, he may be examined again. 
The deposition taken before the trial shall, in any case, 
form part of the record, and the costs thereof shall enter 
into taxation. 
· 
" Upon the application of any party, the judge may, 
at any time after defence filed and before trial, order the 
opposite party to exhibit any object, or to give com­
munication or furnish a copy or allow a copy to be made 
of, any book or document in his control, relating to the 
which have contributed to the present Quebec discovery practice. For 
the parallel French interrogatory procedure see Cremieu, Precis de Pro­
cedure Civile, p. 255. 
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action or the defence, at such times and places, under 
such conditions and in such manner as are deemed 
proper. 
' ' The costs of such examination form part of the costs 
in the cause unless the judge, in adjudicating upon costs, 
orders otherwise. ' '  186 
There is the following statutory procedure which is 
known as interrogatories upon articulated facts: 
' ' The parties may be examined upon articulated facts 
as soon as the defence is filed, upon the facts in issue as 
then joined, and without retarding the trial or the judg­
ment. 
' ' If the defendant is in default to appear or to plead 
to the action, he may be examined on articulated facts 
as soon as he is so in default. 
' ' Parties are summoned to answer interrogatories upon 
articulated facts by means of a process issued by the 
prothonotary, in the name of the Sovereign, upon a 
written requisition to that effect, and ordering the party 
to appear before the court, the judge or the prothonotary, 
to answer the interrogatories to be put to him, which are 
annexed to the process and are served upon him. 
' ' The order to answer upon articulated facts is served 
upon the party personally or at his domicile, and not 
upon his attorney; unless such party is absent or abscond­
ing ; and a copy both of the order and of the inter­
rogatories must oo left with him. 
" If the party is absent, the attorney who has been 
served may apply to have delay given him to appear, or, 
if he declares the place where such party then is, the 
opposite party may require that he be examined under 
a commission. 
' ' Even in the case where service is made on the party 
himself, a copy of the order and of the interrogatories 
1811 Que. Code of Civil Pro. (Curran, 1922) sees. 286-290. 
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must be left with the attorney, observing the same delays 
as to service. 
' ' A  party summoned to answer interrogatories upon 
articulated facts must appear personally to give his 
answers under oath. 
"When the service is made upon a corporation or 
legally recognized body or community, the answers may 
be given under.oath by the president, manager, secretary, 
treasurer, or other officer or employee, if he holds a gen­
eral or special authorization for that purpose ; or the 
answers which he must give and swear to as being those 
which the party summoned intends to give, may be spec­
ified by special resolution. 
" When such service is made upon a foreign corpora­
tion carrying on business in this province, the answers 
may also be given under oath by the person who is at the 
time intrusted with carrying on the affairs of the cor­
poration, whatever be his designation or official title ; but 
such answers may also be given by any person previously 
authorized by a resolution of the board of directors of 
such foreign corporation, to appear and answer in its 
behalf the interrogatories that may be served upon it. 
"If the party served with the rule fails to attend or 
to answer the questions put to him, a default is recorded 
against him, and the facts may be held to be admitted. 
' ' The judge may, nevertheless, for cause shown and 
upon such conditions as he thinks fit, allow the party so 
in default to answer the interrogatories afterwards, be­
fore the conclusion of the evidence of the party who sum­
moned him. 
' ' The interrogatories must be drawn up in a clear and 
precise form, in such a manner that the absence of an 
answer shall be an admission .of the fact sought to be 
proved. 
' ' The answers are taken down in writing and signed . 
by the party. 
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' ' The court or the person before whom the party is 
summoned to answer, may put any other interrogatories 
he may deem necessary and pertinent. 
· 
' ' If the party refuses to answer such interrogatories, 
the court, the judge or the prothonotary, as the case may 
be, causes them to be written out and placed in the rec­
ord, and they are held to be admitted. 
' ' The answers must be direct to the question, categor­
ical and precise. 
"If any dispute arises during the examination, the 
parties are sent before the judge to have it decided. 
' ' Every answer which is not direct, categorical and 
precise, may be rejected, and the facts mentioned in the 
interrogatory declared and held to be proved. 
' ' The expense of interrogatories upon articulated facts 
forms part of the costs in the cause. 
' ' Any party, on being served with a rule to answer 
interrogatories upon articulated facts, may demand the 
necessary funds to pay his travelling expenses ;  but when 
he is before the court, the judge or the prothonotary, he 
cannot refuse to be sworn or to answer unless he is paid. 
" He has a right to have his expenses taxed, and such 
taxation may be enforced by execution against the oppo­
site party. ' '  186 
Rhode Isla.nd. 
The following statute on depositions obtains in Rhode 
Island: 
' 'Except in equity causes, any justice of the supreme 
or superior court, justice of the peace, or notary public, 
may take the deposition of any witness, to be used in the 
trial of any civil suit, action, petition or proceeding, in 
which he is not interested, nor counsel, nor the attorney 
of either party, and which shall then be commenced or 
pending in this state, or in any other state, or in the 
District of Columbia, ,or in any territory, government, or 
186 ld. sees. 359-370. 
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country ; and in equity causes testimony may be taken by 
deposition or orally. ' '  18'7 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, has held 
that a party is not a witness in the sense that his deposi­
tion may be taken before trial.188 There is at present in 
Rhode Island a concerted movement among the bar to so 
amend the statutes as to allow adverse examinations be­
fore triai.l89 
Discovery of documentary evidence is authorized un­
der the following statute : 
"Whenever either party to any proceeding at law or 
equity in the superior court shall set forth in writing, 
under oath, upon his knowledge or belief, that the op­
posite party is in the possession or control of some docu­
ment which the applicant is entitled to examine, and 
prays for its production, a justice of the court, to whom 
application is so made, on such petition, may order the 
opposite party, or if the same be a body corporate, then 
some officer thereof, to make answer on oath at or before 
a time to be fixed in said order, as to what document 
he or it so has relating to the matter in dispute between 
the parties, or what he knows as to the custody of such 
document, and, if in his or its possession or control, 
whether he or it objects to the production of the same 
and the grounds of such objection ; and thereupon such 
justice, after hearing such petition, answer, and evidence, 
shall decide whether or not said document shall be pro­
duced, and order, or decline to order, its production, and, 
if proper, compel the party having the same in his or 
its possession or control to allow the applicant to ex­
amine the same, and, if necessary, to take examined 
copies of the same, or have such original documents im- . 
pounded, and may make such further order in the prem­
ises as shall be just. ' ' 140 
18'7 R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) ch. 342, sec. 22. 
188 Tilden-Thurber Corp. v. Farnell (1921) 43 R. I. 42. 189 See Fourth Report of Rhode Island Judicial Council (1930) p. 21. 140 R.�I. Gen. Laws (1923) ch. 342, sec. 50. 
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South Carolina.. 
There is the following provision for oral examination 
of parties before trial : 
" No action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of 
the prosecution or defense of another action, shall be 
allowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on 
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre­
scribed by this chapter. 
' ' A  party to an action may be examined as a witness, 
at the instance of the adverse party, or of any one of 
several adverse parties, and for that purpose may be 
compelled in the same manner, and subject to the same 
rules of examination as any other witness, to testify, 
either at the trial, or conditionally, or upon commission. 
" The examination, instead of being had at the trial, 
as provided in the last section, may be had at any time 
before trial, at the option of the party claiming it, before 
a judge of, the court, on a previous notice to the party to 
be examined, and any other adverse party, of at least 
five days, unless, for good cause shown, the judge order 
otherwise. But the party to be examined shall not be 
compelled to attend in any other county than that of his 
residence, or where he may be served with a summons 
for his attendance ; nor unless it be upon the order of a 
judge of the court granted after four days ' notice, and 
upon good and sufficient cause being shown therefor. 
' ' The party to be examined, as in the last section 
provided, may be compelled to attend in the same manner 
as a witness 
#
who is to be examined conditionally ; and 
the examination shall be taken and filed by the judge in 
like manner, and may be read by either party on the 
trial. 
' ' The examination of the party, thus taken, may be 
rebutted by adverse testimony. 
" If a party refuses to attend and testify, as in the 
last four sections provided, he may be punished as for 
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a contempt and his complaint, answer, or reply may be 
stricken out. 
' 'A  party examined by an adverse party, as in this 
chapter provided, may be examined on his own behalf, 
subject to the same rules of examination as other wit­
nesses. But if he testify to any new matter, not respon­
sible to the inquiries put to him by the adverse party, or 
necessary to explain or qualify his answers thereto, or 
discharge when his answers would charge himself, such 
adverse party may offer himself as a witness on his own 
behalf in respect to such new matter, subject to the same 
rules of examination as other witnesses, and shall be so 
received. 
" A  person for whose immediate benefit the action is 
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action, 
may be examined as a witness, in the same manner and 
subject to the same rules of examination as if he were 
named as a party. 
' ' A  party may be examined on behalf of his co-plain­
tiff, or of a co-defendant, as to any matter in which he is 
not jointly interested or liable with such co-plaintiff or 
co-defendant, and as to which a separate and not joint 
verdict or judgment can be rendered. And he may be 
compelled to attend in the same manner as at the in­
stance of an adverse party ; but the examination thus 
taken shall not be used in the behalf of the party ex­
amined. And whenever one of the several plaintiffs or 
defendants who are joint contractors, or are united in 
interest, is examined by the adverse party, the other of 
such plaintiffs or defendants may offer himself as a wit- . 
ness to the same cause or action or defense, and shall be 
so received. " 141 
There is the following statute on depositions : 
" The clerks of the courts of common pleas in this 
state, in all civil causes or proceedings at issue in the 
141 S. C. Code of Laws (1922) sees. 690-698 as amended by S. C. 
Session Laws (1923) eh. 122. 
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courts of common pleas for their respective counties, 
shall, upon the application of either party to such cause 
or proceeding, after ten days ' notice to the adverse party, 
take, in writing, the depositions of said party, or of any 
witness or witnesses in said cause or proceeding, whose 
· examination shall be required by the party making such 
application ; upon taking which depositions, the several 
parties shall be entitled to the same rights of examina­
tion, cross-examination, and examination in reply, and 
the same exceptions to the admissibility of evidence, as 
are allowed by law upon examination before the court. 
And the depositions so taken shall be certified by the 
clerk before whom such examination was had, · and may 
be read in evidence. at the trial of the said cause or pro­
ceeding ; subject, nevertheless, to the right of either 
party to require the personal attendance and viva voce 
examination of the witness or witnesses at the trial of 
said cause, or proceeding ; the exercise of which right, 
however, not to cause a continuance or delay in the trial 
of the said cause or proceeding. 
' ' In addition to the methods for taking testimony now 
provided by law the testimony of any witness may be 
taken in any civil action pending in the court of com­
mon pleas for any county within this state by deposition 
de ' bene esse, where the witness lives without the county 
in which such cause is to be tried, or at a greater distance 
from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is 
bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of this 
state or out of the county in which the cause is to be 
tried, · or to a greater distance than one hundred miles 
from the place of trial before the time of trial, or when 
he is aged or infirm. The deposition may be taken before 
any circuit judge of this state, or the clerk of any of the 
circuit courts of this state, or any magistrate or notary 
public of this state, or any chancellor, justice or judge 
of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief magis-
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trate of a city, magistrate, judge of a county court or 
court of common pleas, of any of the United States or 
the Dominion of Canada or Kingdom of Great Britain, 
or any notary public not being of counsel or attorney to 
either of the parties interested in the event of the cause. 
Reasonable notice, not less than ten days, must :first be 
given in writing by the party or his attorney proposing 
to take such deposition, to the opposite party or his at­
torney of record, as either may be nearest, which notice 
shall state the name of the witness and the time and 
place of the taking of his deposition ; and whenever, by 
reason of absence from the state and want of an attorney 
of record or other reason, the giving of the notice herein 
required shall be impracticable, it shail be lawful to take 
such depositions as there shall be urgent necessity for 
taking, upon such notice as any of the circuit judges of 
this state shall think reasonable and direct. Any person 
may be compelled to appear and depose as provided by 
this section in the same manner as witnesses may be 
compelled to appear and testify in court. ' '  142 
There is the following provision for inspection of 
w:ritings : 
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a 
judge or justice thereof may, in their discretion, and 
upon due notice, order either party to give to the other, 
within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per­
mission to take a copy, of any books, papers, and docu­
ments in his possession or under his control, containing 
evidence relating to the merits of the action or the de­
fense therein. If compliance with the order be refused, 
the court, on motion, may exclude the paper from being 
given in evidence, or punish the party refusing, or 
both. ' '  148 
.142 Id. sees. 719, 722. 
148 Id. sec. 689 in part. 
/ 
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South Da.kota.. 
Examination of adverse parties is provided for by the 
following statutes :  
' 'No action to obtain discovery under oath in aid of 
the prosecution or defense of another action shall be al­
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on 
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre- · 
scribed by this chapter. . 
' ' A  party to the record of any civil action or proceed­
ing ; a person for whose immediate benefit the action or 
proceeding is prosecuted or defended ; or any officer, 
superintendent or managing agent of any corporation 
which is a party to the record, may be examined as a 
witness at the instance of the adverse party and for that 
purpose may be compelled, in the same manner as any 
other witness, to attend and testify either at the trial, 
conditionally or upon commission. Such examination 
shall be subject to the rules applicable to the examination 
of other witnesses, except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter. Such adverse party or witness may be exam­
ined by the adverse party as if under cross-examination ; 
the party calling him shall not be bound by his testimony, 
and the testimony given by such witness may be rebutted 
by the party calling him. Such witness, when so called, 
may be examined by his own counsel, but only as to mat­
ters testified to on such examination. 
' ' The examination provided for in the preceding sec­
tion may be had at any time before the trial, at the option 
of the party claiming it, before a judge of the court or a 
referee appointed for that purpose by a judge of the 
court, upon six days ' notice to the party to be examined 
and any other adverse party, unless, for good cause 
shown, the court order otherwise ; but the party or per­
son to be examined shall not be compelled to attend in 
any county other than that of his residence or where he 
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may be served with notice of such examination ; and the 
examination sh8J.l be taken and filed before the judge or 
referee as when a witness is examined conditionally, and 
may be read by either party at the trial. 
. "If a party refuse to attend and testify, as provided 
in this chapter, he may be punished as for a contempt, 
and his complaint, answer or reply may be stricken 
out. ' '  lit 
There is the following liberal provision for taking 
depositions : 
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by 
depositions at any time after service upon the defendant. 
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in 
the following cases : 
' '  1. When the witness does not reside in or is absent 
from the county where the action or proceeding is pend­
ing or is sent for trial. 
' '  2. When from age, infirmity or imprisonment, the 
witness is unable to attend court, or is dead. 
' '  3. When the testimony is required upon a motion, 
or in any other case where the oral examination of the 
witness is not required. ' '  146 
Inspection of writings is authorized as follows : 
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a 
judge thereof, may, in its or his discretion and upon due 
notice, order either party to give to the other, within a 
specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission to 
take copy, of any books, papers and documents in his 
possession or under his control, containing evidence re­
lating ,to the merits of the action or the defense therein. 
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, may, 
on motion, exclude the paper from being given in evi­
dence, or punish the party refusing, or both. ' '  146 
lit So. Dak. Comp. Laws (1929) sees. 2713-2716. 
146 Id. sees. 2756, 2757. 
llfl Id. sec. 2712. 
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Tennessee. 
Examination of parties is provided for as follows : 
" In all chancery causes, and proceedings in the nature 
of chancery causes, the depositions of parties may be 
taken by the opposite side, or by a coparty on the same 
side when the latter is entitled to such evidence, upon 
notice as in the case of other witnesses. 
" Either party to a suit at law is entitled to a discovery 
from the other party of any matters material to the issue 
of such suit, in all cases where the same party would, by 
the rules of equity, be entitled to a discovery in aid of 
such suit. 
" To obtain such discovery, · he shall present his peti­
tion, verified by affidavit, to the court, judge, or justice, 
setting forth the matter upon which his claim to dis­
covery is founded, the facts sought to be discovered, and 
such interrogatories in relation thereto as he may think 
necessary to exhibit in order to obtain a full discovery. 
' ' This petition, in all cases pending in courts of record, 
should be presented at least five days before the trial 
term, or a sufficient excuse given by affidavit for not thus 
presenting it. 
' ' The court, judge, or justice may, upon such petition, 
grant an order requiring the party from whom such dis­
covery is sought, to answer the petition and interrog­
atories, or such of them as it may appear to the court or 
officer ought to be answered, or show cause why they 
should not be answered. 
' ' The order shall prescribe the time within which the 
petition and interrogatories should be answered, or cause 
shown against the rule ; and the trial of the cause will be 
stayed until the order is complied with or vacated. 
' ' The petition and order will be filed with the other 
papers in the cause, and a copy served upon the party 
from whom discovery is sought, or his counsel, and such 
proceedings may be had as are had by a court of equity, 
· upon a bill of discovery in aid o� a suit at law. 
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' ' The answer to the petition and interrogatories may 
be sworn to before the same officers, and in the same 
way, as answers in chancery to bills of discovery. 
' ' The answer of the party to the petition and inter­
rogatories is evidence on the trial of the suit, in the same 
manner, and with like effect, as an answer to a bill in 
equity, for discovery. 
' ' If the answer is not filed in the time prescribed, or 
if it is not full, or is evasive, unless further time is given, 
the party filing the petition is entitled to take the same 
for confessed, or to proceed by process of contempt to 
enforce a full and satisfactory answer, as in the court of 
chancery. 
"If the petition is taken for confessed, the facts stated 
in the petition may be given in evidence as admitted by 
the person from whom the discovery is sought. ' '  147 
There is the following provision for depositions : 
" The evidence of witnesses may be taken by deposi­
tion, in civil actions, by either party : 
' '  1. When the witness, from age, bodily infirmity, or 
other cause, is incapable of attending, to give testimony 
at the trial. 
' '  2. When he resides out of the state. 
"3.  When he  resides in the state, but not within the 
limits of the county in which the suit is pending ; in 
which case, the adverse party may, if he desire to have 
the witness examined in open court, cause him to be sub­
poenaed. 
"4. When he is under the necessity of leaving the 
state before the cause is tried, or even before it is at 
issue. 
' '  5. When he is about to leave the county in which the 
suit is pending, and will probably not return until after 
the trial. 
' '  6. When he is the only witness to a material fact. 
147 Code of Tenn. (1932) sees. 9868-9878. 
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" 7. When he is an officer of the United States, an 
officer of this state, or of any county in the state, the 
clerk of any court of record other than that in which the 
suit is pending, a member of the general assembly while 
in session, or clerk or officer thereof, a practicing physi­
cian or attorney, a jailer or keeper of a public prison in 
any county other than that �n which the suit is pending. 
' '  8. When he is a notary public, whether a suit be 
pending or not ; to be evidence between the same parties 
in any suit then or thereafter pending, should the notary . 
die or remove out of the state before the trial. 
' '  9. When the suit is brought by a party in forma 
pauperis. ' '  tts 
Texas. 
There are the following statutory provisions for dis­
covery and preservation of evidence under the ordinary 
deposition procedure in Texas : 
' ' Depositions of witnesses may be taken when the 
party desires to perpetuate the testimony of a witness, 
and, in all civil suits heretofore or hereafter brought in 
this state, whether the witness . resides in the county 
where the suit is brought or out of it ; provided, the fail­
ure to secure the 'deposition of a male witness residing 
in the county in which the suit is pending shall not be 
regarded as want of diligence where diligence has been 
U:sed to secure his personal attendance by the service of 
subpoena or attachment, under the rules of law, unless 
by reason of age, infirmity or sickness, or official duty, 
the witness will be unable to attend the court, or unless 
he is about to leave, or has left the state or county in 
which the suit is pending and will not probably be pres­
ent at the trial. 
' ' The testimony of any witness and of ap.y party to a 
suit by oral deposition and answer may be taken in any 
civil case in any district or county court of this state, in 
1M Id. see. 9806. 
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any instance where depositions are now authorized by 
law to be taken. 
' ' These rules shall govern the taking of the deposition 
of the adverse party : 
' '  1. Either party to a suit may examine the opposing 
party as a witness, upon interrogatories filed in the 
cause, and shall have the same process to obtain. his testi­
mony as in the case of any ·other witness. 
' '  2. No notice of the filing of the interrogatories is 
necessary. 
' '  3. A commission to take the answers of the party to 
the interrogatories shall be issued by the clerk or jus­
tice, and be executed and returned by any authorized 
officer as in other cases. 
" 4. A copy of the interrogatories need not be served 
on the adverse party before a commission shall issue to 
take the answers thereto. 
' '  5. The examination of the adverse party shall be 
conducted and testimony received in the same manner 
and according to the same rules which apply in the case 
of any other witness, subject to the provisions of this 
article. 
" 6. The party interrogated may, in answer to ques­
tions propounded, state any matter connected with the 
cause and pertinent to the issue to be tried ; and the 
adverse party may contradict the answers by any other 
competent testimony in the same manner as he might 
contradict the testimony of any other witness. 
" 7. If the party interrogated refuses to answer, the 
officer executing the commission shall certify such re­
fusal ; and any interrogatory which the party refuses to 
answer, or which he answers evasively, shall be taken as 
confessed. 
' '  8. The party interrogated may, upon the trial of the 
case, take exception to the interrogatories on the ground 
that they are not pertinent, and to the answers that 
they a�e not competent evidence. 
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" 9. It shall be no objection to the interrogatories that 
they are leading in their character. 
' '  10. Where any party to a suit is a corporation, such 
corporation shall not be permitted to take ex parte depo­
sition, nor shall any ex parte deposition be taken of the 
agents of such corporation, but if there are more than 
two parties to the suit ex parte depositions may be taken 
by or of any such parties to the suit, except the corpora­
tion or its agents. It is hereby expressly provided that 
any party to a suit wherein a corporation is a party . 
shall have the right to take written and oral depositions 
of any party to such suit or of any witness, after giving 
notice and complying with the other requirements of 
that statutes (statute) of the State of Texas, as to the 
taking of written and oral depositions of witnesses. It 
is further hereby expressly provided that when any ex 
parte deposition is taken in any suit whatever, either the 
party taking the same or the party giving the same shall 
have the right to introduce the deposition in evidence, 
subject to the general rules of evidence without regard 
to whether the person offering the same has crossed the 
interrogatories or not, and without regard to whether 
or not the witness who gave the deposition is present in 
court or has testified in the case. ' '  149 
Uta.h.. 
Examination of adverse parties may be had by deposi­
tion under the following Utah statute : 
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken 
by deposition in an action, at any time after the service 
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and, 
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has 
arisen therein in the following cases : 
' '  1. When the witness is a party in the action or pro­
ceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the 
action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended ;  
149 Tex. Stat. (1928) Arts. 37381 3752, 3769. 
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" 2. When the witness resides out of the county in 
which his testimony is to be used ; 
" 3. When the witness is about to leave the county 
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con­
tinue absent when the testimony is required ; 
" 4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the 
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend ; 
' '  5. When the testimony is required upon a motion, 
or in any other case where the oral examination of the 
witness is not required. ' '  150 
There is the following provision for inspection of 
books and papers : 
' 'Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge 
thereof, may, upon notice, order either party to give to 
the other within a specified time a copy, or permission 
to take a copy, of entries of account in any book, or of 
any document or paper in his possession, or under his 
control, containing evidence relating to the merits of 
the action, or the defense therein. If compliance with 
the order be refused, the court may exclude the entries 
of accounts of the book, or the document or paper from 
being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence by the 
party applying, may direct the jury to presume them to 
be such as he alleges them to be ; and the court may also 
punish the party refusing for a contempt. This section 
is not to be construed to prevent a party from compelling 
another to produce books, papers or documents when he 
is examined as a witness. ' ' 1111 
Vermont. 
There is the following statutory provision for taking 
depositions : 
' 'Justices inay take the deposition of a witness or 
party out of court : 
' ' I. When he resides more than thirty miles from the 
place of trial ; 
· 
150 utah Comp. Laws (1917) see. 7178. 
1111 Id. see. 7204. .1 •. I I .• • 
VIRGINIA 379 
"II. When he is going out of the state, not to return 
before the time of trial ; 
' ' III. When by reason of age, sickness or other bodily 
infirmity, he is rendered incapable of traveling and ap­
pearing at court ; 
"IV. When he resides out of the state ; 
"V. When he is confined in jail ; 
"VI. When he is a judge of the supreme court and is 
going out of the county in which he resides to perform his 
official duties, not to return before the time of trial. 
' ' VII. When she is a cloistered sister of a religious . 
community. ' ' m 
Virginia.. 
Interrogatories to the adverse party are authorized by 
the following statute : 
' ' In a case at law a party may file in the clerk 's office, 
and, in a case or matter before a commissioner of a court, 
any person interested may file with such commissioner 
interrogatories to any adverse party or claimant. The 
clerk or commissioner shall issue a summons, requiring 
the officer to summon the proper party to answer said 
interrogatories, and make return thereof within such 
time, not exceeding sixty days, as may be prescribed in 
the summons. With the summons there shall be a copy 
of the interrogatories, which shall be delivered to the 
person served with the summons at the time of such 
service ; if the summons be against the plaintiff who is 
not a resident of this state, or a defendant who is not a 
resident of this state, but who has appeared in the case 
or been served with process in this state, the service may 
be on his attorney-at-law. When the court in which the 
case is, or whose commissioner issued the summons, is 
satisfied that the interrogatories are relevant, and such 
. as the person to whom they are propounded would be 
bound to answer upon a bill for discovery, and sees also 
168 Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) sec. 1910. 
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that the interrogatories have not been unreasonably de­
layed, it may, if the said person do not in a reasonable 
time file answer thereto, upon oath, or, if he file answers 
which are ·evasive, attach him and compel him to answer 
in open court, or to answer more explicitly. It may also, 
if it see fit, set aside a plea of his, and give judgment 
against him by default, or if he be plaintiff, order his 
suit to be dismissed with costs, or, if he be claiming a 
debt before a commissioner, disallow such claim. An­
swers to such interrogatories may be used as evidence 
at the trial of the cause, in the same manner and with 
the same effect as if obtained upon a bill of discovery. 
A cprporation may be required to answer proper inter­
rogatories under this section, and shall answer by its 
president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, cashier, 
business manager, or by any officer or agent, having the 
information sought in said interrogatories, and any such 
person may be summoned to answer said interrogatories 
for such corporation. " 168 
There is the following provision for taking deposi-
tions : 
' ' In any pending case the deposition of a witness, 
whether a party to the suit or not, may be taken in this 
state after the declaration or bill has been filed by a 
justice, or notary, or by a commissioner in chancery ; and, 
if certified under his hand, may be received without proof 
of the signature to such certificate. " 164 
Discovery of documentary evidence is provided for as 
follows : 
" In any case at law a party may file in the clerk 's 
office, and in any case or matter before a commissioner 
of a court any person interested may file with such com­
missioner, an affidavit, setting forth that there is, he 
verily believes, a book of accounts or other writing in 
168 Va. Code (1930) sec. 6236. 
15! Id. sec. 6225. 
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possession of an adverse party or claimant containing 
material evidence for him, specifying with reasonable 
certainty such writing or the part of such book. The 
clerk or commissioner shall issue a summons, directed 
as under the preceding section, requiring him to sum­
mon the proper party to _produce such writing, or an 
-exact copy of such part of the said book, and make re­
turn thereof as under that section. With the summons 
there shall be a copy of the affidavit, which shall be de­
livered to the person served with the summons at the 
time of such service ; if the summons be against a plain­
tiff, who is not a resident of this state, or a defendant 
who is not a resident of this state, but who has appeared 
in the case or been served with process in this state, the 
service may be on his attorney-at-law. When the court 
in which the case is, or whose commissioner issued the 
summons, is satisfied that the person filing such affidavit 
has no means of proving the contents of such writing, or 
of such part of the book, but by the person summoned 
producing what is required by the summons, and also 
that the call therefor has not been unreasonably delayed, 
it may, unless the person summoned shall, in a reason­
able time, either produce what is so required, or answer­
ing in writing, upo:n oath, that he has not under his con­
trol such book or writing, or any of the like import, 
attach him and compel him to do the one or the other. 
It may also, if it see fit, set aside a plea of such person, 
and give judgment against him by default, or if he be 
plaintiff, order his suit to be dismissed with costs, or if 
he be claiming a debt before a commissioner, disallow 
such claim. This section shall apply to corporations and 
the court or commissioner, as the case may be, shall have 
jurisdiction to enforce its provisions as to a corporation 
by attaching the . proper custodian of any such book or 
other writing, in the possession of such corporation. ' '  155 
156 Id. see. 6237. 
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Washington. 
There is the following provision for examination of 
parties before trial : 
' ' A party to an action or proceeding may be examined 
as a witness, at the instance of the adverse party, or of 
one of several adverse parties, and for that purpose may 
be compelled in the same manner and subject to the same 
rules of exahlination as any other witness to testify at 
the trial or he may be examined on a commission. 
' ' Instead of the examination being had at the trial, as 
proyided by the last section, the plaintiff, at the time of 
filing his complaint or afterwards, and the defendant, at 
the time of filing his answer or afterwards, may file in 
the clerk 's office interrogatories for the discovery of 
facts and documents material to the support or defense 
of the action, to be answered on oath by the adverse 
party. 
' ' Such interrogatories shall be served in the manner 
provided by law for the service of summons, or by service 
upon the attorney of the party to be interrogated, and 
the answers thereto shall be served and filed within 
twenty days after such service unless for cause shown a 
further time be allowed by the court. A private corpora_­
tion may be interrogated in the same manner as indi­
viduals, and it shall not be excused for a failure to an­
swer any proper interrogatory unless it shall show that 
no one in its employ or connected with, or interested in 
it, can give the desired answer or information. 
' 'A party to an action or proceeding, having filed inter­
rogatories to be answered by the adverse party, as pre­
scribed by the last two sections, shall not thereby be pre­
cluded from examining such adverse party as a witness 
at the trial, nor from taking his deposition to be read at 
the trial. 
"If a party refuse to attend and testify at the trial, or 
to give his deposition, or to answer any interrogatories 
filed, his complaint, �nswer or reply may be stricken out, 
WASHINGTON 3S3 
and judgment taken against him, and he may also, in the 
discretion of the court, be proceeded against as in other 
cases for a contempt : Provided, that the preceding sec­
tions shall not be construed so as to compel any person 
to answer any question where such answer may tend to 
criminate himself. ' '  1&& 
There is the following provision by rule of court for 
discovery by taking depositions : 
" The testimony of a witness may be taken by deposi- . 
tion, to be read in evidence in an action; suit, or proceed­
ing commenced and pending in any court in this state, in 
the following cases : 
' ' 1. When the witness resides out of the county, and 
more than twenty miles from the place of trial ; 
' '  2. When the witness is about to leave the county, and 
go more than twenty miles from the place of trial, and 
there is probability that he will continue absent when the 
testimony is required ; 
' '  3. When the witness is sick, infirm, or aged, so as 
to make it probable Fhat he will not be able to attend at 
the trial ; 
"4. When the ,witness resides out of the state ; 
' '  5. When the witness is ('a ) a party to the action or 
(b)  an officer, agent, partner, stockholder or employee of 
a party or (c) the next friend, guardian or guardian ad 
litem of an infant party or party of unsound mind or 
(d) the person or any of the persons for whose benefits 
the action is prosecuted or defended. 
" The deposition of a defendant or of an officer, agent, 
partner, stockholder or employee of a defendant or of 
the next friend, guardian or guardian ad litem of a de­
fendant or the person or any of the persons for whose 
benefit the action is defended shall not be taken until the 
expiration of twenty days after the service of summons 
upon such defendant, Provided, however, that for good 
168 Wash. Comp. Stat. �Remington, 1922) sees. 1225-1230. 
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cause shown the court may permit the taking of such 
deposition prior to the expiration of said twenty day 
period and in such case a copy of the order authorizing 
the taking of such deposition shall be served with the 
notice for the taking of the same. ' '  167 
West Virginia. 
There is the following provision for taking and using 
depositions: 
' 'In any pending case the deposition of a witness, 
whether a party to the suit or not, may, without com­
mission, be taken in or out of this state by a justice, or 
notary public, or by a commissioner in chancery, or be­
fore any officer authorized to take depositions in the 
county or state where they may be taken. And such 
depositions may be taken in shorthand, or stenographic 
characters or notes, and shall be written out in full and 
transcribed into the English language by the stenog­
rapher taking the same, and certified to by the officer 
before whom the depositions are taken ; and if certified 
by such officer under his hand and if further certified by 
him that such stenographic characters and notes were 
correctly taken and accurately transcribed by him, or 
under his direction and supervision, and that the wit­
nesses were duly sworn, such depositions may be received 
and read in evidence without proof of the signature to 
such certificate and without the signature of the witness 
to such depositions. And in case the stenographer tak­
ing such depositions is not the officer before whom the 
same are being taken, then such stenographer, before 
proceeding to take any of said depositions, shall be sworn 
to take correctly and accurately transcribe the same, and 
· the certificate of the officer before whom the depositions 
are taken shall state that the stenographer was so 
sworn. ' '  1&8 
16'7 Supreme Court Rule 8, .found in 150 Wash. XXXVII. 
168 W. Va. Code (1931) eh. 57, art. 4, see. 1. 
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There is the following provision for production of 
writings : 
"In any case at law, upon a party making affidavit that 
a particular book of accounts, or other writing or paper 
is important for him to have in the trial of his cause, he 
may procure from the clerk of the court in which the 
action is pending a subpoena duces tecum requiring any 
party to the action to appear before the court on a day 
named therein, and bring with him and produce before 
such court such book of accounts, or other writing or 
paper, as is specified in such process, in order that the 
same may be used as evidence on the trial of the action. 
And unless the person upon whom such process is served 
shall, at the time specified therein, produce what is so 
required, or show to the satisfaction of the court that he 
has not under his control such book, writing or paper, or 
unless, from an inspection or otherwise, the court is of 
opinion that the character of the book, writing or paper 
is such as should not be used as evidence on the trial of 
the action, the court may attach him and compel him to 
produce the same. It may also, if it see fit, set aside a 
plea of such pe1'son and give judgment against him by 
default, if he be a defendant, or, if he be a plaintiff, 
order his suit to be dismissed, with costs, _or if he be 
claiming a debt before such court or commissioner, dis­
allow such claim. 
" When it appears by affidavit or otherwise that a 
writing or document in the possession of any person not 
a party to the matter in controversy is material and 
proper to be produced before the court, or any person 
appointed by it or acting under its process or authority, 
or any such person as is named in section one of this 
article, such court, judge or president thereof in vacation 
may order the clerk of the said court to issue a sub­
poena duces tecum to compel such production at a time 
and place to be specified in the order. ' '  1119 
1119 Id. ch. 57, art. 5, sees. 3, 4. 
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Wisconsin. 
There is the following provision for discovery examina­
tions before trial : 
' ' The adverse examination of a party, his or its as­
signor, officer, agent or employe, or of the person who 
was such officer, agent or employe at the time of the 
occurrence made the subject of the examination, may be 
taken by deposition at the instance of any adverse party 
upon oral or written interrogatories in any civil action 
or proceeding at any time before final determination 
thereof. Each of said persons may be so examined once 
and no more, except when examined before issue joined, 
in which case he may be again examined after issue 
joined, upon all the issues. If. the examination is taken 
after the complaint is served, but before issue is joined, 
it may extend to all the allegations of the complaint. 
' ' Except as provided otherwise by this section, such 
examination may be had within or without the state, and 
may be instituted and conducted under and pursuant to 
the laws and rules regulating the taking of other deposi­
tions for use in actions or proceedings. 
" Such examination, when taken within the state, shall 
be taken before a judge at chambers or a court commis­
sioner on previous notice to all adverse parties or their 
respective attorneys of at least five days. If the person 
to be examined is a nonresident individual who is a 
party to the action . or proceeding, or is a nonresident 
president, secretary, treasurer or managing agent of a 
foreign corporation that is a party to the action, the 
court may upon just terms fix the time and place of such 
examination, either within or without the state, and such 
nonresident shall attend at such time and place and sub­
mit to the examination, . and, if required, attend for the 
reading an4 signing of such deposition, without service 
of subpoenas. Such examination shall not be compelled 
in any county other than that in which the person exam- · 
ined resides, except when a different county shall be 
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designated for the examination of a nonresident, and 
except that any nonresident subject to examination may 
be examined in any county of this state in which he is 
personally served with notice and subpoena. 
"If discovery is sought, to enable the plaintiff to 
frame a complaint, the notice of taking the examination 
shall be accompanied by the affidavit of himself, his 
attorney or agent, stating the general nature and object 
of the action or proceeding ; that discovery is sought to 
enable him to plead, and the subjects upon which informa­
tion is desired ; and the examination relative thereto 
shall be permitted unless the court or presiding judge 
thereof shall, before the examination is begun, further 
limit the subjects to which it shall extend, which may be 
done on one day's notice. 
' ' Such portions of any such deposition as are relevant 
to the issues may be offered by the party taking the 
same, and shall be received when so offered upon the 
trial of action or proceeding in which it is taken, notwith­
standing the deponent may be present. ' '  160 
The testimony of a witness other than a party may be 
taken when : 
' '  1. He shall live more than thirty miles from the 
place of trial or hearing of the action, proceeding or 
matter in which his testimony is wanted or beyond reach 
of the subpoena of the court. 
' '  2. When he shall be about to go out of the state, 
not intending to return in time for the trial or hearing. 
" 3. When he is so sick, infirm or aged as to make it 
probable that he will not be able to attend at the trial 
or hearing. , 
' '  4. When he shall be a member of the legislature, if 
any committee of the same or the house of which he 
shall be a member, shall be in session, provided he waive 
:Q.is privilege. 
160 Wis. Stat. (1927) eh. 326, sec. 12. 
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' '  5. When his testimony is material to any motion or 
other similar proceeding in any court of record, and he 
shall have refused to make affidavit of the facts, within 
his knowledge, in reference thereto. ' '  161 
Inspection of documents is provided for as follows : 
" The court before which an action or proceeding is 
pending, or a judge thereof, may, in discretion and upon 
due notice, order either party to give to the other, '!ithin 
a specified time, an inspection and copy or permission 
to take a copy of any books, papers and documents in his 
1 possession or under his control containing evidence re­
lating to the action or proceeding. If compliance with 
the order be refused, the court may exclude the paper 
from being given in evidence or punish the party refus­
ing, or both. " 168 
Wyoming. 
Written interrogatories are authorized by the following 
statutes : 
"A party may annex to his pleading, other than a 
demurrer, interrogatories pertinent to the issue made in 
the pleading, which interrogatories, if not demurred to, 
shall be plainly and fully answered under oath by the 
party to whom they are propounded, or if such party is 
a corporation, by the president, secretary or other officer 
thereof, as the party propounding requires. 
"When annexed to the petition the interrogatories 
shall be answered within the time limited for answer to 
the petition ; when annexed to the answer they shall be 
answered within the time limited for a reply ; when an­
nexed to the reply they shall be answered within the time 
allowed for an answer, but further time may be allowed 
in all cases by the court or a judge thereof in vacation. 
' 'Answers to interrogatories may be enforced by non­
suit, judgment by default or by attachment, as the justice 
161 Id. ch. 326, sec. 7. 
168 Id. ch. 327, sec. 21. 
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of the case may require, and on the trial such answers, 
so far as they contain competent testimony on the issue 
or issues made, may be used by either party. ' '  168 
There is the following provision for depositions : 
' ' The deposition of a witness may be used only in the 
following cases : 
' '  1. When the . witness does not reside in, or is absent 
from, the county where the action or proceeding is pend­
ing, or by change of venue is sent for trial. 
' '  2. When the witness is dead, or, from age, infirmity 
or imprisonment is unable to attend court. 
' '  3. When the testimony is required upon a motion, 
or when the oral examination of the witness is not re­
quired. 
' 'Either party may commence taking testimony by 
deposition at any time after service upon the defend­
ant. ' '  164 
There are the following provisions for discovery of 
documentary evidence : 
' ' The court in .which an action is penaing, may, on 
motion and on rea.sonable notice thereof; require the par­
ties to produce books and writings in their possession or 
power which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in 
-cases and under circumstances where they might hereto­
fore have been compelled to produce the same by the 
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery ; if the plaintiff 
fail to comply with such order to produce books or writ­
ings, the court may, on motion, give judgment for the 
defendant, as in case of nonsuit ; and if a defendant fail 
to comply with such order to produce books or writings, 
the court, on motion, may give judgment against him by 
default. -
' ' Either party, or his attorney, may also demand of 
the adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission 
to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his pos-
168 Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) sees. 5689-5691. 
164 Id. sees. 5831, 5832. 
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session, or under his control, containing evidence relating 
to the merits of the action or defense, which demand 
shall be in writing, and shall specify the book, paper, or 
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other 
party to distinguish it ; if compliance with the demand 
within four days be refused, the court or judge may, on 
motion, and notice to the adverse party, order the ad­
verse party to give the other, within the time specified, 
an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of 
such book, paper or document ; and on failure to comply 
with such order, the court may exclude the paper or 
document from being given in evidence, or if wanted as 
evidence by the party applying, may direct the jury to 
presume it to be such as the party, by affidavit, alleges 
it to be ; but this section shall not be construed to prevent 
a party from compelling another to produce any book, 
paper or document when he is examined as a witness. 
"If the party in possession of any such book, paper, 
writing or document, allege that the same, or any part 
thereof, is of mere private interest, or of such character 
that it ought not to be produced, or an. inspection or 
copy thereof allowed or taken, the court may, on motion 
of either party, direct a private examination thereof by 
a master ; if the master find that such book, paper, writ-
. ing or document contains matter pertinent to the cause, 
and proper to be produced, inspected or copied, he �hall 
report the same to the court, or a copy of such part as he 
finds pertinent to the cause, and proper to be produced, 
inspected or copied ; and the book, paper, writing or docu­
ment, or part thereof, so reported, shall be admitted in 
evidence on the trial, unless excluded by the court for 
proper cause. 
"Either party, or his attorney, shall, if required, de­
liver to . the other party, or his attorney, a copy of any 
- instrument of writing whereon the action or defense is 
founded, or which he intends to offer in evidence at the 
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trial ; and if the plaintiff or defendant refuse to furnish 
the copy required, the party so refusing shall not be per­
mitted to give in evidence at the trial the original, of 
which a copy has been refused ; but this section shall not 
apply to a paper, a copy of which is filed with a plead­
ing. " 165 
165 Id. sees. 5855--5858. 
INDEX 
ACTIONS IN WHICH DISCOVERY IS AVAILABLE 
actions for penalty, 28. 
automobile accident litigation, 30. 
criminal conversation, 29. 
deceit, 30. 




patent cases, 28. 
summary actions, 29. 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 
comparison of discovery examinations with proceedings before, 264. 
ADMISSIONS 
see also NOTICE TO ADMIT DOCUliiENTS; NOTICE TO ADlliT FACTS. 
by nondenial in pleading, 1. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOCUMENTS 
contents of, 181. 
contradiction of, 182. 
documents objected to, 182. 
form for, 181 • 
.ALA:BAMA 
discovery in, 40, 92, 96, 165, 188, 272. 
ANSWERING INTEB.B.OGATOB.IES 
time and mode of, 96. 
APPEALS FB.O:M DISCOVERY RULINGS 
see also CEJ!.TmCATION; REviEw. 
as incident of final appeal, 177. 
availability of extraordlnary methods of review, 176. 
generally, 175-178. 
rulings enforcing penalties, 176. 
rulings granting or denying discovery, 175. 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 




comparison of discovery with, 255. 
ARIZONA 
discovery in, 188, 275 . 
.A.RXANSAS 
discovery in, 96, 188, 276. 
ART OF EXAMININ'G FOR DISCOVERY 
mode of questioning, 83. 
tactics employed by lawyers, 82. 
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION 
questions as to injuries, 127, 137. 
relative use of discovery in, 28. 
restrictions upon use of discovery in, 30. 
scope of discovery in, 127, 137. 
use of discovery in, 257. 
BILL OF DISCOVERY 
use in actions at law, 12. 
BLACKMAIL 
use of New York procedure for, 131. 
way to prevent use of discovery for, 31. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
as affecting right to discovery, 126-139. 
CALIFOB.NIA 
' 
discovery in, 30, 38, 40, 59, 60, 62, 64, 97, 165, 188, 278. 
CANON LAW PROCEDURE 
simplicity of pleading in, 13. 
use of discovery in, 13. 
CERTIFICATION 
of questions upon discovery examination, 100, 107. 
CHANOERY 
analysis of chancery rule as to scope of discovery, 132. 
CODE PLEADING 
/ reforms under, 7. 
relation of discovery to, 17. 
statements of facts under, 7. 
CO�OB.ADO 
discovery in, 188, 280. 
COMMISSIONER 
supervision of discovery examinations by, 104, 107. 
INDEX 
COMMON LAW PLEADING 
effect of general issue upon, 2, 3. 
generality of allegations in, 2. 
preparation for trial, 1-5. 
purpose of, 1. 
COMPELLING ANSWERS TO WRITTEN INTE:&B.OGATOBIEB 
burden of proceeding, 116. 
English practice, 115. 
fuller answers, 117. 
generally, 114. 
OONCILIATION 
use of discovery in effecting, 255. 
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CONCLUSIVENESS OF RECORD UPON PAB'rY WHO USES, 168. 
CONDUCT OF ORAL EXAMINATION · 
art of examination for discovery, 82. 
copies of record, 85. 
correcting record, 86. 
examination by attorney for party against whom discovery is sought, 
82. 
examination by attorney for party seeking discovery, 81. 
filing record, 89. 
reading and signing record, 85. 
record of examination, 83. 
swearing of witness, 81. 
CONNECTICUT 
discovery in, 40, 92, 96, 138, 156, 281. 
CONTEMPT 
appeals from rulings enforcing, 176. 
as penalty for refusal to disclose, 156. 
CONTRADICTION OF WI'l'NESS 
use of record for purpose of, 163. 
OOPIEB 
right to copies of record, 85. 
' 
CORPORATION 
discovery from generally, 39-46. 
discovery from under deposition procedure, 42, 46. 
employees, discovery from, 41. 
former employees, discovery from, 42. 
municipal corporations, discovery from, 44. 
necessity for statutory provision, 39. 
number of representatives examinable, 45. 
officers who may be examined, 401. 
selection of person to represent corporation, 44. 
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CORRECTIONS OF RECORD 
right to make, 86. 
COST OF DISCOVERY 
INDEX 
average cost per examination, 171. 
fees of officer who supervises examination, 170. 
methods of reducing, 172. 
taxation of, 172. 
COUNTY 
where examination held, 76. 
CB.IMINAL CONVERSATION 
prohibition of use of discovery in actions for, 29. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
right to upon discovery examination, 81, 12o-125. 
DAMAGES 
discovery as to extent of, 128, 137. 
DECEIT 
restrictions upon use of disco,very in actions for, 29. 
scope of discovery in actions for, 129. 
DECIDING OBJECTIONS 
adjourning examination to trial court, 100. 
answers subject to objection, 99. 
carrying objection to trial , court, 100. 
New York practice, 102. 
review of rulings of commissioner, 107, 109, 112. 
to questions upon oral examination generally, 97-113. 
who decides, 97, 104, 107, 110. 
DEFAULT 
as penalty for refusal to disclose, 154. 
constitutionality of penalty, 154. 
practical enforcement of penalty, 155. 
DEFENDANT 
effect of New York rule upon right to discovery, 32. 
relative use , of discovery by, 33-35. 
right to have discovery, 32-36. 
DELAWARE 
discovery in, 188, 283. 
DEPOSITION 
see also particular titles. 
advantages in combining discovery with preservation of testimony, 
241-246. 
DEPOSITION-Continued 
federal practice, 270. 
of nonresident, 79. 
INDEX 
proposed uniform deposition act, 23. 
right to inspect documents when taking, 184. 
397 
statutory amendments which would make procedure more eft'ective, 
247. 
unconditional right to take, 20. 
use of for purpose of discovery, 18, 19. 
DISCOVERY 
see also particular titles. 
canon law practice, 13. 
discretion of court in granting or refusing, 132. 
early equity practice, 14. 
historical development of, 11-18. 
methods used in dift'erent jurisdictions, 25. 
of documents, 179-188. 
provision of common law procedure acts for, 12. 
relative satisfaction of plaintift' and defendant with, 34-36. 
respective rights of plaintift' and defendant to, 32-36. 
under code procedure, 17. 
under reformed English system, 18. 
DIVORCE 
prohibition on use of discovery in actions for, 29. 
DOCUMENTS 
ascertaining what documents are in possession oi adverse party, 
' 179�183. 
disclosure of in support of party's case, 144. 
discovery of generally, 179-188. 
penalty for refusal to allow inspection, 154. 
EVIDENCE 
application of rules of evidence to discovery examinations, 146-155. 
disclosure of evidence of own case, 120-145. · 
extent of objections, 151. 
privilege, 146. 
relevancy, 149. 
E�ATION FOB. DISCOVERY 
see also particular titles. 
art of examining for discovery, 82. 
copies of record, 85. 
correcting record, 86. 
examination by attorney for party against whom discovery is 
sought, 82. 
examination by attorney for party seeking discovery, 81. 
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EXAMINATION FOB DISCOVERY-Continued 
1iling record, 89. 
reading and signing record, 85. 
record of examination, 83. 
right to cross-examine, 81. 
swearing of witneBB, 81. 
FEDERAL EQUITY RULE 58 
discovery under, 28, 46, 92, 95, 134, 267. 
FILING 
mode and time of filing interrogatories, 92. 
of record of examination, 89. 
FLORIDA 
discovery in, 40, 92, 188, 292. 
FOREIGN CORPORATION 
discovery from, 77. 
FORFEITURE 
' 
prohibition on use of discovery in actions to enforce, 29. 
GENERAL ISSUE 
effect upon common law. pleading, 2. 
GEORGIA 
dis�overy in, 40, 45, 92, 294. 
GEB.M.ANY 
innovations in pretrial practice in, 240. 
IDAHO 
discovery in, 188, 297. 
ILLINOIS 
discovery in, 188, 298. 
IMPEACHING WITNESS 
effect of taking deposition upon right of, 169. 
INDIANA 
discovery in, 29, 40, 42, 50, 59, 61, 62, 63, 66, 73, 85, 91, 92, 96, 97, 
98, 101, 124, 158, 165, 177, 184, 188, 220, 300. 
INJUNC'l'ION 
against taking depositions, 177. 
INJUBIES 
questions as to, upon discovery examination, 128, 137. 
INSPECTION 
see also DOCUMENTS. 
of documents generally, 179-188. 
of property, 189-193. 
INDEX 
INTEB.BOGATOB.IES 
see also particular titles. 
administrative burden upon trial court, 117. 
deciding objections and compelling answers to, 114-119. 
motion for further answers to, 117. 
number allowed, 93. 
time and mode of answering, 95. 
time and mode of filing, 92. 
use of to obtain summary judgment, 220. 
IOWA 
discovery in, 40, 54, 96, 176, 188, 303. 
ISSUES 
upon which discovery may be had, 120-145. 
JUSTICE 
399 
contribution of discovery to general administration of, 251-266. 
KANSAS 
discovery in, 36, 188, 304. 
KENTUCKY 
discovery in, 42, 50, 61, 62, 63, 64, 90, 96, 97, 98, 121, 124, 157, 184, 
188, 306. 
LAWYERS 
satisfaction with discovery procedure, 265. 
LEGISLATION 
to improve discovery practice, 247-251. 
LmEL 
restrictions upon use of discovery in actions for, 29. 
scope of discovery in actions for, 129. 
LOUISIANA 
discovery in, 92, 157, 160, 308. 
MAINE 
discovery in, 188, 310. 
MALPRACTICE 
restrictions upon use of discovery in actions for, 29. 
scope of discovery in actions for, 129. 
MARYLAND 
discovery in, 188, 310. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
discovery in, 33, 40, 43, 45, 47, 92, 93, 96, 116, 119, 122, 124, 125, 139, 
145, 158, 164, 194, 196, 203, 205, 223, 312. 
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MATE:&I.A.IJ:TY 
requirement of, in seeking discovery, 126, 133, 136. 
liiiiCHIGAN 
discovery in, 38, 40, 73, 103, 133, 160, 188, 190, 195, 197, 208, 217, 
222, 315. 
llrll:MEOGB.APHED FOB.M:S 
of written interrogatories, 94. 
l!UlOlES0'1'A 
discovery in, 188, 318. 
liiiiS8ISSIPPI 
discovery in, 188, 319. 
liiiiSSOUBI 
discovery in, 30, 31, 36, 42, 50, 51, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 107, 121, 
124, 140, 172, 176, 184, 188, 207, 321. 
MON'1'ANA 
discovery in, 188, 325. 
NAMES 
see also WITNESSES. 
disclosure of names of witnesses, 139-144. 
NEBRASKA 
discovery in, 42, 50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 110, 121, 124, 170, 184, 188, 326. 
NEVADA 
discovery in, 188, 328. 
NEW HAMPSBIB.E 
discovery in, 42, 50, 51, 61, 62, 66, 90, 98, no, 121, 124, 141, 145, 259, 
329. 
NEW JERSEY 
discovery in, 34, 39, 54, 65, 74, 97, 137, 140, 148, 158, 160, 170, 188, 
192, 195, 198, 238, 329. 
NEW MEXICO 
discovery in, 92, 188, 333. 
NEW YORX 
discovery in, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 57, 67, 78, 
79, 88, 102, 126, 153, 160, 168, 178, 179, 185, 188, 190, 198, 201, 203, 
205, 207, 231, 334. 
. 
NONRESIDEN'1' 
place of exami:fiation of, 76. 
NOB.'1'R CAROLINA 
discovery in, 38, 40, 59, 62, 63, 73, 97, 160, 175, 176, 188, 347. 
INDEX 
NORTH DAKOTA 
discovel'y in, 40, 59, 62, 63, 160, 188, 347. 
notice as initiating step in taking discovery examination, 62. 
NOTICE TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS 
fol'm of notice, 209. 
statutol'y provisions, 207. 
NOTICE TO ADMIT FACTS 
fol'm of notice to admit, 202. 
means of service of notice, 200. 
purpose of procedure, 194. 
l'ight to qualify admissions, 205. 
statutory provisions, 195-199. 
type of fact which may be admitted, 200. 
NUMBER OF INTEB.B.OGATOBJES 
limits upon, 93-95. 
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS 
401 
see also COMPELLING ANSWERS TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES j DE· 
CIDING OBJECTIONS. 
frequency of, upon discovery examination, 151. · 
method of deciding, 97-120. 
OFFICE 
where examination is held, 79. 
OFFICER 
fees of, who supervises discovery examination, 170. 
who is eligible to supervise discovery examination, 97-120. 
omo 
discovel'y in, 40, 42, 50, 51, 54, 59, 62, 64, 66, 89, 96, 99, 110, 120, 124, 
139, 145, 151, 170, 184, 188, 222, 349. 
. 
OKLAHOMA 
discovery in, 188, 352. 
OB.AL QUESTIONS 
as method of discovery, 25. 
supel'iority to written interrogatories, 26. 
OB.DER 
as mode of initiating discovery examination, 67, 132. 
situations in which necessary, 57, 67. 
OREGON 
discovery in, 188, 359. 
P AB.TIOULA.B.S 
bill of, 11. 
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PARTIES 
adverse party, discovery from, 37. 
assignor, discovery from, 38. 
corporation, discovery from, 39-46. 
determination of for purpose of discovery, 38. 
discovery from generally, 37-46. 
executor, discovery from, 39. 
infant, discovery from, 39. 
opposite party, discovery from, 37. 
real party in interest, discovery from, 38. 
relation to record as affecting right of discovery, 38. 
PARTY'S OWN CASE 
chancery rule, 132. 
cross-examination as to, practical result of allowing discovery, 121, 
122, 124. 
disclosure of names of witnesses, 139-144. 
disclosure of party 's documents, 144. 
disclosure of what party will testify to, 120-139. 
discovery as to in tort actions, 126. 
discovery of, in federal equity courts, 134. 
limiting discovery to particular issues, 26. 
materiality and necessity of discovery, 1261 1331 136. 
practical e:lfeets of restrictive rules, 130. 
special rules in automobile accident eases, 1271 1311 138. 
ways of obtaining names of witnesses, 143. 
PENALTY 
see also CONTEMPT; DEFAULT. 
contempt, for unjust refusal to disclose, 156. 
default for unjust refusal to. disclose, 154. 
for refusal to admit, 204. 
prohibition on use of discovery in actions for, 29. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
discovery in, 188, 360. 
PEB..TtT.B.Y 
e:ffeet of discovery upon, 124, 130, 251. 
PERSONS FROM WROM DISOOVE:&Y MAY BE HAD 





before trial, 191. 
method of conducting, 193. 
necessity of statutory provision, 191. 
PLAOE OF EXAlltfiNATION 
of nonresident, 76-79. 
of resident, 76. 
INDEX 
office in which examination is held, 79. 
PLAINTIFF 
relative use of discovery by, 34. 
right to have discovery, 32-36. 
PLEADING 
inadequacy of pleading as basis of preparation for trial, 1-8. 
relation of discovery to, 262. 
P.BELIMIN.ARY REFERENOE 
as method of handling interlocutory matters, 238. 
PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY 
advantages in combining with discovery, 241-246. 
combination with discovery, 19-25. 
common law method, 19. 
PB.IVILEGE 
basis of decision as to questions of, 147. 
matters injurious to public interest, 147. 
method of asserting, 147. 
professional privilege, 146. 
right of attorney to instruct refusal to answer, 148. 
self-incrimination, 146. 
PROHIBITIONS UPON USE OF DISCOVERY 
in actions for criminal conversation, 29. 
in actions to enforce penalty, 29. 
in divorce proceedings, 29. 
in patent litigation, 29. 
in summary actions, 29. 
PUBLIOATION OF REOOB.D OF EXAl!diNATION 
generally, 91. 
restrictions upon, 30. 
READING OVER AND SIGNING B.EOOB.D 
necessity for, 85. 
waiver of requirement, 85. 
REOOB.D OF EXAlltfiNATION 
conclusive effect upon party who uses, 168, 169. 
contents of, 84. 
necessity for transcription, 84. 
purpose for which used, 163-168. 
who may use, 158-163. 




applying rules of evidence to discovery examination, 149. 
practical method of deciding questions as to, 150. 
right of witness to refuse to answer on ground of irrelevancy, 150. 
:RESIDENT 
place of examination of, 76. 
:RESTRICTIONS 
see also types of actions and PARTY 's OwN CASE• 
upon scope of discovery, 126-139. 
upon use of discovery, 29. 
:REVIEW 
as incident of :final appeal, 177. 
availability of extraordinary methods of, 176. 
of rulings enforcing penalties, 176. 
of rulings granting or denying discovery, 175. 
of rulings of officer upon discovery examination, 107, 109, 113. 
of rulings of trial court as to discovery generally, 175-178. 
RHODE ISLAND 
discovery in, 188, 365. 
SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES 
English practice, 228. 
practice in Scotland, 227. 
purpose of procedure, 227. 
SETTLEMENTS 
use of discovery as basis for, 34, 252-255. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
discovery in, 38, 39, 59, 75, 137, 188, 219, 367. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
discovery in, 40, 59, 73, 160, 188, 192, 367. 
STATUTES 
see under each state. 
provisions in different jurisdictions, 267-391. 
STENOGRAPHER 
right of lawyer to use own in taking discovery examination, 98. 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
effect of discovery upon development of, 259. 
S�Y ACTIONS 
prohibition on use of discovery in, 29. 
INDEX 405 
S'D'MMARY JUDGMENT 
combination with discovery procedure, 217-223. 
constitutional questions concerning use of discovery with, 224-226. 
extent of use of procedure, 216. 
use of discovery in obtaining, 216-226. 
SUMl!riONS FOB. DIRECTIONS 
appraisal of procedure, 231-238. 
matters which may be presented by, 230. 
purpose of procedure, 229. 
SWEARING OF WITNESS 
at discovery examination, 81. 
TAXATION OF COSTS 
of discovery examination, 172. 
TENNESSEE 
discovery in, 92, 373. 
TEXAS 
discovery in, 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 97, 121, 124, 161, 375. 
TITLE 
disclosure of documents in support of, 144. 
see also RECORD OF EXAMINATION. 
effect of discovery in expediting, 263. 
effect of discovery upon orderly conduct of, 166. 
TRIAL BRIEF 
as basis of discovery before trial, 212. 
practice in law offices, 211-215. 
use of discovery in preparing, 211. 
TRUTH 
use of discovery. in ascertaining, 124, 252. 
USE AT TRIAL OF RECORD OF EXAMINATION 
conclusive effect upon party who uses, 168, 169. 
purpose for which used, 163-168. 
who may use, 158-163. 
UTAH 
discovery in, 188, 377. 
VACATION 
of notice to take examination, 67, 73. 
VEB.MONT 
discovery in, 188, 378. 
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VIRGINIA 
discovery in, 40, 96, 158, 165, 188, 379. 
WAIVER 
of formalities in taking examination, 65, 72. 
of reading and signing record of examination, 85. 
WASHINGTON 
discovery in, 41, 79, 92, 95, 96, 118, 136, 158, 176, 192, 382. 
WEST · VIRGINIA 
discovery in, 85, 188, 384. 
WISCONSIN 
discovery in, 30, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 49, 56, 62, 63, 66, 76, 80, 
84, 85, 90, 104, 122, 124, 141, 151, 158, 188, 190, 199, 201, 203, 205, 
207, 386. 
WITNESSES 
disclosure of names of, 139-144. 
discovery from, 46-53. 
taking deposition of for purpose of discovery, 50-53. 
WYOMING 
discovery in, 388. 
